Nixon, Kissinger & Duc on Vietnam War and Paris Peace Accords

I was wondering if you think that he might have leaked out the Dole thing.
No, I just talked about it.
And he talked to Dole.
He said there's no problem.
And that all Dole wants to do now is he's going to cover his Kansas space.
And now the Kansans tell him that he's got to get out of the championship.
So he can play his back home stuff.
And that he will tell you next week the change should be made.
I understand it's January 19th.
Bush is, he's going to be fun to work with.
He's smooth.
He is.
Because, you know, you can level what you've done.
It's just simple.
You tell them what the problem is and how you are going to level it with the goddamn goal.
Yeah.
I think he is a little off his rocker.
I've felt that all along.
I know that we've felt that from time to time.
I think Bob, he is, you know, that overriding sarcasm.
Everything's negative.
He sees everything from a negative viewpoint.
But Dole said he forgot, I mean, Bush said he got it.
And Mitchell told me some more, too.
I talked to him again later.
And so Dole's totally sold on Bush.
It sounds great.
He wants to, you know, make that the most positive kind of move and all that sort of thing.
So I don't think we have a way to answer the next question.
Yeah?
Yeah.
You be sure to go forward with you on the California party because I've got to get things set up at the White House on that Tuesday for a half hour.
I learned they were in town and I'm coming.
I'm going to be here for, I'll arrange to be here and then have the helicopter roll up.
We love not getting the hell out of there.
Shake all their hands.
Thank them very much for the people that brought me where we are.
I wish Bob Finch the best.
How's that sound to you?
Great.
I have one request to add to that.
I'd be permitted to accompany you at Camp David.
I'd like to be able to walk out of all hell.
I still miss those people.
I think it's bad for you.
It is.
It's very.
Yeah, well, Earth is the Californian.
I don't think the gun is tied in, but they do have me tied in.
That's one of the honor reels.
They're not honoring.
They don't have Fred Malick and all of them.
I don't think he will.
He's got a hell of a job working on that.
There's one other job that you can give him, and that's that damn movie, Lord of the Lost.
Remember that one?
Yeah.
There are two that I can play around with.
Schlesinger came in and brought his paper, you know, that you asked him to do.
He's going to be a good man, I think.
He said, let me say something, because I don't know if the President understood it clearly.
I understand what he's talking about here, and I would love to do it.
I would also love to say as chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, I can do a hell of a good job there.
There's a lot of things there, so don't think there's any entanglement.
If you want, whatever you want me to do, I will be delighted to do.
Secondly, you talked about the DIA.
He said,
you can cut that 85%.
You've got to maintain, or it would be wise to maintain, the defense and the terrorist capability to cheat, but that's all you need.
Move on to the rest of it.
What the little bastard now said is that we should go on alone, test our prisoners for withdrawal, and let them continue fighting.
I think they have
to get it into their heads.
And in that case, they'll conquer it, no matter what you intend to do.
The North will be the measles of demand, cutting off military and economic aid as a price for that.
What the hell are they gonna shoot?
They won't have any bullets.
Well, their idea is we continue to give aid, and they'll fight along.
But tell them that the country will be built.
No, I'm sorry.
That's fine.
But I can't seem to direct that the country will cut off all military aid.
Well, I would just say that the Congress will have no such degrees as I've got.
So that you're not the villain.
I'm going to be the villain myself, too.
You get to be the villain.
Henry, you must say to the reporter that you're not going to listen to him from him.
No, no.
We're going to have it straight out and get it out.
Well, there's some hopes that they will start to be reasonable, too, to be wrong.
I don't know if they're going to be able to after the agreement is made.
They won't be able to decide it.
I've already done that.
These guys, the major trouble is they have this punk kid in the palace, a 30-year-old suitor who's acting out a blackmailing drama.
But I must say, when I went through the agreement this morning, I told Hagen afterwards, when you listen to these guys, you begin to doubt your sanity.
No, that's a good reason.
But it's a good reason.
We will cut off the .
I think, of course, it means that everything that you bought for us will miss.
Well, we can just let Congress do it.
Yeah.
I think Doug understands it.
Doug understands it.
And the investment is accurate.
What I put in truth, Carson, is the President, you gave an absolutely magnificent presentation.
You could not have been doing it.
Oh, no, no, no, no, no, no.
I've dealt with these guys.
They're going to wait until a minute before midnight.
This is a lot better than the annual main deal on Saturday.
It's signed, and then what happens?
Come back here and do what?
And then we'll have to put it through them and say, this is a gentleman.
Come back here and put it through them and say, do you want me to meet with the president or not?
That's all.
All right.
Is that what you say?
Yes, sir.
This is an agreement that we're going ahead on this without economic assistance.
All right.
Well, obviously, you notice on this Monday they are having a message for us now to maybe
I'm crazy.
They're both nuts.
I mean, that's the trouble with these reasons.
It is that... Sir, I don't worry.
It's the gods.
They'll be here.
They'll be here.
And that's the fighting.
I mean, you think that our...
I guess that our Vietnamese could just break off.
No, they can't.
Why would they can't?
But we've been playing with fire ever since we had this goddamn agreement with these two maniacal parties.
If you want to come this way.
Yeah.
Yeah.
Well, been doing a lot of talking.
I've already reported to the treasurer.
I, uh...
I understand that your government has now decided that you want us to go ahead and continue on your own.
Is that basically what you're saying?
I think I should qualify this rather than present it to you in terms of the three points that I presented to you and the three points that you asked.
If North Vietnam remains an enemy, and then if we have a very
It would be a choice to die right now or to take the pill which would make us die on its own.
So we do not consider
the possibility of doing anything separately from the United States government.
But in this context, the President here would be grateful if he would help us to find some formula which would be inspired more or less by a solution.
whereby the United States can return its principal object, like I said, the nuclear war, the nuclear radiation, and the force of the world.
And it seems fine.
It seems fine because the force will be applied to everybody.
And hopefully, we will get that.
with respect.
If it is not respected, then we should do our best to protect ourselves, protect the United States, and then take retaliatory action in favor of Vietnam and France, this time.
So the President here will start with this context.
This constitutes a very severe handicap for South Vietnam because of the captation of bombings and mines.
At this time, it is the bombing of the mines which we have to establish will be managed.
We are not unaware that the stopping of these things would be very serious for us.
So I would value very highly if you could help in order to find some way, not necessarily exactly the solution that we stand now, but something along these lines so that we can find a way
in a very difficult situation, although not just the two options.
Well, here's the situation that I see, Mr. Custer, which you and your colleague should convey to President Hsu.
I met with the Joint Chiefs this morning for two hours.
I got over the agreement with them.
They were unanimous.
We are only able to particularly respond to that.
There is no question, whatever, that not only we have won, but a half dozen legal reasons to respond in the event.
there is any breach of ceasefire or any step-up of infiltration.
I mean, the Cambodian Laotian provisions impress them particularly.
The provisions with regard to violation of the DMC impress them very much.
They also have the intelligence capability, and they think it's better than what Dr. Kitchener tweeted.
They think that anything over 1,000
Second point, they have contingency plans ready in my question.
Contingency plans that in the event that there are violations at the agreement that we will respond here.
other responses that will go beyond what we have done previously.
I'm not going to tell you what they are, because it's best that this not appear to be in a threatening posture to anybody, but I can just give you the assurance that when I act, I do not act sovereign.
The third point is that, and this is the other thing that we have to realize, is that
I, Secretary Laird, who is a great friend of your country, as I am, and who also is a political expert, has just made yesterday what I call the hawks.
These are the people now, foreign affairs and foreign relations committee, whether you fast or know it, does.
But the armed servicemen,
that if we got agreement for a ceasefire for the return of our prisoners of war and for the kind of political provision which guarantees the right of President Hu to stay in power and the government of Vietnam to retain total control not only over its territory but its foreign policy and security policy,
and a veto over any political process and anything, that if that kind of agreement ever becomes public, as it will, that they would have to vote against
See, it's an honest difference of opinion.
I understand Mr. Chu's concern because of how it's going to be interpreted in the Senate.
We have a problem with how it's interpreted here.
We have a problem with the Congress.
And I don't want there to be any illusions on this point.
And I say this emphatically and I will not repeat it.
There is no chance, whatever, once this agreement is concluded,
on our part, you know, the military aspects, which President Chu would do a prescriber attention.
There's no chance, whatever, for American economic and military assistance to continue.
Now, we can talk, and I'm rather surprised to hear President Chu, who's such a very sophisticated person, talk next term.
We'd rather die now than die later.
You're not going to die at all.
I mean, that's what this is all about.
You don't die if you have the support of whoever sits in this chair, which I have promised and which I will give and which is the main point of all this exercise.
I've got to have
I can act strongly, provided we have appeared to be reasonable in negotiating a ceasefire, the return of our prisoners, and have political settlement, which people here at least are convinced provides for the right of the people to settle here and the right of the government to stay in power, which it does.
So we face this point.
I'm going to write the instructions out.
The instructions will tell him to negotiate as hard as he can on the points that remain, but within the framework of what is negotiable.
I mean, we can talk about the fact that we should start all over and go over every phrase and change this and that.
that we're going to reopen all these things.
There are some things that have already been indicated that are still subject to negotiation.
What I told you last night.
What you went through last night.
That's right.
I got that from talking over here.
And as far as .
And those points, those points, we will negotiate more of them in the very best possible way that we can.
When those negotiations are completed, that would be it.
Then what I would like to do, and it would be a very proper thing to do, so that the interpretation of the agreement is put out our way and your way.
What I suggested, Dr. Ketchinger, is that, President, you and I then meet at Midway.
We sit down, not to discuss, not to negotiate anymore, because two presidents shouldn't handle over the agreement.
It's too late.
That should be done at this point.
And he will be consulted all the way along.
But at Midway, I will then have the opportunity to give him the personal assurance, which he ought to hear directly from me, about continued U.S. support of military and economic, but more important, my personal assurance
the event that the agreement is broken, the United States will retaliate.
When he hears that from me, and then we can interpret the agreement with the world's press looking on, we will obstruct the flow that will be affected.
That will be done before we would then have to go to Hanoi and get them lined up.
He couldn't interpret the agreement yet at that point, but we can do it right now.
But I mean, the point is, President Chu and I will determine what the interpretation is going to be, because we both have the same line, and it will be the right line.
And I put the chief's end line here.
That is the better way to proceed.
Now, if, on the other hand, we totally understand if President Chu, after all these years we've been allies, after all of our suffering together, after all of our sacrifices, if he decides that he doesn't trust my judgment,
You know, no man is altogether wrong.
I'm wrong sometimes.
No man's altogether right.
I'm right sometimes.
On this, I have studied it.
I know the comments.
I don't trust him any more than he does.
I know what is politically possible, what is not politically possible.
And I have determined that this course of action is what we have to take.
And so you, of course, must represent your president in a kind of eloquent way.
But I, of course, must speak honestly to you.
You wouldn't want me to speak any other way.
And I'm speaking candidly and honestly to you.
So we're going to go forward.
The agreement will be reached.
It will be the best possible agreement we can get.
And then, at that time, I would think right then we should move.
And I'm keeping my schedule free.
I would meet with the president, too.
And I give him the personal assurance, which he needs to hear.
and then we determine the line that we're going to take with regard to the briefings and we'll do exactly the same thing and we'll do everything here that will be helpful we'll say the things here that will be helpful in Saigon and he should say the things there that will be helpful then then after that the agreement would be signed probably the latest is the 22nd of December
I will vote the 21st.
That's my preferred date.
But the 22nd is the latest it can resign.
Now, I understand him, and I respect him.
I don't agree with him.
I think it would be a tragic mistake for South Vietnam.
President Chu should not lightly say to the 17 billion people of South Vietnam, he turns away from America.
He, by his action now,
after all of these years, says, in effect, and this is what he's going to be saying if he doesn't want to go along with what is the best, my best judgment, and the best deal we can get, he would be saying, I don't want any more of you.
I'm going to give you.
I want all of you to leave.
I don't want any more of you to leave.
I want no assurance that in the event that the North, the East, and the East come in massively, I will leave.
That's the choice.
He shouldn't do that.
He should not do that.
And I'm simply stating the fact.
That's where it is.
I state this fact with great reluctance.
Great reluctance.
If I were a dictator, I could speak differently, but I'm not.
I have a Congress.
It's an immigration Congress.
That Congress will go over itself very far.
over its better judgment, because I've always said that President Jew was a reasonable man, that we received the peace that we thought was right.
But in the event that we get this kind of agreement, the kind that is with the improvements that I can better put in the ballpark, and it'll be that much, but it will not be more than that, when we get that kind of agreement, then if South Vietnam refuses to go on,
And then what happens is that the age jumps.
In the light of that, congressional leaders have to meet with the community.
It would be a major crisis.
We have to face up to it.
And there'd be no way we could convince them.
No way at all.
I would be less than honest if you were not to know this.
Because I could sit here and say, well, since President
prefer that we go our own way, and he'll go his way, with the hope that we can continue to respect and not be very effective and say, well, I respect that, and I'll try to get it out of the Congress.
I can't even try, because I know the Congress.
I've already been told by, not the does, but the hogs, that they will provide it.
So you see, that's where we are.
We don't, we face a fact.
We don't face a theory here.
And the fact is that we now, and I would hope that this week, that we all work together, full attendant together, keep the very best possible agreement we can.
And then, if that agreement is obtained, we go forward.
We do go forward.
And the economic assistance, the military assistance, and my personal commitment
or retaliation, which the Joint Chiefs of Staff rule back, and they have a plan ready for it.
You have all that.
That's one choice.
And the other is to say, well, because we don't like this, it's a fundamental point in the agreement, which I think
can be rationalized, justified properly, that we make a separate peace in the back of North Vietnam, and you will want to continue the war, then it would be with great reluctance that I would have to say that our assistance is no longer available.
That's where it's standing.
So I think he ought to know what the choices are.
It's not mine.
We've got the Congress, and they told me
And I cannot convince them on that.
I cannot convince them particularly to deal with the fact that the agreement that we have is the one we have.
I don't think it's any necessity to repeat this several times, to repeat your comments as you should and as I should.
But now we understand each other.
I would hope that you would convey this message to President Chu, and I would look forward to his meeting me at midway.
And then I also like the idea of a later meeting of the Asian heads of government, which he's proposed.
That's a very good suggestion, and I would be prepared to participate in that, provided it came by before the 5th of January.
It would have to be right after the computer.
But on the other hand,
of choices for us to go along, which we're prepared to do, not by choice, reluctantly.
And I think we can work it out together and do the very best we can.
And I would think the President would have enough confidence and trust in me and everything that I've done in the past that he would say, well,
I have doubts about this or that or the other thing, but what really counts is the alliance of the President, the alliance of the United States.
I can commit that all the way.
I can commit it if we reach an agreement.
I cannot commit it and have it mean anything if we don't.
Because if I did commit it, I would have to break my word due to the fact that our Congress will cut off the purse
That's what we said.
So that's the I wish you all the best in your negotiations.
I know it's going to be hard.
I understand that we don't even know what the arts going to do.
Apparently, at this point, they're going to be your main citizens.
Mr. President, the situation is this.
We can get them out of the text of the agreement.
The issue now is, should they be in the preamble?
I told Mr. Duke we'd make a major effort to get them out of the preamble, too.
The trouble is, we have to get from the Vietnamese side what their priorities are.
We cannot get all three points.
If they tell us which of them is most important, then we can...
trade some of the other.
Give us the points in order, priority, then you know what to get harvest on.
It's out of the text of the agreement now.
The only place it is now.
Well, in the operating portions of the agreement, it does not exist.
It does not.
It exists only.
It's not agreed to.
But they've already agreed to delete it from the text.
So the only question is, should it be in the preamble?
Which, in fact, can be detached from the agreement.
There's nothing in the preamble that's offered.
Those of you who mentioned that, okay, we've got that in mind, and I understand.
I've got it.
If the word is mentioned once, they could claim that it is a commission, but there are two governments in South Carolina, and that is very serious.
I understand that.
Well, we have put out a separate statement to the effect that we do not recognize the government's talking.
Oh, yes.
That's what we will do.
Our government will make a unilateral statement.
We do not recognize that.
We don't.
Your government is the only government we recommend.
And that we so interpret the agreement.
That's what we would say.
I mean, everybody has his own interpretation, but that's what we would say.
Absolutely.
Absolutely.
And we do not accept the temptation.
You see, in the days that we have here today, we have what we call the
the historical record and interpreting clauses.
Well, let me put it another way.
We made a solid agreement with the Russians.
Each side, both the Russians and us, put out various, you know, lateral statements as to what we considered
We already have in the protocol a statement from the North Vietnamese that it doesn't constitute recognition.
That's right.
The point that I make is this, that we will make a unilateral statement to the effect that we do not interpret this agreement to mean that there are two South Vietnams.
We interpret this as a statement to mean, this agreement to mean, that there's one member of the South Vietnam Church, and that's the governor of the GVN.
That's what we would say.
Whatever he gets on, he does his best on it.
I may be the leader of the government.
We've got to try, but it depends on what else.
But many of that, we will do that.
And incidentally, we're also going to make the unilateral statement for the effect that this is not, under any circumstances, as far as that commission on reconciliation, it is not a government issue.
It is not a government.
Now, it cannot become a government.
It in no way infringes upon the sovereignty of the government of Vietnam.
Over the work, which we have very late in the department, the work of three companies, three companies of the council, because
We for the side have always described the police government as having three conflicts.
Now the conflicts will be C&R now, since the members are to be appointed by Vitor Lehmann or equally by both sides.
Vitor was actually...
redundant.
They do not respond to any usual problems.
But if they are there, our government will be in great difficulty to explain.
But this is not, if you might give words, if you can give a sign, if you can't give a sign, if you can't give a sign,
Mr. President, what is more important is how we .
And because that's the concept .
I've explained to the Mr. President what the actual negotiating
They want to withdraw Article 8C, which is one of the political prisoners.
We have to give ground on some of the three remaining issues.
We cannot both demand an expiration of 8C.
That's the one thing you've got to insist upon.
You can't let them have those political prisoners.
I mean, you've got to keep those political prisoners in prison, right?
That's a must.
So you can't give ground on that.
So I'd rather give ground on some of this verbiage and on that issue.
That's the point.
And that's been a hard one.
It's impossible, in my judgment.
I've gone through this with him now.
It is impossible to get the word precomponent set and also
get in what they want about protection of their territory.
But we can interpret it.
Oh, yes.
It's the interpretation.
Mr. Duke admits it has no practical significance.
Well, the point is, we can interpret it.
And I'm going to interpret it myself in my own public statement as soon as this agreement is signed.
There'll be no doubt about it.
Yes, it has no practical significance.
It's very vague.
It's political.
It's a question of the priorities.
If they're willing to put the CRT into the preamble,
We can try something on the other side.
It is impossible.
There's no sense deluding them.
There's no sense that we need to pretend that we're going to win all three points of issue.
We may win one, win two, lose one.
We can't win three.
I would like for you to tell what you consider to be in order.
As a lawyer and so forth, I don't negotiate.
I always want to look at what my client wants above everything else.
And I don't give an inch on that.
I fight, fight, fight until I can maybe recognize it.
I try for everything, but recognize this is the thing I want first.
But we need to know what we consider to be the most important.
Figuring that you might get all three, but you might get only one.
The main thing is if you got only one, what is the most
Yeah, but we got about 12 of those 69, so it's, uh... Well, I have to be very quick, comrade.
I understand.
I understand.
We have the, uh...
But I think we must have no illusions.
It's a choice.
It's a very momentous choice for you, for us.
And my own judgment, and I'm more detached from it than President Hughes or people involved, it's a picture of free,
to turn away American aid, to thumb its nose at the American Congress, and to say, we don't want your aid, we don't want your military assistance.
That's what he's going to be saying.
Of course he wants it, but he's going to be saying,
Or if it means that if the government of Vietnam, the GDN, blocks either an agreement, which could be one-off down here, it may be that no agreement can be reached separately.
It's very possible no agreement can be reached separately.
Or if an agreement is reached separately,
And Vietnam decides to continue the war.
Now, there's no way, for example, that we would say, well, we'll get our prisoners back, but we'll continue to support Vietnam.
And we're not talking about months.
We're talking about weeks.
I did not get to liberty, but I've been flared who was a farmer.
It's going to be two weeks.
He said the committee will organize on the 5th.
The Congress meets on the 3rd.
The committee's going to organize on the 5th.
And they put this in the given, probably a high-priority rule in the House and the Senate.
And we're talking about the 10th.
We can't let this happen, though.
You're not going to let it happen.
You can't let it happen.
At least that's our job.
And you must speak, just as Dr. Kissinger speaks to me, my friend.
very frankly to you, President, that right now he must not break the American alliance.
The President has another point.
We cannot negotiate with them.
The May 8th agreement is a separate deal because we don't have the realistic threat that we'll continue bombing if they don't agree to it.
I mean, that would... You see, in May 8th, they know that we were going to continue bombing, which we did for months.
sitting there ready to chop it off.
So they are going to demand that we cut off hay to build, and that we have no protection for laws in Cambodia.
Well, in the end, I just want to make sure that my guests understand.
And I say I hope that we will be meeting in midway.
And that's what we'll be doing.
Midway physically, midway geographically, and midway on our agreement.
But most important, we're going to win.
You're going to win.
And you're going to win because
This country is still the most powerful in the world.
Also, with the kind of majority I have, I can act very, very strongly.
But I can act strongly only if I have, if we have an alliance that the American people want to support.
But if they don't want to support it, they aren't going to allow me to do it.
These are, you know, our lives.
And then you see the seal of the floor there.
That's the traditional mark there.
That's for your wife as a man.
That's not good.
That's not good.
That's not good.
That's not good.
We wish you the best.
And you worked hard.
You continue to work hard.
You'll work this out.
Because this alliance must stay.
President, you and I have stood together, and we must not break down.
And I'm not trying to be unreasonable, and neither is he.
But we've got to understand what the realities are.
There's a third party, that Congress, down there.
So let's not give in.
And also, there's another, there's a fourth party.
All of our enemies, his and mine, are oppressed.
And in the world, we want to see us fail and see us break up.
Let's not let that happen.
Pastor, good luck to you and your family.
Al, could I talk to you for a little while about Patricia's schedule?
Yes, sir.
Henry, if you could step back for just one minute.
I'll give you ten minutes without an extra athlete, please.
The You've talked about
Psychological problems, is that right?
Yes, sir.
What we have to do, of course, is see to what we're aggressively doing.
I think we'll have to give him a damn good rest.
That's what he needs.
He needs a rest and he needs to get a little bit of respect.
He came in to see me yesterday and brought up this other good and silly argument and said, give me a long song and dance.
This is what he said at all and he had said it.
and so forth and so on and so on.
He's never been on a horse.
He's lying.
He didn't mention it.
But in my view, Al is exactly what he said.
I think he said exactly what he said.
That's why I'm not saying that, because I have an ego problem.
What we have here is an ego problem that is quite serious.
And it goes to the edge.
Yes, sir, I do, although I did tell Bob that I think he goes to peaks and valleys, which is a classic case of this problem.
And he's now in much better shape.
Second point, I was glad he got a chance to see Casey.
Now we're putting Casey in.
I'm going to keep him below the surface for about five months.
He's not sturdy at all.
You trust Ray Martin very well.
They tell me he's one of the few that is on our side.
Yes, I do trust him.
I mean, if he was a weird operator, but he definitely, and the deputy administrator, thank you for the administration of a comfort job.
Does he know how the bodies are buried?
We're sure of that.
Yes, he does.
Would you trust him?
Yes.
See, Casey, somebody can trust us.
I don't know why we want to do this, but I'm going to let Casey.
Casey can leave it at that.
Yes, sir.
So, don't let it help, cuz I can't .
But that's all worked out.
All worked out.
In the meantime, the Casey thing, the operation is gonna get ready so that we can, cuz you can't go right after you've not got any players to replace people with.
But we've got it all set.
I've had some...
He'd like to be the junk guy over there, but I've had some real bummer reports from Walters on his Brazil contract.
He said I was very late.
Left?
That's enough.
All right.
Goddamn, who the hell is over there?
You're getting the same.
You're getting the same.
I wish I had that.
I'll come to the final point.
I talked to Mrs. Davis.
She's working it out.
She's a very nice lady.
I had her in the kitchen.
The schedule's all fine.
We have no choice with these people now.
No, no.
Goddamn.
I know this little guy understands it and so forth, but if they want to commit suicide, I'd tell her to do it.
Are they going to?
No.
It would be inconceivable.
This man is suicidal.
You don't think so?
No.
Why did he send that message this morning?
He came in here and he motivated the effect that she would lay out and all of it.
Not really in that way.
And that's what he tried to pull away from.
What he was saying is, for God's sake, if I can't get these three principles, then try to work out the May 8th proposition, in which you've cut the mining and the bombing in return for your prisoners and a ceasefire.
And then we'll continue to try to police the ceasefire with your help.
And if they break it, then we would hope you could, you know, be installed up.
You know,
What I told him was that he'd kill us with the Soviets.
He says he's got a message coming in from the North.
We have to meet.
Maybe they're going to break off the negotiations now.
But they have a tower.
I got it.
Also, go water.
Go water.
Criteria, you know, because this ever becomes public and you don't accept it, you're down to two.
And they don't understand.
I need that data to be cut off like that, like that.
They can't do that.
I think the meeting in Midway is an excellent idea if you will do it.
Yes, but I understand a meeting for the purpose only of my, of our agreeing
I will not go there to talk about the agreement.
That's impossible.
They're going to fight and negotiate right to the wire.
What's that?
They're going to fight right up to the wire.
You've pulled the wire tight today, that's the end of it.
And they now know it.
What do you mean?
Plan number 15, sir.
Henry did not take the .
It's been hard for him.
Emotional pattern.
Which works.
This past, well, he had three weeks where I thought he lost touch with Rihanna.
Started out in Paris.
First ran in October.
He drove that thing despite all the counsel I could give him.
Well, I was trying to tell him, you know what, he didn't want the goddamn thing.
But you don't want to get that.
You want to make these four or ten dollars.
You don't have to.
You don't have to.
Don't do that.
Anyway, in Saigon, he really lost touch because here he was sending two messages to the North Vietnamese, agreeing to it, knowing that you was not on board.
That's what caused our problem.
Now, this week, he started to regain himself.
And I think he did a very fine job last week.
Are you going with him?
Yes, sir.
Because he had you on the meetings.
Yes, sir.
In fact, the two private meetings I sat there.
We did the right thing.
We hinted the lead.
But we could never have done this with you.
Well, this has got to get you something in that meeting with the Joint Chiefs.
No, sir.
You know, it's conceivable.
I just don't think he'll do that.
I think he's going to come around.
He'll come around and we've got to have that communication completed in the next 24 hours.
The next 24 hours he'll come around?
We'll have to drive it to that.
I think he's going to wait.
He'll just wait to see what we get.
Well, he'll caveat it at a certain point.
But he's got to know
Why don't we give up the mining, the bombing?
Which is a hell of a .

Nixon, Kissinger & Duc on Vietnam War and Paris Peace Accords

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Nixon Library Finding Aid

Also recorded on November 30, 1972

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