Nixon, Kissinger & Ziegler on Vietnam War and POW release

Yeah, they have agreed.
They've given us the list.
We got the list.
No, we got the list.
They haven't given us the date yet, but...
But that's really now a matter of a day or two.
We expect them to be out over the weekend.
After we get the list, we have to set up transportation, find the time, and...
Sunday, I think, no later than Sunday.
Saturday, Sunday.
What is your advice then on the press?
I think it's tomorrow would be the day that the Paris conference signs its final documents.
I was thinking as I was reading that book on Kennedy,
God damn it, Henry, how they did it in Berlin and all that.
How they did, for example, you had told me before, how the Sky Bowl and the Nassau thing, the greatest summary was made, I think, by Howard Smith at the time.
when he said, by cancelling Scott of the Sky Bowl, we practically ruined our relations with the British, that by-grander, to do the damage, the 36-hour meeting, just think, 36 hours, and Nassau would pour open milk.
We did it to French, and it was that that really led to the French veto of the common market, and to the Gauls getting out of NATO, that goddamn Nassau.
Do you agree with that?
What, in the name of God, were you around here then?
No, I... What did you think?
Did you ever give any advice?
All these other people, right?
No, I don't... No, what happened on the Skyfall?
I had left before the Skyfall decision.
I wrote an article in the Reporter attacking the Skyfall decision.
Good.
And then after...
What does he do?
He offends the Italians and Turks by pulling out him.
That also had a bad effect on the British and French.
He ruins our relations with the British by the skyfall.
He ruins our relations with France.
by NASA, all of this in three weeks, and how did we do it?
By getting floods of advisors in here, talking, drama, lots of announcements.
Nobody really knows how you handled this week's crisis.
Most of it was... We often said that the Jordan thing was one of our toughest, and Indian Pakistan was tough, but nobody knows how we handled either of those things.
That's the whole story.
And Triantuegos was tough.
Three times.
That's right.
What?
That's right.
Captain would have been out there moving around.
But, you know, I'm going to say, however, on the business of the other, I had a meeting with Bob yesterday.
I think we need a formal, even if we have to make something up, to have a formal NSC meeting once a month.
Every four weeks.
We haven't had one for a while.
We've had one once.
And what I would do is to, it would seem to me that the first subject you want to do is to get on it.
And this time, I think you should also know that I have, and if they try to make an errand on you, you can say, I have told all of them that neither shall we start finding you in the NSC meetings, unless there is something that they're there for.
We had Mitchell for other reasons.
And we had Monty for other reasons.
And I don't, now if we had, for example, a talk on the European community,
We might have shelves, but I don't want anything ever solved.
Yeah.
See my point?
But next week, Mr. President, we need a meeting on this all, please.
All right, fine.
Now, another one is that I think the NSC ought to take up its whole business of our new posture here.
Maybe the NSC ought to go over and see that, uh, let's go over and look at the, uh, at that, you know, that, not that program, the Pentagon.
Let's go over and see it.
My strong advice, Mr. President, is that we should have an NSC meeting on Europe.
There's no way the NSC as a group can go to Europe without you, you mean, or with you.
My purpose is to get the bastards all in, get the men in, get Richardson, Rogers, and the rest all in.
I want to do it with the NSC.
I'm going to make one change, which is very important for the future.
I want Clemens always invited to sit back at the other call.
And that gives us an opportunity to have Ryan invited to sit back at Rockings because we have to be ready for the Russians coming anyway.
Well, in all these cases.
But Clemens.
Every meeting.
No, but every meeting.
I'll tell you why there's a good precedent for that.
In the Eisenhower years, both states and defense always brought their deputies.
Now, there are reasons that we may not have wanted the deputies in the old days.
But with these two men.
We had the arrogance of the state.
But.
And I think, let's be honest, we need to balance Richardson.
And how?
You know what I mean?
Richardson is really showing his true colors.
Is he?
Yeah, well, you know, he's basically a peace thing, but... Well, can I suggest that what I hope is...
I'd like to get the NSC meeting at that time, very frankly, just for a little session.
In other words, I would rather do that than to sometimes have them off on something that you and I may be working on privately, if you get my point.
I don't want to get them too involved.
We can't tell them what our whole European strategy is.
Maybe we'll have a meeting, for example, in Latin America.
Why not a meeting in Latin America?
We can have an SG meeting for less than, or not a long one.
Let's make one that could be just an hour.
They need to touch the throne, that's it.
and I can read them out a little and I can say no I want to do this and Russians sit there and hear it but we shouldn't ask the next one should be unsolved then the next one after that we can be ready for Europe what is Europe?
a dead Latin America I've got a study going on Europe but it isn't ready yet for presentation to the NEC how are you coming to Europe?
middle of April
But I'm just now turning to it.
Don't, don't, don't.
Really, all my good people have been on these trips with me, but starting today, I'm told to do nothing.
I have one personnel question.
Schultz is considering appointing an undersecretary, would be a number four man in this department, to handle international economic issues.
Oh, he'd like to take Sonnenfeld from my staff.
Oh, you mean you need him?
Well, I don't know.
I should soon have him over there.
Because if I keep him... Well, you know, Sonnenfeld, I know as a... Hayden was talking about Sonnenfeld and your case and so forth, but Sonnenfeld, at the time I sat with him, I'm very...
He just got damn smart.
And I agree.
There are very few intelligent people, smart people that are hard to line.
And I will...
I think you've got another hard line.
That is smart, but I could bring Larry Eagleberg back here to take Sonic Felt's place.
Oh, you do what you want.
Sonic Felt should be kept in cover.
He's an intellectual with brains.
And he's a hardliner.
With that in the dust, that's what I mean, a hardliner.
Don't throw it, don't put him out, though, because of the...
There are no personal differences, but on substance I agree with him 100%.
The problem is I'd have to make him a deputy to me.
In order to keep him, I'd have to make him deputy assistant.
He won't stay in this job.
If I make him deputy, I may have a morale problem among my other people because of his abrasive personality.
Well, Schultz would be lucky to get him.
How about getting him something more important?
Any place else where you could use him or be of defense?
Well, Richardson won't take him in ISA.
Well, who the hell is he taking in ISA?
Anybody who won?
Well, he's going after a guy that I wanted, please, international economics, Chuck Cooper.
Well, ISA is a more important thing.
I want a weak sister in there.
No, if Sonnenfeld could get ISA, that would be excellent.
Would you like Sonico in that job?
Sonico would be excellent, in my opinion.
And then does that mean you would still have the use of this brain?
That's my point.
But I'd have the use of this brain also as a treasurer.
It's so different, Bob.
It's so different.
I'm afraid they're getting bogged down.
At least, I'd say for Schultz, he doesn't take time.
He's a scientist.
Of course, we take science.
He's great.
Science is going to be great every Monday.
And Schultz, he probably won't want to set aside, I suppose.
I don't know if he does.
Schultz is a valuable man.
Schultz is just...
He's got all the...
He's got the toughness.
He's basically as tough as Conway.
But he has...
He isn't as good as the other side.
Boy, in terms of tenacity and quietness and so forth.
And thoughtfulness.
Schultz won't move on this.
And also, what is impressive is, you know, he gets invited to many of these.
He said that about his idea.
Never has he pandered to the Georgetown list.
Never.
Never.
He's so confident.
Mr. President, I was sorry you let Peterson go.
So was I.
But...
His behavior, since you let him go, indicated you were right.
It was not the behavior of a mature man.
Well, there's got to be awkward in the moment, frankly, and the student actually wouldn't take it.
He wouldn't take it.
That was a terrible position.
And it isn't right.
And it just isn't worthy of a man to go around making all these fitted comments that he did.
I wanted to talk to you about this, Mr. President, because I've got to call them to tell me.
Go ahead.
No, no.
I just want to...
Yes, sir.
In just 48 hours, so now they've given... Good.
So, everyone, let me ask you a couple of questions.
Henry called me at midnight last night when I finished the other...
Well, the only point is, Ron, as I was saying to Henry, only you, Holman, Henry, and I know well the names on this map.
How it really happened, though, should have wasn't expected.
The fact that we played this tough line, we didn't let Rogers go in and sign that goddamn document.
We sent, and without bravado, rather than publicly, we privately whacked the message in there and had those bleep drop off and stopped the withdrawals.
We sent about four or five messages that you don't know about in the middle of the night.
But they had to at least be hilarious.
You should forget that you're here now.
That's how we avoided the Georgia crisis.
We were denied it tonight.
The state never had the slightest goddamn idea what we were doing there.
And also, it's how we saved what was left of Pakistan.
We had to move that carrier and that Pakistan had been swallowed up.
You know that?
Absolutely.
And when we demanded that they give us a guarantee against attacking West Buckeye South.
He's going to shoot it?
Yeah.
Anyway, the point that I made, which sure makes it scarred, is the headline I got today afternoon looked pretty goddamn silly.
Where they said, red is still in their terms.
What's that, Dan?
That was the headline.
They had a headline before around 3.
They switched it after the
you see I called Ron about that I tried to get you your meetings I called Ron and I said what in the name of God is this and Ron said oh this came out before the thing but I'm glad I'm glad to get on it was written by that son of a bitch that AD bastard out there Arbuckle yeah I think so I think it's Arbuckle Arbuckle has always and he's never been right they didn't hold the cards this way they just couldn't run it this way
Well, the reason I... Let me ask you this.
Yeah, go ahead.
I'm sorry.
I will be asked now for a comment.
How we did it?
No.
No, no.
What's your reaction?
Is the president pleased?
Is he... Well, I don't... Don't characterize my reaction.
It's like, well, the president is elated.
I don't want to see any mood stories.
Just say we are the...
Don't gloat about it.
Just say, as the president indicated, we are, this government, vitally interested in the implementation of the entire agreement.
And we will use our influence with all parties concerned
see that that agreement is implemented.
However, of the highest priority, among other priorities, and I'm not the only one, of the highest priority is strict adherence to the POW release without linkage, just as the agreement provides.
There cannot be, and you could say, you might even say, one of the problems in reaching the final agreement was that we
always consistent in the torturous negotiations, in the long negotiations before we finally reach agreement.
In no language.
Correct?
No language between any other except to the withdrawal of American forces and the full of mines.
And no language to any other.
Well, the withdrawal of American forces.
No.
Therefore, and that we vote.
We are, we are, we are, we are.
And there can be no mediation, whatever.
That's what we were insisting upon.
We believe that we obviously are pleased not only because of the fact that the OW is returning, but we're also pleased too because the other side is adhering to this agreement now, once we've brought it to their attention.
How's that sound to you?
The other thing is, what about the balance of the ceasefire?
Have you lectured Mr. Chu and so forth?
I don't know how that might be discussed.
Do you think so?
You said of the highest priority, you don't want to say the highest priority.
I don't want to indicate that we fought this war for our prisoners.
See, that's why I've always said, I never want you to say of the only priority is to get the prisoners back.
one of the highest priorities you can say one of the highest priorities yeah if you can that's avoid the very first sentence
Just a flat line to put out of this initial reaction would be to say, as the President has pointed out, that we think our interest in this matter was to bring the prisoners home.
They are coming home.
You know what I'm saying?
I put it that way.
And that there can be no mediation, whatever.
That the agreement clearly states they should, and there can be no mediation, whatever, from that agreement.
No linkage in any other manner.
That's very true.
On Mrs. Mayer, most of what I...
But here's the situation.
Here's the situation.
We had a major crisis with her.
It didn't bother you, did it?
But we condemned Israel and the United Nations with a shoe down.
And she says she's up for election this year, so here she comes over here while she's in this country.
Why do we do that?
It was...
It was stupidity...
Scali talked to the Israelis up there.
Sabin says their guy up there is very anti-American and more than embarrassed and belongs to a faction in Israel that's against Mrs. Mayer.
So he didn't report it properly, so it didn't come to our attention, of course, today.
But there are two issues.
One is the negotiation.
The other is the weapons.
on the negotiation, she's prepared to tell you what they're willing to do on the interim agreement.
She feels she cannot voluntarily... She's definitely going to run.
I saw in the mid-summer and year-summer here that Paul says he's not going to run.
Well, she hasn't decided yet, but the impression she makes is that she's running.
So she is willing to proceed on the interim settlement and tell you what ideas she has, and then at least work it over.
On the private contacts, she feels she cannot volunteer it.
But if you ask her, she'll agree to it.
Private contact with Sadat?
With Egypt and the Soviet Union.
She feels she cannot be in the position of telling you to have private contact.
But if you raise it, she'll agree to it.
The only thing I was concerned about the briefing paper here, you said you should make a commitment for the planes.
I know we've said it all along, but let's not let the planes get in the way of the agreement.
Here's what the State Effects Department has recommended that you should recommend.
They are in favor of your accepting aid in their production for 100 planes.
and giving them 15 a year for four years.
My recommendation is that they have asked for 66 a year.
My recommendation is that you don't get into the numbers at all, that you say to them that you are willing to have them work out with our people for the future deliveries of F4s and A4s within a framework
give it sympathetic consideration, then you are willing to agree to the production of 100 airplanes.
They're going to do it anyway.
It's just a question of doing it a little faster.
And that should be not enough.
But at least she can go home to her cabin and she got something.
If you turn her off completely, which no one has recommended, incidentally, neither defense nor state, this, with respect to production, is exactly what
What they want.
No, it's half of what they want.
On production?
They want to produce 200.
It's exactly what state and defense recommend.
I get it.
And on purchase, at least open the numbers for a later discussion.
And if you can do that, I think then the discussion.
But that's much less than they want.
It's half of what they want to produce.
And it gives them no fixed figures on, uh, on delivery.
Yeah.
Okay.
You know, when you think of the goddamn disaster that the Alliance of Partners was, that you were riddled with, you're all right that we ruled Latin America, but that we overthrew our friends?
which may be in their respect.
Of course, that silly test man was a...
That's where he was most active.
But he wrecked Adenauer and he wrecked Ehrhardt.
And this is what really struck me.
Ehrhardt got his number the first time.
And so did de Gaulle.
I had read some of the stories here that he impressed de Gaulle.
And de Gaulle made enormously complimentary statements about him.
You know, Rolly Evans and others reported that.
And nobody ever said he impressed Ehrhardt.
But, you know, Jackie Kennedy said that Adenauer was got out at one point.
Jesus could be right when she was in there.
And, of course, he got out.
And then, of course, Salinger calling him an old fart or something like that.
Jesus Christ.
I mean, this proud guy saw him and was scared of that when he got out, wasn't he?
Adenauer despised him.
Adenauer didn't switch to the goal until he met Kennedy.
That's what they say here.
I'm not absolutely disappointed.
Why did he?
Because he, well, he said to me, he said he's incompetent.
He's a lightweight.
He's a movie star.
I'm a bad boy.
I don't know.
I don't know where we are.
Some of that stuff.
Frank would not be chancellor in Germany today.
First he made Adenauer's position impossible.
Then when Adenauer left and Erhard came in, Erhard was a dope, to be sure.
But he could have survived if we hadn't pressed him to the offset agreement as brutally as we did.
Then that is what wrecked Erhard.
That forced him to take the Socialists into the government.
He and the government, they became respected.
Socialists were never considered as qualified to govern one front every foreign minister.
as Schiller and all of them had been in the cabinet, then it was no longer possible to argue that the socialists were not a national party.
And that gave them the rest of the votes.
If Kennedy had let Gulao become a dictator in Brazil, there's no question about it.
And Sokarno would have been.
And Sokarno would have been.
But his worst damage, he broke what was left of the European back.
I don't know.
I did a good job on that.
Kennedy completed it.
Yeah, you've got to say this.
Whatever Dulles and Spader's made then, they only say he had some.
But by God, he left NATO damn strong.
And he kept on now.
He understood the Germans.
He understood the Germans.
And to me, Dulles didn't like him.
He had to respect Dulles.
Dulles had everybody.
Dulles was a...
But I see now, you know, I...
created the American press because they're all trying to rewrite, at that time, rewrite history to make Kennedy look good.
I always thought at first that the idea that he calls a goddamn fool, and of course I saw both at the time he got out of NATO.
And there again, I must say, I remember Boland giving me that crafty effect.
Well, really, this move of NATO improves its strength, and it doesn't mean much that we're losing.
We can still defend it and so forth.
Now, God damn it, Boland was better than that.
Boland knew that when France got out of NATO, it damn near destroyed it.
Right?
Absolutely.
The major, of course, the major perception of Picard was that if these countries didn't have pride in themselves,
They wouldn't be good to anyone else.
Anti-negotiation.
What are we left with now?
We are negotiating in the common market with a bunch of bureaucrats, without a constituency, without a sense of responsibility.
I bet we could do better than negotiating with De Gaulle on economic matters, sending hands to these bloody bureaucrats in Brussels who owe nobody anything.
Well, you know businessmen are the worst decon, the worst negotiators.
They're selfish.
They can't take a world view.
They can never get above the fact.
But here we sit now, you know, you stop to think of the world, except for heat in Europe.
Who in the hell else can we talk to?
That's our problem, and it really worries me.
The only other two people who can talk to me is that goddamn Russian man.
And you know what that is.
Well, the Russian man, you can't really talk to the Russian man.
When he's in your class, the Russian man,
If he has a goal, he can beat at you to get it.
He never can.
And it takes a lot of strength to stand up to him.
But the only other person, except me, that you can talk to at your level is Marlowe and Schultz.
I said it.
I will reassure her today.
Now, on the plain thing, you know, I had a very nice last night with the governor's
I was sitting by Mrs. Mandel.
How'd they do it?
Sure.
She didn't ask them, but I had been talking about it.
I was talking about the mitigation.
I said, tomorrow we'll be in this mine.
And I said, we've had this unfortunate incident.
Everybody realizes it's unfortunate.
And I said, it only indicates that we must move forward, you know, to try to cool it in the area.
And we decided on that way.
You certainly don't know that.
Well, I told her not to raise that vote with you, that this is a matter that was handled routinely in the state.
I don't think she's going to raise it.
You said, have we voted yet?
Yeah.
It was stupid to do it while she was here.
It was really stupid.
Who introduced the resolution?
Well, not us, but we should have said we'd vote for the investigation, but we were willing to condemn after the investigation was completed.
It was an odd vote to condemn it very first and then ask for an investigation.
It was such a tough one to hear, uh, that, uh, wisely in this country this happened.
I don't think he's a blame Scali for that, though.
No, no, no, he got it such from Satan.
You understand, because John and I told him here, I said, now, damage you from again.
He said he would follow, so maybe we should have called Scali.
I didn't know about that.
I didn't know the vote was coming up.
It was a huge, it was a big chaos.
And, uh... Why don't somebody tell us?
Well...
Our state had told us, but they misled us.
They told us the Israelis in New York were content with it.
Well, he had told them.
And so she recognizes her own people made some mistakes.
Look, he didn't get his flight.
Not here, but he did in Israel.
But that...
It was expected.
That was something that had to happen.
Now, if she can get on the plane, what I've suggested to you is much less than she does.
But that she can live with.
And then she has a basis for saying on this, uh, on this negotiation now.
If we can get her involved with the interim negotiation and then use the private negotiations to get the general principles of Sanders, we ought to be able to get it off Ted Sanders by the summer.
Let me just...
You've got to go.
No, I have some soldier I've been.
I've called him by 1030 just to tell him what he should raise.
But we have to dispense with him.
Sure.
Listen to me.
Please, because of meeting Congress and the briefings on the invasion and upon the invasion, this is Cuba, the invasion had been held in Washington since November 29, 1929.
None was allowed to leave before the second.
This was before these poor sons of bitches landed.
President of the meeting was Secretary of State Dean Rusk, McNamara, Dillon, Lindes, Allen, Dickerson, Georgia, Paul Nissen, Tom Mann, Adolph Burley, Arthur Schlesinger, Richard Goodman, and Bill Fulbright.
Now, Henry, that's an invasion.
Supposedly, any of these things, I'd call them, you know,
Well, that would mean that we'd be calling in Bill Sapphire or Ray Price and, you know, Pat Buchanan.
God almighty, I may trust them all, but I'd never have them in a meeting.
It's unbelievable.
And moreover, when you get that many people in a meeting, you really have to take presidential leadership.
What can the president then decide?
Well, it's the Air Force.
He said Bill Soros is the only one that objected to him, the son of a bitch.
He was wrong.
There's no reason for the pay-it-takes to fail.
If he had not changed the plan, it would have succeeded.
Now, maybe we shouldn't.
Maybe it should never have been done in the first place.
Oh, I think it should have been.
But I could be damn sure if I had been here, Cuba would not be in Castro's hands today.
As long as we moved, we'd have found those bastards right off the road.
That's right.
And then you pretend you're not involved.
That's a contradiction in turn.
But by now, one of the most important, one of the most important factors in the entire operation, the factor of surprise and loss, so cruelly the secrecy men kept in the administration, that rumors were circulated.
Mr. Bowles, under Secretary of State.
He happened to be sitting in as an active secretary that gave documents about the project across Dean Rusk's desk.
Angry at not having been let in on the secret, and horrified, as he told friends, he retaliated by quietly leaking the information to the press.
He should be shocked for that.
Shocked for it.
Or should be.
And that is why you have now the situation in this government.
They think that it's right to lead to the press.
And later on, Kennedy, to his enormous distress, told the then-publisher of the Dreyfus, the now-dead of the Times, he said, I wish that the Times had published more about the Bay of Tays before.
After hearing him from the President of the United States, can you blame the Times for printing Pentagon papers?
This book is not profound.
It's badly written and so forth.
But I'll get you, I'll have to get you a copy of it.
You've never heard of it.
No, I haven't.
Kennedy's
analysis of Europe, every member of that Security Council should read before he sits into that meeting.
That's what we did in Europe.
Well, as a matter of fact, Henry, one thing we're not getting enough credit for, I mean, our reports from these others, but many of them are saying we, by our moves from Russia and so forth, are ruining Europe.
My God, we at least are
I don't know.
Maybe we haven't done enough.
But what do you think?
Our European policy has been all that bad.
First of all, it was an example when you took over.
Secondly, you're hitting it at an absolutely point with lousy leaders in every country.
Third, we have been more meticulous in consulting the Europeans than any previous administration, at least since Eisenhower.
It's a totally different circumstance.
We've run up against the difficulties.
But on the common market, we have major troubles with them, which no other administration has.
That the domestic structure in all of these countries is so lousy that they keep playing to their left and blame us, which is what the journalists don't understand.
And a lot of this criticism is so that they can make themselves look good to their domestic opponents.
And I think our European policy has been the only one possible.
We've taken the heat off them by asking on policy.
We held firm on Berlin several times.
We kept NATO strong.
We got a modernization program started for NATO.
I admit it isn't enough, but 80% of the fault for that is in the Europeans.
It's the Europeans.
We've now started a massive program on...
on our European relations.
Have you thought, have you had a chance to talk to Abe very privately about my desire to see him?
No, I was going to do it tomorrow.
Talking very privately, saying, what the hell are we doing?
Now, I already feel we need new leadership.
I'm rather sorry we had to send Rumsfeld over there to stop him.
That was insane.
He'll do all right.
He's a little over-eager.
The British have complained about him.
The British have complained about him that he's too aggressive, but I'm getting that under control.
I don't want to bother you.
What's he doing?
Well, he is trying to browbeat them.
We have this complex MP of our negotiation.
The British said, we're willing to come along with you, but we can't be browbeaten every week.
The British are smarter than he is.
That's the whole point of that.
That's exactly what I've told him.
I've sent him an instruction yesterday saying, look, God damn it, two weeks don't make any difference.
Let the British move at their pace.
Everybody wants to be a hero.
He wants to get it done.
He wants to bring in VFR.
There probably shouldn't be VFR.
I don't know.
I don't know what else to do.
I'll tell you what I'm concerned about, Henry.
I'm really concerned about the Russians.
The Russian buildup is enormous.
you might in fact use the occasion of this old meeting
to say something so that Richardson can hear it.
All right.
Because Clemens completely agrees that if we don't have strategic programs going on, they'll never negotiate.
What is it they want to negotiate?
The only two things that they're willing to negotiate are the ones that our liberals drove you crazy about.
ABM in the last round.
Now they want to negotiate Merv.
We might do something on new Mervs because we have most of ours already in.
Well, the point is, though, Henry, let's look at what they have.
They have these huge profits.
You want to go over and make your call?
I'll get to it if you don't mind.
Okay.
Can you get me a basket of beans at the warehouse, please?
Here's Kenny and I'll play a piece.
All of us believed he had his press conference.
He said, under any commission, no intervention in the Cuban-Indigenous forces.
The basic issue in Cuba is not one between the United States and Cuba.
It's between the Cuban and the South.
I tend to see that we hear that press conference.
I intend to submit to it.
And I just so understood and shared that.
And I addressed it with Exxon.
You know, we all know you want to be, you've got to be trying to cover the covert operation.
But after all, we're going to have to leave each other.
You're going to have to leave each other.
I'm just not going to comment.
Because once you've got all your Security Council, the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Goodwin and others at a meeting, it's no longer Fogarty.
We would have, we, a defeat was our defeat.
So a victory, so we should have put in what was needed to win.
We should have blown air cover for them, we should have given them naval cover, and that would have been enough.
Because even that first lousy, half-assed, big, running-by strike took out half of the Cuban Air Force.
And another strike would have done it if they let it.
Kennedy hadn't done half.
They'd taken the whole Air Force out to get in, and the ships wouldn't have been sunk.
The people would have gotten in.
But the overall situation, Cuba would have changed.
And if we hadn't had naval cover there so that the... Also, the other Kennedy statement, though, was wrong.
It's just that they didn't work.
Look what it did.
It, of course, made it possible for the Cubans in Cuba, who were on our side, to join us.
They're next.
Now, the President of the United States says that there's no certain chance that we do this and that and the other thing.
The best thing is to say, I'm not going to comment.
And made it possible.
And they would have thought, huh, maybe we'll get it.
That's why it worked out.
It's my gift to the President of the United States.
Mr. President, I've addressed and I've discussed the matter we discussed in our conversation.
In the environment, there is the issue of the interest rate.
The President will then raise the other one and proceed in the sense that we discussed.
On the plane, I think the Prime Minister will explain what you requested.
And my question is that the President
a figure of 100.
And this is the very consideration of the others, of the other figures to be worked out by experts, including A4s and F4s.
You're up.
And I've had a word with Joe Sesko this morning, so he's generally
No.
Well, there's something to be said for doing it tomorrow in the sense that you are all for clear success.
There's no overwhelming need for it.
I have a slight
preference on the other hand.
Well, you're pretty well prepared.
There isn't much new that has happened except the prison event.
Well, I'm sorry.
I don't think much of it.
Now, we can also announce, if you wanted to, we were going to announce tomorrow how we were setting up the East-West trade things.
We could drop that into your press conference, or Ziva could do it separately.
Yeah.
With Schultz as chairman and Depp as vice-chairman.
Right.
I'd say, first of all, let's put it in perspective.
Yeah.
You might sit down, if you would, perhaps, if I do decide to go tomorrow, in fact, you can meet with my areas and so forth.
It would take a great deal.
You don't have to do it.
If they say, well, how's the ceasefire going, Mr. President?
Then you would say, let's put it in perspective.
Is that what you would say?
What I would say is, let's put it in perspective.
The average is about 20 so-called major violations.
That means a few artillery shells and some minor violations, which means driving fire.
Considering that the political control depends
territory of control that is unpleasant, but it is infinitely less and it's growing less.
Secondly, you can say you know that new orders have been issued.
This has been just got today to exercise maximum restraint on our side.
Secondly, the other side has been infiltrated.
But one has to have some patience.
A war that's been going on for ten years that has aspects of a civil war
until the parties are disengaged, the lines are clearly demarcated.
It's going to take some more time.
It's going to take some more time, and it has to be seen in terms of the evolution.
One shouldn't write about everything.
How about the situation about the Jew government?
Do you want to condemn them for their kicking around the ICS?
No.
No, I'd say that the Detroit Military Commission yesterday assurances were given to work it out.
It's unfortunate that it happened.
But these are all the...
I can also say what's on both sides.
For example, it's unfortunate that the U.S. oil company was shut down.
That's right.
And here on the other side, it's being handled by the commission.
That's what the machinery is set up for.
Both sides have to show some patience, of course, if it continues.
In Laos, actually, it's quieter down.
After our bombing strike, Mr. President, we always get this crap, but after the bombing strike, now there is a ceasefire.
It's quiet.
It is almost totally quiet.
It's quiet.
I don't know, but that, I think, is going to move itself up.
What you should say, Mr. President, is we expect the withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces from Laos and Cambodia under Article 23 of the agreement.
Which is how soon?
Under the agreement, it's supposed to be unconditional.
Well, the last agreement is within 60 days of the formation.
But our position is we don't need a date.
The agreement requires... All right, well, they don't do that.
I don't speculate on that.
We expect...
That's right, I'd say until there's a formal ceasefire, we won't do anything not requested by the government.
Good, good.
The fact is, Mr. President, your B-52 strikes were
We laid a really big one into Cambodia this week and wasn't even reported in the newspaper.
Did you get any report on how big it was?
Well, we don't have ground observers, so it's awfully hard to tell.
Speaking of NATO, wouldn't Hank be at all good a man to send over there if he needed more of the army?
You know, Haig is basically one of the few soldiers I've ever met here.
Now, unfortunately, I shouldn't say that because I don't know the others.
There must be in that great big army guys like Haig.
Haig would be good.
It'd be an extremely rapid ride from deputy here to vice chief.
We could do it, say, next summer, end of next summer.
Haig would do it superbly.
He'd be great.
He'd be excellent.
Then you could bring him back the following year, Mr. Chairman.
Which is what he ought to be?
I think that's what he ought to be.
Oh, look over the Navy, then.
The Navy men are generally the best for teaching.
They have the most strategic concept.
The air has the most strategic concept.
We've got to get rid of Zumbo, too.
Do you think so?
Zumbo?
I wouldn't fire him, but his tour is up at 74.
And you let him go?
Absolutely.
Why?
I agree.
Why do you think?
Because first of all, he's a whore.
He's a total opportunist.
He was a man.
He was .
He's done everything since he came in, purely opportunistically.
He talks a tough game.
Then he wanted to send an aircraft carrier to Chile.
Then he stopped that.
He leaked it.
I think he's had the morale in the Navy go to hell.
He's turned it into a social welfare institution.
Mura was absolutely down on that.
Oh, yes.
And Clemens is down on that.
Social welfare issues, right?
The way they handle the black situation.
Disgusting.
Disgusting.
A military organization has time around when it's disciplined.
You don't hear anything in the Marines about that.
Yeah.
All right.
You break it up.
What time did you break it up?
1230.
All right, fine.
You tell Michael what you did at 1230.
Right.
Uh...
She's bringing the ambassador to New England.
Can both sit in?
Yeah.
Okay.
Yeah, I wanted to tell you, sir, did you get one of these fed off?
Yes, I have.
He says the record is not quite as bad as printed in the paper, for one thing, but he has talked to Gray this morning.
Gotten him off of this?
Gotten him off of this.
What did you tell him?
I told him without... That's right.
He wanted to tell you he had gotten the situation turned around, straight around.
He said he didn't need to talk to you based on our conversation.
He said that Gray, in offering this, had said, one, not that he was going to turn the files over, but that they could come down.
But he also did say that this was subject to the approval of the Attorney General.
So if my needs field, he can weigh back in on that.
And he told Gray, if it comes up again, that the Attorney General procedures, they'll have to talk to the Attorney General about as to what he will or will not make available.
Well, because Kleine will say this is not a circumstantial situation, it just got to be, you know, it's a no situation.
Oh, yeah.
I did, and I said that I would be sending over that chapter on the Hiss case out of 6th Price.
Yeah.
Well, I've got it in my hands, I guess.
The point is, if you just go there, you can find out that we had no cooperation from the FBI.
None.
The speech I made in the Congress on the Hiss case points out how the FBI was not fighting.
Here's what happened.
That's what Mollenhoff keeps trying to raise as to your position now on executive privilege.
See what?
Mollenhoff wants to use what you said about executive privilege then.
I didn't have it then.
All right.
because it wasn't quite us people we were after.
I have just recently gotten that excerpt from the record of your speech, and I think we'll be able to very clearly distinguish, particularly if Zeeler gets a question from Mohawk, because what we were talking about then needs to be now.
We were, I would say, we were talking about cooperation from the FBI and the Justice Department, which we were trying to and getting done.
You see, we weren't asking for cooperation from the White House.
We were asking for cooperation from the Justice Department and the FBI.
And they put it out on order.
Listen to this.
In the spring, bring me a copy of 6th grade.
Now don't send it to the library.
There occurred between Kennedy and Budapest leaders dramatic battle at 3 o'clock on an April morning, a ringing telephone bell awaited an Associated Press reporter.
The man in the other end of the line introduced himself as an agent of the FBI, told the 18 men to expect him to revisit the FBI.
One hour later, the FBI agents rang his doorbell.
The doorbell had been reported to the Wall Street Journal and was routed out of bed by other FBI agents at 6.30 a.m.
That's excellent material, but that should be out in the domain right now.
You see, well, crisis is an old story, that's right, but it's just not.
The special early warning attempts of the FBI were given as well to major detectives to large new corporations, which had announced price increases.
These invasions of privacy were in the order of the President's brother, Robert Kennedy, as a junior general.
He issued his story.
There he is.
His claim is he could tell them what happened in the Hiss case.
I did, and I said that I would be sending over that chapter on the Hiss case out of Sixth Price.
I've got it in my office, I guess.
The point is, if you just go there, you can find out.
We had no cooperation from the FBI.
The speech I made in the Congress on it, on the his case, points out on the other side.
Here's what happened.
That's what Mollenhoff keeps trying to raise as to your position now on executive privilege.
Mollenhoff wants to use what you said about executive privilege then.
I didn't attack it then.
Because it wasn't what I was thinking we were after.
I have just recently gotten that excerpt from the record of your speech in the
I think we'll be able to very clearly distinguish, particularly if Zeeler gets a question from Mollenhoff, as to what we were talking about then as it needs to be now.
I would say, say, or others say, we were talking about us getting cooperation from the FBI and the Justice Department, which we weren't talking to, and getting none.
You see, we weren't asking for cooperation from the White House.
We were asking for cooperation from the Justice Department and the FBI, and they put out an order.
The man on the other end of the line introduced himself as an agent of the FBI, told the 18 men to expect him to revisit the FBI.
One hour later, the FBI agents rang his doorbell.
That's excellent material.
That should be out in the domain right now.
Well, crisis is an old story.
That's right, but it's just not...
The records are sort of old and sort of... We need somebody and I'll...
I don't have anybody smart, frankly, or who...
It's like I read...
two months to get, because everybody around here was against or wanted me to stop in the San Amnesty.
And he said, I want to be like Lincoln.
I told him, have you ever read Sandburg?
You know, it's too long.
I said, here's a read one page.
There's one page in Sandburg.
Lincoln's position in the Amnesty was very different.
Because Sandburg was very exposed.
And it was very simply that he gave Amnesty to the South.
But when somebody who'd gone to Canada and kicked us out in front of the White House said, I know that's going to be me.
given amnesty, and like the road on the bottom of this little emotional lake, you should see all these clowns come around as much as you could.
He said he may return to his country, provided he serves in prison for the number of days in the top of the country.
That was Lincoln's amnesty.
In other words, amnesty for those who'd walk for the South, either prison sentences,
or execution for those who deserve it, or grab it and dodge it from the norm.
That's what they think in this position.
Not that people around here won't really be receiving it.
Well, the point you made is very good, that we're not scouring what's really in the public domain right now.
We're putting some of these things in perspective, and we should have a team doing that right now.
I've got that open in my office now, Lord.
Mark the pages of some of the findings today.
Amen.
Go back, go out and get me and bring in to me my speech on this case.
Bring me my speech on this case that I made in 1951, 1950 in the House of Representatives.
You do that in faith, sir.

Nixon, Kissinger & Ziegler on Vietnam War and POW release

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