President Nixon met with John Dean and Stephen Bull to discuss the upcoming Senate Watergate hearings and the administration's strategy for handling executive privilege claims. Key topics included the appointment of minority counsel, communication with Attorney General Kleindienst and Senator Baker, and the potential for leaks from the FBI. Nixon and Dean agreed to revise a statement on executive privilege to allow for informal discussions while barring formal testimony before committees, and discussed how to manage Kleindienst's testimony and potential fallout from FBI investigations.
On February 27, 1973, President Richard M. Nixon, John W. Dean, III, and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House from 3:55 pm to 4:20 pm. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 864-004 of the White House Tapes.
Nixon Library Finding Aid
Conversation No. 864-4
Date: February 27, 1973
Time: 3:55 pm-4:20 pm
Location: Oval Office
The President met with John W Dean, III.
[A transcript of the following conversation may be found in RG 460, Box 172, pp. 1-21.]
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Conversation No. 864-4 (cont’d)
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[Begin transcribed portion]
Stephen B. Bull entered at an unknown time after 3:55 pm during the transcribed portion.
Bull left at an unknown time before 4:20 pm during the transcribed portion.
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Dean left at 4:20 pm.
Transcript (AI-generated)
This transcript was made by an AI model listening to the recording (gemini-3.8-flash) and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Speaker names are the model's inference from the voices and the participant list. Words and names can still be wrong — verify against the audio and the finding aid before citing.
DeanNo, he hasn't. Uh, he called Sam Ervin and offered to come to both he and Baker, and uh that was done last week.
DeanAnd he thought the timing would be bad to call Baker prior to the joint meeting, so he says, "After I have that joint meeting, I'll start working my relationship with Baker."
NixonBaker [unintelligible] he was planning [unintelligible]
DeanErvin just left it dangling and said, "I'll be back in touch with you."
DeanI think what what disturbs me a little bit about Baker, was his move to put his own man in as minority counsel so quickly, without any consultation, as he had promised consultation.
DeanAnd, I'm told this man may be a disaster in himself, the minority counsel.
NixonBaker says, he puts the blame on the White House. He says [unintelligible] Harlow has called him and suggested somebody else, and that is a great mistake, because he doesn't want [unintelligible]
DeanWell, Baker too, was quite open in his soliciting, "I want a counsel with you all, and I don't want to move until I've told you what I'm going to do," and then, he did just the reverse.
DeanSo, it was curious: one, that he wanted a meeting with you, uh, secondly, that uh he suggested Kleindienst as a conduit.
NixonWell, that's what he indicated. He indicated, but, of course of course, with regard to his uh situation, his position now and with regard to Kleindienst's position, I uh, I shook Kleindienst up a bit night before last.
NixonReal reason is the is the fellow that's going to get hurt most of this, if thus, essentially. So, that we should get hurt too uh, essentially, it's uh, it's the real problem is what they're not [unintelligible]
NixonI said, now the the perjury is very damn hard thing to prove, fortunately.
NixonBut uh I mean, if you get these people popping off. And, they told, "Well, I I think I talked to Kleindienst and Mueller's walked in here," never happens.
NixonDid you go over the facts and part of it with Kleindienst, or did you get into any of the substance at all?
DeanI've always I've always braced Kleindienst in the past about, you know, the potential implications of what this whole investigation the bureau conducted, what the US attorney's office was doing, what the trial meant.
DeanI, at this last meeting, I just had with him, I said, "Dick," I said, "I don't think I ought to brief you on everything I know. I don't think that's the way to to proceed.
DeanBut if I see you going down the wrong track, I'm going to have to tell you why."
NixonOn the executive privilege one, I worked with uh talk to John Ehrlichman a little and we decided that the last paragraph which uh should be modified so that it covers what I might have to say if I were asked at a press conference, he'll indicate.
NixonIn other words in in a nut shell, rather than simply bluntly saying that I didn't What we should say is uh that uh that uh that the uh that members of the president's staff will not appear before formal sessions of commission-
NixonHowever, under proper, appropriate circumstances, that uh informal discussions or so forth, can be conducted to obtain information, and so forth, and so on.
NixonI want to- I have, I tell you what you're what we're up against, what I hear is uh
NixonKleindienst, Kleindienst has indicated to me, and maybe he did to you-
Nixonthat uh he felt that the back-up position ought to be an executive session of the committee.
NixonAnd I said, "Well, that's a hell of a difficult thing." Uh, what I have in mind, I said, I think the position should be one of uh, our position should be one of uh, uh assuming, that you can't get broad agreement, which is unlikely,
Nixonuh of the two of the uh ranking committee members and counsel questioning any member of the White House staff, you know, under proper proper restrictions, and so on and so on.
Nixonshut up. Baker, Baker, probably uh, probably wants to get, for the same reason Ervin does, because of the publicity and so forth, wants you all down at the White House and, then, the glare of the lights.
NixonThat we cannot have. On the other hand, we cannot have a stonewall, uh, so that it appears that we're not letting them-
NixonAnd so, I think we've got to be in a position, do, do Did you discuss this with Kleindienst, as to what the position would be on that point? That's, I think, John, is the important thing that Kleindienst has got to stand goddamned firm on.
DeanI did. I talked to him about that. I said that uh, one, there's a statement forthcoming, I don't know the timing on it, the President will issue.
DeanAnd then what, as a practical matter, I told him, would probably happen, it'd be much like the Flanagan situation, where there's an exchange and then the issues become very narrow as to the information that's sought.
NixonWell, you worked with, after you talked to John Ehrlichman, you work in revising that last paragraph.
NixonAnd, let me take a look at it again, and then we'll approve the statement. I don't want to put it out right now, because I did it depended somewhat on what I decide to do on that, on the press conference.
DeanIt'll probably be easier not to have those questions in your press conference, as you say.
NixonI would prefer That's why I want to do it, we can have this statement come out after the press conference to say, if they ask me, I'll say,
Nixon"I have covered that in a statement that will be issued tomorrow in executive privilege, it's very complicated, and I would [unintelligible] see it."
DeanTold him one, what became the case, and I had an extended discussion with him on the executive privilege question. Of course, he differs somewhat from where we're coming out, but he agrees that certainly the President has the legal authority to do that.
DeanMansfield himself, Mr. President, has recognized that communications between you and your staff are protected. He said this in a policy statement before they issued this resolution up there on having confirmable individuals agree to testify before they are confirmed.
NixonWell, I'm sorry that confirmable individuals concern, they're all available for testimony, though.
NixonThere's no problem there. We're not to give away by any means, you know, that. They of course will, uh, they they they can I guess we we would not normally claim executive privilege for a Cabinet officer.
DeanNo, sir, only only if in say the rare instances where we have already where they're going for information which should be protected, investigative files, uh, classified material for say aid programs and something when we did it in the past, IRS files, those are instances in which we've done it.
DeanAnd they're quite traditional and and should be expected by the Congress and they go after information like that.
NixonI don't know whether open or blind instincts that just to show you how the we're in currents here, but when we went through the Hiss case, there we were investigating not an espionage by a political one political organization against another, but a charge of espionage against the United States of America, which is a hell of a lot more serious.
NixonAnd in that case, the Department of Justice, the White House, the FBI totally stonewalled the committee.
NixonWhich uh they really they really know is true. And you know, these instances that they talk about about the uh but our bugging in the FBI stuff, believe me, I know exactly what those were.
NixonIt was limited as hell. And Hoover, and good God, we could have used them for every excuse. But Johnson had just apparently, just used them all the time for this sort of thing.
DeanThat's what I'm learning. They're more and more [crosstalk] these things.
NixonWell, who's who's who from the FBI is trying to put out this stuff on us?
DeanNo, I I confronted Sullivan, as a matter of fact, right after this. I said, "Bill," I said, uh, I called him into my office. I said, "I'm going to tell you what Time Magazine says they have."
DeanHis reaction was not that of a man who has leaked something. Uh,
DeanAnd then he held- he told me, he said, "If this ever comes down to the very short strokes," he said, "as far as I'm concerned, this was Hoover and Sullivan,
Deanno one else. And I'm ready to stand forward and take it as that."
DeanI said, "Well, I don't think it's ever going to be that because uh"
NixonWell, how- why did he Hoover and Sullivan, you mean, Hoover ordered him to do it?
DeanThey did this so that he could say, "I could cite examples, chapter and verse, of Hoover telling me to do things like this."
NixonNow Sullivan knows that they were it was carefully it was limited. That's right.
NixonAnd and after that, I think, we did request though, we'd say, "Find out the leaks," and so Hoover goes and bugs people. But I I can't believe that it,
DeanThe way The way it's fostered now, uh we can stonewall it, Gray can go up there in his confirmation hearing, he's not going to have to bother with it because they've accused him in the article of being sitting on top of the bugs if they were there once he came in, which is not factual.
NixonWe stopped it, John. We got rid of them and we got rid of the Army bugs, we got, you know, that whole army and espionage business, intelligence business, we got. You remember that?
Nixonyou can't blame Hoover. I'm sure he didn't do it unless uh, Johnson asked him to, but Johnson was that kind of a man. He used the FBI as his own private tool, but God we've been as careful, but I've talked to Hoover any number of times and we've never ordered anyone.
DeanJohnson, uh Johnson used the FBI to cover the uh, New Jersey convention uh, before he dropped out officially. He had all the delegates, which is kind of fantastic.
DeanMhm. Sullivan's a wealth of knowledge and I the more I, you know, sort of gently chat with him about these problems, the more comes out. He's the man that can also document them.
NixonWhy did Hoover have a fight with It was a hell of a mistake for Hoover to do that. Sullivan knows too much.
DeanHe told Pat Coyne. Coyne told Rockefeller. Rockefeller relayed this to Kissinger. This was one channel that might have it in the public domain. The other
Deanis when Sullivan took the records or all the documents in connection with this out of his office and out of the Bureau, he also instructed the Washington Field Office to destroy all of their records, which they did.
DeanHoover, incensed that that he couldn't reconstruct or didn't have the records and couldn't get them from Sullivan, tried to have the Washington Field Office reconstruct them, which they couldn't. As a result of that movement and flailing around by Hoover,
Deana lot of people in the agency were aware of what had happened, and it was on the grapevine.
NixonOh, that's why it happened, that way. When Sullivan left, he took the records with him?
DeanHe took the records with him. That's the only records that weren't—the only records that were
NixonShould have been out of the FBI. Is he pissed off at Hoover?
DeanNo, Hoover never got his hands on the records is what happened. Sullivan had them. Sullivan had his his pissing match with Hoover and then and he took them with him at that time,
DeanI think Mark Felt has poisoned Gray on this issue, and I think once Gray is out—
NixonHell, somebody's doing Mark Felt in, you know. But you—do you believe what Time magazine's lawyer—is Felt [unintelligible] Is he capable of this sort of thing?
DeanWell, let me tell you where I where else I heard that from was Sandy Smith had told not not the lawyer, but somebody else that Felt was his source. And this came to Henry Petersen.
DeanNow, Henry Petersen is an old hand over there as you know, and bless his soul, he's a valuable man to us.
DeanYes. He knows about that. I called Felt, asked him what he knew about it, and he was, for example, very cool when I I said there's a Time magazine story running, Mark, in '68 or or in '69 and '70, and so on and so forth. And he said I said, "True or false?" He said, "True."
DeanI said, "How do you know that?" I said, "I've never heard of that before." He said, "Well, you talk to Bill Sullivan. He'll tell you all about it." And then he gave me sort of a general painted a general picture about it.
NixonWhat does he say about denying that he has? How is he going to stand up for the denial?
DeanHe says, "John," he said I said, "Well, first of all, I don't I don't believe this could happen." I was protecting us as far as knowing what he said. He said, "Well, John, as far as I'm concerned, our our phone call is totally off the record. We never had it."
NixonIn other words, you can't blow the whistle on Felt, just like you can't blow the whistle on the son of a bitch out there at the UN in the, uh, in the Dan Anderson case, right?
DeanThat's right, but the well become it there will come a day when Gray is comfortably in there, when other things come to pass,
DeanI I think that Gray can at some point when he if this sort of thing continues once he gets through his confirmation, I don't know why he couldn't himself say, "I'm going to take a lie detector test, and I'm going to ask everybody in my immediate shop to take one, and then we're going to go out and ask some of the other agents to take them."
DeanAs to leakage, because it's it only hurts his whole institution.
NixonWhere are you, uh, where do you stand with, uh, in regard to, uh—
NixonHow how will we leave it on the Kleindienst hearings, or let me put it this way: You take the responsibility for Kleindienst. I want to keep Ehrlichman and Haldeman out of it,
Nixonout of their any relationship with Kleindienst. You should have it, only. But, you've got to watch him and brace him on the executive privilege thing. Did you did you tell him what the line is?
DeanI I have I have told him, and I I said, "It's going to be enforced" Did he did Gray did Gray indicate that they're hurrying executive sessions, which
NixonAll right. Shirley knows what the back-up position is, which is to, right, if I understand it, that we wouldn't under proper restrictions allow the two committee members to come down and they'll interview you.
DeanI think we ought to I think we ought to draw the line at written interrogatories.
DeanI think the position should be that you are holding nothing back information-wise.
DeanThat's right, that'll be sworn. Uh, you can't be in a position of of protecting any anybody around here. The information has to be available, but to go up there and make a circus out of the appearance of of people.
NixonWe should find out such information as we can, but, uh, not that we ever use, but we've just got to be awful careful. Joe Kraft, of course,
Nixonshould have been put. I'm convinced the son of a bitch is practically an agent for the Communists.
DeanOn what you said about Bob and John, too, I think as before the election, I tried to only bother them or consume any of their time when it was just absolutely essential, and I think that's the way to do it.
NixonIf you could, uh, do your best to, uh, You can keep me posted and, uh, call and check to, uh, that where you need to, but particularly with relation to Kleindienst, okay?
Also recorded on February 27, 1973
416-001 2:48 PM · 16 min — President Richard M. Nixon and John D. Ehrlichman met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building from 2:48 pm to 3:40 pm.
416-002 3:40 PM · 14 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Manolo Sanchez met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 3:40 pm and 3:46 pm.
864-001 3:46 PM · 24 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 3:46 pm and 3:55 pm.
864-002 3:46 PM · 5 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 3:46 pm and 3:55 pm.
864-003 3:46 PM · 27 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 3:46 pm and 3:55 pm.
864-005 4:21 PM · 16 min — President Richard M. Nixon, Peter M. Flanigan, Luigi Raimondi, White House photographer, and Manolo Sanchez met in the Oval Office of the White House from 4:21 pm to 4:36 pm.
864-006 4:36 PM · 12 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and David C. Hoopes met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 4:36 pm and 4:37 pm.
864-007 4:37 PM · 40 min — President Richard M. Nixon, Richard M. Helms, and Henry A. Kissinger met in the Oval Office of the White House from 4:37 pm to 5:19 pm.
Conversation 864-004, February 27, 1973. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives (NAID 417182539). Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/864-004 (accessed November 15, 2026).