Conversation 825-004

TapeTape 825StartSaturday, December 16, 1972 at 9:37 AMEndSaturday, December 16, 1972 at 9:50 AMParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Haig, Alexander M., Jr.;  Bull, Stephen B.Recording deviceOval Office

On December 16, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon, Alexander M. Haig, Jr., and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House from 9:37 am to 9:50 am. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 825-004 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 825-4

Date: December 16, 1972
Time: 9:37 am - 9:50 am
Location: Oval Office

The President met with Alexander M. Haig, Jr.

       Vietnam negotiations
            -Kissinger’s meeting with Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
                  -Status of talks
                  -Threat
                  -Soviet Union concern
                        -Breakdown in talks
                               -Delay
            -Vice President Spiro T. Agnew
                  -Meeting with the President
                        -Timing
                               -Kissinger’s briefing
                  -Conversation with Kissinger
                  -Briefing by Kissinger
                  -Conversation with Kissinger
                        -Kissinger’s briefing
                               -Nguyen Van Thieu
                  -Possible trip to Saigon with Haig
                  -Stalemate
                        -Cut off of US funds
                               -“Dove” line
                  -Meeting with the President
                  -Relations with the US
                  -Agnew
                        -Barry M. Goldwater’s view
                               -Letter to Haig
                                     -Charles H. Percy

Stephen B. Bull entered at an unknown time after 9:37 am.

       The President’s memorandum to Kissinger
                                               -4-

                   NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                        (rev. June-08)

                                                               Conversation No. 825-4 (cont’d)

Bull left at an unknown time before 9:50 am.

       Vietnam negotiations
            -Congressional relations
                 -Thieu
                        -Goldwater’s view
                              -Settlement agreement
                              -Percy
                                     -Cut off of US funds
            -Thieu
                 -Agnew
                 -Conversation with Haig, Kissinger
                 -Possible trip to Saigon
                 -Kissinger’s briefing
                        -North Vietnam

Bull entered and left at an unknown time before 9:50 am.

       Vietnam negotiations
            -Kissinger’s briefing
                  -The President’s memorandum to Kissinger, December 15, 1972
                  -Tone
                        -Richard M. Helm’s conversation with Kissinger
                        -The President’s memorandum, December 16, 1972
                               -Copy for Kissinger
                               -The President’s possible role
                               -Pace of talks
                                      -Enemy buildup
                               -October 8, 1972
                               -Kissinger’s “peace is at hand” statement, October 26, 1972
                               -Technical details
                               -Settlement agreement
                                      -Long war, short peace
                               -Exchange of messages
                               -Resumption of war
                               -Duration of talks
                                      -Casualties
                                           -US, North and South Vietnam
                               -North Vietnam’s delays
                                -5-

      NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                           (rev. June-08)

                                                 Conversation No. 825-4 (cont’d)

                 -Settlement agreement
                        -Timing
                              -Prisoners of War [POWs]
                              -Casualties
                                    -US, South and North Vietnam
                              -Enemy buildup
                              -Delays
                                    -North and South Vietnam
                              -Cease-fire
                              -South Vietnam’s self-determination
                                    -Battlefield to ballot box
                                          -The President’s memorandum,
                                           December 15, 1972
                              -Prolonging war and talks
                              -Resumption of talks
                 -US military action
                        -Air and sea
                              -Enemy buildup
                              -Haig’s view
                                    -Helms’s view
-Thieu
      -Haig’s trip to South Vietnam
            -Announcement
      -Agnew
            -Intentions
            -Meeting with the President
                   -Compared to the President’s meeting with William P. Rogers
                        -The President’s May 8, 1972 decision
-Kissinger’s briefing
      -The President’s schedule
      -Meeting with Kissinger
      -Tone
            -The President’s memorandum, December 15, 1972
            -Kissinger’s demeanor
                   -The President’s conversation with Kissinger, December 14,
                   -Breakdown in talks
                   -The President’s memorandum, December 15, 1972
-Kissinger’s view
                                             -6-

                    NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                       (rev. June-08)

                                                            Conversation No. 825-4 (cont’d)

             -Haig’s view
             -US bombing, mining north of 20th Parallel
                  -Public relations [PR]
                        -Kissinger’s view
                               -Demonstrations
                                     -White House
                        -Haig’s view
                               -Breakdown in talks
                                     -Press relations
                                           -North Vietnam
                                                  -B-52s
                               -Eastern Establishment

       The President’s schedule
            -Meeting with Agnew
                  -Duration
            -Kissinger’s schedule
                  -Dobrynin
                         -Note from Haig
                  -Meeting with the President

Haig left at 9:50 am.

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

They have come back, you know, they're very anxious to be sure that these talks don't fail on the surface.
And he's asked for it fairly specifically.
Yes.
So what Henry's trying to do is to get a postulate just after this.
Well, after this, he's going to come in to see me.
And, uh, right before the briefing.
And, of course, I just can't attend him.
I'm not giving him his advice or something.
I know what the problem is.
He called Henry last night.
He said Henry had briefed him yesterday in accordance with what we had laid off.
He had no difficulties with what was being done.
But Henry mentioned it.
Of course, we're going to have to take on two a little bit in this briefing to keep balance.
And he said he thought that was a mistake.
We shouldn't take on two.
And he said, you know, he's wrong.
My friend is wrong.
He's a goddamn fool.
I mean, that shows you we never can.
It shows you how dangerous it is.
I thought he was on board, Al.
He was totally on board with what we were doing.
for the credit.
But now we have a sale mate.
He said that we're going to have funds cut off.
On one hand, that's on the deli line.
He took on one hand.
And on the other hand, Henry, he took this.
He just doesn't know a goddamn thing.
He just bores in a lot of funds and credits.
He has to cut the message.
I'm trying to come in here.
Of course, you have to be there.
Well, there's no question about it.
We've got to maintain a balance that we're not being victimized by, too.
I think maybe Goldwater has sent him to the Vice President because he wrote me a letter about Percy's.
Yeah, but Goldwater takes the line all the week.
Is that camera on?
Yes, sir.
Go ahead and sign it.
Yes, he did, but he was
He was after Percy because Percy had cut off funds.
Well, the cutting off funds is something else again.
Yeah, right.
Yeah, that's what I didn't go to talk to.
What's the vice president?
You talked to him.
Henry's talked to him.
What is the trouble?
Well, there was none before when we were going to go on the trip.
He was fully on board to lay it to you.
But I think he feels in a public sense that Henry has to be careful not to
Be too critical of Jill.
But he's going to be too critical.
That would be more critical of an arm.
That's what I'm saying.
He might have come along.
But we can't look like complete students of Jill.
well i think elma said that told him so that well the finance of the people wouldn't be surprised but anyway here it is if you want to talk about
Here are some pertinent questions on your briefing today, having in mind the age of strength and portions which might be interpreted as meaning that we are willing to go along with the present phase of negotiations without needing some action to stop the office and to build up an action which would bring the negotiations to a quick conclusion.
and patiently trying to work out what this is Henry talking about, tactically detailed, so that there will be no misunderstandings.
The clarifications and changes that we have insisted on have had only one purpose.
After a very long war, we don't want to end up with a settlement which will bring only a sharp peace.
That is the critical line.
But now the remaining differences can be settled within a matter of a few hours by an exchange of messages between the sides and without a program meeting, provided there is a series of change on both sides,
to negotiate a real and lasting peace rather than to try to gain some advantage which will enable one side or the other to remove the war.
We had been talking with the enemy for over four years.
During that four years, 5,000 Americans, North Vietnamese and South Vietnamese, had lost their lives.
The time has now come to bring talking, and the war would end.
Reluctantly, you would have to say that for the past 30 days,
The way the other side has gone up the hill and down the hill in various proposals would indicate a filibuster rather than a serious intent to reach a settlement and end the fighting.
We want a rapid settlement for three reasons.
First, from a personal standpoint, our POWs.
We want the release of our POWs.
Some of whom have been incarcerated for over six years.
Second, we want to stop fighting because our U.S. casualties are minimal.
With several weeks in which there have been no field of action, South Vietnamese and North Vietnamese are still dying in battle for the thousands every week.
And third, we want to settle it now, because we will not tolerate allowing peace talks to be used as a cover for a military build-up, which could mean a step-up of the war in the future.
Both the North Vietnamese and the South Vietnamese must share responsibility for the delay in reaching a summit.
Each side wants to gain advantages of the peace people that it has not and cannot give in the battlefield.
It is time to have the ceasefire and let the people of South Vietnam decide, by their bad votes, what kind of government they want for South Vietnam.
It is time, in the name of the previous memorandum, that we move this conflict from the battlefield to the ballot box.
Consequently, we are going to step up our pressure on both sides for a faster settlement.
In taking this course, we are doing it in the interest on both sides.
Neither side can gain from continuing the war.
Neither side can gain from prolonging the war.
Neither side can gain from prolonging the peace talks.
We are ready to resume the talks and to reach rapid settlement whenever the enemy is ready to do so.
In the meantime, the President will continue to order whatever actions he considers necessary by heresy to prevent what appears now to be an ominous buildup in North Vietnam for the purpose of launching a new offensive against South Vietnam.
That's the kind that's going on in New York, isn't it?
Yes, sir.
I don't know they should be quite so specific on what we're going to do.
These guys will walk into a board mess up there.
It may be a little too specific.
Well, that's what helps one solve something more.
To cover it up, yeah, exactly.
Maybe you don't want that specific guy.
I don't think we should tell them.
Let's take right on the air action.
That part I cut out.
I think the other is exactly right.
It strikes a tone between both.
You've got to say both sides.
And this is going to be quite evident in any event when my trip is announced.
It's going to be interpreted as a strong push again on two.
I know.
So everything that you're saying.
I think the idea is that
I mean, he's so well-meaning, well-intentioned, and known.
But there's no way he can know this.
He has no feel for what...
He has no self-development.
Now, he's going to come in and tell me the obvious.
Please don't take you on, Mr. President.
There are lots of people around here that are with you.
I just want to warn you.
Just like writers come in and say, gee, deliver me if you think it'll work.
Exactly.
Jesus Christ, what a crisis they want.
I mean...
He's got to be in there confident.
The reason I really never had to mess today, I can tell from his tone the first time he got in, the first time I talked to him, and it's gradually improved.
destroy him with sort of a defensive attitude with regard to explaining the god damn failure of the talks.
And he just shouldn't be that way.
You notice the memory I had when I wrote it was, I didn't take any time.
I just busted off the top of his head, just like this.
Confident that way.
He just needed to be defensive.
That's right.
Well, he's, I think that's turned him.
He now is very confident in that.
He thinks he's doing the right thing.
Doing the right thing?
He thinks he's doing the right thing.
We've just drawn another ship in the body.
That's all.
We're going to catch them.
We'll catch them.
Of course, Henry thinks they're going to be marching around.
I don't believe this.
I think there's going to be more disappointment about the talks not proceeding.
That's right.
Far less about the bombing.
If you read the news today, they think we're knocking the hell out of North Vietnam.
Anyhow, heavy speed 52 to the war north of the area north against North Vietnam.
I don't think that's going to be the issue.
The issue is going to be the disappointment
with another delay in peace, not the fact that we're bonding.
But I don't think that's going to be overriding either.
There's nobody that wants, they want you to be responsible on this.
That's what you've been, and that's going to get a, except for some of this East Coast establishment, why I don't think this is going to be a difference.
and get him the hell out of here in a reasonable time since I've had to get him.
Wouldn't it be an ability to get him the hell out of the house?
You shouldn't really take that much time.
Well, why don't I sit in the middle?
But I'd like to talk to him.
Why don't you do that?