Nixon, Ziegler & Kissinger on Arab-Israeli conflict and US-Israeli relations

ZieglerMr. President.
NixonHello, Bill. Did Bill Rogers place a call to me? I got a message to call his office.
NixonUh did you get your reaction thing on on this yet?
ZieglerYes, I have another 100 positive telegrams.
NixonThe wire services, this whole thing was just--
ZieglerYeah. Well, we get this on top. What they do today they realize that they've been had again and they--
NixonThey have?
ZieglerVery unusually. Pierpoint Pierpoint came up, and he said, Pierpoint has been a a liberal, you know, on the war. He said, "I want you to know, Ron, that I think that the President has handled this business just evenly." And he said, "First of all," he said, "damn, CBS has running a story out of Paris. They're using your statement,
NixonThat's right.
ZieglerRon, that they won't use this and stand by on it." But he said, "uh I want you to know that I think that the President handled this whole matter just in the right way." On the POW thing, on this last few days.
NixonWell, we would have been killed if we hadn't struck this.
NixonUh Henry asked me whether you think tomorrow we break uh we should go forward with the uh the idea of a press conference. Tomorrow, Henry is so so much [unintelligible] bill.
NixonI can go tomorrow easy enough. I'm also
NixonI could rehearse that day--
ZieglerWell, from a foreign policy standpoint you may have a
Zieglera reason to do it.
NixonNo, no, no reason for a policy. The only point that I make is that it's usually best for us to be out to be outgoing on the press conference, remember,
Nixonit uh on our story rather than on theirs. Now, this story will be washed by Monday.
NixonUh but Friday it'll be they'll still be talking a bit about it and saying, well, how's the ceasefire going and all the rest.
ZieglerYeah.
NixonAnd I'd a hell of a lot rather be talking about that than I would about uh well, what about Watergate? What about Shultz? What about uh
Nixonwhat about Meany, you know? I I can handle all of that, but uh, there ain't much in it for us.
ZieglerNo, but if if you feel that, you know, what what's about doing in at 3:00 tomorrow? I thought, well, 3:00 tomorrow I think would be--
NixonWell, I can do it by 11:00 tomorrow, Ron, you know, yeah.
NixonIf you think, or 11:00 or 3:00, either one.
NixonWhat is your view?
NixonYou'd rather say Monday? If you do, we will go Monday.
ZieglerWell, you have Let me think a moment. You have a good argument about the fact that this is now ironed itself out today. Rogers is going to sign the uh the uh nine-point agreement. When is that being-- That would be before 11:00 tomorrow
NixonYeah.
Zieglerwouldn't it?
ZieglerIt would be before 11:00, wouldn't it? Well, press secretary. If I just take the time,
NixonWell, and it would We're being We'll be out here in a more positive--
ZieglerYou would be within the story. You would be commenting on the POW thing and and within that story.
NixonFriday,
ZieglerUh,
Nixonthe way things have ironed out now.
NixonYou see, which is basically our story rather than rather than waiting till Monday when you have the news magazines and everybody else and they've--
NixonYou see, one thing you've got to realize, Ron, and I'm sure you do, that whenever we have a good story,
NixonSALT II, or something like that, that all right, the Berlin agreement, they write about 48 hours and drop it.
NixonNow, to their interests, in other words, to kill the story.
NixonNow that it's happened, it's to our interest, frankly, to ride it rather than letting them get on another one.
NixonNow, we have a fight with them too, I know, on foreign policy and economics. That's why I'd--
ZieglerI feel good good tomorrow.
NixonYeah. Now, how about, in that case, I'll have to see how later how I get on today, but 3:00 tomorrow may be all right, too. We have 3:00 tomorrow.
NixonSo, I may not be able to get prepared by 11:00. If we do it 11:00, 11:30 would be all right. It'd be perfect.
Ziegler11:30's
NixonYou see, we'll be up till midnight, Ron, if we are at 11:30.
ZieglerWell, you and I could I'd say be totally flexible and if you want to do it at 11:30, we'll do it then. If you want to do it at 3:00, we'll do it at 3:00.
NixonWell, I finally think we ought to try to go tomorrow.
ZieglerAll right, well you tell me then,
NixonCall tell them to do it. Well,
Nixonthe way I don't I want to travel. I guess the best thing to do is to have Safire work on ready
ZieglerYou can be setting it up.
NixonWell, tell Pat, I want about two pages update, no more. I don't want him to whip up a book,
ZieglerYeah.
Nixonand I don't want a great gob of new material. Give me Henry is going to give me the foreign policy stuff, but just say I want just some brief,
Nixonvery, very brief updating, because I just haven't time to study all this stuff, see?
NixonBecause I like to get a hold of and go over and off and on. Well, this damn Fall trip, like that. So, is there anything, just
UnknownWe'll do a picture to start.
ZieglerYeah.
UnknownThey're bringing another person. Would you expect both of them to pose with the photo? It seemed to me to time to serve and Oh yes.
UnknownAnd not have them in that picture. Have both the others, have Ambassador Dinitz and Meir come in for the picture. All right. And then, the others
NixonYou don't think you should be in it, Ron? Be glad to have you.
NixonI think you should be in. Let's go, Ron. Let's have the whole group.
ZieglerOkay.
NixonCan they go for us? Fine.
ZieglerFrank's here.
NixonYeah, I know. We're going to try to get people set up for us.
Ziegler[whispering]
NixonWell, uh on Frontpage last night. Mrs. Colombo says she delivered something Oh, yes. And I hate it when they have the camera back on. These people
Zieglerthat it's what they say.
UnknownThey often wonder why, how they politically have splattered us completely.
UnknownThey don't know the why of why they turn around.
UnknownWell, if they're also being observed tomorrow,
Unknownthey [unintelligible]
NixonMadam Prime Minister.
MeirMr. President.
NixonWell, how are you? Good to see you again. Hello, Henry.
NixonI see you know Henry, of course.
MeirYes, we have wrestled.
KissingerYes. How are you?
NixonHow are you, Mr. Ambassador?
DinitzVery nice to see you.
NixonWell, we've missed you, but we welcome you.
DinitzThank you, Mr. President.
NixonWell uh, Madam Prime Minister, you know where your seat is, right over there.
NixonThe seat of honor.
NixonAnd Dennis? Dennis, why don't you sit on that-- You've been busy?
MeirI tell Henry yesterday
Nixon99 jobs.
Nixonthe opposition girl.
MeirHe was beautiful.
NixonWhat a girl.
NixonYou know her reputation.
MeirCan you see [unintelligible]?
NixonShe's with the with the press.
Unknown[unintelligible]
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UnknownOkay.
UnknownOkay.
UnknownOkay.
Nixon[unintelligible]
Nixon[unintelligible] Prime Minister. Yeah.
UnknownYears ago [unintelligible]
Nixon[unintelligible]
NixonNow I know, you got you've been here three years.
UnknownFive.
NixonFive. [unintelligible]
NixonYou see each other in the press [unintelligible]. It won't work.
NixonAll right. We'll go back. We'll go back to work.
Meir[unintelligible]
MeirMr. President, I want to really congratulate you from the depths of my heart
Meiron behalf of all these citizens for your leadership in bringing back peace to
Meirthe world, and I have prayed for the first time for a long, long period
Meirto awaken the real hope in the hearts of people that to maybe we're at the beginning of an era of the end of wars,
Meirand people will live with each other with different opinions, different ideologies, but can live with each other.
MeirPeople talk about this for many a years. Hopes expressed
NixonWell, you know Madam Prime Minister,
Nixonyou naturally and your colleagues are well aware,
Nixonthere is a tendency in this country for our people to be what we call hopeless idealists. And so they see they see the President of the United States shaking hands
Nixonwith Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and clinking glasses with the Chinese party.
NixonThey see a supposed meeting with Brezhnev, together on the SALT, and exchange of people and scientists and all the rest, and so forth, and so on.
NixonAnd they think as a result of all that, that the world's that the attitude of the communists has changed, that our attitude has changed, and
Nixonthat the world, by reason of the fact of our getting to know each other, has become instantly more safe, or is in the same period more safe than it is to, actually.
NixonNow, what what really has happened here, we all must realize, is that is that, over the past 4 years, and particularly over the past year,
Nixonas the ambassador was saying, in his terminology,
Nixonwe have changed the world. We have changed it because of this communication, of the dialogue that has begun, of the agreements that have been reached,
Nixonthe chances of of of of those misunderstandings that are inevitable even between friends,
Nixonand of course predictable between antagonists, so those periods, times that might explode into armed confrontation or war,
Nixonthat had passed. But we realize also, as you know very well, we are totally, we're totally realistic with regard to the danger that still exists.
NixonFor example, in our country at the present time, many people would want us They'd say, "Now the world is safe. The war is ending forever. The Russians are acting very well. The Chinese are acting very well.
NixonSo, why doesn't the United States reduce its armaments and spend more on ghettos, etcetera, etcetera, etcetera?"
NixonGod knows we'd like to, but there can be no reduction of U.S. arms unless there is a mutual reduction by the Soviets.
NixonAnd that's the way it has to be. Now, so I see
NixonI and we appreciate your comments and I've although I've said to Henry, I learned a lot about you reading
Nixonwhile while flying. But, that is background, you, too, are idealists as we are.
NixonWe have to be.
NixonYou know the world is very dangerous. You know it. Now, this is something So, publicly, we have to take the stance that, well,
Nixonthe world is is moving in a positive direction. We believe it is.
NixonIt's good to have the war in Vietnam over, even if it's on uneasy truce.
NixonIt's good to have have had a dialogue established with the Chinese, which is probably the most significant thing that's happened, because without that,
Nixonthe Russian thing wouldn't have happened. We can't say that. We never say it, because they must never believe that, the Russians. We played the game with both.
NixonAnd we've got to realize, too, that the Russians it's better to have Brezhnev and Nixon talking to each other, and sometimes
Nixondisagreeing, very vigorously, which we do, than it is to have us snarling at each other and we're not talking at all.
NixonBut on the other hand, you can be sure, from where you sit, in your dangerous part of the world,
Nixonwe're we're not so weak, because we've gotten to know each other, that now we can unilaterally drop our guard.
NixonWell, that's real That's what we have to do, you see.
MeirI said to my socialist friends here in France and as citizens of the world, as human beings,
Meirwe're very happy with what you are doing.
MeirBut, I hope and pray that you won't become bleary-eyed and forget who you are dealing with,
Meirbecause something that's That's very true, and who told who told them that, eh?
NixonYeah. Well, I told you the best thing you could do, though. Tell your socialist friends all over Europe.
NixonBelieve me, believe me, one of the great problems, if we can speak candidly, where you can have great influence,
Nixonis with the new type of leadership that is developing here, with the exception of Heath.
NixonPompidou, they are, the interior of peace, he's all right in in his heart. But, on the other hand,
Nixonthe pressures of socialists, and so forth, in France, very Italy, you know, they're they're having [unintelligible] at the moment. The Germans torn apart.
NixonAnd at the present time, this naive attitude that, well, we can now drop, uh,
Nixonbe, drop our defenses and rest, or whatever, and that the United States shouldn't defend Europe, and so forth. This must not This must not be allowed to continue.
NixonBecause we That doesn't mean you have you shouldn't say that the Cold War can go on forever. It doesn't say that the Russians are beasts, and so forth and so on. They may be that.
NixonBut, it does say that they're realists, and there's one rule that they definitely see. They talk about the Golden Rule. The rule that I call an international affair,
Nixonis a very simple one.
Unknown[Laughter]
MeirNow, I think that the greatest danger to what we have had for the Europeans for it is really not to to run away
Meirfrom a realistic appraisal of the situation. If we, if there is hope, and and I hope there is hope, of coming to some real coexistence,
MeirI always say to my friends who come to the safe coexistence of that the fact is the same thing, that when you say coexistence we, when we say coexistence, when you say coexistence, it means you exist your way, we will exist our way, but let us live together.
MeirWhen they say coexistence, it means you live as we want you to live, then we will coexist.
NixonYeah, when they say their coexistence means, I mean, you you well put it that coexistence to us, you live your way, we live our way. When they say coexistence, they mean you live your way, but inside of us.
MeirYes.
NixonSwallowed.
MeirWell, I think caution [unintelligible]. In this Paris Socialist conference, somebody was very, very insane.
RabinIt was a conference of Socialist leaders of Europe meant during the Vietnam thing and the Prime Minister, our Prime Minister, announced that [crosstalk] she would participate.
MeirThey asked me why I came and kept, and protested against, kept on protesting against. Well, I was, I was not, I was, I wasn't
Meirprepared to sit there on judgment and decide who who is right. And so at one point I said look here, folk, as far as I knew that this the press conference again on the way
Meirthe the question of how this ceasefire will be kept. What the observers, the UN observer will do, that's all I know about, do you know more? I said as far as the keeping of ceasefire
Meirand UN observers with with all respect to all of you around the table, I'm the expert here. So, Palme said, "Well, next to Golda, I think that I know about the UN observers
Meirfor the other side that the Swedes took part in the in the observers' corps." But Kreisky was very-
NixonHe's a good man.
MeirVery same.
NixonHe's solid.
MeirAnd he understands at least.
NixonOnly, only, yeah. I only regret, I wish he were in a bigger country.
MeirCorrect.
MeirAnd the German delegation was good.
NixonThey are good.
MeirBrandt didn't come. He was
MeirIt was schedule to come on about two weeks later to deal with to do with Pompidou, I think. So, he wasn't there. But the Belgians
Meirand a member of the shadow cabinet of Wilson came there.
MeirAnd we all want idealists, but idealist with the in the clouds in this world, I guess.
NixonWell, we work towards the ideal, but you have to work for it pragmatically. It's obvious that speeches, and so forth, get you made if something's done.
NixonThat's the only test for it.
NixonYou take, oh, Woodrow Wilson, you know, he was probably one of the most religious idealist men ever sat in this office, but worst of all, when it finally came down to he created a great impact on rhetoric for a
Nixon14 points.
MeirPoints.
NixonAnd then when he goes over to the Versailles Conference, the practicalist of Europe gobbled him up in about two bites. And the World War II was in the making as a result. Right?
MeirYes.
NixonAs a matter of fact, I think if Versailles had been worked out more cleverly,
Nixonwe'd never had Hitler.
NixonYou know, you read what produced that ball, it had to start with Versailles.
NixonHad to start with Versailles. You can't take differing sample the attitude toward the Germans
Nixonafter World War I and the attitude that we took after World War II.
NixonIt might have been a damn situation. But, what do you think?
DinitzWell, I think Versailles was either too soft or too tough.
NixonI thought it was too tough, actually.
DinitzWell, it was, it,
Dinitzuh, it, it created the possibility of humiliating the Germans,
Dinitzwhile not weakening them enough.
NixonYeah. Never do that. If you're going to humiliate somebody, you must destroy him.
DinitzRight.
NixonOtherwise, he's going to be able to destroy you. You must never strike a king unless you kill him.
DinitzThat is why the old balance of France, which had been demoralized by the war, because Russia could not help it to be. So Versailles was disastrous.
NixonLet me, let me come to our, other, current problems. Fortunately, I was so busy, had this meeting and Henry and the Ambassador had talked this morning.
MeirVery helpful.
NixonWe talked. Let me get one thing out of the way, because they will probably ask you whatever was discussed.
NixonThis unfortunate plane incident. We we we understand the problem.
NixonWe we know that you're in in your statements, in uh make that point. We had an opportunity to talk to your people.
NixonIn this situation where we have that uneasy truce incidents are bound to occur. And this was one that, as I told them, somebody
Nixonprobably ask me say, "Well, no, the Israeli certainly wouldn't have intended anything like this to happen.
NixonIt's the last thing Mr. Meier pointed out in her statement they wanted to have. Because they wouldn't want innocent people
Nixonkilled. That wouldn't work. And second, they're too smart to have done it deliberately even if they intended to do it.
Meir[Laughter]
NixonSo there it is. And frankly, let me show you, in fact, I saw Henry saying, "Well, there's been some resolution UN." This was not actually,
Nixonyou know, we were with the POW thing yesterday and it did not come to my desk. If it had, it wouldn't have happened.
NixonWhat we would have done, would have been at least try to amend the resolution to have the investigation first.
NixonYou know, you don't start to condemn somebody you investigate.
MeirYes, first you condemn.
NixonLet me say it is. Let me say it's one of those things, we're sorry that it didn't it does not figure, not our policy at all.
NixonCould we go into apprehend it, then it'll be good that you people Oh yeah, well, apparently, there was some feeling, let's be quite candid, Scali, the new man, a good man.
NixonHe clears everything with us here, as well as State Department.
NixonWhat happened, he had a conversation with your ambassador at the UN, got the impression that it was all right.
NixonYou know.
MeirWell, the misunderstood. When they spoke to Tekoah this morning.
NixonYeah.
MeirBut, they misunderstood.
NixonYeah. It was a misunderstanding.
NixonWe expressed these hopes. As you know, of course,
Nixonwe have so that so there's no embarrassment to you as far as we're concerned,
Nixonwe obviously have to indicate an interest in it because the interest has been raised here. So, now we've done it. So we say-
MeirMr. President, no matter what happens at the UN, I want you to know this.
MeirDuring the month of January,
Meirwarnings that this Black September is planning
NixonWhen you mean is crash it?
MeirYes.
NixonLike a, have kamikaze.
MeirSince in Lod we had Japanese who came in who were prepared to commit suicide.
MeirAnd just shoot everybody in sight.
NixonIt's crazy, fools, yeah.
MeirYou see, we we had to consider that seriously.
NixonRight.
MeirAnd it is in that context that one must understand it.
NixonSure.
MeirNow, Mr. President, I'm interested above all
MeirIf had anyone of the people there had any doubt
Meirsaid you should have tried to bring the plane down on its way out. He said
Meira passenger plane. He said even on the way in. Even if it was coming into the country we wouldn't have done it.
MeirAnd nobody, I believe, in the world was full of so much sorrow as our people.
NixonLet me say we understand. I followed it all and know, and and the the main concern we have, as I explained
Nixonhere to the ambassador to the ambassador was, we don't want your position, I mean Israel's position,
Nixonin the in the world to be eroded or something. Now, you have made a clear statement and that I hope that was a very a very intelligent move to suggest that we're willing
Nixonto, you know, to on humanitarian grounds would would pay compensation and so on. Now, what I what I would say is this:
Nixonit has happened to us before. For example, if we were bombing military targets in North Vietnam, the hospital was hit. Now, we didn't intend to bomb the hospital, it makes no difference to the world.
NixonIf people If we had really intended to hit not military targets, but the targets of North Vietnam, we could have wiped it out in Hanoi in about three days. Right.
NixonYou know, but we didn't. Be that as it may, they're not they're not parallels, but let us understand.
NixonWe know what your intentions are and your motive, but we want to be because we have to work together, we want your position that you want that you that that you can sell before the world, you know,
Nixonand that's that's what we're after. Now, so we'll discuss the [crosstalk] I thank you. Mr. The ambassador, the the ambassador
Meirreported that. What surprised me when we went into Lebanon about two weeks ago. Great.
MeirThe easiest thing would have been for the easiest thing, the safest thing for our men would have been to go in with planes.
MeirWe knew exactly where these headquarters and camps of the terrorists are. They deliberately
Meirput them either into a refugee camp or right outside of a refugee camp. These places were so close to refugee camps
Meirthat it was decided not to use planes, but to go in.
MeirNow, our men had to go in and walk for hours in enemy territory in order to locate exactly each one and they tested this in this room, even from the Lebanese,
Meirwe had the statement that it was exact. These were places of terrorists of armed terrorists,
Meirand no no civilian was touched in the refugee camp. But believe me, that night until 3:30 in the morning when the Chief of Staff and the Defense Minister said
Meirour boys are back. Two wounded, one lost an arm and an eye, but, hell, I know what could have happened to these men walking in enemy territory over hills
Meirfor hours in order to reach these places in order not to touch anybody. Sometimes it happened.
MeirBut everything is done, and it isn't a question that we have to tell the military to be careful. They themselves are really sensitive to this question.
NixonI appreciate that. Now, the but I suppose the continuing issue is
Nixonwe always seem to be discussing, one is the issue of the whole program of arms
Nixon[unintelligible] those are the main things. Let me begin the discussion by simply by saying, first,
Nixonthat as you are quite aware, for four years, while there have been ups, while you've been concerned at times by
Nixonwhat you think that our danglers [unintelligible] and so on, but you know here in this office that
NixonI think we have kept every commitment, and also in those four years, we have not
Nixonever tried to use a ratchet, squeeze you in a commitment. That has been our policy, and in doing that,
NixonI want you to know that that will continue to be our policy. But on the other hand,
Nixonas as we've engaged with that, we we feel it's important that the two of us work together toward
Nixontoward seeing if there's if it's dead center, at least on the negotiating side. In other words, let me put it this way: if you put,
NixonI know that no government, like yours, can be in the position of
Nixonin order to give this up, and yield this that the other. We have to realize that heard such such things all
Nixonas far as we're concerned, will never be directly linked. As far as we're concerned,
Nixonwe we would like to we want to proceed with our program of mutual assistance, whether it's arms deal, economic deal, because we believe Israel
Nixonhas to be strong, we has to remain strong enough to defend itself against its potential enemies. We think that's in our interest.
NixonAnd also of course it's also true for reasons you might believe it. On the other hand, we also think it's in our interest, meaning yours too, to move on the negotiating
Nixonfront. So, with that background, why don't we talk about what you think, what you want on the arms thing, what we can work out.
MeirFirst, I want to say, I've said publicly, I say it at home, I say to all American visitors that come,
Meirthat every commitment has been given, has been meticulously implemented.
MeirAnd I must say, we've never had it so good.
MeirAnd I think it was I appreciate mainly, in the basis of what I say, because there is
Meirthere's mutual understanding, and there's mutual confidence.
MeirMr. President, I am convinced that, without any doubt, as to what we want to do with the arms we get.
MeirAnd the fact that there is this confidence that what we want is merely to be in a position that of self-defense, and your policy has been proven so right.
MeirNot only does it make Israel give Israel the capability of defending itself, but it has prevented war.
MeirIt has prevented shooting.
MeirIf after then we had been left weak, I'm convinced there would be shooting across the canal.
MeirAnd if Sadat didn't start shooting despite all the dates that he set, it's because he knows that we're capable of defending ourselves.
MeirAnd this and this way your policy has been proven right 100%.
MeirIt has not only made us capable of defending ourselves when attacked, we weren't attacked because of that. There's been no shooting because of that.
MeirThis was the uh the primary element in having at least the Egyptian front quiet.
MeirSo, there it was proven right. And
Meirwhat we are interested now, well, and can I say one more thing?
MeirWe've been asked naturally at home and by others uh, "Now that the Vietnam uh thing is out of the way, don't you fear that the American government will now become more active in your area?"
MeirAnd I said, "I don't feel that at all. There's no difference of opinion as to the necessity of
Meirtrying to do everything which is possible to do, in order to have reached a state of of peace in the area.
MeirAnd the question is how to go about it. The question is what will be done. But we are we are not opposed to the American government being active in that. On the contrary,"
Meirthere's nothing, uh, we have no differences of opinion on that. The question: how do we go about it? And the appraisal of what the other side means when it speaks about peace or when it speaks about negotiations.
MeirNow, as far as we are concerned, as the President can tell best, I stand as we've stood in the beginning. We are prepared to sit in negotiations at any time, anywhere. May I give a a few moments to tell you, uh, uh, something that happened last, uh, May?
MeirMay. A special envoy came from the President of Romania. Romania is the only uh East European country that has not severed its relationship with us. And he came in. He was the deputy foreign minister, he's now foreign minister,
MeirMacovescu. He came for two days and uh he said he was coming for a talk with the Foreign Office. But then he came to see me. And he said, "I'm told this is the reason I come. I've been sent by my president. My president was in Egypt.
MeirUh, he met President Sadat. I don't know what he wants to say to you, but he would like to see you. And he asks you, would it be possible for you to come to Bucharest?" I thought. So, I went to Bucharest secret visit.
MeirAnd I spent about 7 hours at least speaking with the President in two sessions. The message that he brought was that he saw Sadat. Sadat is wants peace. And the important thing is that Sadat
Meiris prepared that there should be a meeting, direct meeting, at some level between an Egyptian and Israeli. And I said to, uh, the President, I said, "This is the best news I've heard for a long, long time. By all means. It can be at any level, at any place."
MeirAnd he said, "Well, I'm very glad that you accept it." And as a matter of fact, uh, dinner was served, Macovescu was there, and technical arrangements were made how he would convey the message. He flew the next day to convey my message to Sadat. And I said, "Please,
Meirtell Sadat we honestly and sincerely want peace. And at any level at any time." And he said, "All right, in about a week or 10 days, I'll have a message for you." The message never came.
MeirTwice during this period, I asked our ambassador to go, and he didn't want the ambassadors to know, the Romanian ambassador, the Israeli ambassador in Bucharest, fine. But I said, "Will you go and just ask is there a message for me? Not saying what the subject of the message." Nothing.
MeirI'm sure that Ceausescu he delivered the message to Sadat. He wanted to. He saw this as an important mission for for him, and for Romania. Nothing happened. So as far as negotiations are concerned, we first thought
Meirthat direct negotiations will still, you know, will still be the right way. We're prepared to go to indirect negotiations. Uh, when your government suggested uh what's called proximity talks, proximity talks. And we are still prepared at any moment that uh there's no question whatsoever.
MeirOn that, actually, there is no difference of opinion in any corner in Israel as far as negotiations are concerned. Uh, with Egypt, with any one of the countries. With uh King Hussein, you know, Mr. President, that there is contact on a reaching in a very, very friendly atmosphere.
RabinHe just, the King sent a special message the day before yesterday for Florida through the foreign minister.
MeirHe you know he's touched, then, that when he left for here, Egypt, that could be uh, uh, uh, annoyed with him. And he's he wants to know how,
RabinA special message just [unintelligible] the day before yesterday [unintelligible]
NixonWe uh, let me suggest something to you. I'd like to pursue this possible course. We're seeking, as I told you in the brief conference we had, we're not seeking a confrontational [unintelligible].
NixonThere are two tracks, of course. There's the public track. Now, the trouble with the public track is that it's very hard to to Once you launch something in the public arena,
Nixonit has to work. If it doesn't work, then you have, and then one side or the other tends to react. In other words, I always say don't go to the summit unless you know what's on the other side. Now, in this instance, therefore, we're going to go, I think, the public track, wherever that may be, ought to go forward. And we will continue, we want you to continue, discussions uh, you know, with, uh, the informal talks, right?
NixonNow, this part is particularly among us. Um We have found in dealing with the Chinese and Russians
Nixonuh because of the relationship which that Dr. Kissinger and because of the confidence he and I have in each other and the way we work, that in addition to public, what we do publicly,
Nixonthat we have a very intensive uh series of exploratory discussions with Chou En-lai, so that by the time we go to the summit in Moscow, or by the time we go to the summit, so-called, in Peking,
Nixonwe know in advance what's going to happen. Not totally, because there are always, but we also know what's going to what's not going to happen, so that we're going to have an argument, what we're going to say and what we agree that we'll say. That's why those endeavors have succeeded up to this point. We have not yet done that in your area
Nixonbecause you've you haven't wanted it. In other words, and we didn't that was your decision, and in any case, I don't know if it would work. But what I would like to suggest is the possibility that and to do it, we've got to have confidence, frankly, in each other, that we are not going to put you in an impossible position.
NixonIn other words, uh that we would we know your problems, right? We know what they're up to. We're not getting bogged down with all the rest of them. But, there's also the problem here. And, as you you know, particularly
Nixonthat the with energy crises and all the rest, there's a lot of heat now. We've got to do something about the Middle East. Whether that's related or not, you've got people thinking so. So, what the best way, well, I think we can approach the problem
Nixonis that since uh since you're in a very strong bargaining position at the moment, and you are, uh you can lick anybody in that border. They all tried it, could you, you know, lose a few, but you would win. Even if the Russians play, well, no problem.
NixonUh and you will continue to be able to continue this for some time. And that's why, frankly, on the one side, you can say, "Why should we talk?" On the other side, however, you look down the road and say, "Well, maybe it could change." It could. Now, let us, at this time, I would suggest, while you are in a very strong bargaining position,
Nixonand where, for the first time, and I must say it's because of your strength, the the Egyptians are approaching us. Rather than us going to them, they're coming to us. And not for the first time. Now, let's talk about the Russians quite candidly. The Russians are panting
Nixonto get some sort of a settlement there. And, I think, the reason they're panting for it is that they want to get the Egyptian monkey off their back. There may be other reasons, but uh we we won't try to judge Russian motives, except that they want something down there after some time. Now, you don't want the Russians in your game. You'd rather have us in your game. Delight to have the Russians, however, you know they got to play a role,
Nixonbecause they've got to keep their clients in line, you know, from uh, from uh like uh breaking loose. So, I would like to try a process where Dr. Kissinger on a totally private basis
Nixonwill explore with the Egyptians uh what is doable. He will not negotiate with you. He He's got You will have to let us know uh the the the areas uh that that as I would understand, Henry, that you uh you would be able to negotiate within. You're not going to negotiate about it, you want to explore.
NixonNow, the other thing is that the other thing is the same kind of thing can be had with the Russians. Now, Brezhnev, also, wants to listen, he said. Brezhnev will probably be
Nixonhere, sometime this year. It'll be here sometime this year. We know what the question is whether it'll be early summer or late summer or fall.
NixonNow that that that's what gives us a a reason for us to be able to talk to him on this basis to persuade him that we can act.
NixonWhere, you know, we had a long discussion with him after you, Golda.
KissingerNot yet, but we have had, though. And I'm always kid Well, you know I can listen to it. You know [unintelligible]
Nixon[unintelligible] But the last time we did have a boost, the Russians' position had changed considerably, you remember, the talk we had with Gromyko and the talk we had with Brezhnev, because when we were in Moscow. But at that time, they offered to pull their troops out of Egypt, and, uh, you know, they did pull them out.
Meir[laughter]
NixonNow, what what we would be talking about here is is a is a game, in which you would have to In which, I will tell you, I'll give you the assurance that Henry will conduct this under my direction,
Nixonuh, on absolutely off-the-record basis. Some of them will leak, you know, they leaked, and, you know, and and have, and they leak in Africa, but they don't leak out of, you know, the White House doesn't leak it all the time.
NixonSo, uh, be that as it may, what what we would like to do, what what I would suggest is that he can discuss that, uh, let us see, uh, whether whether there is something Now, what is the goal?
NixonLet's see. You know that you know there's impossible thing. The Egyptians, on the one hand, say they've got to have overall settlement before they'll talk about interim settlement. And that's that's the thing that's been there. And the other great debate is the question: you want security, and they want sovereignty. And so those are insolvable, right?
NixonOn the other hand, if we could get an interim settlement, I mean, let us face it, that's in your interest. You're extended,
Nixonand then leave the other, now we're talking with the greatest of confidence, in the most, shall we say, fuzzy atmosphere, because it has to be fuzzy for both sides. The more concrete it is, the less chance there is ever to get an agreement.
NixonBut Henry is a master at writing fuzzy language. [laughter]
KissingerIt's isn't that I'm being picked deliberately [laughter] for that.
NixonThat's why they want to that's why they want to have talks with you, Madam Prime Minister, because they're afraid you'll gum them up a lot. You will. [laughter] Yeah. Well, they look you're bad. Oh, you think you're clever. Oh, I see. [laughter]
NixonI could tell him what, uh, what John Meyer said: "You Henry can't you know all about that, but, uh, [unintelligible]
KissingerOur negotiations still uh often cross Mr. Safire.
MeirSomeone told me that at a party somebody said it was a group of editors. Somebody told me that somebody said, "Can you answer this question?" He said, "I have no choice, because the only man who can talk for half an hour without saying anything is Kissinger." [laughter]
MeirSo, when I was there, I said I had I had a complaint that you came away like Secret.
KissingerHe said, "No, I didn't say, Henry. But I said another thing and..." [laughter]
NixonWell, why we Why we, uh let me tell you why I think this procedure could be helpful. First first, there's a chance that it might work, faint. Second, however, it keeps It keeps the action going so that, so that they don't, so that they don't confront us with something we don't know, to have to go to the public area.
NixonYou see, what I am concerned about, uh Prime Minister, is going to the public area, and then get all the eager beavers on both sides doing that, and, you know, make statements, text, and, all of a sudden, we're in a confrontation. And distance doesn't work. Now, privately, it may not work either. Maybe all we're going to have for this is this compromise, but it gives us a pride. So that's what I would suggest as a line of procedure, if you will permit it. Now, I don't We won't do it unless you, uh, will will approve it.
NixonBecause, you see, and, and let me say, we're not a broker for you, but we need to know at least some outlines of what you think we should talk about.
MeirMr. President, neither we speak to the Russians, nor do the Egyptians speak to us. And, uh, we, we didn't want conflict [unintelligible] and, they find that we're strong, thank God. Um, but, uh, we don't want to use our strength, and we are anxious for a situation being created in the Middle East where there is
Meirreal peace. Now,
Meirwe're we're anxious that, uh, you talk to the Russians and the Egyptians, and, uh, which you say now I can only underline, naturally not, uh, come to some decision, or to have some agreement at, uh, at our expense, let us say. Let me put it bluntly. You don't want an agreement closed right
MeirThe Egyptians want the United States to deliver Israel. First they thought the Soviets would deliver Israel to them. Now they're pretty much disappointed in the Soviets. Now they want the Americans to deliver Israel to them. When I, uh, I don't have to fear that you're going to deliver us to Egypt, that you're going to squeeze Israel, all this terminology that is used by Sadat.
MeirUm, and not only that, but I naturally expect that the United States will not take a stand of its own in this matter without consulting us, without us knowing. What what is happening, that is, that we don't get up some one morning, and find that the United States and the Egyptians, or the United States and the Russians, have come to some agreement, and that here it is, and we we won't be able to to accept it,
Meirbecause it isn't sovereignty that we want. That isn't the main thing. If we say we must have sovereignty in certain areas, it's because we must have security. Who like Mr. President will understand that? And the second thing is: What do the Egyptians really want? If the miracle would happen, and they would really want peace with us,
Meirand say, "This is it. And, from now on, uh, no confrontation, no threats, and so on. We live in peace." That would be the greatest day for Israel. We know that that is not what they want. We know that they speak to their close friends and say they want all kinds of things. They want Israel to go back to the '67 border. They want after that to drive Israel to the '47 border. And after that,
MeirIsrael will have to settle its matters with the Palestinians. Palestinians, uh, means Arafat. It's terrorists. So, we agree that practical approach is this, uh, special agreement about the Suez. We are prepared,
NixonIn the interim?
MeirYes, we've we've said, and we say, and we say it to you, we say it to, that the line to which we are prepared to, uh, withdraw from the Suez Canal is a temporary line. We don't say that this is the final line. Final lines is the peace treaty with negotiations, that will have to be beautiful between us and the Egyptians. But as an interim agreement,
Meirwhen we say we will step back, it means a lot for us to leave our fortifications and step back. These fortifications
NixonThe fortification lines of the Suez Canal, which is very The The Suez Canal is a natural, uh, block between us and the Egyptian army. And, uh, someday, when the story will be told, the number of guns on our side and the number of guns on the other side,
Meirprobably nobody will believe it. This is one of the reasons why it's so essential for us to have an air force, because there's no comparison between the number of guns that they have on their side, and we have. We can't afford it. We've not the manpower, nor in guns. So, when we say we're prepared to leave this the strongest point that we have, vis-à-vis Egypt, our fortifications,
Meirwe're doing something. We're taking a risk, but we're prepared to take a risk for peace. In addition to that, we say: all right, they want to clear the Suez Canal,
Meiragreed, not not only to clear the Suez Canal, but they want to operate the Suez Canal in order to have a division of forces which is not only in talk, not only in agreement, but if the canal is operated, we hope they won't begin shooting. We hope they will begin to, uh, uh,
Meirto rehabilitate the people in the towns that have been destroyed on the other side, bring them back. Normal life there, which again, is a guarantee, almost a guarantee that they won't start shooting again. We say, naturally, they want to, uh, clear the Suez Canal. They will have to bring over some personnel, technicians and so forth.
MeirWe are prepared to say something which
Meirsure that people have got human will, the way to go, the right to chop our heads off for that. Some, uh, policeman,
Meirthat civilians there and police women there, fine. They can count them. We are even prepared to do something which is difficult for us.
MeirIf the Suez Canal is open and operating, not during the opening, for the right of shipping. We are prepared in the first stage that they should recognize in principle
Meirthat we have a right of shipping in the Suez Canal. But, uh, we won't use that right immediately. Since we've lived so long without the Suez Canal, we'll try to live a little while longer.
MeirThis if we are often told we must do something and face-saving for Sadat. So, the laugh is that that's a face-saving, he has the canal,
Meirand in practice, there is no Israeli ship, although in principle, he must recognize our right to ship in the Suez Canal. So, it seems to me that in in a package of this kind, with all these points,
Meirthat there is something that can be done if they really want it. Now this, Mr. President, has never been negotiated before, and I mean the proposals have never been formally put
Nixonto the other side? Well, let me ask this, uh. Should they be?
MeirI am prepared to go home, I'm prepared to go home and fight for this. Never in public. Well, here I'm talking about it just publicly.
KissingerNo, no, this is— Well, we have a number of decisions to make on it. When the Prime Minister and I had a long talk yesterday about one to four, yeah, and she mentioned these points
Kissingerthat, uh, she was ready to make this Israeli position, that contributes. Now, to this point, we then have this question: we can do it in one of two ways. We can
Kissingereither let the State Department start an interim negotiation procedure, an interim settlement procedure without putting this position to them to, you know, get proximity talks going in order to have something to keep these positions back until
NixonNow, I think it wouldn't be wise for because they were the Prime Minister which, you know, gives those points away. Well, you could say you'd be reasonable, but I would fall off at this point. I think
Nixonthat would fit it better into our private channel. The Egyptian, you got to have something for the State Department to be talking to, and, of course, the the the Egyptians need something in the public area, and so on. So, but the point is that that the It seems to me that
Nixonthe channel, the private channel, the procedure, the better procedure is to have that moved ahead and not and not not put this whole position out there. In that, you take the other position, you take the position
Nixonand go ahead and talk, and then uh, in other words, sell it two or three times. You know, you're good at that.
MeirFor instance, on the that other question of the, uh, line to which we withdraw, we will never say publicly now
Meirthat we are prepared eventually to withdraw to the passes, but uh not not in one step. But we wouldn't say that in public, or I may say I won't say to the State Department, because then it's gone. We've given away a lot.
NixonYeah, that's where you start your negotiation. That's the point. And we will You've got to be in a position, that's why the private negotiation is better, you've got to be in a position that you know what you are willing to do and then you get part and you end up here. Otherwise, if you say it here, you'll end up here. That's the way it works.
KissingerAt this stage, uh, first of all, we don't have to trigger anything for a few weeks, but they'll have enough to talk about just discussing procedures on how to get the talks started. That could occupy everyone that is the State Department could proceed. They'll come to you with a proposal,
Kissingerand they'll come to the Egyptians, and then both sides will have proposals, and all this might happen, that would occupy everybody for a couple of months. And you should be very awkward on that
Nixonforthcoming. Those things are
MeirSo, well, this uh it did The trouble is that the Egyptians, as you said, they want the end before they begin. And then, uh,
Meirour principle: we're prepared to discuss an all-over, an overall peace agreement, but no, they want before they depart, before they negotiate, to have everything that uh they want to get. And we've uh taken the we'll stand on the passes.
MeirIf it's practically impossible to hear that at all, it's the Suez Channel. And, uh,
Nixonwell we had, I I talked personally with Ismail, as Henry did too, and, uh, you know, they're they're going to hold, they're they're going to force their positions very hard on it, uh, but uh there's a window there, it seems to me, a break in the wall, it's not a very wide one,
KissingerIf they have given nothing in substance, but they've entirely changed their psychological attitude. So, now this is the So now it's important for them to see what happens in the next round. If they will put in something in substance as opposed to rhetoric, and you have now given something in substance, so we know, and we Well, the point is we've got to tell them what you what you what you have,
Nixonand he just couldn't sit here and say, "Look, Ismail, we can't tell you this, we know your position is this, and basically you're talking about
Nixon1967 borders, which you cannot accept, we understand that, and that we're going to be talking, they tell us that, you know, they can't, they said, "We can't have any, we can't have any talks or anything until there's an agreement that we're going to withdraw from all of that." So, that will be something [unintelligible]
NixonAnd I said, "No, we've got to find something to talk about in between." That's where we have them, now. You see, you've got to get them smoked out as to where they are, but the main point is, now, everybody's view is, "It's the Russian game."
KissingerWe can keep, if we have these Egyptian talks going, what the Russians undoubtedly will do is to present a very detailed paper. This would get us into the position of maneuvering towards imposing a settlement.
KissingerOn the other hand, Ismail told me that he doesn't want a detailed Russian position as long as they are talking to us. So we could use the Egyptian talks to say that
Kissingerwe'll offer the Russians that we're willing to talk in generalities, but that we want to wait to see what the Egyptians come up with, otherwise we'll produce total confusion. We're in this interesting position, at the moment, that when we talked a little over a year ago,
Nixonand also when we talked in Russia six or seven months ago, basically, the Russians talked as if they were brokering for, or they were the Egyptians, and they were talking about what they could get the Egyptians to do. Now, the new situation is that at the moment, that's why I say there's a slight window here,
Nixonthe Egyptians have come to us and said we would rather talk to you rather than through the Russians. I wish they'd [unintelligible]
KissingerThey said, that's why they sent Ismail. While the talk goes on, while they're talking to us, they don't want the Russians to present detailed proposals, and that they've said they would be prepared to say to the Russians, too. At any rate, that's what we could say to the Russians,
Kissingerwhen Dobrynin comes back here, undoubtedly with a specific scheme. If I'm permitted, I'd say something like that. Well, you see, one thing that is in your interest, it seems to me, and that's why I think we're in a very delicate state,
Nixonit's much better to for you, and for you I mean, if this gets down to a situation where the Russians represent Egypt,
Nixonand then it forces us in the position of we're representing Israel, the result of that is not going to be one that you're particularly going to like. Because that means the two great powers will sit down and say, "Well, we'll work this out." However, if we, as the middle man,
Nixonif we can get jockeyed into the position where we talk to both sides, I think you're in pretty good shape, because you know how we're going to tilt. No doubt about it. Yeah, but the other side will keep—
MeirThe information that we had, that while Ismail was in Moscow, the Russians, took a stiff line and said, "Don't give in.
MeirDon't give in to the Americans." That's right. The name of the game always was that. They make it, "Don't give in to the Americans. Don't give in at all." Although I must say the Russians
Meirget us—encourage them to go to war. The Russians said to them, "Look, this is a decision you have to take, but—"
Meirand uh full of sobby words. He said, "Look, in a war there is shootings. Therefore, you have to be careful." On the other hand,
Meiruh he promised, uh Brezhnev did, that they would get MiG-23s. He invited pilots to come to Russia immediately to begin training with the MiG-23.
NixonWe always get transcripts of these Egyptian conferences and Egyptian conversations, anyhow. So, why say it?
MeirIt's very much secret between you and me, but uh—
NixonYou don't think it's secret between you and me? That's right.
MeirBut uh I won—I want to stay strictly on the—on the major point that the Russians will not encourage them to uh, for a compromise, and certainly they don't encourage them to make any compromise with you. With the—
NixonAll right, then, maybe you could say that uh if this disadvantage, if they go over to Cairo, then if he doesn't make a settlement, then they might still be interested? It could be. Yeah.
NixonUh-huh, and they can uh undermine him, ever, if uh if they don't like him. Well, they would like to have uh a performance, what they would like, is a repeat performance of uh '57,
Meirwhen actually what we did in '57 was because of the United States, but they take the credit for it. Now, then, when they went back to the Egyptians and said, "See, what we did for you. The Israelis went right back." And they'd they'd like to have a a repeat performance of this kind. Therefore, they say for one,
Meirdon't compromise on anything. And two: by no means should you make any compromise in your talks or negotiations with the Americans. Well, may I at the present time, see, we've got a [unintelligible] practically talk to them, keep in mind that we'll have to keep with the Russians.
NixonIt is in everybody's keep them being pushed either toward war, or delegating a settlement. The Russians are playing the radicals out there. They're playing with Syria, and they're playing with Iraq, and they're playing with a craze for the Soviet Union to a certain extent. Is that?
NixonAnd all the Arab nations here are uh problem makers for everything that's going on. They're try—trying to strengthen the Syrians. I think they're very happy with the results, but um the Syrians handle their their equipment, but uh they're sending an awful lot of equipment to Syria. And uh,
Meirif we were to make a list of madmen in the area, then Qadhafi, of course, takes uh He has to. He's the—he's the student's competitor. And the others uh have difficulties at home: Hussein,
MeirSadat. And uh—
NixonWell, shall we uh shall we shall we leave it this way, then? Yes. Now, the contact then would be through the uh Henry and the Ambassador. Yes.
NixonAll right. That would be fine. Yeah, fine. And I asked uh I asked Denis to come along with me because I wanted him to be in on these discussions, Sure. so when he takes uh
Meirthe office, he's And US eye to stays in your office, so that it doesn't come back through Foreign Affairs. The channel is very good. It was just [crosstalk] Thanks. That way channel too. Right. Well, let's keep it here.
NixonNow, on the question of what do we want as the Mr. President wants it in hardware, Hardware? Well, software hardware? Now, there are two main points. I know what you want, but uh we have to find out what we can get though, see? How to how to work it out.
MeirWell, one is the question of art production, Right. and there've been long negotiations with negotiating on a prototype. And uh,
Meirwell, Mr. Ambassador, you know better than I know the names. It's the Pentagon was uh said: go along and helped us in producing. Now, it just happened that it's successful now. Now, we want to go into production,
Meirand uh we need certain We need help in parts and so on, and here we run into a position where the things don't move.
MeirWhat uh we would like is that the Pentagon should say, "Now, all right, now you've hanged for a long time. If it works, well, go ahead, and we'll help you do that." That's one point. The second point,
Meiruh as I said before, we've never had it so good, because what uh you the decision that you made, the ongoing military delivery and planes are coming in, the Skyhawks and Phantoms, but that's till the end of '73, and uh couple of months in '74.
RabinA few Phantoms also in '74. In '74. What we would like now is to know what is for '74 and '75.
MeirAgain, without public announcements, as I've said over and over again, the only time that Phantoms appear in the papers is when they are not delivered. As long as they're delivered, nobody's said boo about it. And uh if you tell us that this will go on for '74-'75, we've asked for 36 uh
Rabin36 Phantoms.
Meir36 Phantoms and 30 Skyhawks for '74-'75. Uh if you make this decision, this will remain here among us. And I assure you nothing will be said in the press about it.
NixonWell, as I understand it on the uh on the uh and the planes for delivery after this year, that first, we both agreed that uh nothing should be said now, right? It's a matter that is in discussion, and approval has uh subject to further discussions. It will be. Uh,
Nixonas I understand, as far as the uh the numbers are concerned and so forth, uh I think it would be better to indicate that we're that we have a general uh agreement in principle, but this is a matter that uh should be discussed, negotiated, worked out. Is that about the way you'd like to have it left, Henry? In principle? That's what I think. Or have they just passed words for a defender. You would want to do that, Mr. President. He could indicate
Kissingerwillingness to supply Phantoms and Skyhawks, and that you look into this very sympathetically, but that the precise number to be developed in uh subsequent discussions by experts. We've not had We've rarely, we've never uh well, we haven't you've never gotten everything [chuckle] you wanted, but we've always gotten enough to solve the problem. But if I, if we say that on the basis of just a discussion with us, we've agreed it's going to be this or that,
Nixonthe mockery of uh fact here supposed to be talking about long negotiations and talking to others. Difficult to be had, and they've got to be handled by our own to the president. You're going to think that the bureaucracy has recommended a very small number, and the others, and suddenly, they're just over ruled, and make any other number, and I think it's
Kissingerfurther discussions. Yes, uh but but they have agreed that some number be delivered, and therefore, uh See, we have a we had agreed in principle, and then the uh we have a recommendation from them that's well, it's very small number. Very small number. You'd consider it a very small number, let me say, a small, but my point is that uh that we uh
Nixonuh we we know that uh that you feel urgently about about your needs. Uh we will uh we will look upon that. That uh you've suggested some numbers to us. I will look upon that sympathetically. Uh we will now uh uh rather than taking the recommendations of our of our Defense Department, State Department, and so forth, which is for a smaller number, and also not to guts this thing ahead, you can also be sure that we will uh do it on the basis of that already. The link should be clear of course.
NixonBut I think, you see, if you I would rather that you not put me in the position now that if that if uh that we're that if we say, "Well, as far as we're concerned, we overruled, we've agreed on 36 and 36." That that's that's not a healthy situation. Let me say this, we'll treat you right. Let us work it out in our own way. You see what I mean? We've never let you down before. In principle In principle, madam, in principle you see in principle we'll see that you're you're
Nixonyou should you should be You get all you want. Not quite, but almost. Yes. Now, let's distinguish between the public appearance and what is agreed here. Public appearance, I believe, should be said that the United States uh was the balance of arms was discussed. If would they ask planes? Yes. Yes. And I think that the Prime Minister should be I never I always say that we never discuss details. This is
Dinitzthe fact that the United States will continue to adhere to maintain to the maintenance of the balance. To do whatever is required to follow its policy, to maintain the balance without being specific. What does that mean? Buying? Deploying? Now,
Dinitzsecond, if, I understand you cannot now decide about 30 and 36, let's make here, if not to go beyond that, that for '74, '75, we'll get planes, Sky- Skyhawks and Phantoms.
DinitzI understand that even in uh there is such a recommendation now, and you'll explore sympathetically on a later stage to meet the requirements of the balance in term in numbers.
NixonIn the numbers, yeah. Well, we may That's why I say we agree in principle that the and that means on your request, yeah, you need the planes. The question as to the numbers however, uh we've got your your thoughts and we've listened sympathetically and now we will explore it sympathetically.
NixonUh let's work out that number. How does that sound to you?
MeirAll right, as long as you give it.
NixonYou get [laughter] [crosstalk] You're get— [laughter]
DinitzNow, now about the production.
MeirIt's a production which I would uh like.
NixonYou want 200.
NixonYeah. And we we believe we give 100. Is that fair enough? I can At least.
MeirAt least 100, all right?
NixonNow we we I saw the the number situation, let me say that that's a good that's a good number and that's not a burden on your economy, too. So, we'll look Now, I think 100 is a good number, don't you? Yes.
DinitzAnd uh But, uh may I say the problem is not It's not a problem of how much they cost. The whole that is that to get the know-how. We got the know-how for the production of the prototype.
NixonAll right.
DinitzSecond, we whatever we do, we do with American company on a business-like basis.
DinitzThe American companies, the American industry is interested.
NixonAll right. Sure.
DinitzWe need we need a certain decision to go and give us the know-how. We'll be dependent anyhow for certain parts in the future also to get it from the United States.
DinitzNow, we cannot go on one type of plane to develop to develop all the facilities, to produce and to know only 100. Therefore, let's say at this stage the decision is at least 100.
MeirAnd we're and we have to go on to make to more than that.
NixonYes, but why don't I check this with with the Defense Department, because they didn't know I I think we can The practical consequence, Ambassa- Mr. Ambassador, is the same, because we we would not be committed, if I understand the Prime Minister and the Ambassador, to more than 100 at the present.
DinitzAll we are doing with this thing is not to preclude it. Not that They're not able to [crosstalk] themselves. [unintelligible] precluded.
MeirPrecluded, not always, buddy.
Dinitz[Laughter] Exactly, and not to preclude the the decision on the later stage for So, that we don't find ourselves in a position where they said, "No, the decision was 100 [crosstalk] and you cannot go beyond that."
Nixon[crosstalk] 100. And at the present it's true.
DinitzAt the present it's true, but on a later stage.
MeirIf uh whatever that is, it does not mean automatically that you go above the 100, but does not preclude it that after the 100 we can come back and say we we need 100. Before, when time, well before that.
Dinitzis to say, you are not committed to more than 100.
NixonAll right, that's fair enough. And uh we'll we'll make that clear to the Defense Department. We're not committed to more than 100.
MeirThat's fine.
NixonYou see, we gave in here. [laughter]
MeirI thought we I gained a little bit. It's two hundred and fifty four to three.
MeirI here on the economic side, we won't go into details. Our Minister of Finance was here, came back extremely happy with his contacts with Dr. Shultz, but uh it is not yet
NixonWell, we have there, I'll be very We have a very, very serious budget problem. Uh we will Of course, we'll approach this sympathetically. There will be some uh As you know, there's not the aid shrinkage all around. So, uh but I think a substantial amount of credit. So, that uh we'll do the best we can, but we've got very difficult
NixonI must give instructions to the press because I have a 12:30 [unintelligible].
MeirYes, I just wanted to say one word about Russian Jewry.
NixonWhat did you get in? What was the [unintelligible]?
MeirWell, he said we have to break up soon, yeah. I wanted to take only one more minute on that.
NixonI have one minute. Talk about that.
MeirIt's a serious problem that, uh, you know, we have your full sympathy in that Russian Jewry.
NixonYeah. I know. It was very important what we wanted to raise to, uh, Well, how are they behaving, right?
MeirPeople are coming in.
NixonYeah, well, fine.
MeirPeople are coming in.
NixonYes. Russian Jews.
MeirBut, uh, they make the lives of Jews miserable. I've spoken to men that came out of an insane asylum.
MeirI'm sure that you, Mr. President, cannot conceive of anything like that, neither can I, but that's the fact. They, they take, they told me they act insane, and the procedure is, one sane man among, in a ward of 20 aggressive madmen.
NixonMm-mm.
MeirMm-mm.
MeirIt is, it is inconceivable. And then in 70 prisons, there are about 30, over 30 men and women in Siberian prisons now, only because they want to go to Israel.
MeirAnd there is real anti-Semitism, an official anti-Semitism.
NixonAwful.
MeirAnd if they would only, at, at this ransom business, it's really highway robbery.
MeirTens of thousands of rubles that they expect from families. And this they do, not only to scare Jews away, that they shouldn't go, and, and to get bread for their people in foreign currency.
MeirNow, if they would only adopt the policy,
MeirJews that want to leave, let them go. A Jew applies, he's immediately sent away from his work. According to the, uh, rules in Russia, anybody that does not work is a parasite. He's called to court and they put him in for five, six months.
MeirThey send him away for five, six months. They bring him up for trial, they sent him to the same prison, or to a, or to a Siberian prison.
NixonWell, let me say that I, uh, I very strongly have sympathy. You know, Russia, even more for most of the Jewish community in this country have thought about it, that, uh, 25 years ago,
NixonEugene Lyons, another said that they consider deeds beyond the pale what fashion would do. They could go, they could push, could be bad. They call off Hitler, and all of the rest. But they have been anti-Semitic for a long time. And it's ingrained in, in, in their [unintelligible]. It's awful, isn't it?
MeirNow it's official.
NixonNow it's official. The second point, however, is how do we deal with it? And I, I, I, I think that we worked on them. And I do know we, as a result of all of our persistent efforts, we got it broken down some. Am I right? We talked to the Russians and, uh, and we've talked very privately and confidentially about this.
NixonAnd, uh, and, uh, we, we will see that the subject is properly brought up again, and, but, but quietly. Now, let me say, to be quite candid, we can go out, talk like the Senators and the press, and publicly, uh, draw a confrontation with the Russians, beat the, beat the hell. What would that do? They'd just slam down the door.
NixonIt just will not work with these people if we take them on publicly. That's one of the reasons why, in my opinion, it is not, not, not a fortunate development that, uh, that a number of the Senators are, uh, are, uh, tying the, uh, the most-favored-nation, uh, thing to the exit bureau.
NixonUh, let me quite candid, that's, that's, that would be terribly popular for me to say in the United States. Uh, it would help with the Jewish community and there're a lot of other people that are not in the Jewish community who hate the communists and say, "Fine!" You people are savages. Don't get most-favored-nation unless, which is another, doesn't mean we just don't treat—
MeirYeah, they just
NixonBut, unless, unless they do something about it. Now, let me tell you, I, I've had to play hard ball, after all. But it is, it was like to make terribly difficult decisions: bomb North Vietnam in December in order to break the deadlock.
NixonUh, it shows we'll do what is necessary, don't take risks.
MeirYou did a world.
NixonBut in my view,
Nixonand you, and we put it to the Russians on the basis that like the Congress wants to: "Look, either you do something about the problem of, of, of the treatment of Jewish minority in Russia, either you do about something about that now,
Nixonand, or, or you aren't going to get Most Favored Nation," they will knock it out completely. They cannot back down from that. You, you understand?
NixonNow, if we work it, on the other hand, if we, there may be some stroke we can use in other directions of the work. Believe me, if I know the work we're doing, and only these things, and I know what these people understand, my view is, my view is that we can accomplish a lot, a lot more, as like in our conversations with the Russians.
NixonIt's not delicate. It's very direct. Very, they talk tough to us. We talk tough to them. And then we, we all understand that. And, and why we get along reasonably well. And we, I can assure you, we discuss these things. But, we have also found that with the Russians,
Nixonif on an issue like this, and my view is, my political judgment, my, my diplomatic judgment, that if we put this to them directly, on the basis of Most Favored Nations, that they must accept your, they'll slam the door down, nobody'll come out, and they'll be rougher than they are at the present time. That's the way these people react. Henry, I don't know whether you agree or not?
KissingerI totally agree, Mr. President.
NixonAnd so my view is, I can make to you, I can make you a, which I've done, the ambassador knows, you can be sure that I'm aware, you can be sure that we'll put it to the Russians privately.
NixonBut, I do not think that it is helpful to your cause, and it's ours, too, this is this is inhumane treatment for people, period. And that doesn't make any, whether they're Jews, or, or Rumanians, or anybody else, in history. But, in dealing, we, we've had so much experience in dealing with these people.
NixonAnd on this sort of a thing, on this sort of an issue, I don't think a public confrontation will help. I think it'll hurt. I think what we got, we got to stay and talk privately. And then, there are other things that we can take away from them, like they want, they want wheat, they want this, they want that, and the other thing.
NixonThere are just little ways that the message gets through, what we got to say blindly, [unintelligible] we're not putting anything [unintelligible]. Right? That's the way we've done it. We've avoided three Cuban confrontations by this sort of approach.
NixonWe've avoided a couple of others with, with the Russians. And I'm just very much afraid, Madam Prime Minister, if this thing continues to escalate, so we've got the whole Congress, uh, putting us in a position where, where, where our whole frankly, the whole detente, with the dealings with the Russians, will ride or fall
Nixondependent upon what the Russians do about the Jewish minority emigration. If that happens, it's not going to hurt, to help the Jewish minority. It will not help. It'll hurt what you want. I want to get them out of there, we, and I think it's horrible and I, frankly, I think it's, they must be doing worse in putting them in with the crazy people.
NixonI think the Russians are a savage bunch. And I say Russians, sorry, communists. Communists. Russians are good people.
MeirYou know, there are, there were tens of cases of a chick, a young woman that is in the last stages of tuberculosis.
NixonOh, that's terrible. We, uh, we, we, we know of that case.
MeirAnd you see.
MeirThere are about 30 cases of this kind.
NixonI know. They, they are capable of everything.
MeirNow we don't, we don't intend, uh, that, uh, the Russians should come out and say to the world from now on no ransom, every Jew can go. We know that. But, I am sure that your pressure, I'm not asking to do it in public.
NixonWell, you see the problem, when I say, you ask me to do it in public, it puts us here, me, in a very difficult position where senators, of course, most Democrats, and awful lot of Republicans, and congressmen, uh, come out, and they say, supported by and instigated by the Israeli government,
Nixonuh, as well as the American Jewish community, they come out to say, the whole Russian policy must cease, the detente, unless they do something about these, about the, about the, about the Jewish under. Now, the Ambassador has been very good about this, we know, we worked that. But, you see, if you do that, then the thing could turn
Nixonthe other way. Because a lot of people here say, "What? We're not going to have progress on SALT, we're not going to have progress in these other things, because we're making this a condition to it?"
NixonIf it would work with the Russians, I'd do it. But, you see the problem.
MeirI understand that, Mr. President. I've
NixonI will work, I can assure you. You'll get results. But, if we, but, if this sort of thing takes up, the Congress passes something like that, that's going to
KissingerThat's the main problem. To prevent mean not to inflame the senators to put on Jackson Amendment, and all that the Jew and the has a little bit.
NixonSee Jackson the Jackson Amendment.
MeirYou see, uh, I can't say to the Jews of the United States because I'm
NixonYeah, and you've got to talk about this issue.
MeirI don't I won't say it because it's I can't, not because I can't bear it to of any political beliefs, but I can't say it to the United States don't worry about Russia Jews. I don't.
NixonOh, no, no, you've got to say it.
MeirThere are three There are three and a half million Jews in Russia. They're not all of them will come to Israel, but I know there are 80 to 90,000 Jews that have applied for exit visas to uh to go to Israel. And the Russians are fools. They could get all the goodwill in the world.
NixonRight. Absolutely.
MeirThey're sending [crosstalk]
Kissinger[crosstalk] Russian Jews.
MeirInstead of doing, but they do two things which are opposite, one to the other. On the on one hand, we have now about 45,000 Jews that have come since the middle of '71.
MeirWell, that's wonderful. We could praise them to the skies, if they would not make their lives miserable.
NixonThe problem--
MeirThey're defeating their own purpose.
KissingerThe problem I don't think is you shouldn't say anything about it, which is entirely, you shouldn't. That's up to you. But the problem is, and of course, and I understand I agree with that. It's whether
Kissingerit's whether the Senate's hearing who are somewhat friendly, susceptible to influence, whether they could be restrained somewhat from pushing through the Jackson Amendment in terms of it, which would be very embarrassing to our whole foreign policy. That is the problem that's here.
NixonYeah. I I'd like frankly to uh Well, well, we've just we we've For us to make progress on the Russian initiative in the long I think that Madam Prime Minister, it's in your interest. We'll have We'll have, if we can have more I I think, look,
Nixonthe the the Russians are, as the Ambassador knows, the Ambassador beat the team with the awesome nuclear capability. In time, the United States confrontation, as we did in Cuba, is gone, because it's mutual suicide, and they know it. On the other hand,
Nixonso, therefore, our influence must be, to the greatest extent possible, from within rather than simply confronting them from without. We've got to do both. But you see, for this reason, I think the Russian I think the Russian initiative is important, you see,
MeirI don't think they'd tell you
Nixonon the basis of being pragmatic, and uh and on self-interest, because,
Nixonlook, as I said earlier, you, thanks to people like Rabin and others, uh,
Nixonyou get more uh of your defense dollars than anybody. You've got the best manpower, the most skilled people uh in the world. There's no question. I've I've said that to others and to you. And I'm impressed. Uh we've admired you for it. You can lick anybody, and you will, if necessary. You don't want to,
MeirWe will.
Nixonyou can if they start anything. All right. On the other hand, you can lick anybody except the Russians. We've got to keep them out. So, you see, that's the game. So, what I want to say is, let us develop our Russian in a way that we can influence these people.
NixonNow, you've uh Mr. Brezhnev is a tough cookie. He uh he basically pretty close to the soil. And uh I won't go any further than that.
NixonWell, you're going to the Press Club, huh?
MeirNow. Yes.
NixonGood. Well, don't hurt
MeirTonight.
NixonDon't hurt. They'll be friendly.
Meir7:30 tonight.
NixonThey'll be friendly. They'll push you on that plane thing and you just uh I think what you've said publicly has been very good. Uh, you know what I mean. Uh, don't worry.
MeirYeah.
NixonYou know what I mean, they'll push you. They have to ask the question.
MeirYeah, so that's
NixonAnd uh, and you're in a good position to say, well, everyone regrets it.
MeirAt the airport, I was hopeful for what they're going to do to me.
NixonNo.
MeirNo.
NixonWell, they they like you. They like you. That's Madam Prime Minister, uh Madam Mr. Ambassador, your birthday, those are cuff links for, and that's a souvenir for your wife and yourself on your birthday.
RabinA total value of eight dollars.
Kissinger[laughter]
NixonHere, I'll help you on.
KissingerWell, do you have a coat?
MeirNo.
KissingerNo.
MeirI came without.
KissingerWell, I didn't either.

Nixon, Ziegler & Kissinger on Arab-Israeli conflict and US-Israeli relations

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Nixon, Ziegler & Kissinger on Arab-Israeli conflict and US-Israeli relations

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