Nixon, Kissinger & Ziegler on Prisoner of War release

Nixon[unintelligible]
KissingerYeah, but they have agreed. They have given us the list.
NixonWe've got the list.
KissingerNow we've got the list. They haven't given us the day yet, but—
NixonI see. But the list is—
KissingerBut that's really now a matter of a day or two. We expect them to be out over the weekend.
NixonGood.
KissingerRight. Now you've checked the list, we have to set up transportation, find them, and make sure that they start to release. Sunday, no later than Sunday. Saturday, Sunday.
NixonWhat is your advice then on the press? We got to go around.
KissingerI think it's a success. Tomorrow would be the day that the Paris conference signs its its uh final document.
Nixon[unintelligible] might just as well leave it, might't we? Uh in other words,
KissingerYou know, Henry, that must say, over the the way you've you've handled, in fact, must say that it's just incredible. It's over. You've had a really a double-team operation. Having to pry the info to those bastards. Oh, yeah. And then holding Rogers in check.
NixonYou know, that's the you know, sitting around. I was thinking as I was reading that book on Kennedy. God damn it, Henry, what they did to the Berlin Wall then. What happened? How they did, for example, you have told me before how they how the Skybolt and Nassau thing And they said that Brilliant summary was made, I think, by Howard Smith at the time.
NixonWhen he said, "By canceling Sky- the Skybolt we forever we we practically ruined our relations with the British and then by trying to redo the to do the the damage, a 36-hour meeting Just think, 36 hours at Nassau with poor old Macmillan. We did in the French, and it was that that really led to the French veto of the Common Market to de Gaulle, and to de Gaulle's
Nixongetting out of NATO. That goddamned Nassau meeting." Do you agree with that? Not a question. What, by the name of God, were you around here then? What would What did you think? Did you ever, oh, oh, I saw you were a candidate. But did you ever give any advice?
NixonAll these other people around. No, but nobody told Kennedy, that he couldn't do that. I know
Kissingeruh what happened. On the Skybolt, I had left before the Skybolt decision. I wrote an article in the Reporter attacking the Skybolt decision.
NixonGood.
KissingerAnd then after It was an incredible thing. It isn't because of the Skybolt, or Nassau. None of this. This is all typically, like, but it's the pressure. Shilly the goddamned British is what it did. Did it without consulting the French.
KissingerAlso, Mr. President, here he had come out with a great victory on the Cuban Missile Crisis, for two or three months after. What does he do?
KissingerHe he offends the Italians and Turks by pulling out the missiles.
NixonHe ruined And also, that that also had a bad effect on the British and the French.
KissingerIt did. He ruins our relations with the British by the Skybolt. He ruins our relations with France by Nassau, all of it in three weeks. And how does he do it? By getting flustered, by visiting here, uh talking, drama,
Kissingeruh lots of announcements. Nobody really knows how you handled this week's crisis. Most of it will be Most of it will be in the Jordan crisis. Haldeman said that the Jordan was one of our toughest.
NixonAnd India-Pakistan was tough, but nobody knows how we handle either of those things.
KissingerBefore that, that's how it's hard.
NixonNow Cienfuegos was tough.
KissingerWell, three times.
NixonThat's right.
KissingerWhat?
NixonThat's right.
NixonKennedy would have been out there whooping and hooting around. But anyway, but, you know, I'm going to say, however, on the business of the other, I was I had had a meeting with Bob yesterday on I think we need a formal even if we have to make something up to to have it, a formal NSC meeting once a month.
KissingerI agree.
NixonAnd every 4 weeks. Now, we haven't had one for 1. We haven't had any for 1. And what I would do is to it would seem to me that the first subject you want to do is Europe. And as to that, I think you should also know that I have uh, uh, uh if you want to know how it is, I can say it, I told Haldeman that neither Shultz nor Kline be at the NSC meeting
Nixonunless there is something that they're there for. We had Mitchell for other reasons, and we have Connally for other reasons. And I don't think Now, if we have, for example, a talk on the European community, we might have Shultz, but I don't want him there for assault.
KissingerNo.
NixonSee my point?
KissingerWell, next week, Mr. President, we need a meeting on SALT, really.
NixonAll right. Fine.
NixonNow, another piece is I think the NSC ought to take up this whole business of our new posture here. Maybe they ought to see ought to go over and see the goddamn uh Let's go over and look at the uh at that, you know, that not that Pentagon, let's go over and see it.
KissingerNow, my strong advice, Mr. President, on that, that we should have an NSC meeting on Europe. There's no way the NSC as a group can go to Europe without giving me a
Kissingerwith you.
NixonI have a position to get the bastards all get them in and get Richardson, Rogers, and the rest all Oh, now one other thing. I want to tell you this. With the NSC, I'm going to make one change which is very important for the future. I want Clements always in there.
KissingerAll right.
NixonSit back in the other, huh? That gives us an opportunity to have Rush invited to sit back with Rogers, because we have to be ready for that.
KissingerRush is coming anyway.
NixonWell, in all these cases, but Clements in every meeting, now put every meeting. I'll tell you why. There's a good precedent for that. In the Eisenhower years, both State and Defense always brought their deputies. Now, there were reasons that we didn't want the deputies in the old days, but with these two men out
KissingerWe had the deputies of State, never of Defense.
NixonYeah, but that's And I think Clements—
KissingerPlus we need to bounce Richardson.
NixonAnd how.
NixonYou know what I mean?
KissingerRichardson is really showing his true colors and—
NixonIs he?
KissingerYeah. But, you know, he's basically a decent a decent egg, but uh—
NixonWell, can I suggest that, but what I want the NSC, I'd like to get the NSC meeting in at that time, very frankly, just for a bull session. In other words, I would rather do that than to sometimes have them walk on something that you and I would be working on privately, if you get my point.
KissingerYeah.
KissingerYeah.
NixonI don't want to get them too involved in uh, you know, we can't tell them what our real European strategy is.
KissingerSee, what I think we ought to aim for with Europe Then you could have a meeting, for example, on Latin America.
KissingerWe must have.
NixonYou get my point? Why not a meeting on Latin America?
KissingerWe must.
NixonAnd, hell, we can have an NSC meeting for less than uh or uh not a long one. Let's make one of One could be just an hour. They need to touch the troll, that's it, these guys. And then and now and then a subject could come up, and I will be resolute, and I can ring them out a little.
NixonNow I could say, "Now I want to do this." And Rush will sit there and hear it. See? Because we shouldn't have we should The next one should be on SALT, then the next one after that we could be ready for Europe.
NixonSALT, and, you know,
Kissingerand then Latin America.
NixonGood.
KissingerI've got a study going on Europe, but it isn't ready yet uh for presentation to the NSC.
NixonHow about coming here April 1st?
KissingerMiddle of April.
KissingerI'm just now turning to it, Mr. President.
NixonDon't, don't, don't.
KissingerBecause really all my good people have been on these trips with me, but starting today uh—
NixonWell, don't push it. If we do it even in May, it's all right.
KissingerI have um one personnel question. Shultz uh is considering appointing an under secretary, which would be the number four man in his department, Yeah. to handle international economic affairs. Now, he'd like to take Sonnenfeldt from my staff.
NixonDo you need him?
KissingerWell, I don't Well, I'd just as soon have him over there, because if I keep him—
NixonWell, you know, Sonnenfeldt, I know has a he pushed me in something like the irritation and so forth, but Sonnenfeldt, the times I've seen him, I'm very He's just goddamned smart. And, boy, Henry, you you they're very few intelligent people, smart people, that are hard-line, and I would—
KissingerUnless you've got another hard-liner, that is as smart as he, as Sonnenfeldt is. But I could bring Larry Eagleburger back here to take Sonnenfeldt's place.
NixonAnd, well, you do what you want.
NixonSonnenfeldt though should be kept in the government. He's a fellow I know with with with with the brains.
KissingerAnd he's a hard-liner, of course. With iron, yes, that's what I mean, a hard-liner.
NixonDon't throw him don't put him although because of the uh because he may be because of personal differences.
KissingerNo, there're no personal differences, on substance, I agree with him 100%.
Kissingerdeputy to me. In order to keep him, I'd have to make him deputy assistant. He he won't stay in this job. If I make him deputy, I may have a morale problem among my other people because of his aggressive personality.
NixonShultz, well Shultz would be lucky to get him. How about getting him something in State?
NixonIs there any place else where you could use him or he'd be he'd be in Defense?
KissingerWell, ah Richardson won't take him and I ah
NixonWell, who the hell is he taking, by the way? Is there anybody he wants?
KissingerNo, he's going after a guy that I wanted for International Economics, ah Chuck Cooper, who has
NixonWhy ISA is more important, Henry. We want a weak sister in there.
KissingerNo, if Sonnenfeldt could get ISA, that would be excellent.
NixonWould it?
KissingerYeah.
NixonYeah, but then you'd take Cooper, you'd get
KissingerWell, I want if if
NixonWould you like Sonnenfeldt in that job?
KissingerSonnenfeldt would be excellent in ISA.
NixonAnd then does that mean you will still have the use of his brain, Henry?
KissingerPlus my own. But I'd have the use of his brains also at Treasury, though he's also.
NixonHe's so damn, Henry, he's so damn [unintelligible]
KissingerThat is best at Treasury.
NixonLeast got to say for Shultz, he he doesn't he doesn't dig telltale things.
KissingerNo, Shultz's weakness, of course, is we have weak seconds. But he's great.
NixonFinances can be pretty good, aren't they? And Shultz, you know, he he handles problems with a lot of self-reliance, and so on. I don't know how he does it. Shultz is a valuable man, Henry.
KissingerShultz is a Shultz
NixonIt's just, he's got he's got all the he's got the toughness. He's he basically is hopeless, not like this, but he has he doesn't show it like the outside, but boy, in terms of the uh in terms of tenacity and quietness, and so forth,
Kissingerand resolve, and thoughtfulness. Where Shultz won't move until And, also, what has impressed me about Shultz
Kissingeris, you know, he gets invited to many of these Santa Barbara ideas. Never has he pandered to the Georgetown [crosstalk] Never.
NixonYes, he's so confident.
KissingerHe never tolerated a joke about you or a joke about the administration. He's always 100% with you. And, see, Peterson used to be susceptible to that.
NixonWell, you know, it's a shame. Petersen was ah Petersen was so good, but I think there's a little flaw in character there, I don't know. He isn't He isn't all the heavyweight, but uh I was
KissingerI must confess, Mr. President, I I was sorry that you let Peterson go.
NixonSo was I.
KissingerBut, his behavior since you let him go indicated you were right. It was not the behavior of a mature man.
NixonWhat ah Look, he was going to be offered the World Bank thing, but he wouldn't take it. He wouldn't take it.
KissingerThat was a hell of a position.
NixonAnd it isn't right. And it just isn't worthy of a of a man to go around making all these bitter comments that he did.
KissingerNo.
NixonWell, I want to ask
KissingerI had wanted to talk to you about this, Mr. President, simply because I've got to call them about how
NixonGo ahead. Walk on them. Now, it's one of the more important things. You see, after after the comments just now you can't just give 48 hours and not let him get them. Good.
NixonSo, Henry So, Henry, let me ask you a couple questions. Henry called me at midnight last night when I finished the others. About 30. Good.
NixonProbably the only one who didn't cry. So I would say Henry, and only you, Henry, know what really in some of this happened, what really happened, though, shit, it wasn't expected.
NixonIt's the fact that we made this tough line. We didn't let Rogers go in, sign that goddamned document. Eh, we sent and without bravado, rather than proud publicly, privately wacked the message in there and had those planes drop drop off stop the withdrawals.
NixonThat got to them. We sent about four or five messages, which they don't know about, in the middle of the night. But they had the they had to lead to
KissingerMr. President, you you shouldn't forget either now. Is that how we avoided that the Jordan crisis?
NixonWe worked night after night. State never had the slightest goddamned idea what we were doing there. And, also, it's how we saved what's left of Pakistan, Henry.
KissingerIf we hadn't moved that carrier in, then Pakistan would have been swallowed up. We don't have Absolutely.
KissingerAnd then we demanded that they give us a guarantee against attacking West Pakistan.
NixonYeah. Shoot. Yeah, but they did. So anyway, the point that I make is to return to the Star's headline, goddamnit, [unintelligible]
NixonWell, they said, "Reds Stiffen Their Terms".
KissingerWas that the early?
NixonYeah, earlier headline. But then
KissingerThey had that They had that headline before Ron briefed, then they switched it after the briefing.
NixonYeah, after the. But, you see, I called Ron about that. I tried to get you your your reading. I called Ron. I said, "What in the name of God is this?" And, uh Oh, he says this came out before the thing. But I'm glad I I I'd like to get I'm glad I'm right about that son-of-a-bitch, that A.P. bastard out there, Huh?
KissingerArbuckle?
NixonYeah. I think so. I think it's Arbuckle. Arbuckle is always he's never been right.
KissingerThey didn't hold the cards this week. They just couldn't have won it this week. And it's Well, the reason I'm
NixonLet me ask you this. Yeah. Okay, fine. I'm sorry. I will be asked in an hour for Comment. How we did it? No, no, no, no, no. Well then, what's your reaction? Mr. President, please,
NixonWell, I wouldn't Well, first, don't characterize my reaction as, "Well, the President is elated," and, "Now we'll see any moves for it." Just say we are the uh Don't gloat about it.
NixonJust say uh the uh
Nixonthat that the as as the President indicated, the we are we are we are we are this government
Nixonis vitally interested in the uh implementation of the entire agreement. Uh and we will use our influence with all parties concerned to see that that agreement is uh is uh is uh is uh
Nixonimplemented. Uh However, of the highest priority, among other priority, of the highest priority is strict adherence
Nixonuh to the uh the POW release, without linkage, just as the agreement provides. There cannot be and and uh
Nixonand we you could say, you might even say, that one of one of the problems in reaching the final agreement was that we always insisted in the arduous negotiations in the long negotiations before we finally reached agreement in no linkage.
KissingerCorrect.
NixonCorrect? No linkage because to anything other except the withdrawal of American forces and the removal of mines. And no linkage to any other thing.
KissingerIt's not even linked to the removal of mines.
NixonWell, the withdrawal of American forces. Now, therefore uh and and then and then we will we are we are we are we and there can be no deviation whatever. Uh, not one iota of deviation.
Nixonfrom that provision of the agreement. That's what we were insisting upon. We uh we uh we uh we uh
Nixonwe believe that uh
Nixonthe uh we are certainly are pleased, not only because of the the fact that the POWs are to be released, but we're also pleased, too, because
Nixonthe other side uh is adhering to this agreement now, once we have brought it to their attention. And firm uh like that. No gloating or anything like that. The other thing is that what about the balance of the ceasefire? Aren't uh Aren't uh Have you Have you Have you, well, have you lectured Mr. Thieu and so forth? Well, how about I like to discuss that.
KissingerMake sure When you say of the highest priority, you don't want to say the highest priority, is that? No.
NixonI don't I don't want to indicate that we that we fought this war for our prisoners, see? That's why I have always said of the I don't never want you to say of the only priority is to get the prisoners back. One of the highest priorities. You can say one of the highest priorities.
KissingerAnd then the other stuff
NixonSo you're not bringing this man in?
KissingerNo, but
ZieglerThey have had an initial action. We did get that in. Yeah, if you can perhaps avoid the very first sentence, which gives a very enthusiastic answer to
KissingerYeah, if you can perhaps avoid to bury the first sentence, which gives it, uh- to your present answer to
ZieglerYeah, a flat line to whatever was initial action would be to say, as the President has pointed out, that we- the- our interest in this matter was to bring the prisoners home. They are coming home. You don't insist, stay off that. Put it that way, and that there can be no deviation, whatever, that the- that the agreement clearly states that they should, and there can be no deviation, whatever, from that area. And no links to any other matter.
NixonYou almost stay- stay off that, put it that way, and that there can be no deviation whatever. That the- that the agreement clearly states that they should and that there can be no deviation whatever. That area. No link with that or any other matter. Absolutely. Now, on Mrs. Meir, most of what I said, but here is- here is the situation. Here is the situation. We had a major crisis with it that didn't bother you over the weekend because we condemned Israel in the United Nations for the shootdown.
KissingerNow, on Mrs. Meir, most of what I said, but here is- here is the situation. Here is the situation. We had a major crisis with it that didn't bother you over the weekend because we condemned Israel in the United Nations for the shootdown, and she said she's not elected to see us. And she's come over here. Why she's in this country, why did we do that? Well, it was it was stupidity. Uh, Scali talked to the Israelis up there,
NixonWhy did we do that? It was stupidity. Scali talked to the Israelis up there,
KissingerYeah. uh, but the Israeli said their guy up there is very anti-American. He's more lean than Paris and is a- belongs to a faction that is against Mrs. Meir. So, he didn't report it properly. So it became an order test, but it works today.
KissingerNow, there're two issues. One is the negotiation, the other is the weapons. On the negotiation, she is prepared to tell you what they would agree to do on the interim agreement. She feels she cannot volunteer, She definitely going to run? I saw in the news summary, the news summary here, all that she's not going to run. Well,
NixonShe's definitely going to run? I saw in the news summary, news summary here, all that she's not going to run.
KissingerYou're probably right. She hasn't decided yet. The pressure is on her to run. Yeah. Uh, so she's willing to proceed on the interim settlement and tell you what ideas she has, and they're, and they're at least workable.
KissingerOn the private contacts, she feels she cannot volunteer it. But if you ask her, she will agree to it. Private contact with Sadat? With Egypt and the Soviet Union. She feels she cannot be in the position of telling you to have private contacts,
NixonPrivate contact with Sadat?
Kissingerbut that if you urge it, she'll agree to it. Uh,
NixonThe only thing I was concerned about the briefing paper is that you made commitment for the planes.
Kissingerthat's that part. Now, second, on the, on the plane, they have been Now here's what I know we said it all along. Well, let's not let the plane get in the way of the agreement, though. You know, Here is what the State and Defense department have recommended that we- you shouldn't recommend- they are in favor that- of you- of your presenting a their production for 100 planes
NixonI know we've said it all along. Well, that's not what the planes get the way of the agreement. Though, you know.
Kissingerand uh and giving them 15 a year for 4 years. My recommendation is that on the, they have asked for 4 66 a year. My recommendation is that you don't get into the numbers at all,
NixonRight.
Kissingerthat you say to them that you're willing to happen to work out with our people for the future deliveries of F-4s and A-4s within the framework and we will give it sympathetic consideration,
Kissingerand that you are willing to agree to the 100- to the production of 100 A-4 planes. They're going to do it anyway. It's just a question of doing it a little faster. Then she can, and that that that should be not announced, but at least she can go home to her cabinet that she got something.
KissingerUh, if you turn her off completely, which no one has recommended, including State and Defense today, this with, with respect to production is exactly what what- What they want? State, no, it's half of what they want. What, production? They want to produce 200. It's exactly, it's exactly what State and Defense recommend.
NixonWhat they want.
Kissingerno, it's half of what they want.
NixonFor production.
KissingerThey want to produce 200. It's exactly it's exactly what State and Defense recommend.
NixonI get it.
KissingerUh, and on purchase, it leaves open the numbers for a later discussion. And if you can do that, I think, under discussion. But, that's much less than they wanted. It's half of what they want to produce. And it gives them no fixed figures on, uh, on delivery.
NixonYeah.
NixonOkay. You know, when you think of the goddamned disaster of the Alliance for Progress, was it- Did you ever read about that? Almost practically ruined Latin America, because we overthrew our friends, supported our enemies,
KissingerWell, we just- we just barely avoided, by an hair lash, for whatever Brazil being communist,
NixonGoulart. This author says Kennedy's most serious mistake in foreign policy was to destroy Europe, which may be, in that respect,
KissingerFor certain, that's what ruined certainly the test ban was, That's where he was most active, and he wrecked disaster. He wrecked Adenauer, and he wrecked Erhard.
NixonAnd that is what really drove France out and uh, Adenauer's. Adenauer had got his number the first throw. And so did de Gaulle.
KissingerAnd so did de Gaulle. I have read some of the stories here. He impressed de Gaulle, and he impressed- Oh, God, he enormously complimentary uh, statements about him, you know, and really, I haven't heard other people say that. Nobody ever said he impressed Adenauer.
NixonBut you know, Jackie Kennedy saying uh, that Adenauer was gaga at one point. Jesus, and he rallied and she wasn't gaga. And of course it got out. And then of course, someone here calling him a oh fart or some like that. Jesus Christ. This proud guy, saw him and was scared to death of him, wasn't he?
KissingerAdenauer despised him. Adenauer didn't switch to de Gaulle until he met Kennedy. That's what they say here.
KissingerAdenauer absolutely despised him. Why did he? Just because Well, he said to me, he said, "He's incompetent. He's a lightweight, a movie star."
NixonWhy did he?
KissingerWell, he said to me, he said, "He's incompetent. He's a lightweight, a movie star." God damn boy. I don't know. I don't know where we are. Some of that stuff.
KissingerBrandt would not be Chancellor in Germany today if Kennedy hadn't broken the back of the Christian Democratic Party. First, he made Adenauer's position impossible. Then when Adenauer left and Erhard came in, Erhard wasn't strong to begin with,
Kissingerbut he could have survived if we hadn't pressed him with the offset agreements as brutally as we did. Oh. Then that is what wrecked Erhard. That forced them to take the Socialists into the government.
KissingerBeing in the government, they became respected. Yeah. Socialists were never considered as qualified to govern. Once Brandt had been Foreign Minister and Schiller and all of them had been in the cabinet, then it was no longer possible to argue that the Socialists were not respectable part. And that gave them the rest of the votes.
KissingerIf Kennedy had lived, Goulart would have become a dictator in Brazil. There's no question about it. And Sukarno would have had everything. But his worst dam- He broke He broke what was left of European back.
NixonAnd Sukarno would have had everything.
KissingerEisenhower did a good job on it, and Kennedy completed it. Yeah, you've got to say this: whatever Dulles's failures may have been, but really I'd say he had some, but, by God, he- he left NATO damn strong. He kept Adenauer. He understood the Germans.
NixonHe understood the Germans. And, to an admirer, de Gaulle didn't like him, he respected de Gaulle.
KissingerDulles had everybody's respect. De Gaulle is, uh, but I see now, you know, I From reading the American press, because they're all trying to rewrite- at that time rewrite history to make Kennedy look good. I I always solve that. First, had the idea that de Gaulle is a goddamn fool. And, of course, I saw Bohlen at the time he got out of NATO.
NixonThere, god, I must remember Bohlen giving me that crap to the effect, "Well, really, that this this move of NATO proved its strength. And it doesn't mean much that we're losing. We can still defend and so forth." I thought that Bohlen knows better than that. Bohlen knows that that that when France got out of NATO, it damn near destroyed it. Right?
KissingerAbsolutely. Can't rebuild that piece. The major Of course, the major perception of de Gaulle was right, that if these countries didn't have pride in themselves,
Kissingerit wasn't be good for anyone else, and it negotiates. What are we left with now? We're negotiating with the Common Market with a bunch of bureaucrats
Kissingerwithout a constituency, without a sense of responsibility. I bet we could do better negotiating with de Gaulle on economic matters than we can with these bloody bureaucrats in Brussels who owe nobody anything.
NixonWell, you know, businessmen are the worst. Economists are the worst negotiators. They're so selfish, parochial. They can't take a world view. They can never get above the battle.
NixonAnd here we sit now, you know, you stop and think of the world. Except for Heath in Europe, who in the hell else can we talk to? That's our problem, and really Heath worries me, you know. The only other two people we can talk to is that goddamn Russian. I mean, well, not that it matters,
KissingerWell, Brezhnev, you can't really talk to Brezhnev. I mean, he's not in your class, Brezhnev. If he has a goal, he can beat at you together. You can, ah and it takes a lot of strength to stand up to it.
KissingerBut the only other person except Heath that you can talk to at your level is Mao and Chou.
KissingerI send in the
NixonI will reassure her today. No, I don't know, I'm Now on the plane thing, you know, I had a very nice it was last night with the governors.
NixonI was sitting with Mrs. Mandel, who's, you know, she can Are they Jewish?
KissingerSure.
NixonAnd, uh she didn't ask, but I I been talking about her, I mean was talking about the meeting. I said, "Tomorrow, I'll be meeting Mrs. Meir." And I said I said, "We've had this unfortunate incident, and we everybody realizes it was unfortunate,
Nixonand I said it only indicates that we must move forward, you know, to try to cool it in the area." Pretty excited by the way. Israelis all know that, don't they?
KissingerWell, I told them that today. I said, "Vote with you that this is a matter that was handled routinely in State. I don't think she's going to raise it.
NixonIt's settled, and we voted, yeah. It was stupid to do it while she was here. It was really stupid.
KissingerAnd who who introduced the resolution?
KissingerWell, not us, but we should have said we vote for the investigation, but will will condemn after the investigation is completed. It wasn't our vote. They condemned her first, and then asked for an investigation.
KissingerIt was such tough on her um that uh while she's in this country, this happened, but
NixonI don't think you can blame Scali for that though.
KissingerNo, no, he got instructions from State.
NixonYou understand, because it's John, and I told him, I said, "Now damn it, you've" and he said he would follow. So, maybe we should have called Scali. I didn't know about it.
KissingerI didn't know the vote was coming up. It was that day. It was into chaos and
NixonWhy doesn't somebody tell us?
KissingerWell, State had told us, but they misled us. They told us the Israelis in New York were content with it.
NixonWell, he had told them.
KissingerAnd, uh so, she recognizes that her own people make some mistakes. Well, the plane. Not here, but they did in Israel.
NixonWell, that, uh,
Kissingerthat It was expected.
NixonThat was something that had to happen.
KissingerNow, if she can get on the plane, what I've suggested to you is much less than she does. He might win on that, but that she can live with.
KissingerAnd then she has a basis for saying on this uh on this negotiation now. We can get her results at the end of the negotiation
Kissingerand then use the private negotiations to get the general principles established. We ought to be able to get it off our sector by the summer.
NixonLet me just
KissingerNow I'll, uh Now I have to I've told Rabin I'd call him by 10:30 just to tell him what he should raise. But we have him defend it. Very
NixonListen to this, Henry. "He suggested a meeting Congress briefing on Bay of In- on the invasion. This is Cuba. The invasion had been held in Washington since November 29th, 1960. Another slight leeway before suspension. This is before this poor son-of-a-bitch's landing.
NixonPresent at the meeting were: Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, McNamara, Dillon, Dulles, Earl Rogers, Dick Bissell, McGeorge Bundy, Paul Nitze,
NixonTom Mann, Adolf Berle, Arthur Schlesinger, Richard Goodwin, and J. William Fulbright." Uh, Henry, that's an invasion. Suppose on any of these things, I'd called in, uh, you know,
NixonWell, that had to mean that we'd be calling in Bill Safire, Ray Price, and uh, you know, uh Pat Buchanan. Uh, God almighty. I mean, I trust them all, but I never have them in a meeting. And Fulbright?
KissingerThat's unbelievable. And moreover,
NixonFulbright?
KissingerWhen you get when you get that many people in a meeting, you really abdicate presidential leadership. What can the President then decide?
NixonWell, see Air Force, he said Bill Fulbright is the only one who objected. Well, that son of a bitch. He's He was wrong, I think. There was no reason for the Bay of Pigs to fail,
KissingerNone whatever.
Nixonfundamentally. More or less, if he had not if he had not changed the plan, it would have succeeded probably. Now, maybe we shouldn't Maybe it should never have been done in the first place, oh, I agree.
KissingerYes, Mr. President, but I can be damn sure if I'd have been here, we would have we Cuba would not be in Castro's hands today. One thing or another, we would we'd have bombed those bastards right off of the the globe.
KissingerThat's the point, Mr. President. If you hadn't fails. Huh? You call in four cabinet members, the Chiefs of Staff, God knows who else, and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and then you pretend you're not involved.
NixonYeah.
KissingerThat's a contradiction in terms.
Nixon"By now, one of the most important" Hmm. "uh uh uh uh one of one of the most important factors of terror, which the factor of surprise was lost. So poorly has the secrecy been kept by the administration listen to this "that rumors were circulating, circulating all over Washington that the United States was about to overthrow Castro. The rumors were even actively supported by one member of the administration, Chester Bowles, Under Secretary of State. He happened to be sitting in as acting Secretary, the day documents about the project crossed Dean Rusk's desk.
NixonAngry at not having been let in on the secret, and horrified, as he told friends, he retaliated by quietly leaking information to the press."
KissingerHe should be shot for that.
NixonShot for it. We should weep for him. And that and why you have now the situation in this country,
KissingerThat's right.
Nixonthey think there is right to leak to the press. And, uh later on Kennedy, to his enormous discredit, told uh the the then publisher uh uh
KissingerTimes.
NixonChrist, who's now dead, of the Times. He said, "I wish that uh" he said that the Times had published more about the Bay of Pigs, to stop it.
KissingerWould have stopped it.
NixonYeah. "After hearing that from the President of the United States, can you blame the Times for Pentagon Papers? Can you, really?" God damn, that disperse. But the damage People criticize us,
KissingerYeah.
Kissingerbut the damage Kennedy did to the uh to the structure of discipline to this government was unbelievable. By turning it into this frivolous exercise.
NixonThis book is not so profound. It's badly written and so forth.
KissingerVery much. Uh Richardson, between us, don't understand that a lot of this criticism is so that the Democrats look good to their domestic opponents.
KissingerAnd uh I think our European policy has to be the only thing possible. We've taken the heat of them by our Ostpolitik. We held firm on Berlin several times. We kept NATO strong, we had a modernization program started for NATO.
KissingerI admit it isn't enough, but 80% of the fault for that is in the Europeans, it's the Europeans. We've now started a massive program uh on uh on our European relations. And--
NixonHave you talked, have you have you had a chance to talk to Haig very privately about my desire to see--
KissingerNo, I I saw Al yesterday, but I was going to do it tomorrow. Yeah, talk to him very privately and say how what the hell do we do because [unintelligible]
NixonHow would I really deal with him? I feel um I'm rather sorry we had to send Rush over there to stop Campbell [unintelligible]
KissingerHe'll do all right, but he's a little over eager. British [crosstalk] have complained about him, he's a
KissingerBritish have complained about him that he's too aggressive, but I'm getting that under control, I didn't want to bother you with it.
KissingerWell, he's trying to browbeat them. We have this complex MBFR negotiation, the British said "We're willing to follow you, but we can't be browbeaten every week."
NixonBritish are very shrewd, they're very smarter than he is on this. That's the whole point of that.
KissingerThat's, that's exactly what I've told him. I draft, I sent him an instruction yesterday saying, "Look goddammit, 2 weeks don't make any difference, let the British move at their pace."
NixonEverybody wants to be a hero, they want to get it done. You want to bring MBFR, there probably shouldn't be MBFR. I don't know, I don't know what else to think, but--
NixonWhat are you, what I'm concerned about Henry, I'm really concerned about the Russians. All right, the Russian build up is enormous. I read what happened that missile man. I want to get, I want if you can make a note, tell, tell
KissingerI think that's good [unintelligible]
KissingerNow what if the Russian saw um you might, in fact, use the occasion of the Salt meeting
NixonYeah.
Kissingerto say something, so that Richardson can hear it. All right.
KissingerBecause Clements completely agrees that if we don't have our strategic programs going on, they'll never negotiate. What is it that they want to negotiate? The only two things that they are willing to that have been willing to negotiate are the ones
Kissingerthat Congress that that our liberals drove you crazy about: ABM in the last round.
NixonYeah.
KissingerNow, they want to negotiate MIRV. We might do something on new MIRVs, because we have most of ours already in.
NixonWell, the point is, Henry, unless we've won they have they have these huge rockets. You want to go over and make your call?
KissingerI can do it in your [unintelligible]. Okay.
KissingerYou can give me Ambassador Dean at the Blair House, please.
Nixon[unintelligible] Here is Kennedy now on the Bay of Pigs and all this leak he had his press conference. He said "Under any condition, no intervention in Cuba by United States [unintelligible] for force. The basic issue in Cuba is not United States and Cuba. It's Cuban themselves." I mean, gee, we hear that, then Mr. B hit and then Mr. and so on and so on, it's chaired by high crossed exiled.
NixonYou know, we always want to be you've got to be try to covert an open operation. But after all, we got that leak, you could, you could, he ought he could have said "I'm just not going to comment." But Mr. President, and also once you've gotta once you've got uh
Kissingerall your security council, the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Goodwin, and others in a meeting, it's no longer covert. We would have we a defeat was our defeat.
NixonRight.
KissingerSo, a victory so we should have put in what was needed to win. We should have flown air cover for them, we should have given them naval cover, and that would have been enough.
NixonBecause even that first lousy, half-ass B-25-strike, got half the Cuban air force.
NixonAnother strike would have done it, if they let it. If Kennedy had kept, they'd have taken the whole air force out, the gates and the ships wouldn't have been sunk, the people would have gotten in. But the whole morale situation in Cuba would have changed.
KissingerAnd if we had had naval cover there, so that the Cuba was also the other Kennedy statement though was just stated [unintelligible]
NixonLook what it did. It, of course, made it impossible for the Cubans,
Kissingerin Cuba
Nixonwho were on our side to stick their necks out. When the President of the United States says "Under no circumstances, will we do this, that and the other thing." The best thing is to say "I'm not gonna comment."
KissingerAnd made it impossible Then they wouldn't have known.
NixonThey would've thought, well, maybe he'll get in. That's why I will go.
NixonIt's a blinding, terrible, tragic thing.
KissingerHello. Hello, Mr. Ambassador. Uh I've stressed, and I I've stressed to him the results of our conversation. Uh if the Prime Minister raises the issue of the Phantom, then the President will raise the other one, and we can proceed as a sanction. Can't we discuss Phantom?
KissingerOn the planes, I think the Prime Minister would be very pleased with your questions. And my suggestion is that the best for presentation would be the cake of the production.
KissingerUh if we can have a 100, and sympathetic consideration of the others of the other 50 to be worked out by experts, including A-4s and F-4s.
KissingerGood. All right.
KissingerRight. And I had a good discussion with Joe Sisco on that this morning, so he's trended late [unintelligible] so we can we can definitely proceed with proper chances.
KissingerGood. See you then. Bye.
NixonSo far as your press conference is concerned uh tomorrow [unintelligible]
NixonDo you lean either day? Well, there's something to be said for doing it tomorrow in the sense that you are off a clear success.
KissingerUh there's no overwhelming need for it.
NixonPoint is, if you do it Monday, they may not have it. You want to say that, so [unintelligible] be more on the defensive, because after a success they always attack us again.
KissingerThat's true.
KissingerSo, I have a slight uh preference. On the other hand, well, you're pretty well-prepared. There's not much new that has happened, except the prisoners' thing.
KissingerNow, we are we can also announce if you wanted to, we could even announce tomorrow uh how we've been setting up the East-West trade things. We could drop that into your press conference, or Ziegler could do it separately. Yeah. With Shultz as Chairman and Dent as Vice Chairman.
NixonWhat about this? Yeah, well, that's a separate matter. What about this issue? They'll bound to me, they'll ask you about the violence, cease-fire, how that's working.
KissingerI'd say, first of all, let's put it into perspective. Yeah.
NixonYou might sit down, if you would, uh perhaps if I do decide to go tomorrow, that afternoon, if I am going, and so forth, give me a piece of paper, a brief you don't have to do it, have your people name what What What What would you want to get across if they say, "Well, how is the cease-fire going, Mr. President?" Then you could say, "Well, put it into perspective." Is that what you would say? Now, tell me how you What I would say, first put it into perspective,
KissingerWe know that new orders have been issued, but they've been cut-cut today.
KissingerTo exercise maximum restraint on our side. Secondly, the other side has been infiltrated. And one has to have some patience in a war that's been going on for 10 years, that has aspects of a civil war,
Kissingeruntil the parties are disengaged, the lines are clearly demarcated. It's just going to take some more time. And it has to be seen, too, in terms of the evolution. Right. And they much rather right now
NixonAbout every individual situation, how about how about the GVN? How about the [unintelligible] never ever have there they've given around the ICCS? No.
KissingerNo. What I'd say is that at the Joint Military Commission yesterday decisions were given to uh to to work it out. It's unfortunate that it happened,
Kissingeruh but uh these are all There have also been several incidents on both sides. It's unfortunate that a US helicopter was shot down.
KissingerThat's right. ICCS US helicopter. Right.
KissingerAnd here and the other side has apologized for that, though. It's being handled at the commission. That's what the machine was set up for. And we have to We Uh Both sides have to show some Some patience. But of course if it continues
Kissingerin Laos, actually it's quieted down after our bombing strike, Mr. Pres- We always get this crap, but after the bombing strike now there is a cease-fire.
NixonIs it quiet? It is almost totally quiet there now.
KissingerUh, well, I don't know, but that that I think is going to work itself out. What you should say, Mr. President, and hit hard, is we expect a withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces from Laos and Cambodia under Article 20 of the agreement.
NixonWhich is How How soon?
KissingerWell, under the agreement it's supposed to be unconditional.
NixonThey don't have a date, though?
KissingerWell, in the Laos agreement it's within 60 days of the formation of the [unintelligible].
KissingerIn Cambodia we don't have a date, though. No. But But our position is we don't need a date, the agreement requires it.
NixonAll right, well they won't do that, Mr. President. They don't withdraw. Well, I wouldn't speculate on that. We expect it.
NixonYeah. We expect it, and, uh, I'm not going to speculate on what we're going to do about it. That's right. Because we would say back, "Well, are you going to bomb them?" Are you going to continue the bombing, Mr. President, in Cambodia?
NixonI'm not going to comment on military activities. We expect that each party to the agreement Is that what you'd say?
KissingerThat's right, and until there's a formal cease-fire uh we won't do anything not requested by the government.
KissingerGood. Fact is, Mr. President, your B-52 strikes worked. We laid a really big one into Cambodia this week and wasn't even reported in the newspapers.
NixonDid Did you get good reports on how good how it went?
KissingerWell, we have we don't have ground observers, but they dumped 800 tons.
NixonSpeaking of Haig, wouldn't Haig be a hell of a commander to send over there if we needed one in the Army? Um-hmm.
NixonYou know, Haig is basically one of the few soldier-diplomats we have to get out. Unfortunately, I shouldn't say that, because I don't know the others. There must be in that really big army, God, why can't Abe worry about Haig would be good. It'd be an extremely rapid rise for him.
KissingerDeputy here to Vice Chief and We could do it say next summer, end of next summer.
KissingerHaig would do it superbly.
NixonHe'd be great, wouldn't he? It'd be absolute. And you could bring him back, the following year as Chairman.
NixonWhich is what he ought to be.
KissingerI think that's what he ought to be.
NixonOh, look over the Navy men. The Navy men are, ironically, the best strategically. They have a strategic concept. Air has no strategic concept.
KissingerWell, we've got to get rid of Zumwalt. Tour's Tour is up.
KissingerZumwalt? I wouldn't fire him, but his tour is up in '74.
NixonAnd you'd let him go?
KissingerAbsolutely.
NixonWhy?
NixonI agree, but why do you think so?
KissingerBecause, first of all, he's a fraud. He's a total opportunist. He was a McNamara man. He was Nitze's aide. Uh he's done everything since he came purely opportunistically. He talks a tough game, then he wanted to send an aircraft carrier to Jordan, then you stopped that, he leaked it. I think he's uh the morale in the Navy go to hell.
KissingerHe's turned it into a social welfare institution, and Moorer is absolutely down on him. See? Oh, yes, and Clements is down on him.
NixonSocial welfare issues. Right, the way they handled that black situation [unintelligible]. It's sickening. Disgusting. A a military organization has high morale when it's disciplined.
KissingerYou don't hear anything in the Marines about rioting.
NixonYeah. All right, good. 12:00. 12:00? Can you break it up? What time can you break it up, Henry? About 30 minutes.
NixonAll right, fine. You tell him I have a luncheon at 12:30. Right. Uh
KissingerShe's bringing the ambassador, the new ambassador. Okay. 15 Okay. Both of them? Yeah.
KissingerOkay, it's hard not to listen to all of that. All right. All right. Fine. Morning.
DeanYeah, I wanted to tell you uh so Henry Did you get a hold of Kleindienst at all, Henry? Yes, I have.
DeanYeah. Uh he says the record is not quite as bad as printed in the paper for one thing, but he has talked to Gray this morning. Got him off of this.
DeanGotten him off of this. Uh Did you tell him Did you tell him without telling him who's calling? That's right.
DeanHe wanted to tell you he's got-got this situation turned around, straight around. He said he didn't need to talk to you based on the conversation.
NixonYeah.
DeanHe said that uh Gray in offering this had said one, not they could turn the files over, but they could come down, but he also did say that this was subject to the approval of the Attorney General. So Kleindienst feels he can weigh back in on that, and he told Gray, if it comes up again,
Deanthat uh the Attorney General's procedures, they'll have to talk to the Attorney General about as to what he will or will not make available.
NixonWell, now, what are they going to say with Kleindienst, if they ask ask for it? No. "Files will not be made available." And how can he?
DeanWell, uh because Kleindienst will say this is not a circumstanced situation, it just got to be, you know, it's a known situation.
NixonIt's a bad record. Oh, yeah, it's tough.
NixonGod, Kleindienst doesn't realize it.
NixonHe doesn't realize it's a bad record.
NixonDoes Kleindienst Did you tell him what happened in the Hiss case?
DeanI did. And I said that I would be sending over Yeah.
Deanthat chapter in the Hiss case out of uh "Six Crises." Yeah, he didn't have to get the book to read it.
DeanNo, I've got mine. Just I can just Why didn't he just go there and you can find out. We had no cooperation from the FBI.
DeanUh-huh.
NixonThe speech I made in the Congress on it, on that, on the Hiss case, points out how the FBI- Well anyway.
DeanHere's what that's that's what Mollenhoff is trying to raise as your position now on executive privilege.
DeanHe want- He Mollenhoff wants to use what you said about executive privilege, then. I didn't attack it then.
NixonRight. Because it It wasn't White House people we were after. Well, I have I just recently gotten that excerpt from the record of your speech and uh
DeanI think we'll be able to very clearly distinguish, particularly with if Ziegler gets a question from Mollenhoff as to what we were talking about then, as these would be now.
NixonWhat we were what Ziegler ought to say is, what you were talking about was to get cooperation of the FBI and the Justice Department, which we were entitled to and getting none.
NixonYou see, we were not asking for cooperation from the White House. We were asking for cooperation of the Justice Department, and the FBI, and they had they and they then they put out an order-
NixonWait. Listen to this.
NixonIn the spring
NixonI don't send to the library for it. Want it right here. "In the spring,
Nixonthere occurred what may have been a much later dramatic battle of the At 3:00 on April a ringing telephone bell awoke an Associated Press reporter.
Nixona news an agent of the FBI, told the AP man, 'Look back in your business with the FBI.' 1 hour later, FBI agents rang his doorbell. 4 hours after that, a reporter for the Wall Street Journal was routed out of bed by other FBI agents. At 6:30 a.m.,
Nixona newsman working for the Wilmington, Delaware Evening Journal found FBI men waiting at his office door. The reporters were not involved in any crime.
NixonThey had merely written that steel executives were raising prices and it'd become important for President Kennedy to know the source of the story." That's excellent material.
DeanThat should be out in the in the domain right now.
Nixonand we don't have that instantly. The uh the records are still hold this or that.
UnknownWe need somebody in in our who is smart frankly and who who can dig out--
NixonIt's like I tried to dig out six two months to get the, because everybody around here is an expert, wanted me to soften this thing on amnesty. He said, "I wanted to be like Lincoln."
NixonAnd so when you ever read Sandburg, and uh, took a month before I had got that. I said, "Just bring one page, just one page of Sandburg, Lincoln's position on amnesty." It was rigid. You know, because Sandburg wanted them to think that it was brilliantly exposed.
NixonAnd it was very simply this, he gave amnesty to the South, but when uh somebody who'd gone to Canada came, his out in front of the White House, said that no that's would be uh given amnesty.
NixonAnd Lincoln wrote on the bottom of his little memorandum, you see, "Let him see all these files, and uh I'll let you go ahead and hold all this." He said, he said the "He may return"--this fellow--
Nixon"provided he, provided he serves in prison for the number of days that he's out of the country." That was Lincoln's amnesty. In other words, amnesty for those who fought
Nixonfor the South, either prison sentences or execution for those who deserted or uh dodged the draft from the North.
NixonNow that's what the Lincoln position was. Now, goddamn people around here won't read it, you see?
UnknownWell, the point you made is very good, that we are not scouring what's really in the public domain right now [crosstalk] to put all of these things in perspective.
Nixon[crosstalk] That's right.
UnknownAnd we should have a team doing that right now.
NixonThat's true.
NixonI could talk about my own stuff and everyone would--
Nixon[unintelligible] just under the findings today.
NixonGo back, go out and gather up and bring in to me my speech on the Hiss case, in the Senate.
NixonReread my speech on the Hiss case, the one that I made in 1950, or '51. I've forgotten, the house, for example.
UnknownDo that right away, sir.

Nixon, Kissinger & Ziegler on Prisoner of War release

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Nixon, Kissinger & Ziegler on Prisoner of War release

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