Conversation 866-015

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There's nothing good.

We have our own differences of opinion on that.

The question, how do we go about it?

And the appraisal of what the other side means when it speaks about peace and when it speaks about negotiation.

Now, as far as we are concerned, Mr. President, you know that my staff has been from the beginning.

We haven't changed that negotiation at any time, anywhere.

May I take a moment to tell you something that happened last May.

A special envoy came from the president of Romania.

Romania is the only East European country that has not severed the relationship with us.

And he came in.

He was a deputy foreign minister.

He's now a foreign minister.

He came for two days, and he said he was coming for a talk in the Foreign Office, but then he came to see me, and he said, actually, this is the reason that I've come to the country.

I've been sent by my president.

My president was in Egypt, and he met President Saddam.

I don't know what he wants to say to you, but he would like to see you.

And he asked you, is it possible for you to come to Bucharest?

So I went to Bucharest, official visit, and I spent about seven hours at least speaking with the president, two sessions.

The message that he brought was that he sought to find me.

sometimes you face one's peace.

But the important thing is that sometimes it's prepared that there should be a meeting, a direct meeting at some level between the Egyptian and the Spaniard.

And I said to the president, I said, this is the best news I've heard for a long, long time.

By all means, if that's the case, at any level, at any place.

And he said, well, I'm very glad that this is how you accepted.

And as a matter of fact, Dennis was with me, the rest of them were there, and technical arrangements were made, how he would convey the message to me after he had conveyed my message to Sundar.

And I said, please, tell Sundar, we honestly and sincerely want peace.

And at any level, at any time.

We have 10 days.

I'll have a message for you.

A message for you.

Twice during this period, I asked our ambassador to go, and he didn't want ambassadors to know his ambassador.

In Israel, our ambassador looked around and said, fine, but I said, will you go and just ask, is there a message for me?

I think what the subject of the message is.

Nothing.

I'm sure that the ambassador says, go and deliver the message to Saddam.

He wanted to.

He saw this as a report mission for him and for Romania.

Nothing happened.

So as far as negotiations are concerned, we first start direct negotiations.

We still believe that that's the right way to go to indirect negotiations.

When your government suggested what's called proximity talks, and we're still prepared at any moment that the

There's no question whatsoever.

And that, actually, there is no difference of opinion in any corner in Israel as far as negotiations are concerned.

With Egypt, with any one of the countries.

With the kingdom, say, you know, there is contact, there are meetings.

In a very, very frantic atmosphere,

He knew him to such an extent that when he left for here, he took a man with him, and

There are two tracks.

There's the public track.

Now, the problem with the public track is that it's very hard to... Once you launch something in a public arena, it has to work.

If it doesn't work, then

you have a possibility that one side or the other has to react.

In other words, I always say, don't go to the summit unless you know what's on the other side.

Now, in this instance, therefore, we're going to go, I think, the public track, whoever has to be on, we have to go forward, and we will continue, we want you to continue your discussions, you know, in a horrible way, right?

Now, this is the part that is particularly among us,

We have found in dealing with the Chinese and Russians, because of the relationship we've established with our history, and because of the promise that you and I have in each other and the way we work, that in addition to public, what we do publicly, that we have a very intensive series of exploratory

the time we go to the summit in Moscow, or the time we go to the summit in so-called Beijing, we don't invent what's going to happen.

Not totally, because we also know what's not going to happen, so that we're going to have an argument, what we're going to say, and which way we're going to stand.

And that's why those initiatives have succeeded up to this point.

We have not yet done that in your area, because you have wanted it, and others haven't.

And we haven't.

Others haven't succeeded.

have any change.

I don't know that we will.

But what I would like to suggest is the possibility that, and here's where you've got to have confidence, frankly, indeed, that we're not going to put you in an impossible position.

In other words, that we know your problem.

We know there's everyone looking for help, and all the rest of them are going to get involved.

But there's also the problem here

And I think you were quite right.

If you were an energy crisis and all the rest, there's a lot of heat now.

We've got to do something about the heat.

Whether that's related or not is irrelevant.

People think that.

So the best way that I think that we can approach the problem since you're in such a very strong bargaining position,

You, like anybody in that whole area, they all are trying to get you to what exclusive view that you build, if the Russians stay out there.

No question.

And you will continue to be able to continue to do so.

And that's why, frankly, on the one side, you could say, why should we talk?

On the other side, however, you look down the road and say, well, maybe you could change.

Now, let us at this time, I would suggest, while you're in a very strong bargaining position,

And where for the first time, and I must say this because you're strong, the Egyptians are approaching us.

Rather than us going to them, they're coming to us.

And not for the first time.

Now let's talk about the Russians quite gently.

The Russians are planning to get some sort of a settlement there.

And I think the reason they're planning for it is that

They want to get the addiction monkey off their neck.

There may be other reasons, but we won't try to judge Russian motives, except that they want something done there for some time.

Now, you don't want the Russians in your game.

You'd rather have us in your game.

You'd like to have the Russians.

However, you know they've got to play a role, because they've got to keep their clients from breaking loose.

I would like to try a process where Dr. Kissinger, on a totally private basis, will explore with the objections what is doable.

He will not negotiate with you, I understand, but he's got, he will have to let us know the areas that I would understand and agree with you.

that you would be able to negotiate with them.

You're not gonna negotiate the marriage, you're gonna explore it.

Now, the other thing is that, the other thing is the same kind of thing can be done with the Russians.

Now, let me tell you what, there's also this, he said, Brezhnev will probably be here sometime this year, probably be here sometime this year, we know what the question is, whether it'll be the early summer or the late summer, early fall.

Now, that therefore gives us,

He's a reason for us to be able to talk to him on this basis.

Where can you know we didn't have long discussions with him?

Not yet, perhaps.

Well, you know, I said you never lose me.

The Russian position has changed considerably.

Remember the talk I had with Rumiko and the talk we had with Brescia?

That's right.

What we're really talking about here is, is a, is a game in which you would have to, in which I will tell you, I'll give you the assurance that Henry will conduct this under my direction on absolutely off-the-record basis.

Some of them will, in any event, it doesn't have to be, you know, you have to do it all the time.

So be that as it may, what we would like to do, what I would suggest is that he can discuss that.

Let us see whether there is something.

Now, what is the goal?

You know, there's an important thing.

The objections on the one hand say they've got to have an overall settlement before they talk about an interim settlement.

And that's the thing.

And the other great debate is the question, you want security, they want sovereignty.

And so those are insomniacal, right?

On the other hand, if we could get an interim settlement, I mean, let us face it, imagine your interest, if it's interim, and then leave the other, now we're talking about greatest incompetence in the most, shall we say, fuzzy atmosphere.

Because it has to be fuzzy for both sides.

The more concrete it is, the less chance there is ever to get an agreement.

But Henry is a master at writing fuzzy language.

I'll tell you why they don't want to have talks with you, Madam Prime Minister.

Because I'm afraid you've got them on the line.

You know what?

Why do you feel you're bad?

Because you're clever.

Oh, I see.

In fact, I wanted to tell him what Joe and I said to you, Henry.

You can't tell us, you know, about the time that, what was it, I shouldn't have used you.

I'm not here to negotiate this, Joe.

Oh, if you talk to us, this is fine.

It wasn't so I don't want to go through this.

He said...

There was a group of editors coming forward, and somebody said, can you answer this question?

He said, I have no choice, because the only man who can talk for half an hour without saying anything is Kevin Chisholm.

So then I will say, I have a complaint that you gave away my secret.

He said, no, I didn't say half an hour.

I said an hour and a half.

But what we have, let me tell you why I did this procedure.

First, there's a chance it might work.

Maybe.

Second, however, it keeps

It keeps the action going so that they don't confront us with something we don't know.

I have to go into the public area.

You see, what I'm concerned about, Prime Minister, is going into the public area.

And all the eager beavers on both sides do that.

And it makes sense.

It makes sense.

All of a sudden, we're in a confrontation.

And this isn't working.

Privately, it may not work either.

Maybe all we're going to have is this problem of status quo.

But I think we've got to try.

So that's what I would suggest is that if you'll prevent it, we won't know unless you approve it.

Because you see, and let me say, we're not going to broker it for you.

But we need to know at least some outlines of what you think we should talk about.

Mr. President, I speak to the Russian institutions, which I think about it.

And we really want something better.

I know we're strong, but we don't want to use our strength.

And we are anxious for a situation being created in the Middle East where there is real peace.

Now,

We're anxious that you talk to the Russians and the Egyptians.

And what you say now, I can only underline.

Naturally, not coming to some decision or to some agreement at our expense, let's say.

Let me put it bluntly.

You don't want an agreement.

The Egyptians want...

the United States to deliver Israel.

First they thought the Soviets would deliver Israel to them.

Now they're pretty much disappointed with the Soviets.

Now they want the Americans to deliver Israel to them.

But I don't have to fear that you're going to deliver us to Israel, that you're going to squeeze Israel.

All this terminology that is used by Saddam.

And not only that, but I...

I truly expect that the United States will not take a stand of its own on this matter without consoling us, without us knowing what has happened.

That is, that we don't get up one morning and find that the United States and the Egyptians and the United States and the Russians have come to some agreement, and then here it is, and we won't be able to accept it because it isn't sovereignty that we want.

That isn't the main thing.

If we say we must have sovereignty in certain areas, it's because we must have security.

Who, like Mr. President, will understand that?

And the second thing is,

What do the Egyptians really want?

If the miracle would happen, and they would really want peace with us, and say, this is it, from now on, no confrontations and no threats, and so we live in peace, that would be the greatest day for Israel.

We know that that is what you're thinking.

We know that they speak to their close friends and say they want all kinds of things.

They want Israel to go back to the 1967 border.

They want afterwards to drive Israel to the 1947 border.

And after that, Israel will have to settle its matters with the Palestinians.

Palestinians means Arafat, means terrorists.

So we agree that the practical approach is this special unit on the Swiss Canal.

We have prepared...

Yes, we've said and we say and we say to you, we say that the line to which we have prepared to withdraw from the Swiss Canal is a temporary line.

We don't say that this is the final line.

final line, isn't a peace treaty with negotiation.

There will have to be a freedom between us and the Egyptians.

But as an interim, when we say we will step back, it means a lot for us to leave our fortifications and step back.

These fortifications under the Suez Canal, which is great.

The Suez Canal is the natural

as blocked between us and the Egyptian army.

And Sunday, when the story will be told, the number of guns on our side and the number of guns on the other side, probably nobody will believe it.

This is one of the reasons why it's so essential for us to have an air force, because there's no comparison with the number of guns that they have on their side and we have on ours.

We can't afford it.

We're not in manpower nor in guns.

So when we say we're prepared to leave this,

The strongest point that we have is immediate solution and justification.

We're doing something, we're taking a risk.

Would you care to take a risk for peace?

In addition to that, we say, all right, they want to clear the Suez Canal.

We agree.

We want them to clear the Suez Canal, we want them to operate the Suez Canal in order

to have a division of forces which is not only in talk, not only in agreement, but if the canal is operated, we hope they will begin shooting.

We hope they will begin to rehabilitate the people in the towns that have been destroyed on the other side, bring them back, normal life there, which again is a guarantee, almost a guarantee, that they won't start shooting again.

We say, actually, if they want to clear the sewage system out, they will have to bring over some personnel, technicians, and so on.

We are prepared to say something, which I'm sure that some people in the country will like to chop our heads off for that.

Some policemen.

There are civilians there.

They need policemen there.

Fine.

They can come.

We are even prepared to do something which is difficult for us.

If the Suez Canal is open and operates, naturally we should also have the right of shipping.

We are prepared in the first stage that they should recognize our principle that we have the right of shipping through the Suez Canal.

But, we won't use that to the detriment of others.

to live so long without the Suez Canal, or try to live a mile longer.

This, we are often told, you must do something in space-saving for Saddam.

That's a long phrase about space-saving.

He has the canal.

And, in practice, there is no Israeli shipping.

Although, on principle, you must recognize our right of shipping in the Suez Canal.

So it seems to me that I'm

in the context of this guy with all these points, that there is something that can be done if they really want it.

And this, Mr. President, has never been negotiated before.

I mean, the proposals have never been formally put to the other side.

Well, let me ask this.

Should they be?

I'm prepared to go home.

I'm prepared to go home and fight for this.

Never publicly.

You're talking about very publicly.

No, no, this is... Well, we have a number of decisions to make, I must admit.

The Prime Minister and I had a long talk yesterday about what to do.

And she mentioned these points that she was willing to make as Israeli.

position and contribution to this.

We then have this question.

We can do it in one of two ways.

We can either let the State Department start an interim negotiation procedure, an interim settlement procedure, without putting a specific procedure to get the proximity talks going in order to have something going on, and keep these positions back until we get a deadline for State Department decisions.

I think it wouldn't be wise for, because they were the prime minister, which gave those boys away.

Well, you could say it'd be reasonable, but I wouldn't tell them off.

I think that would fit it better into our private track.

I think you've got to have something.

The state court's got to be doing something, and of course the injections need something in the public area as well.

So the point is that it seems to me that...

I think you're going to cover this.

The procedure, the better procedure is to have that move better, but not put this whole position.

Well, then you take the other position.

You take the position and go ahead and talk.

In other words, sell it to him three times.

You know, you're good at that.

But it's a question of the line to which we will withdraw.

We will never say in public now that we are prepared eventually to withdraw to the passes.

But not now in one step.

But we wouldn't say that.

I may say, I won't say it to the State Department, because then it will

You've got to be in a position, that's why the private negotiation is better, because you've got to be in a position that you know what you're willing to do, and then you get the part, and you end up here.

Otherwise, you just say it here, you end up here.

That's the way it works.

But at this stage, we don't have to take action for a few weeks, but...

They'll have enough to talk about just discussing procedures and not have to get to talk about it.

That's good to occupy everyone.

That's a good statement.

They'll come to you with a proposal and undoubtedly they'll come to the interest.

Then those that are going to have proposals and how this might happen, that will occupy them for a couple of weeks.

And you should be very outgoing on that before it comes.

Those things are not an issue.

So, uh, this, uh,

The trouble is that the Egyptians, as you said, they want the end before they begin.

And that's our principle.

We're prepared to discuss the law over peace agreement, but they want before they negotiate to have everything that they want to get.

And we've taken the stand all the time.

The practical possibility is that all is as interpretable.

And... Well, we had...

I talked first to him.

I was going to talk to him about this.

You know, the agreements and so on.

Of course, there are positions very hard on it.

They have given nothing in substance, but they try to show great flexibility in attitude.

So now it's important for them to see what happens in the next round if they will put in something in substance, which is really important.

If you end up getting something, that's silly now.

Well, the point is, we've got to tell them, which is what I, we had a two-year trial, and he just couldn't sit here and say, look, so I told him, you can't, we know your position.

I said, basically, you can make your speech to everybody you make, and I said, no.

that we're not going to make any progress because, you know, we can't have any, he said, we can't have any talks or anything until there's an agreement that we draw from.

He said, that won't be accepted.

I said, now we've got to find something in between.

I said, what do you suggest?

That's where we have them now.

And so you see, you've got to get them smoked out as to where they are.

But the main point is that you, now every audition review is for the Russian game.

We can keep, if we have these Egyptian talks going on.

What the Russians will undoubtedly do is to present a very detailed head.

This would get us into the position of maneuvering towards imposing a settlement.

On the other hand, Ishmael told me that he doesn't want a detailed Russian position as long as they are talking to us, so we could use

the Egyptian talks to say that we're off to the Russians, that we're willing to talk in generalities, but that we want to wait to see what the Egyptians come up with, otherwise we'll produce total confusion.

We're in this interesting position at the moment, that when we talked to Grenier a year ago, and also when we talked to Gresham six, seven months ago,

Basically, the Russians talked as if they were brokering war, and they were the Egyptians.

And they were talking about what they'd get the Egyptians to do.

Now, the new situation is that at the moment, that's why I say there's a slight win-win here.

The Egyptians would come to us and say, we would rather have to talk to you rather than through the Russians.

I don't wish any of you to say that.

They said that it was, that's essentially it, it was said at the moment.

While they're talking to us, they don't want the Russians to make detailed proposals.

And that, they said they would be prepared to say to the Russians, too.

At any rate, that's what we could say to the Russians.

When the briefing comes back here, I doubt it will be the specific scheme, if I'm any judge of it.

Well, you see, one thing is that you're a Christian, and that's why I think this is a very delicate stage.

It's much better for you than it is me.

If this gets down to the situation where the Russians represent Egypt, and then it forces us into the position that we are representing Israel, then the result of that is not going to be one that you predict are going to lie.

Because that will mean the two great powers will sit down and say, oh, we're pissed off.

In the end, if we, as the middlemen, if we could get John here to the position where we talk to both sides,

I think you're in very good shape, because you know how we're going to tell them.

Is that about it?

The information that we have...

The information that we have is that when Ismael was in Moscow, the Russians took his fifth life, and said, don't give it.

Don't give it to the Americans.

That is the main... Don't give it to the Americans.

Don't give in at all.

Although I must say the Russians didn't encourage them to go to war.

The Russians said to him, look, this is a decision you have to take.

But, in so many words, he said, look, in a war there is shooting, therefore you have to be careful.

And on the other hand, he promised, Brezhnev did, that they would get next 23.

He invited pilots to come to Russia immediately to begin training since 23rd.

We always get transcripts of these injunctions coming, so the injunctions come and say so.

So if I say you don't need it, I'll say that you don't need it.

We don't keep the secrets from you either.

But...

And what I want to say, to make this point, that the Russians do not encourage them to compromise, and certainly they don't encourage them to make any compromise with you.

Then, if he doesn't make a settlement, they'll have advice against him.

Exactly.

And they can undermine it, because they certainly don't like him.

No, they would like to have a performance, what they would like is a repeat performance of 57, when actually what we did in 57 was become of the United States, but they take the credit for it.

Now, they went back to the Egyptians and said, see what we did for you?

The Israelis went right back.

And they'd like to have a repeat performance of this kind.

Therefore, they said, for one, don't compromise on anything.

And two, by no means should you make any compromise in your talks or negotiations with the Americans.

Well, that's just the president.

the Russians are playing the radicals out there.

They're playing the Syrians and they're playing the Iraqi and they're playing the crazy ones.

To a certain extent or another.

I think they're very happy with the results, but now the Syrians handled their equipment, but they're sending an awful lot of equipment to Syria.

And if we were to make a list of madmen in the area, then Gaddafi of course takes.

And so the Syrians come next.

And, but not his, uh, difficulties at all.

Well, shall we, uh, shall we, uh, can we leave it this way then?

Yes.

Now the contact then will be through the, uh, Henry's class?

Yes.

All right.

I asked Dennis to come along with me because I wanted him to be in all these discussions.

So when he takes the office, he's... You decided to stay in the office so that he doesn't come back to you?

The channel is very good.

It's a direct channel to me.

Right.

And the question of what do we...

One is, Mr. President once said, in hardware.

Hardware.

I saw hardware.

Now, there are two main items.

I know what you want, but at least we have to find out what we can get them.

And work it out.

One is the question of art production.

Right.

And there have been a lot of negotiations, but there were negotiations on the prototype.

And...

I understand rightly, I don't know about you, I don't want to make a mistake, that Patagon was said to go along and helped us in producing the film.

Now, it just hadn't been successful.

Now we want to go into production.

And we need help in parts and so on.

And here we run into a position where

I think so.

Move.

What we would like is that the Pentagon should say, now, all right, now you've hanged for a time.

It is successful.

Now go ahead.

And we'll help you do that.

That's one point.

The second point, I said before, we've never had it so good because what you...

decision that you made, the ongoing military delivery.

The planes are coming in, the Skyhawks, the scientists, but that's till the end of 73 and a couple of months in 74.

But we would like now to know what's for 74 and 75.

Again, without public announcements, I've said

over and over again.

The only time when the bantams appear in the papers is when they are not delivered.

As long as they're delivered, nobody says anything.

And if you tell us that this will go on for 74 and 75, we'll ask for 36.

36 bantams and 30 skyhawks for 74 and 75.

If you make this decision, this will remain here among us.

And I assure you, nothing will be said because of that.

Well, as I understand it, on the, uh, on the, uh, on the, uh, planes for delivery, in other words, so that, first, we both agree that, uh, nothing should be said now.

How does it matter?

It's a discussion, and we'll, and some divergent discussions, and there will be...

As I understand, as far as the numbers concern and so forth, I think it would be better to indicate that we were, that we have a general agreement, principle, that this is a matter that should be discussed, negotiated, and worked out.

Is that about the way you want to leave it?

That's right.

I think the way we discussed was that we would

We are not, we will never, we are never going to leave.

but we have always ended up with a good, solemn number.

But I think if we say that there's a basis for just a discussion on this, we agree it's going to be this or that.

It's a mockery of the fact that you're supposed to be talking, you know, negotiating, talking about it.

Difficulty we have.

I mean, that can be on and off.

The bureaucracy has recommended a very small number.

There's another resident suddenly just overruled that makes many other numbers.

I've got to discuss it.

Yes, but...

But they have agreed that some number be delivered.

And therefore, we have a recommendation for a minute.

Well, it's a small number, a very small number.

And you would consider it a very small number.

I'd say a small number.

My point is that we know that there

You feel very strongly about your needs.

We will look upon that.

You suggested some numbers to us.

I will look upon that sympathetically.

We will now, rather than take the recommendation of our Defense Department, State Department, and so forth, which is for a small number, I should say, I'll pick up this one.

And you can also be sure that we will do it on a basis that I've already had.

Thank you.

But I think, you see, I would rather that you not put me in the position now where we say, well, as far as the direction, we overrule you.

We've agreed on 3636.

That's not a tangible decision to make.

Let me say this.

We'll treat you right.

But let us work it out in our own way.

You see what I mean?

We've never let you down before.

You can agree to the principle, ma'am.

The principle, you see.

The principle of sitting when you're there and then.

You usually, you should usually get all of them.

Not quite, but almost.

Yes.

Well, uh, let's distinguish between the public appearance and what isn't really here.

I think that the United States will continue to adhere to maintenance...

do whatever is required to follow its policy to maintain the balance of power without being specific.

What does that mean?

The power.

Now, second, if, I understand you, cannot now decide about 30 and 36, let's make here, it will not go beyond that, that for 74, 75, we'll get planes, skyhooks, anything.

I understand that even there is such a recommendation now.

And you explore, sympathetically, at a later stage, to meet the requirements of the Parliament.

It's definitely the numbers.

The numbers, right.

Oh yeah, we may, that's why I say we agree with the principle.

But that means on your request.

Yes, you need compliance.

Questions?

The numbers, however, we've got your thoughts, and we've listened sympathetically, and now we look forward sympathetically.

But let's work out that number and how that's on to you.

Well, I always get it.

You get it!

Now about the production.

The production was, I was the mic.

You want 200.

At least we give 100.

Is that fair enough?

I saw the number situation, but let me say that that's a good number and it's got a burden on your economy, too.

No, I think 100 is a good number, don't you?

Yes.

May I say a question?

What's the problem?

The problem is that we've got the know-how for the production of the prototype.

Second, whatever we do, we do with American companies on a business-like basis.

The American companies, the American industry is interested.

Third, we need certain decisions

to go and to give us the number.

We depend anyhow on certain parts in the future also to get them from the United States.

Now, we cannot go on one type of plane to develop and develop all the facilities that we're about to produce to note only 100.

Therefore, let's say, at this stage, the decision is at least on 100.

You're not committed to more than one.

Yes.

Why don't I check this with the Defence Department, which I don't know.

I think we can...

The practical consequence for us is the same, because we will not be permitted to understand the Prime Minister and to do more than that.

That is present now.

All we are doing with this statement is not to preclude another statement.

They're not able to accept it.

Not to preclude it.

They're not able to accept it.

Exactly.

It's not to preclude the decision on the later stage.

But then we don't find ourselves in a position to say, no, the decision was one hundred and one hundred.

One hundred or more.

At the present it's true.

At the present it's true, but on the later stage.

It's quite a...

It does not mean automatically that you go above 100, but it is not precluded that after 100 we come back and say we really want more.

It is to say you are not committed to more than 100.

All right.

That's good.

And make that clear that we're not committed to more than 100.

That's right.

That's good.

You see, we gave it again.

I know, I gave it again, but it's the same.

But it's two hundred and one hundred.

And the economic side, I don't want to go into details.

Our Minister of Finance was here, came back extremely happy with this contract with Dr. Schultz.

But it is not yet.

But we have there, I'll be very clear, we have a very, very serious budget problem.

We will, of course, there will be some, there's going to be a strategy all around some, but I don't think it's substantial enough to answer.

We'll do the best we can, but we've got a very big problem.

We won't cut you.

Budget problems, we understand.

Yeah.

Yes, I just want to say one word about what I should be doing.

I want to... What did you give him?

I don't know.

Oh, he said we have to break up soon.

I want to take only one more minute.

I have one other thing.

You know, we have serious problems and we have your full sympathy.

That's what you do.

Yeah, I was married to a woman raised to...

It makes a line.

People aren't coming in.

Yes, ma'am.

But they make the lives of Jews miserable.

I've spoken to men that came out of prison.

I'm sure that you, Mr. President, can't conceive of anything of that kind.

Neither can I, but that's the fact.

They go to the end of the road, and the procedure is one sane man in a ward of 20 aggressive bad men.

It is.

It's inconceivable.

And then they send them to prison.

There are about 30, over 30 men and women in Siberian prisons now, only because they want to go to Israel.

And there's real anti-Semitism, official anti-Semitism.

And they would only have this ransom.

Highway robberies.

Tens of thousands of rubles that they expect from families.

And this, they do not scare Jews away that they should, and to get by without any foreign currency.

Now, if they would only, without compromising, Jews that want to leave, let them go.

A Jew applies, he's a million steps away from his work, according to the

in Russia, anybody that does not work is a parasite.

They send him away to work.

They bring him up to trial.

They send him to the bank, or to a security prison.

Well, let me say this.

I, uh...

about 20 years ago.

And there were a few, Eugene Lyons and others, and I'm certain they were considered to be beyond the pale of what a fashionable Jewish man in this country.

The Russians couldn't be bad.

I mean, they've always fought Hitler and all the rest, but they've been assassinated for a long time, and it's ingrained in that problem.

Anyway, now it's official.

The second point, however, is how we handle it.

And I think that...

And we worked on that, as you know.

We, as a result of our visit, we got it broken down some.

And we talked to the Russians, and they talked to you a great amount, and I was involved in that.

And we will continue to.

We will say that some of you just probably brought up that.

Now, let me say, if you quite can, we can go out and talk like the Senators and the rest,

publicly draw a confrontation with the Russians and beat them over the head.

What would that do?

They'd just slam down the door.

It just will not work with these people if we take them on publicly.

That's one of the reasons why I don't think it's not an unfortunate development that a number of senators are

tying the most favored nation to the ex-Jewish, I don't know, that would be terribly popular for me to say in the United States.

It would help with the Jewish community, and there are a lot of other people who are not in the Jewish community who hate the communists and say, no, these people are savages, go get them the most favored nation, unless, which is not the most favored nation,

but unless they do something about it now let me tell you I would play a hard one after all but it was willing to make a terribly difficult decision to bomb North Vietnam in December in order to break the deadlock it shows that it was necessary if it would work

But in my view, in my view, if we put it to the Russians on the basis that, like, the Congress wants to, look, either you do something about the problem of the treatment of the Jewish community in Russia, either you do something about that problem, or you aren't going to get most favored nations to be able to deny about the problem.

they cannot back down from it.

You understand?

Now, if we were, on the other hand, if we, there may be some stroke we could use in other directions of the word, but what do you mean?

If I thought of the word, what are you doing?

Are they only with these things?

I don't know if these people understand.

My view is, my view is that we can accomplish a lot, a lot more, and it's like in our conversations with the Russians.

It's not that it can't

They talk tough to us, we talk tough to them, and we all understand that.

And that's why we get along reasonably well.

And we, I can assure you, we discuss these things.

But we have also found that with the Russians, on an issue like this, it might be my political judgment, my diplomatic judgment,

that if we put this to them directly on the basis of the most favored nations, they'll slam the door down.

Nobody will come out, and they'll be rougher than they are for the rest of the time.

That's the way these people react.

Any other way you agree or not?

So my view is I can make you a giant ambassador.

You can be sure of it.

that I'm aware of.

You can be sure that we'll put it to the Russians by and large.

But I do not think that it is helpful to your cause.

And it's ours, too.

This is inhumane treatment for people, period.

And I just make it for the Jews or Romanians or anybody else in history.

But indeed, we've had so much privilege of dealing with these people.

And on this sort of thing,

On this sort of an issue, I don't think a public confrontation will help.

I think we've got to stick it to them privately.

And then, there are other things that we can take away from them.

Like they want we, they want this, they want that, or the other thing.

They're just little ways that the message gets through.

But we've got to say blindly, no, no, we're not liking anything.

Right?

That's the way we've got to.

We've avoided three human confrontations by this sort of approach.

We've avoided a couple other things with the Russians.

And I'm just very much a brave man in prime ministry.

This thing continues to escalate.

So we've got the whole Congress putting us in a position where our whole, frankly, the whole initiative in dealing with the Russians will rise with balls.

You know, there were tens of cases.

I have a woman there at the last stages of depression.

Oh, it's terrible.

We don't want that case.

And there are about 30 cases of this kind.

I don't think I am capable of everything.

Now, we don't intend that the Russians should come out and say, come on, come on, come on.

No ransom.

Every Jew can go.

We know that.

But I'm sure that your pressure, and I'm nasty to do it in public,

Well, you see, when I say asking me to do it in public, it puts us here in a very difficult position where senators, of course, most Democrats, and an awful lot of Republicans and congressmen,

come out and they say, supported by and instigated by the Israeli government, as well as the American Jewish community, they come out to say the whole running policy must cease in Haiti unless they do something about it.

The ambassador's been very good about this, you know.

But you see, if you do that, then the thing could turn the other way, because a lot of people here say, well, we're not going to have progress on salt.

We're not going to have progress on these other things, because we're making this a condition to it.

It would work if the Russians had to do it, but you see that wrong.

I understand that, Mr. President.

But I will, I can assure you, you'll get results.

But if we, but if this sort of thing, if Congress passes something like that, that's going to, I think, be very bad.

That's the main problem, to prevent, I mean, not to inflame the senators, to put on Jackson.

I know that you're about to ask a little bit.

Say it, Jackson.

Jackson, very long time.

You see, I can't say to the Jews in the United States, because I... Yeah, you've got to talk about this issue.

I won't.

I won't say it because it's...

I can't.

Not because I can't say it for any political reason, but I can't say it to the United States.

Don't worry about Russian Jews.

I know that.

Oh, you can say it.

There are three and a half million Jews in Russia.

Oh, yeah.

And not all of them will come to Israel.

But I know that there are 80,000 to 90,000 Jews that have applied for exit visas to Israel.

And the Russians are fools.

They could get all the good women in the world.

They do two things which are opposite, one to the other.

On the one hand, we have now about 45,000 Jews that have come since the middle of 1971.

Well, that's wonderful.

We would praise them to the sky.

If they would not make their lives miserable.

The problem...

They're defeating their own purpose.

The problem, I don't think, is... You shouldn't say anything about that, which is entirely...

I'm sure.

That's up to you.

The problem is... Of course, I understand.

I will.

Yes.

is whether the senators here who are somewhat susceptible to influence, whether they could be restrained somewhat from pushing for the Jackson Amendment successfully, which would be very embarrassing to our own foreign policy.

That is the President's concern.

Yeah, I would like directly to, well, we just, we, for us to make progress in the Russian nation in the long term,

I think Madam Prime Minister, if you're interested.

We'll have, we'll have, if we can have more, I think, look, what the other Russians aren't is the Ambassador and House Ambassador Rabin to the teeth with an awesome nuclear capability.

The time in the United States to face it down as we did in Cuba is gone.

Because it's mutual suicide and they know it.

On the other hand, so therefore, our influence must be, to the greatest extent possible, from within, rather than simply confronting it without letting it go.

The Russian initiative is important, you see, on the basis that we've got fragmented, strong self-interest.

Because, look, as I said earlier, you, thanks to people like Rabin and others, you get more

Uh, out of your defense dollars and anybody, you've got the best manpower on the scale of people, uh, in the world.

There's no question about it.

I've said that to others that, you know, you have not been president.

Uh, we admire you for it.

You can elect anybody, and you will, if necessary.

You don't want to.

You can if they start anything.

All right.

On the other hand, you can elect anybody except the Russians.

We've got to keep them on it.

So you see that in the game.

So what I want to say is, let us develop our Russian policy in a way that we can influence these people.

Now, you've missed this fresh number, so talk to me.

He's basically pretty close to the soil.

And I won't go any further than that.

Well, you're going to the press club, huh?

Oh, you'll murder him.

You'll murder him.

All right.

They'll push you on that plane at any time.

You just, I think what you said, public, we've been very good, you know what I mean?

You know what I mean, when I say they'll push you, they have to ask the question.

And you're in a good position to say, well, they've all done this already.

At the airport, I was, oh, what have they done to me?

Well, they...

They like you, they like you.

Mr. Prime Minister, I mean, Madam, Mr.

Ambassador, it's your birthday.

Those are some rock lights for you, and that's a souvenir for your wife and your son.

Your birthday.

Total value, $80.

You're not compromised.

Here, I'll give you a... Would you like a Coke?

No.

Thank you.

Uh, did you get your reaction thing out on this?

Describing this, this whole procedure as just... Well, we did this one, you know.

What they do, did they, did they realize it?

Very unusual.

Airpoint, Airpoint came up and he said, Airpoint is going to live, you know, in a war.

He said, I want you to know, Ron,

And I think that the president has said to us, this was yesterday evening, he said, first of all, he said, Dan, the CBS is running the story out in Paris.

They're using your statement, Ron, but they weren't using his statement.

But he said, I want you to know that I think that the president handled this whole matter just in the right way on this last two days.

They've got to respect this.

Let me ask you, what do you think?

We should go forward with the

The only point that I make is that it's usually best for us to be outgoing.

We've got to remember that on our story rather than on theirs, this story will be lost by Monday.

they'll still be talking a bit about it, saying, well, how's the ceasefire going and all the rest.

And I'd a hell of a lot rather be talking about that than I would about, well, what about Watergate?

What about Schultz?

What about Meany?

I might compare it to all the rest, but there ain't much in it for us.

Well, it's okay if you feel that Constable was doing it at 3 o'clock tomorrow.

3 o'clock tomorrow.

think, or 11 or 3, either one.

What is your view?

You'd rather say Monday.

If you do, we'll go Monday.

Well, let me think a moment.

You have a good argument about the fact that this has now ironed itself out today.

Rodgers is going to sign the 9.3 that wouldn't happen.

That would be before 11 o'clock tomorrow, wouldn't it?

It would be before 11 o'clock.

Or just at the time.

We'll be out here in a more positive way.

You would be within the story.

You would be commenting on the field that you're playing in and within that story.

The way things have ironed out now.

Which is basically our story, rather than waiting until Monday when you have a news magazine and everybody else in there.

You see, one thing you've got to realize, Ron, I'm sure you knew that whenever we have a good story, like I told Henry, we had the solitary or something like that, and now we have ours.

The Berlin Agreement, they write it in 48 hours and drop it.

Now, it's to their interest, in other words, to kill the story, now that it's happened.

It's to our interest, frankly, to write it, rather than letting them get on another one.

Now, we have to fight the other ones, too, I believe, because they call us economic bogeys.

That's why I feel good about it.

Now, how about, in case, I'll have to see how later, how I get along today, but three o'clock tomorrow is all right, too.

We have three o'clock right now.

So I may not be able to get prepared by 11.

If we do it at 11, 11.30, we are.

Perfect.

11.30.

You see, we'll be out until midnight, right?

Well, I'd say he's totally flexible.

If you want to do it at 11.30, we can do it then.

If you want to do it at 3, we can do it at 3.

Well, I don't think we ought to try to do it tomorrow.

I'll tell you later.

Now wait, I don't.

new material.

See what I mean?

Henry is going to get me a report on all this stuff.

But just say, I want just brief, very, very brief updating, because I'm just having time to study a lot of stuff, see, because I don't want to get a whole, I don't want to go ring off on, on this kind of culture and play that at all.

See what I mean?

It's just, it's just, it's just, it's just, it's just, it's just,

You don't think you should be in it?

I'll tell you.

I think you should be in it.

Let's have a whole group.

Okay.

If they don't trust you, it's very easy.

It's very easy.

Yeah, I know.

We're just trying to get the people shut up for the first time.

We're just getting broken into these 15-hour days.

Yeah.

Turn it in.

Yeah.

Well, I was talking last night.

Thank you.

Good to see you again.

Henry, of course.

Good to see

You know his reputation.

Did you see that?

No, I didn't.

This guy.

Thank you.

Okay.

Okay. .

Oh, yeah.

Years ago.

Yeah.

All right.

I must really congratulate you for protecting my heart.

We may have long been in this before the revolution, I mean, practically the world, and have created for the first time a long, long period awaiting a real open heart of people that may be the beginning of the era, the end of course, and that people will...

live with each other.

There's an opinion, there's different ideologies, but they can't miss each other.

There's so much talk about it for many, many years.

I'm so surprised.

Well, as you know, you and your colleagues are aware,

There is a tendency in this country for people to be what we call hopeless idealists.

And so they see the President of the United States shaking hands with Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and tipping glasses with the Chinese and Ireland.

They see us coasting and brushing up together on the salt and the exchange of people and science and all the rest and so forth and so on.

And they think that as a result of all that, the world is

that the attitude of the conscience has changed, that our attitude has changed, or that the world, by reason of the fact of our getting to know each other, has become instantly more safe, or instantly safer, you may be more safe with these two actions.

Now, what really has happened here, as we all must realize, is that

is that over the past four years, and particularly over the past year, as the ambassador is saying, we have changed the world.

We have changed it because of this communication, of the dialogue that has begun, of the agreements that have been reached, the chances of those misunderstandings that are inevitably between friends.

Uh, and of course, uh, predictable would be, for example, adversaries.

So those various conflicts will not explode with our, uh, confrontation or, or war.

Uh, but at best, I think what we realize, honestly, that you know very well, uh, we are totally, uh, we are totally, uh, uh, realistic with regard to the dangers that still exist.

For example, our country at the present time, there are many people that want to, they say, now the world is safe, the war is over, the Russians are acting very well, the Chinese are acting very well.

So why does the United States reduce its armaments and spend more on the ghettos, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera?

God knows we'd like to, but there can be no reduction of U.S. arms unless there is a future reduction by the Soviet Union.

That's the way it has to be.

So I see, we appreciate your comments, and I was also certainly interested in what you learned about your career.

Well, from a religious background, you too are as we are.

On the other hand, you know the world is very dangerous.

Now, this is something so publicly, we obviously have to take the stance that, well, the world is moving in a positive way.

We believe it is.

It's good to have a war in Vietnam over an uneasy troops.

It's good to have had a dialogue established with the Chinese, which is probably the most significant thing that's happened, because without that, the Russian people wouldn't have it.

We can't say that.

We'll never say it.

time, you know, but we're seeing the relations with both.

And we've got to realize, too, that the Russians, it's better to have a Russian and a Nixon talking with each other sometimes and disagreeing very vigorously, which we do, than it is to have us smartening each other.

We're not talking at all.

But, on the other hand,

You can be sure, or you said you're a dangerous part of the world, and we're not assuming, because we've gotten to know each other.

Now we can, you know, I don't know, even drop our card.

That's what we have to do, you see.

I said to my socialist friend, he said, as citizens of the world, as human beings, we're very happy with what we're doing.

But I hope and pray that you don't become leery and forget who you are dealing with.

Because something that...

Thank you.

You told what it is.

Good.

Well, I'll tell you the best thing to do.

Tell your associates all over Europe.

Believe me, believe me, one of the great problems, if we can speak candidly, where you can have great influence, is...

with the new type of leadership that developed in Europe, with the exception of any, Pompidou, there, he's all right in his heart, but on the other hand, the impressions of the socialists and so forth in France, Italy, the Germans, torn apart, but at the present time, it's naive attitude.

that, well, we can now drop a beat from our defenses to the rest, whether the United States should, and maybe Europe should, and so forth.

This must not, must not get out of our favor.

Because we, that doesn't mean, you say that the Cold War is going to go on forever.

It doesn't say that the Russians are beasts, and so forth, and so on.

They may not, but it does say that they're realists, and one rule of this is that

The role that I call in international affairs is very simple, whether it's an economic field or a military field.

Do one another, just say do one to you.

That's it.

That's what you're about.

No, I think that the greatest danger to what we do, to what the Europeans want,

It's really nice to run away from a realistic appraisal of the situation.

If there is hope, and I hope there is hope, of coming to some real coexistence.

I always say to my friends, when economists say coexistence, that's exactly the same thing.

When you say coexistence,

When we say co-existence, when you say co-existence, it means you exist your way, we will exist our way, but let us live together.

When they say co-existence, it means if you live as we want you to live, then we will co-exist.

Yeah, but they say their co-existence means, and you well put it, co-existence to us, you live your way, we live our way.

They say co-existence, they mean you live your way, but inside of us.

So...

I must say that in this Paris conference that I had, there was somebody who was very sane.

It was a conference of socialist leaders, all of them during Vietnam II.

The prime minister, if I may say so, kept it, prepared it.

I was prepared to sit there on judgment.

And besides, who was my man?

Just at one point I said, look, people, as far as I hear, because there's a press conference that came on the radio, the question about how is this finally kept, what the observers think, that's all I know about it.

Do you know more?

I said, as far as the Keeper of C. Squire and U.N. observers, with all my respect to all of you around the table, I'm the expert here.

The father said, well, next to Gonda, I think I know about the U.N. observers.

From the other side, he said, this leads to part of me.

He's the observer's core.

But Christy was very...

Very sane.

He saw her.

He understands at least.

I wish he were in a bigger country.

And the German delegation was there.

They are.

Brown didn't come.

He was scheduled to come about two weeks later to deal with .

But the Belgians,

And a member of the shadow cabinet of Whitson.

We all love idealists, but your idealism was in the clouds in this world, I guess.

Well, we work for the ideal, but we have to work for it pragmatically.

That's really what it is, Tom.

to give when he goes over to the Versailles conference, the Francis of Europe, got him up in about two fights, and the world was worried he'd say this or something, right?

As a matter of fact, I think the Versailles forget come out differently.

You know, you really look at what produced that thought.

It had to start with Versailles.

You can't take a...

If, for example, the attitude toward the Germans after World War I had been the attitude that we took after World War II, there might have been a different situation.

I think the side that you saw was too tough.

I thought it was too tough, actually.

But it was...

It creates the possibility of humiliating the Germans, who have not beaten them enough.

You can't do that.

If you're going to humiliate somebody, you must destroy him.

By that point, he's not going to be able to destroy you.

You'll never strike a king unless you kill him.

Then it's the big old veil of France, which has been demoralized by the war, because Russia couldn't help it.

The West Side was a disaster.

Well, let me come to some of our other current problems.

Fortunately, I was happy to have this meeting with Henry.

The ambassador had a talk this morning, I don't know if you've been able to report that, about various matters.

Let me get one thing out of the way, because as Dale probably asked you, we discussed it, and I guess you weren't able to say yes.

so far.

This unfortunate money incident, we understand the problem.

We know that your statements and your people of Hamlet in a similar way and a proper way to be difficult is one of those things where you have a situation of an uneasy truce

that each of these are bound to occur.

This one was one that, as I saw it, said to somebody in private, and he asked me, he said, well, now look, the Israelis certainly wouldn't have intended for anything like this to happen.

That's the last thing, as Mr. Meyer pointed out in her statement, that they want to happen, because they want to, you know, have innocent people killed and so forth.

And second, they're too smart to have done it deliberately, even if they had intended to do it.

So, there you have it.

And frankly, let me say we understand.

I saw, I know Henry said we were disturbed about some resolution you had.

This was not actually, we were busy with the POW thing yesterday, and it did not come to my desk.

Let me say, let me say it's just one of those things.

We did not, it was not a policy in our book.

We made that reaction that it had to be moved out.

Well, you're, apparently there was some feeling, let's be quite candid, Scallion is a new man, a good man.

He encouraged everything with us here as well as the State Department.

But what it happened, he had a conversation with your ambassador, and you got the impression that it was all right.

It wasn't.

It was a misunderstanding.

I spoke to the governor this morning.

Yeah.

But.

Let us understand.

Yes, but I.

We expressed, they said, when the threat, you said, well, of course, but we, we, there's.

so that there's no embarrassment to you as far as we're concerned.

We obviously would have an educated interest in it because of the interest that's been raised here.

So now we've done it.

So we're safe.

Yes.

I'm sure.

No matter what happens at the U.N., I want you to know that I, during the month of January, from...

The warnings that the 9th of September is planning out is something very dramatic, and that is to have a plane with explosives with men who are prepared to commit suicide and drop it either at some very important military installation

Preferably in a city like Tel Aviv or Hiroshima down south or something like that.

Now, since and not, we had Japanese come in.

We were prepared to commit suicide.

And just shoot everybody inside.

It was crazy for me.

You see, we had to consider that seriously, Charlie.

And it's in that context that one must understand it.

Sure.

And Mr. Burton, I'm interested about all that you know.

Has anyone of the people there had any doubt whether their...

Believers, no matter what happened, we wouldn't have done it.

And when someone asked, well, do you think you should have tried to bring the plane down on its way out?

He said, a passenger plane.

He said, even on the way in, even if they were coming into the country, we wouldn't have done it.

And nobody I believe in the world was full of so much sorrow

Let me say this.

We understand.

I follow it all.

And the main concern we have, as I explained to you, is the ambassador, the ambassador goes, we don't want your position, I mean Israel's position, in the world, to be, you know, to, you know, you have your statement, and I hope that's a very, very intelligent to suggest that you would

What I would say is this.

If this happened, for example, if you were bombing the military targets in North Vietnam, the hospital would have said, well, we didn't intend to do the bombing, so we're making the action.

If we intended to hit non-military targets in North Vietnam, we would have taken them out in about three days.

But we didn't.

But be that as it may, they're not current, but let us understand that.

We know what their intentions are.

In other words, what we want to do is we have to work together.

We want your position, if you want, that you can sell before the world, you know what I mean?

And that's what we're after.

So we've discussed it.

I can't hear you, sir.

First of all, when we went into Lebanon two weeks ago, the easiest thing would have been

for the safest thing for our men would have been to go in with planes.

We knew exactly where these headquarters and camps of the terrorists are.

They deliberately put them either into a refugee camp or right outside a refugee camp.

These places were so close to a refugee camp that it was decided not to use planes but to go in

Now, our men had to go in and walk for hours in enemy territory in order to locate exactly each one.

I mean, in this room, even from the Lebanese, we got the statement that it was exact.

These were places of terrorists, of all terrorists, and no civilians.

But believe me, that night until 3.30 in the morning, my military secretary said, our boys are back.

Two wounded, one lost an arm and an eye.

But I don't know what would happen to these men walking in enemy territory over hills for hours in order to reach these places, in order not to touch anybody.

Sometimes it's...

But everything is done.

And it isn't a question that we have to tell the military, don't be careful.

They themselves are extremely sensitive.

I appreciate that.

Well now, I suppose there are two major issues that we always seem to be discussing.

One is the issue of the whole program of arms and also economic, which is related to that, of finance, etc.

And the other is, of course, the whole of the ocean.

And if you have any other, maybe I'll discuss them too.

But those are the main things.

Let me begin the discussion by saying first that, as you are quite aware, for four years...

Father Bennett, it's why you've been concerned at times by what you think that our, in later, our government will be in trouble.

And I, as you know, here in this office, I think we have kept very good.

And also in those four years, we have not ever tried to use or enact or dissuade you from taking the commitment.

That has been our policy.

Now, in doing that, I want you to know that will continue to be our policy.

But on the other hand, as has been the case in the past, and I think you can agree now, we feel that it supports the two of us.

work together toward moving, as you use the term, moving things home, dead center, and on the negotiating side.

In other words, let me put it this way, if you put, I know that no government, like yours, can be in a position to say, in order to give us arms, then we'll do this, then the other.

We have to realize that, I've heard that such, such things, well, as far as we're concerned, will never be a right thing to do.

As far as we're concerned, we, we would like to, we want to proceed with our program of mutual assistance in the arms field and the economic field because we believe Israel

be a strong, be a nation that's strong enough to defend itself against its potential enemies.

We think that's in our interest, and it's also, of course, in yours as well, and there are other reasons for you to include it.

On the other hand, we also think it's in our interest, meaning yours, to move on the negotiating front.

So, with that background, why don't we talk about what you view, what you put on the arms, and what we then work on.

The two, first of all, I want to say, I can say it, ask me, I say it at home, I say to American visitors that come, that every commitment that has been given has been meticulously implemented.

And I might say we've never had such a good one.

And I'll tell you what I appreciate mainly in this space is what I say.

Because there is mutual understanding and there's mutual confidence.

Mr. Francis, I'm convinced that any doubt as to what we want to do with the unknown is proven again.

And the fact that they're businessmen

that what we want is merely to be a position that helps self-defense.

And your policy has been proven so right.

Not only does it make Israel, give Israel the capability of defending itself, but it has prevented war.

It has prevented shooting.

If after a bit we had been left weak, I'm convinced there would be shooting across the canal.

And if Sadat didn't start shooting despite all the dates that he set, it's because he knows that we're capable of defending ourselves.

And this winger of policy has been proven right 100%.

It has not only made us capable of defending ourselves when attacked, we weren't attacked because of that.

There's been no shooting in the ground.

This was the primary element in having at least the ejection front flying.

So everything was proven right.

And what we are interested in now... And again, may I say one more thing?

We've been asked naturally to get home and find others.

Now that Vietnam...

The thing is out of the way.

Don't you fear that the American government will now become more active in your area?

And I said, I don't fear that at all.

There's no different opinion as to the necessity of trying to do everything which is possible to do in order to have a richer state of peace in the area.

The question is how to go about it.

The question is what will be done.

But we are not opposed to the American government being active in that.