Nixon, Laird & Kissinger on Vietnam War and Paris Peace Accords

Okay.
All right.
All right.
All right.
All right.
All right.
All right.
Why don't you slip around so we can get all of this.
The three of you sit on this lounge.
Let's get the people over and sit here.
He's done, and then I'll have her revenge particularly.
If you'd like to go, that's okay.
Thank you.
Yeah, well, I think that's, yeah, he said, bro, I can't afford it.
I mean, it's like, I can't hear it.
I, well, it's a hell of a time.
Yeah, right.
Now, we just don't get to see you often enough.
I mean, I want to be the person to bring it down.
This last year, we can't name the person.
Now we do.
We're very hard-fought.
And I'll say to all of you, we're going to be making very fine speeches on our court of policy, which is important.
But we're very grateful.
the country.
What we're really trying to do now on the purpose of this meeting today is to think of our contingency plan with regard to Vietnam.
I have no objection, and actually you should if you, I guess, know what you want for your own purposes.
But I want it strictly understood.
There's no debriefing, whatever, about these contingency plans.
The reason for that is that we had a health problem yesterday, this morning, in the Bakers where something came up that didn't come from the defense.
It came from over here.
It's great.
It's one of those avoidance statements.
It is an accurate story with regard to progress.
They compared us last week on the DNC point.
I don't know why you said it right.
I'm potentially not a professional actor, but he had raised it totally out of malady.
And what you all realize, I'm sure it's fine, I'm sure they will be in Congress, but it just grates the devil with an article.
And because they, and we blew the whistle on them when they broke down the floor.
And now here's some of our boys.
We don't want him to get out.
This is stuff that we'll use as a product, but I use it as a medium.
Now, because today's on, and this evening's on, it's very important to not get out, so we have this.
If they do succeed, what will happen to the event?
There's a violation.
We all have a mistake in this.
Let me say, I'm going to have Henry give you a little briefing.
He's mellow.
Mellow's already had it.
But a little briefing.
As we wear them, we're going to have to stay on some of the hot wheels.
We're going to have to sleep.
Let me say, we're going to have a little briefing.
And then we'll leave it at that.
And then you can find it.
But now maybe you should say we're going to leave it.
I don't think you need to be .
The congressional problem of the support of these things is very important.
Well, for example, how much is it going to cost?
How much money are we going to have to have for continued economic and monetary aid and so forth?
We all know that there's going to have to be a supplemental amount of some sort right now, regardless of what happens.
All right.
We'll be talking about it at the moment.
Now, let's move directly to Henry.
And Henry, if you would hit the things that are really important.
But also, let me say this, I had a talk with General Westmore before a month ago.
He, just like General Abrams, having been through all this, you know, once the right man was sent, he felt very strongly that
And there could be a total withdrawal of all our Vietnamese from some Vietnam as a condition.
And there could be no agreement on political settlement of any kind, which did not mean totally the, what President Chu had laid down.
When I say he said that, he was going to give his best judgment.
And I'd ask him to do that, and I understand that.
As all of you are aware, over the past four years, we've been keeping a lot of money under our share in this country.
The votes in the Senate and the Congress have become increasingly close as far as supporting funds.
Public opinion-wise, we've been able to withhold our own.
In the last election, fortunately, we had a situation where our opponents were offering a better settlement than we already had.
and our opponents were offering something that to all Americans appeared to be a total sell-off, a surrender, and we just killed them.
Because the American people have a mixed feeling about this.
They want to end the war, but the majority of people probably shouldn't have done it at all.
When our opponents came out with a fact, what was basically a peace at the cost of humiliation, the American people said, no, right, no.
That's where it stands.
So now, that's the white flag that I'm following.
That's right.
That's right.
Now, and including our .
Now, the problem is that we have, as of October 8th, reached certain agreements.
I mean, if I go to the political side, I can't remember the specifics.
On May 8th,
I laid down three conditions for stopping the bombing of Miami.
One, there had to be a ceasefire.
Two, there had to be a return for all people who had been accounted for in Miami.
Three, as far as the political settlement is concerned, the people who saw the attack should have the right to determine their future without having a communist or a communist coalition imposed upon them.
Those were the three conditions.
The agreement of May of October 8th, which has since been somewhat approved, met those three conditions.
And yet, out of sight, and frankly from some well-intentioned people here, we hear this kind of agreement is one that we should not accept.
And I've been having some pretty hairy sessions with the South Vietnamese on this.
But to say we're now in this position where the American people
know what this agreement really is.
And they find that we have an agreement in which our appeal letters will be returned, in which there will be a ceasefire, in which there will be, in fact, President Jewell will say in August that there is some political gobbledygook with regard to committees of reconciliation.
The government of South Vietnam retains
foreign policy, its domestic policy, and there will be no change of government without an election in which they participate, in other words, re-election.
If the American people see that, the American people, in my view, will never see a continuation of a war in order to accomplish an objective
of pushing them all out.
Would you agree with that?
Absolutely.
If it is, it would be my problem.
We've really done very well the last four years in getting the kind of support we needed to cross out the other beings.
Well, you see, the thing that I'm saying is this, that if the President could go only so far, the Congress speech of Jack Murray III, if the Congress cuts
The bill that the military aid, economic aid, petition bombing and mine for the purpose of petitioning the war for a couple more years until the South North Vietnamese will make a marginal and better deal.
And it's questionable whether they believe in that.
That might be an option.
It would be an option if you were a dictator.
It's no option, but it's an option.
It's obvious these are so much better off than they were on May 8th.
Well, they would have loved to cease fire on May 8th.
Yeah, I bet.
But you see, now they don't want to.
Well, as you said, I'm trying to lay the foundation.
And before any of you say this, I just want to say this.
This is a government system.
Mel, you, and with all the civilians, of course you have some problems.
Admiral, you, everybody, every one of you is a Jesus.
Once we make this, if we make it, then the thing to do is to be proud of this man, up for him, and say, by God, we have not fought a thing.
We have accomplished what we wanted.
70,000 people, lacking 5%, who are under DC control, have a right to determine their own future, rather than pissing on it, frankly.
That's the reason we're getting down here.
We'll have enough knocking of it from, strangely enough, the left who have a vested interest in making it appear that the whole thing was fought for nothing.
And so let's not have it from those who have given so much to bring this in.
That's what I mean.
This is a good deal.
It's the best one we can get.
It will be by the end of next week.
The best we can get.
and the ODF know that it won't be as easy to come up with.
When that comes, then certainly from all over, from the defense establishment particularly, there must be a strong partner.
I can take any kind of a deal.
My God, after the Treaty of Versailles, everybody thought I should be convicted, and so forth and so on.
After the end of World War II, many people thought we had, for example, it was a hell of a mistake to give the Russians everything they needed.
It was, but it was done.
and so forth.
Many people think we should have made the deal if we did in Korea.
You know, they said, oh, we should have gone forever.
We were just trying to come down.
And then all of a sudden, we had the troops.
And we've got 50,000 men there.
But it's done.
Once the deal is made, then it's ours.
And after all the sacrifice and the blood and the sweat and the tears we've gone through this war, let's be sure that we understand
We, particularly in the military, we in the military understand it's our duty to report a threat.
That's the point I'm trying to get across to you.
And you know, General, it runs its day and night, because he's bargaining.
But if the North Vietnamese are starting to grow about a deal which basically is a cave-in for them, when this thing is made, he should grow about it as well as an achievement for himself.
particularly when he's got behind him continued American economic aid, continued American military aid, and, as we will later see, a commitment that in the event that the North begins to break the deal, we will react positively and very, very strongly.
So that's where it's at.
So, Henry, now you.
Thank you.
I know that you haven't made a note of this group.
It's good for all of us to hear it again anyway, because it's a complicated deal and we need to hear it from you.
And I can give you also what changes have been made in the last week and what still remains to be done next week.
Because, well, the first operating section feels that it's eased by and it just has the usual provisions in the statute and now it's eased by because it didn't pay.
And it prohibits reconnaissance flight over North Wigan.
It permits reconnaissance flight over South Wigan.
And in the West Act, we had worked out a reconnaissance planet over South Wigan, large Cambodian offshore, which gives us pretty good coverage.
It requires a 60-day withdrawal.
U.S. forces.
It commits civilian personnel, all economic civilian personnel, all the people, all civilian personnel associated with economic programs to stay there.
And indeed, in its original draft, it also only required us to withdraw civilian personnel associated with paramilitary organizations
giving us a free run on the contractors and on the maintenance personnel.
Now, since all these news stories appeared about how we were planning to use this, they had raised the demand that that personnel ought to be withdrawn too.
That is, maintenance personnel and supply personnel.
We have not accepted it, and we don't plan to accept it.
But that is one of the unsaid issues.
As the proposal was originally drafted,
It only required the withdrawal of American military personnel.
And the only civilian personnel that had to be withdrawn were those associated with counter-military organizations.
It required the dismantling of the police-military bases.
But we have fixed that, as you know, with the demo military bases to dismantle.
So this is not a provision that will be executed.
With respect to military supplies, it's a total prohibition against sending in reinforcements.
That is to say, it is not possible to send in not only reinforcements,
There's a total prohibition against sending in additional troops.
This is a prohibition that doesn't apply to us.
It does apply to us, but it doesn't affect us.
What it does, basically, is support Vietnamese, which means that two South Vietnamese pilots shall not accept the introduction of troops, military fighters and military personnel into South Vietnam, and that is part of the religion.
In other words, the total ban on infiltration.
There is a replacement provision by which all arms, munitions, and more material can be replaced on a one-to-one ratio.
We are starting at the plateau of the atomization of an army of 141 plus the one billion dollars.
The one billion additional equipment that we've sent in at the last will be all of which can be replaced on a one-to-one ratio
and it doesn't do them any good you know
We've got 500 extra helicopter engines.
There's no unit in the United States Army or any other place that has as many as they have.
It doesn't do them any good.
It doesn't do them any good to send in staff just to blow this stuff up.
Sure.
Because anything that gets blown up .
Why don't you say reinforcements then?
Reinforcements.
You can't reinforce, but you cannot increase the number.
The word means replace.
You cannot increase the number.
Reinforcement committee means, in some way, replacing.
But you see, the reinforcement, if it means in terms of sending more, no.
But sending the same, yes, is that correct?
You cannot increase the numbers, Mr. President, but you can increase.
You can replace on a one-to-one basis.
Uh, he's existing veterans with veterans with similar characteristics.
So I think he can also improve a little on the quality of life.
That's very important.
So we can modify it and replace it.
But I understand that, uh, Aiden and I went over that particular over there together.
It's not a question of numbers.
Uh, what this does is keep the pipeline open for replacement.
Moreover, for the information of the gentleman, we have handed you the lateral statement to the North Vietnamese saying that we will include that replacement provision in relation to the military equipment that comes into the North.
So if there should be a thick build-up of very advanced equipment in the North, we will just replace...
The only thing, Mr. President, under this agreement, they will not put these 87 tanks into South Vietnam.
At all.
At all.
They will have to put them in other tanks to put in these 87.
That would be a provocation for a renewal of...
And there's no legal way they can put the traditional banks into South Vietnam.
If the United States applies to the north, if the north sends something there, a tremendous influx of weapons from China's presence, which has become the suppressor's problem to which we're dealing in other countries.
Then we have reserved China to celebrate our modernization program in South Vietnam.
I don't have a point, but all of you will find it.
This is something you can make on your own.
You shouldn't have anything to say here.
If you get the contingencies, make your own notes, that would be great.
But on your own, you should make out a supremacy tender.
We talk about a piece of paper.
No piece of paper would come out and say it's worth a damn.
What really matters is in the case of Ivor and South Vietnam is whether they are to continue to have the support, military, economic, and also the will to use power in the event that the agreement is broken on Christian Clark.
That's really what we're getting down to.
And so that is why far more important than slight improvements in language, hearing, and everything is that statement which we have made.
The other point which we made is this.
This is the other side of the coin.
Henry split over it quickly, but let's get to the point.
Whether this thing resolves or not depends not just on the European peace.
It depends on the Chinese.
It depends on the Russians.
can't get caught saying, well, we're going to bend the arm of the Chinese and the Russians to keep them from insulting their interests in this part of the world.
But the very fact that we do have now a different relationship with the Chinese and a different relationship with the Russians, and the fact that they have other fish to fry with us means that we have some opportunity to influence their actions in Vietnam.
Do they want to risk, for example,
Everything that they have, the policy that they have in our world with us, that the Russians, for example, want to risk the European Security Congress and so forth, about Vietnam, well, they got to think of that.
And then this comes to North Vietnam, too.
We are going to have some sort of economic assistance to the North.
Some say, well, that's a hell of a thing to help your enemies.
Of course, we always help our
going to have a lot more influence on your enemies if you're helping them than if you're standing outside.
Isn't that the way that what I'm trying to say is that we used to hear in law school that the only contract is, I often told Ken Rush, Brian Bullock used to say this, he said a contract is only as good as the will of the parties to keep it.
Well, that's what a treaty is.
That's what a piece of paper is.
What we are developing around, we're not only developing an agreement here, but we're developing a whole network of understandings.
Nothing in writing.
They would, we would deny it, they would deny it.
We're talking to Russia, we're talking to the Chinese, we hope to be talking to an army in the east.
And this is what will make this agreement stand for fail, not what it is to stand against the paper.
I'd be quite glad to see that.
I think it's important that all of you, if you understand a little bit, you go out and you can say yes to somebody raising this nitpick or that nitpick about we don't like the fact that the Toads or the Japanese, the Indians, I hope, or some of the, I hope, but supposedly we don't like them on the international program.
First of all, the international
The second point is, even if they did, what really matters is the power, right?
So, let's understand, we're putting in all this dog meat food, because it'll be a breeze for the experts in the Washington Post and the University of Georgia and the New York Times, and Times News, and Eric Severide, and Robert Golds, and Howard Ford, and all this is dumping us.
Nothing.
Henry's old apartment.
He knows what matters.
He knows what matters.
But his concern is that the agreement read in such a way that it not be interpreted
as being the institution of the coalition government.
That it not be interpreted as one against an army that needs a right to have troops in the south.
That's our problem.
And I'm sure that these are questions that we on our own could make.
Yes, sir.
On your own.
Absolutely.
The right hand of the Chinese side, I would simply say, I know, but I think you could make it this way.
You could say, really what is involved here
is whether or not the great powers, the Soviet Union, the United States, and China, with their new relationship, may not want to cooperate and see that this does not break out again.
And that's why the Soviet and Chinese issues are important, but never indicating that we have an understanding of either the Russians or the Chinese, because we don't have any understanding of that.
On the contrary, we obviously have been talking about it.
So there's what we've got to be doing.
We have very close to an understanding with the Russians.
Yeah.
We have some expressions from the Chinese.
But that's...
In other words, in painting the picture of the world as it's going to develop in the next four or five years, you could point out that the fact that we are talking to the Chinese from the inside rather than from the outside.
Well, for example, definitely the point yesterday, which I...
Frankly, he had it counteracted.
He said that, he said, he's one of the greatest members of the president.
He was always mad about it.
present situation, was that we used to have a policy of containment of China.
And now, as a result of my trip to China and our relationship with China, we no longer have a policy of containment.
And therefore, the danger of the Chinese continuing to fuel everything from subversion to aggression in Asia is bigger than it was previously.
And I said, Mr. President, I heartily understand that.
and then also point out recently the policy of containment.
The Shanghai Medicaid specifically says, right, specifically says that there will not be the use of force in the area.
So the policy that we have now, the policy of containment, coupled with talks with the directorate,
which I think gives much greater security to everybody.
To the Indonesians, to the Thais, to the Cambodians, to the Vietnamese.
Right.
That's the point we need to make.
And that's the good thing about it, because some of the hawks, and I am, of course, the super hawk, but some of the less sophisticated hawks,
have made the same point.
If you, of course, fix it up, I'll go down, probably do an event or something, say, which is to be curious.
And on the other side of the act, you've got an asshole like Joe Crow making the same point, knowing better, saying, well, the reason this is a bad deal is because we have the opening in China.
And that, therefore, is
raised as has let down the bars and sedated everybody in Asia, on the contrary, the American dialogue with China is a hell of a lot greater potential, shall we say, not restraint, but it is sending for the Chinese to behave and for us to have a round-up.
What if the Chinese think we wouldn't resist if they resorted to military support?
Well, I thought a little of that, but I don't know.
So the is really, to all practical purposes, unlimited replacement.
It is unlimited replacement.
We can use subjectively maintained at regular levels.
They are subjectively.
Then, there is a draft of the deal for the return of the deal of the use of Missing in Action, which will be carried out at the same time frame as the withdrawal of our forces in the same ratio.
And they make a total responsibility.
for the return of prisoners and helicopter personnel in laws in Cambodia.
They claim there is nobody in Cambodia.
But they are making themselves responsible for laws.
They are not bringing laws.
They have given us the victory to do that today at this time.
We have separated in the agreement of the first one of the bloody trials we had, the issue of some 38,000 political prisoners in the South.
That's nine.
From the issue of South American POWs.
That is to say, we have a provision in the agreement according to which the political prisoners in the South are going to be negotiated between the two South Vietnamese parties.
While for the others, there is a plan committed that they must be released within a two-month period.
all military prisoners, all Americans, military prisoners.
But the political prisoners in the South made the subject of a separate negotiation between the two sides.
But that's important to keep in mind also that we're asking ourselves, does Q have any assets to negotiate with the North Vietnamese or with the PRC on getting a deduction on their forces?
He's got those 38,000 prisoners in jail that he can use to bargain with
I mean, it's embarrassing.
As a result of reopening the agreement, we would draw a few things through that.
That's right.
We've got to get that back here.
Absolutely.
We cannot give that one up because if we give this one up, first of all, we'd never get you to come along.
And secondly, because we take away as it is more important for us, it would mix up the
Solving to be civilian prisoners for the American POWs, and that's going to be a source of endless controversy.
So we are going to insist next week that this paragraph may be restored as it was, and I'd be thinking after some bloody time which we're going to choose to succeed.
That's a political chapter.
Now, as regards to the political chapter...
Yes, sir?
There is language...
There is language that says that the parties shall help each other get information about military personnel, as well as civilian personnel, missing in action to determine the location, and take care of the graves of the dead.
So as to facilitate, as you mentioned, repatriation of remains.
So there's a little policy about this.
But I think that they should help each other get information out.
That's a good job actually.
The prisoner thing was a good job.
Because we can't lose that next week.
You see, that's the problem with reopening.
On October 8th, we had that nailed down, and by reopening, because of some of this political company who, now they've withdrawn that.
So I'm just showing you which, I mean, it's not easy, but we'll try.
Now, the next strategy is the political thing.
There are a number of provisions in there before we get to the details of it, in which the North Vietnamese are assuming very specific obligations with respect to South Vietnam.
Because one of the arguments I now make is that the North Vietnamese do not have any obligations.
That is not true.
There's one provision which says the government of the United States and the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam undertake to respect the following principles with respect to South Vietnam.
One, the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination is sacred in any school and shall be respected by all countries.
Two, the South Vietnamese people shall decide themselves the political future of South Vietnam through free and democratic elections under international supervision.
Three, foreign countries shall not impose any political tendency or personality on the South Vietnamese people.
So you have here a very explicit recognition by the North Vietnamese of the separate identity of the South Vietnamese people.
uh... uh... uh... uh... uh... uh...
I had a very long meeting yesterday, two and a half hours, and I was just sitting down, and I read this compassion letter from you, and he sent me a letter from the Senate.
Now, he said in his letter, and you've got to understand what the argument is, he said in his letter that this provision is basically a camouflage
the imposition of a coalition government in South Vietnam.
And I said, does it affect the conduct of South Vietnam?
Of course it doesn't.
Does it affect the conduct of the .
As far as the lock sheds are concerned, and I agree we'll take over,
It affects them only if certain other conditions are met, and only if there is a unanimous vote and treatment is to be felt.
Now, good God, if I sit there with Pete Hill over something, I think I can stay in power.
So in other words, what we had to do, what I want you to do is to get right now to the fundamentals.
As far as the subject, the person who sees farthest, we have to recognize that the geographies, particularly from the people, where 90% of the people are under Vietnamese-controlled power,
our side, but the government of Vietnam remains in place, two regimes in place, they conduct the foreign policy, they conduct the domestic policy, and what this is about is not about the government, it is about basically reconciliation, elections, and so forth and so on, that all depends on the unanimous vote.
Is that a rough statement of what it is?
Of course it's a reconciliation.
It doesn't mean a goddamn thing anyway.
The police and the military got over the important things.
On the day of July 19th, when we resumed negotiations, they proposed a vote.
You had to resign.
The army and police had to be disbanded.
All political prisoners had to be released.
A coalition government had to be set up.
This would take over all the functions of the coalition government.
would replace the Saigon government.
It would have the spirit of the members would be Saigon, but minus Q.
And it would act like governments do by a majority vote or whatever.
Now, this went on for two months before negotiating this.
What did he have now?
A few states and all.
His whole governmental apparatus states and all.
He remains in control.
He retains control of the army.
He retains control of the police.
He retains control of the courts.
He retains control of the constitutional processes.
And the order of the OCR.
He retains foreign policy.
and instead for this created something which is described as an administrative structure called the National Council of Reconciliation and Conflict.
This council is appointed half and half by the DRG and by Jews.
It operates on the principle of unity.
It has no beliefs, it has no lobby, it has no foreign policy.
It has two jobs, two tasks as described in the agreement.
One,
to promote the implementation of design agreement, not to do it, but to promote it, to encourage it, and the achievement of national reconciliation, whatever that means, but by unanimity.
And secondly, to organize free and democratic elections, but the institutions for which the elections are to be held and the timing of these elections, they can't determine that.
That's decided by direct negotiations.
between the Saigon government and the NLF.
In other words, this committee, which is appointed, operates by unanimity, supervises elections that you first have to agree to in a separate forum.
The committee doesn't come into being for three months.
It is important that they agree with the sign.
It's formed
Now, it's inconceivable how such a committee could be considered a government.
And how it could be considered a coalition government.
That Jew has a double piece of virtue, his credibility on the election.
He doesn't agree on elections, his committee has nothing to do with it.
And that he agrees on elections.
His people on the committee have a veto over the proceedings by which the elections are carried out.
And that is the only task the committee has that's concrete.
All the other stuff is meaningless.
Now, that is where we are from the demand of an unconditional coalition government.
to a committee of national reconciliation, which, frankly, is our one.
And when you read the liberal press here, that's what they're saying.
They're saying it can't work.
It's right.
We don't want it to work.
Was it the economists that picked it up?
I guess so.
We can say it's the can't work.
That's right.
If it can't work, the Q government stays.
We don't want it to work.
And in this room,
I mean, it's an eye-washing, it's a face-saving, quickly.
And what I would like to see is not, we have trouble explaining it to Jews.
What I would like to know is how Hanoi is explaining it to my husband.
Here she has fought for ten years to get a share of the power in South Vietnam.
And what has she got?
She's got a membership on a committee that has no power and no functions.
The fight is that when this thing evolves
For God's sake, let's have the military, at least our military, stand up and be damn proud of this thing.
You see, General, the thing that you did for going out there, we cannot stand here and say, well, you cannot join our...
The people really who are knocking this thing, curiously enough, are some of those who have been the most vile opponents of you.
And he can't understand it.
The reason they're not is that they realize and keep them in power.
They realize all that we fought for, at least much of what we fought for, has been gained.
Right.
You can.
Yes.
You know, you originally said you'd be talking about a smaller amount.
No, no, no.
I have a deal to make.
When this deal is made, there can't be anything but solidarity.
Because it's a deal.
Yes, that's it.
Can you reveal the background of the statement that the DMC is not bound in this way?
Well, I'll come to that in the next section.
That's in the next section.
That is the individual indication of who you're talking about.
That says, first, that the reunification of Vietnam should be carried out through peaceful means as a result of discussion without coercion or annexation by either party without military pressure.
Then, about the demilitarized zone, it says, it uses the exact language of the Geneva Agreement.
which is that the military demarcation line between the two zones is provision of another political-military line.
That's exactly what the Geneva agreement says.
It's a direct quote.
The next sentence says, which we've gotten in last week, which is one of the big changes we got last week, is, South and North Vietnam shall respect the demilitarized zone and the greenification.
So we had two .
That was the thing.
It was busted in the papers.
It was busted in the papers.
And they were raised all the time, you see.
And I'm sure that's why from the North Vietnamese, because.
Well, Henry Hitt couldn't get out, you know.
We know.
We know.
We know.
We know that.
We know where the only people were.
But because that, as you know, was one of the things we discussed when we were out there.
So we had two recognitions of the deep military.
So first, the recognition.
that it exists, sure it's only provisional, until reunification.
By the day, event it exists, the second is that it must be respected.
And, uh, and then, uh, the rest of that chapter, those are the key provisions of that chapter.
The next chapter deals with international machinery.
I don't want to draw your patience by going through all the provisions, but briefly, actually, I must say, the chapter on international machinery is three times as long as the chapters on the political provisions.
What it provides in Greek is two-party military provisions for those provisions that apply only to the two South Vietnamese.
four-party military provisions for those provisions that apply to all four parties, and over it all, an international commission to which automatically disagreements of the other parties go, as well as that it has derived, as well as this international commission has derived from the independent investigations.
In other words, it does not have to wait for these lower parties to appeal to it.
But as you said, we know there have to be many issues to beat the parties, which can be perhaps settled to beat the parties.
And that's why we have to do it for the parties' permission.
So it's a really elaborate machine agreement.
One of the changes we're getting as a result of the current negotiations is that in the agreement it's always said that the decision goes into effect immediately.
But we didn't have to grow it or negotiate it.
Now we're going to insist.
the international commission, the four-party commission, the two-party commission, be signed the same day this agreement is signed, so that the international force and the machinery can go into action simultaneously.
So we will have international supervision going into effect upon the signature of the agreement.
The next section deals with Cambodian laws, and that has, following up, one, it involves an explicit reaffirmation of the 1954 Agreement of Cambodia and the 1962 Agreement of Laws and the commitment that the provisions of these Agreements
uh, as they apply to the parties signed to be respected.
In other words, the groups, this means groups, there can be no more groups in California than ours.
Uh, it means that their territory is inviolable and has to be respected.
Uh, and it, and, uh, and that, and that the groups have to be withdrawn.
Second, there's a commitment that the parties signed this agreement
will not use the territory of Laos or the area of Cambodia to encroach on the sovereignty and security of one another or of other countries.
In other words, the base areas have to be closed down.
Third, there's a provision that foreign troops have to be withdrawn from Cambodia and Laos.
The other provisions
This section is quite significant.
This section is of tremendous significance, and fortunately, this has to stay in this room.
There is an inside understanding.
I'm going to say it will be a formal ceasefire in Laos within 30 days of the signature of this agreement.
I mean, there's a formal understanding in writing.
It's not part of this agreement, but it's a separate one.
I didn't understand that.
And we look at the Jews, we think they can't do that.
I mean, we've always managed to, like, speak to the president, Mr. Chairman, today.
He heard this.
He said, well, I can't understand why anybody, President, you know, everybody else is raising questions.
This is a complete capitulation, I argue.
He knows it is.
Now, of course, when you talk about a complete capitulation, we don't have unconditional surrender.
We have World War II, World War I.
We can't do the things we did then and about.
But in terms of what we have done,
This is quite the achievement.
And I think if we start to talk that way, we see what we can do.
And I say this, but I'm not like a lion, not apologetic.
And while I wish it had been better, if I didn't do this, what would the other say?
We've gone through hell to get this through.
I forgot that I talked about the political provisions.
There is another provision, the political section, where after peace is made, after ceasefire comes into being, the two sides will negotiate the demobilization of forces on both sides and the reduction of military effectiveness, which is their way of taking care of getting some of their forces or most of their forces outside of Vietnam.
And these are the essential provisions.
I've explained the political problem.
Let me say a word about the North Vietnamese forces in the South.
Under these provisions, the following is the situation.
They cannot legally reinforce it.
They cannot legally, not only not reinforce it, they cannot legally bring in any additional troops.
They can't even rotate them.
So that, if they observe the agreement, the forces are bound to the trip.
Secondly, they have to respect the DNC.
They have to respect Cambodians.
They have to .
So there is no legal way they can remain in South Vietnam.
It's a very key point that Henry makes there.
It's quite interesting to see the North Vietnamese by their own line.
the agreement provides that there that that no nobody can violate the bmc or come come in to there so therefore that's why he says even though you can't even rotate because there's nobody there you can't send anybody to rotate right
There will be no introduction of military personnel.
He doesn't say there will be no reinforcements.
He says there will be no introduction of military personnel.
You see, what Hugh doesn't...
I think he understands it, but I don't know.
He doesn't seem to understand it, but he reducted it, certainly understand it.
Because he talked about, well, he said they didn't command that.
And your point was well taken.
They might get in 5,000, but they couldn't get in 50,000.
That was, of course, the critique point.
But the main thing about these forces that are in the south is that if they deny they are there, then the provisions with regard to reinforcement
or shall we say replacement, which provides to both North and South Vietnam, does not apply to replacement insofar as forces that are not in South Vietnam from the North.
There's another point, Mr. President.
Replacement applies only to material.
Replacement does not apply to personnel.
They cannot get a flat prohibition against introducing personnel
uh, that is a provision for replacement of material.
Because we know it can't very easily be introduced.
Well, the replacement of material for North Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam is impossible because there are no forces in South Vietnam.
No, but they could, they could produce a tax and say they're sending a new one for the old one.
That they can do without saying it's a North Vietnamese tax.
But it is not true that this disagreement legalizes the presence of North Vietnamese forces.
They have read into the record long statements saying there are no North Vietnamese forces in the South.
There are only South Vietnamese forces and South Vietnamese who have gone north and returned to the South again.
Of course, this is an outrageous, filthy lie, but from the legal point of view, it means
that there is nothing in here that legalizes the presence of North Vietnamese forces, nor do they claim that they legally have a right to have North Vietnamese forces there.
And therefore, we retain the right to claim aggression.
if North Vietnamese forces are there and therefore be acted on under this agreement to take action if the president should so decide.
Even if they cheat a little bit on that, two can take care of it.
That's what that army was built up for.
But there is no way
They can engage in a massive infiltration into the South without massively violating explicit provisions of the agreement.
They'd have to violate the DNC.
They'd have to violate the provisions with respect to Cambodia's laws.
And they'd have to violate the provisions against the introduction of personnel.
So that the argument that some South Vietnamese are making that this gives them no legal protection is nonsense.
Well, Orson, the argument that was made yesterday
My doctor, the effect of the agreement must at least have provisions so that there will be a legal basis for us to react in the event that they start our stories again.
That's nonsense.
My doctor, you've got a legal basis all over the place, right?
You don't have to go back to the seal thing, you know, which was a very flimsy thing to go in in the first place.
Here you've got an agreement, and my doctor, if you want that,
in the event they do anything.
Absolutely.
That's a very strong point to make, what you should make to Dr. Price.
I understand what Henry's saying.
Even the appearance of a new tank could be proven to be a serial or a path to the agreement.
There can't be a route.
wouldn't this be an important thing to be able to have some system where those can count?
That's right.
That is the Indian National Protocol.
We are establishing four crossing points of the DMZ and four points for our equipment.
And all the equipment has to come in this way.
If we find a tank that didn't come through these crossing points, it would by definition be there to be good.
Basically, the point that they would make is that they are simply
As we are bringing it, we take full force when we put it on record.
But legally, the operative is right.
If we find attacks that didn't come through an authorized process, and who wish they didn't take one out, that would be there by definition.
But the key point is this.
All of you know that
In terms of that, they can bring in some tanks and that sort of thing.
But until they get a hell of a lot more men in there, they can't start up against the biggest land army in Asia and effectively operating
So they got to sit there right in their manning.
So I think that's the key thing.
And that's impossible, Mr. President.
They cannot keep that large army down there without rotation.
They've only got two choices, in my judgment.
They either have to start an offensive next March or April with what they've got there, or they've got to pull most of them out of there.
That's what most people that even we had an intelligence report seems to think.
That is, that they will have to pull a large number of them out.
So that we have built in here as many, plus the division, plus the explicit requirement for demobilization, so that you get all of these things working together.
There are enough handles in there on getting their army out.
Now, what they cannot do, they say.
And we've spent 90% of our time saying they cannot, in a peace agreement, first admit they have an army there and then agree to pull it out.
They have to write in a lot of collateral provisions.
that have practical consequences of dreaming about a reduction of their forces, in fact, where you finally come down to a key point.
So they are faced with whether they want to make a decision to resume hostilities and risk not only South Vietnamese, but American retaliation, or whether under
And to resume on some of these in a way in which there is an agreement in which there would be a clear violation, rather than our having to go say, well, it's punk and dope or C-dope or blah, blah, blah, that sort of thing.
And mind you, I think that with all of our other strings around this thing, Soviet influence, Chinese influence, their own concern about their own problems, for the foreseeable future, with the terrific walloping they've been getting,
the bombing in the Baltimore, the mining, the casualties they've taken in the South, South Vietnamese have taken too, but the size of South Vietnamese casualties always reach another heavy sea, and so it must be heavy.
So all we want, I think the will to do something is significantly less.
I think that sometimes we get so, so tied up in all the agreements that provide this and that and the other,
And I come back to the bottom of the point.
Rightfully agree to this as well as you can.
But don't believe a damn thing they say.
And as far as we're concerned, we'll keep and provide our engine service, otherwise we won't.
That's what it's going to be.
And as I see it at the present time, this agreement probably is going to last for a while.
Not due to the fact that we made an agreement, but due to the fact that they are in a hell of a spot at the present time, and they are going to want to resume this war.
That's right, Mr. President.
Among the factors you listed, I think it's fair to list your own record.
Because if you did what you did last May 8th, two weeks before the Senate, and five months before the election, if one is in Hanoi who wanted that and they couldn't,
Massively violate the DNC, break the ceasefire, break the law enforcement camp, or give provisions on which they have to do to resume large-scale hostilities without reaction from you, that would be one hell of a gap.
They think they have a madman in the White House, and they're probably right on this issue.
That's not true, I say that online.
Jack, let me cover the contingencies quickly, and here, this is for your own information, do it on your own, so forth.
First,
I don't expect this to happen.
It may be that they'll be so hard-nosed that we'll have no other choice.
And if we have a weather choice, I don't want to screw around a plan for a year.
We're going to go for a plan that will be enormously effective.
In other words, that means continuing the bombing.
And it means, I mean, continuing the mining.
But it means targeting in a way that will be very, very effective, including the use of B-52s over and over.
Yes, including them.
Is that clear?
Yes, sir.
You all, I want you all to be thinking about this, just hoping and praying you don't have to do it.
But if we do have to move, we can't move in a half-assed way because the heat we're going to take is going to be so great.
We're going to have to move massively and effectively and attempting to break that back where we are here.
You have to take advantage of that.
No, I think that's absolutely right.
We had a number of plans for which we held on.
I don't think there's a number.
Remember, as far as air is concerned, 52s.
But over Hanoi, they're never going to have to take it.
Now, that'll be a second.
We've got to do something that is different, something that is new, something that's effective.
So that's it.
The second point has to do with the longer term.
And that is, it has to do with the contingencies in the event of disagreements.
It is not uphill.
What do we do?
How?
I need a number of plans on that.
In other words, various levels, because there are various levels of violation.
And here's something where I see no problem in your doing these studies.
Obviously, you can say that this is a great conference.
We've got to be prepared to give the president an opportunity.
We're going to have so few people in the room.
I don't think the best, sharpest decision could possibly come.
And that's the fact that we've got so much investment.
We've generated $12 million.
Look, I didn't choose real property to sign up for.
He's had us there so long that he doesn't have to face up to the fact that he's going to have to grow a lot.
Isn't that right, General?
Don't you think he's really worried about that?
And I think we're doing really good.
Don't you think, Bob, that that's part of the problem?
Sure.
I think that's good.
Now, on the other hand, we've got to have our strongest and best people for the best possible team.
Another point that should be made is the intelligence part.
We will have intelligence capability in Thailand, as I understand it.
Right.
That's not what I'm saying.
But for that purpose, let me say, we are not going to rely on the international permission to provide our intelligence.
We have to have an independent intelligence capability as far as violations are concerned.
I don't think we understand it.
And he said he's sending his best kid to live by the net because he wants to wipe out those rockets.
Now, while we're talking about that, let me digress quickly to another subject before Paul's hearing.
Latin America.
We had made a shocking mistake.
and it's not the mistake of the Defense Department, and allow it because of our obsession with the idea that all we should do is to provide inside plumbing, more freeholdings for peons and landowners, and more opportunity, et cetera, et cetera, by bailing and unleashing to the VATs who are without question going to continue to build up some military capability, and they have to.
So we let the French furnish their air power and all that.
This is a hell of a mistake.
I want all of you to understand that as far as our military attaches and so forth are concerned, we're going to change that.
The Assistant Secretary of the Vatican, I think you should know this again, the Assistant Secretary for Latin America, very nice fellow, is going to go.
I haven't got any man for him, but he's going to be a hard-line fellow.
But in Latin America, we have got to be, I want to restore to the best
American equipment, I mean, where they want to buy it, American cooperation.
So I know you've got problems with the brand, the church, and the rest.
But mentally, I was trying to make a deal on this.
We have cut the board.
It's been a major mistake, and we're going to try to rectify it.
Well, Mr. President, Secretary of Defense and I have testified as probably as we could along these lines.
Yeah.
We have not only permitted them to get French aircraft, they've got British ship, German missiles.
And we missed more opportunities down there, not only to sell equipment, but we forced them to now put themselves so that the logistics are full.
They've got full buy-in to account of ammunition.
All right.
Full buy-in to account of ammunition.
You know, another thing that this does, I was talking to a fellow who's not in the military with us the other day.
He said, you know what this does?
When you have German and French and British military equipment, it means that German, French, and British military
that people can now come in and they get a bigger stroke.
You see?
That's what it was.
We're just killing ourselves in Latin America.
And the Latins want our stuff.
They would prefer our stuff.
They prefer the Americans to the rest of us.
Right, right.
Why is it so cheap?
Maybe it's, of course, maybe with the knowledge and consent of the president, he accepted a $1 million bribe from the European government.
He didn't even survive Harvard.
That's the extent to which .
Just remember, that's my feeling.
Now, Mel, do you want to have anything to say?
Can you support this agreement, or are you just too much of a dog?
Let me ask you about the hawks in the House and the Senate.
Let us suppose we can get that kind of agreement.
Would they, if Tu refuses, would they say under those circumstances, don't sign the agreement to continue the war and hold the bonds?
Because there would be no support for South Vietnam if this agreement ever surfaced in the form that it is.
I guarantee you that you can't get the support that's needed if this agreement goes by the boards.
And Tu, I hope, understands that because it's just as impossible as a practical political problem
we're going to have a problem now these people are all going to support this agreement if they testify up there next year and they've supported no other agreement because you're going to have to have this continued military assistance you're going to have to have this continued economic aid and that's going to be a real effort even to do that you're going to do it
It's going to be a very difficult job.
It only can be done if they start right off supporting this whole program.
Mr. President, the things are, I recall a professor from the academy who was discussing the seat card in 68.
I think at that time he said we were going to do several things.
He did not do.
And so I think it's very important that if all people need to understand that we really mean for them to comply with the terms of this agreement.
And our military plans, we've been proved by the Secretary of Defense, provide for not only keeping in countries out there that have a good retaliatory capability, but also for augmenting these forces if necessary.
and thinking about these contingent plans in two forms.
One, in the event that we are not successful in the negotiations, we have to take additional action.
And secondly, in the event that the negotiations are successful and subsequently they're violated, what kind of options would you have to retaliate?
The other point I'd like to make, sir, is that we need very widely to go forward with it to the Congress.
But when we succeed in the ceasefire, with a complete package of what this has cost and will cost, because we'll be in a much stronger position to get, they will be happy over the ceasefire, and we'll get much better support if we get it all at once, rather than going later for a little bit more, a little bit more, or something like that.
So we should kind of present them with a ceasefire funding package, I think.
I agree.
Let me say finally that I am aware of the fact that I thought it was important that you hear it directly.
We have a little discussion about what this agreement means and we should get all lines up and support it as it is made.
The other thing I should say is that we also have to hear it for cosmetic purposes this morning.
Henry's going back to Paris, and this is just shop here.
And I thought it was very important for it to be understood that I had met with the Joint Chiefs in addition to meeting to this .
So when Henry goes back and says, well, he's met with the Joint Chiefs, we're ready to move either way.
So I think you should know that we, that's why I want those band photographers in here.
I like photographers.
The press guys, I like as well.
You want that on the right, but I met with the Joint Chiefs, and so don't play another line.
say your friend here, you're all advising him to take it over .
Well, anyway, we'll pass it off.
You can't go down.
You've got to go .
Your wives.
Do you plan to give a piece out to the fellows over here?
Yes, sir.
It's the last time I can order a major lieutenant general around, I guess.
Are you a lieutenant general or just a general?
You're a general, Tom, aren't you?
Make it sound.
Is that real big?
This is Kevin Pearson.
Yeah.
I'll be careful.
This is a generalissimo.
Yeah.
And you're a lieutenant general.
I hope a lot of it's all right.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Thank you very much.
Where do you live?
We hope that everything works out.
It's hard to be a black guy in our shop.
We've got all the changes there in your shop in Johnson City.
All right.
Good.
All right.
All right.
You can't get there.
You can't get there.
I know you won't get across.
All right.
You don't have to be quiet, but I just want to make sure you can hear the noise.
Well, it's hard to hear.
I'm in here.
I'm in here.
All right.

Nixon, Laird & Kissinger on Vietnam War and Paris Peace Accords

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Also recorded on November 30, 1972

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