Conversation 872-007

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I'll simply say that we want to read your request sympathetically.

I'd like for him to discuss the details on this thing.

We have something in mind.

And so, do you want to say a word about this?

I mean, I have two problems.

One is, as you have bested us,

Our bureaucracy does not happen to be pro-Pakistan, but it might.

So at the time that we put it on the embargo, which we intended to be there, they also put it on Pakistan in such a way that now not even third country is as possible as Pakistan, which they did not tell us.

They had told us we would never put it on Pakistan.

Like Iran did.

The law says that any group that we cannot, third country cannot give American equipment to any country that does not have a relationship with us.

Therefore, our first problem is to get a relationship with you re-established in some way so that we can then do third country delivery.

Therefore, what we've been thinking of as a first step, we have no idea.

under what pressure we are from the Indians, which we can handle from our own bureaucracy, which we can also handle.

But when you work here, when we have the last exercise, they kill us at the press in Congress.

So what we are thinking of as a first step is to fulfill existing contracts, that is to release the equipment that's on the dance,

that you have, and the honor personnel carriers under the one-time exception that you were in for, plus the re-establishing of pipelines for spare parts.

Then, we've already talked to Helm's fellow, and this has to be kept very secret, that he should talk to the Iranian Special Representative of the President to see what they can do, and to

to work it in this manner, as the minister said.

If we go further now, they're just going to be killed.

This is further than anybody...

I mean, the president of other agencies will be against the unanimous opposition of every American media official.

You can be sure that they're all hell-breakers here.

But what is the concept of floating on the sea?

They don't understand it.

They just don't understand it.

But basically there's an obsession about it.

That's what it gets down to.

And also an obsession about armed forces.

But how do they reconcile themselves to so many of the missions?

They blind themselves to them.

They don't want to admit that that's true.

Well, they say that India is not really a pro-Soviet.

India really has no intention of doing that.

And Mr. Gandhi would always say, well, I'm against the communists and all that.

Let me say, it's unreasoning, it's wrong, and so forth.

So I want you to know we have to stand against the tide.

What we have to do, frankly, looking at Canada, we've got to open the door for you.

And that's what we're, that's what we're, once we have opened that door, then the possibility of a third country thing.

See, we've got to, right now it's a band shunt.

You can't get anything, right?

to crack that door.

That's what we're trying to do.

But the blood will be all over the floor here, I can assure you, Mr. Chairman.

Usually five pounds on a personal basis, too.

We look at, actually, I've got some of the issues that the audience would be willing to about down the channel.

In fact, they might be willing to get some of their own equipment, which isn't happening.

But then we have to establish some sort of relationship.

That's why we have to have the pipelines.

When I say open the door, that means so the Uranians can walk in.

That's what you need.

They can't now with our stuff.

And we need to open that up.

And frankly, we talked to the Chinese about this also.

And they understand that we are strongly in favor of maximum support for you.

We will talk if they will help us with countries who might be of help to you.

I'm not against you talking when you said that, and I am.

I am through a right communication to give to the highest level of the Chinese government.

Our concern is one.

There's no question of them or who's standing.

You remember that we jumped in at the time of the India-Pakistan conflict.

And I don't mind that.

Everybody said this is terrible and so forth and so on.

But we did the right thing.

We did the right thing.

And we're going to try to do the right thing now.

You'll have to be patient with us only because you say, what's the matter with these people?

I don't understand.

Why is it that what you're dealing with, you're dealing with the congressmen and the senators and the people in the press.

There's the question of

trying to reason with them.

They don't want to listen to reason.

They said, we want to say, no, we must not start the armed race on the end of Soviet Union.

They don't realize, too, that if they allow this to get too disproportionate, that's going to provide a whole war.

That's for it to be involved here.

Pakistan never could be a threat to India.

God knows that.

But India will gobble up Pakistan, the couple of bodies that Pakistan pretends to go down.

That's the real argument for this.

And also, I think that President Putin's analysis of defense according to Iraq is, as the President pointed out, a problem is to get ourselves in a position to start strengthening the U.S.

to get over this first hurdle.

Now, all our people are expecting it is to go crazy when we do it.

I don't expect it.

They won't do anything like that.

If he shows nervousness, then they will do it.

But we have to send him a message from you.

In fact, this is what we must do.

That's right.

Well, the Indians who have come there are going to get something out of this, too.

Thank God.

We could have taken that money in there.

So, we're never going to get anyone in that turn.

We're going to cut the payable price for it.

Mr. President, the President would also like to have the children in the country up the board of the Constitution and be able to have the Constitution on the 21st of April.

After that, I think it's up to your committee to be able to do whatever you'd like to do.

for us would be July.

It's not too late.

It's not as warm here then, but it's not too bad.

three or four, and I don't mind wanting to come at a time that we can show a proper second, and that would, you know, secondhand, so I would be good.

On the one hand, if you gave Mr. Price a second edition of this question, that empty-handed people might as well get rid of it, and people would prefer to come after who?

Well, let me say that I can think of no useful purpose.

We've got a very full plate, you know, and after all, it's a new country and so forth, and there are about 30 new countries ahead of us.

So, we might get to the bottom of this on the 7th or 8th.

Is that all right?

Mr. Meadow?

No, it is not separate.

My point is that we can't do anything for them.

I've been sitting here creating the statement that you're helping.

We're talking, of course, humanitarian, that's definitely because they are, and I feel sorry for them.

It's all the things that have happened, but my goodness, for us to have to bring him over here, let me put it this way, we're going to see our old friends before we start making new ones.

Dr. Joseph is pushing hard for you to come.

Well, we wish we could tell you more, but let me say,

And the ambassador is going to sit here and he'll tell you what we do here and cause some trouble.

But we're prepared.

We'll get it through.

And as a quote, if we have a chance to get out on people in line, we're sure to do that.

Don't say anything.

Keep it to your head.

Just let us know.

We've got lineups of people.

We've got great factors.

I have a paper that long from the State Department, the University of Los Angeles, and the Defense Department.

I don't mean the generals, the admirals, but you know what I mean.

The bureaucracy will get a general very solid on this, but they don't understand it.

You see, very few people understand the power politics of the world today.

You understand it because you're in the middle of it.

Very few people.

They just live in their own little place.

But we think we understand it, and we want you to survive, and we'll do our best.

I remember that marvelous parade they had over there.

You know, we thought it would be good when we had our miscreant.

Well, I guess we should do maybe one of these days, but if anything changes, we can do more things.

to present my personal wishes to the President.

And let him stay firm.

Thank you, baby.

Because I would love to remember he's a California golden bear to the University of California.

Yes, that's what I said.

Thank you.

OK. Good to have you again.

Thank you.

What is the purpose of this event?

Mr. President, Governor Carr.

Yes, all right.

I believe I'm going to see you again.

Ambassador Kahn, Ambassador, good to see you again.

Chancellor Bill, sit over here.

Ambassador, hello.

How are you?

Mr. Chief, I'll put the WC here, and you sit over there.

Patrick, you probably sit over there, too.

That's not fair, it's 4x2.

Don't forget, it's 3x2.

Oh, well.

You never get them in the wrong, that's the end of it.

There we go.

So, um, excuse me, excuse me.

Hey, hey, hey.

Uh-huh.

all right thank you

We, uh, we love you, and, uh, we want you to know that we welcome you to the ambassador college that, uh, we want you to know that you have a friend in this office.

Uh, you've been through a very difficult time.

Uh, we, we, of course, uh,

As you know, we were very sympathetic.

We didn't do very much.

We did as much as we could.

But now the survival of the strong, independent Pakistan, we believe, is in the interest of peace in the area and peace in the areas in our interest.

Apart from that, I can say that, as I've often said in my master class, my most pleasant memories are my visit to your country, going back to 53.

I have many friends there.

I like your courage.

Also, I may say in your view, the buying wallet we received.

So the personal factor is there, but I also want you to know that apart from that, we believe that the interests of our country are served by good, close relations with you.

We want to be as helpful as we can, having in mind some of the restraints that we unfortunately have with our Congress.

Without a mind to try to hear anything that the President or you would like to convey, Mr. Mayor, I will change it this time.

Thank you, Mr. President.

And you may have, Mr. President, President Rudolph instructed me to convey his best regards and wishes to you.

He has also asked me to say that he in Pakistan greatly admired the numerous steps you have taken

to advance the cause of the world peace.

As the President said, we recall with gratitude your moral and political support, which we got in critical times in the 1970s when we faced war, aggression from India.

And we look upon you as a friend, Mr. President, and that you are interested in our security and progress and your candid and sincere impressions when you spoke in the Congress, but I can't be grateful for that.

And, Mr. President, we have our difficulties, we have our problems, especially

I'm concerned with India and Russia.

And we want strong Pakistan just to defend ourselves.

We don't want a policy of confrontation, the President has already said.

And in his public meeting, he has been trying his best because the maximum opposition has been strong.

in Punjab, even in Punjab, as I said, and he spoke in public with him about the recognition of Bangladesh and Pakistan interests.

And as president of that group, a month ago, and again I brought this back to you, and I sincerely think that Mr. President, that this time when I go back,

We have a long-awaited reply which we have been waiting for from you because we look upon you as friends and we think that you can help us.

We are grateful that you have given us this opportunity.

And with your permission, I request Mr. Ali Muhammad to now present.

Mr. President, just last night I was told by our situation in the media

I must say, a history review is so hard to realize.

It was 20 years ago when the universe has been ending.

And I said, well, maybe I was thinking that.

It'll take generation for things to change.

The more things change, the worse they get.

Go ahead.

No, we don't.

And we don't.

But the first one about the relations in India, the situation is that troops have been withdrawn.

All that we did is put them on a flight service, in fact, and suddenly not wanted by the Sudanese.

The laws will only take place after the line of control has been delineated in the field.

No, there are no more regulations there, Mr. Chairman.

Their object, obviously, was to pressure us into accepting a line of their choice.

Well, we did not yield to their pressure, Captain Boyd, after the delineation of the line of control.

It was clear enough that it was going to take place, and we couldn't have no use of that.

But you did not yield.

We did not yield.

In fact, there were deadlocks after deadlocks on the military-wide control of the bloc.

Yes, according to us on the line, and if the agents don't accept it, we'll break off negotiations and say, we'll see you again if you want to see us.

And that's how we proceeded with it.

But it was pretty far away, and eventually they did the same thing, and I think this particular pressure tactic was not working.

And as I say, about three and a half months after the date, the police took him to the hospital and said that we could cause an immediate death case.

I'll come later to the position of military troops, so where they are stationed, I will tell you later.

The next thing which was impliedly agreed in the Sundar agreement, and that was that there was an agreement that the prison wall would be repatriated.

And the Sundar agreement said that representatives of the two governments would meet in order to discuss

the arraignments and the brutalities for the repatriation.

In other words, there's no dispute that repatriation has to take place.

But those absences are not met.

And the reason is that it reiterates the line that there cannot be repatriation unless you all understand the people who are in the communities.

The chairman knew from the monitor, I think, that he said that he will not agree.

So that's how the whole position is deadlocked today.

It is very extraordinary that India should have held in a custody, in prison camps, in very severe conditions, very difficult conditions.

Not only the military men, but 17,000 civilians, including women and children.

Even children.

14 months now.

And the outstanding people now is that she doesn't want people to take longer than necessary.

This is what we are told again and again.

We were told that way back in April when I first met you, just a hour prior to your summit meeting.

We don't want people to take longer than necessary.

But when it comes to

uh, to, uh, telling us, what did this, this is the line that they were sent receiving, and that we were not contented, and I say, and of course, we suggest that we recognize some of the issues, but that's the only way.

In case you didn't know, we didn't, until we got the word from him.

So this is the, the, now the President was getting clear to, uh, to Mrs. Ithaca, he wrote a letter to her,

But I would call to the effect that, after the troops were controlled, that we should now proceed to this next important hurdle in the way of normalizing the situation on the subcontinent.

And also, in the case in which this was done, if we may, we could make a further progress under the Center of Freedom to address normalization.

When she wrote back to say that she agreed that you had sued me for trial, that was her and Mrs. O'Rourke should be repatriated, she asked the President to suggest to her in confidence how they may proceed.

But it was her and President O'Rourke who had to say, of course, the alternative is open to you either you agree to repatriate me in such a negative way

tremendously favorable impact on the people who live in this country.

You know what they're saying today.

And strengthen this agency, which we came to, of people who want to get national documentation.

This is one way.

It will ease the way for us recognition, but let's work it out.

And we're going to do it.

But if we're to finally promote the regard that we see here, in this area, in October, I would like to see your interest.

But to that point of bias, so far, the public statements have been made by Gandhi and so on, saying that there will be no point in another summit meeting, or in the last sentence of the two months meeting, so long as the personal recognition is not out of the way.

So that's where we stand.

In other words, you, in effect, are saying, give us back our prisoners first, and they are saying, you recognize first.

That's the end of it all.

And it's getting ready for this.

In the meantime, we did raise some votes in both countries that perhaps the impacts don't have, but last January come to the conclusion that they would increase mutual aid with each other in their mutual interests.

And that even remains a cool story.

Can we

I'd like for you to discuss with me if there's anything, without coercion, very severe.

This is such an unreasonable position that it's this kind of a deadlock.

And I'm thinking of a human suffering.

I mean, now it's very different from what we had to do in Vietnam.

I mean, my God, this is just a question of recognizing those prisoners.

It's been skated around too long.

But if in addition to the issue of war crimes,

Indians want to turn over, I think I've said how many, to Bangladesh to try to relax.

They ought to certainly get, they can certainly, they're going to want some at least.

It's an unreasonable decision.

It's a brutal decision.

The thing that gets me about that is that the Indians always say this,

Only, even now, I ask my moral impression about Texas, which increases with the distance from India.

I should have thought that it would be difficult for people from India to be truly legitimate in Texas, you know.

But if they would have sent them back and kept their soldiers, one could have, you know, got to their situation for some time.

But I don't know how they justify this.

to their own consciences, if any, the fact that there are women and children living in prison camps, undernourished, resilient, old.

Some of them, we are told, don't even have adequate clothing.

We've sent about 400,000 Boston students for clothing, warm clothing, tabloid food, and so on, knowing that they're not getting these things, these early penitents.

And the main problem is that of vaccination.

Now, sir, may I come to the other unit?

The president has already written to you about it.

Since my last visit to the union center.

The Soviets have been showing their hands a little more clearly, although still is camouflaged with the professions of late interest in the friendship with Pakistan.

Enormous desire to help us, they're anxious to avoid any mischief.

For instance, they think that we are the ones who are not taking the necessary decisions quickly.

I suppose it is still understandable that there are thousands of Russian experts in that country.

That may be one reason why they want to get on with it quickly.

But anyhow, as I said, there's a tremendous amount of repression of the movement of Pakistan.

But the fact is that they are a weak hit.

And they have recently, they have evidence also, to that effect, that they are pretty deeply involved in trying to subvert Pakistan.

They were born last year in,

The language disturbances that took place in Karachi.

They were involved in labor troubles that took place in and around Karachi last year.

We have proof of that, and the Soviet investment was confronted with that proof.

In fact, he must have gone to...

This is what he does whenever you tell him something, he says, and they must not remember it.

And the streets out there, of course, they said that they were not involved.

They will never be involved.

They only recognize one government, and that is Mr. Putin's government.

They only recognize one party, and that is Mr. Putin's party, and so on.

But they have nothing to do with the opposition.

They just actually know that they are in touch with them, and so on.

Relatively, yes, to the President of the United States of America, arms finally of the embassy, the Russian arms.

We have 350 Russian sub-machine guns, about 100,000 rounds of ammunition, equipment for trading willows, communication sets, wireless transmitters, receivers, and so on and so forth.

And we set for the Russian ambassador.

And we said, this is a question of government.

We'd be interested to know, from your government, how the executive came to power.

And if you're not in any way connected, therefore you can put that in the discourse.

The discourse gave us, from this Iraqi action, Italy passed on to us.

We've had no reaction from them yet.

I do not know if he would have lost track because of the righteous indignation that was sent out there.

He was just involved in it after all.

He did not know about this.

But he did not think he was going to stop him.

He merely listened in.

According to the official who stopped him, he got the impression that he was very much on the defensive.

But the interesting thing is that all over,

We told them this is not true.

Not nearly three weeks ago.

No response yet from Moscow.

Yesterday, they're continuing to go on with it.

I've got details here of the stuff they've given it here.

Perhaps they're trying to explain to Dr. Kissinger and through some things previous.

tanks, supersonic aircraft, and so on.

They themselves have raised their military budget for the next year to an all-time record of over $2 billion.

So what's President Yeltsin's support?

We've got to answer this question.

She's not planning to invade China.

If the military moves against us, this is not going to end up.

And I think the Soviets really know it.

And we think, and according to what we think there might be the Soviet intention, but we think that it's part of a Soviet plan, in terms of, also deeply involved in this, that it is all part of the Soviet view of what they plan to do in this area.

We, they are telling us they have been sitting off because they've noticed our performance.

We know that they are behind this independent Luchistan movement.

In the spirit of the Luchistan movement, which as you all know, is part of Afghanistan and part of Iran also.

That's a question of both the three on us and the other three countries.

The Iranians are very worried about it.

In fact, if that's the nation, it is better to you that there is a kind of an island, this Soviet, this unarmed, running through Syria and Iraq.

The 15 Soviets have a thinking similar to that of the United States.

The unarmed has been running through India.

And within the embrace of this Spencer lie Pakistan, Iran, and the Persian Gulf.

And the very, very time and time that the Spencer would bring began to close in Afghanistan.

I understand that as part of this strategy is the passing of Indian forces and, surprisingly, of Afghan forces on Nagorno.

...which I think is poor, poor building, poor, poor, poor, poor piece.

We are reporting out for that, but we have told that they will not look at that at all.

They will not look at all.

Also, we next year will ask ourselves, what is, what does this picture signify?

It could be that the jointing of India

Soviet Union is due for further disarmament by China.

It would be that, perhaps that's not the promoteable as far as that, but it's the Soviets exercising pressure on us, perhaps to lead us away from China, induce us to fundamentally be Soviet-protective of Iran.

It may be, as the President mentioned in the letter, perhaps a form of softening our process

trying to prepare Pakistan for eventually accepting the Soviet offer that we joined in a security effect.

In fact, the offer was a bit worse.

It's very interesting.

So in the last story, I said to you that we wouldn't be surprised if the Soviets come up with an offer of a treaty similar to the treaty with India in the near future.

And in actual fact, about two months ago, the Soviet ambassador formally proposed to the President

that we got in this treaty with them.

So, basically, this, sir, is a obvious concern of mine, concern of the Soviet involvement in this continent.

You know also the Soviet Union presence in the Indian Ocean.

Yes.

And we feel that

We can take care of ourselves.

We don't want your physical involvement in any way.

You gave us the tool, we take care of ourselves.

But we feel that we must have the tools.

I mentioned this yesterday to the House Committee from yesterday and also to the Senate.

The House committee members said that they were fully buying this.

They said, go to the centers, they are the ones holding the case of the treaty.

We are with you.

In fact, they are wanting to know what we wanted.

And I said, look, I only suggest that you take the basic decisions first.

Let us say that when you go and open up the military aid to Pakistan, I mentioned to them that they are still your allies.

I also mentioned to them the fact that

And the way, uh, in 1959, I'd had a complaint with the U.S.

Assembly to continue the supplies economic military aid.

And I said, are they going to stop seven years ago, military aid?

And the members of the Senate, when I told them this, expressed that none of the supplies were going to stop seven years.

I said, yes, seven years ago.

And in the meantime, I quoted from your reports that last year, in the meantime, the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union,

He said...

He was having a carrot pitch.

Something, something, it didn't happen, but it wasn't something that he said, that he planned to have in Pakistan, so economically, certainly.

On the question of military aid, he said, there's this problem, we don't want to encourage an arms race between India and Pakistan.

and we'd like to support you and so and so.

And I said to him, I said, well, you may not want to, you may have a friend, you may not want to provoke an arms race, but I said, it's obvious that not, not yet, but if there is any such concentration, we will continue to rob India, even if you don't give us any arms.

So, what we want is, if we are supported militarily too,

We hope that the Indians might eventually realize the futility of this arms race.

But if we, if we, if we have to bring them, and thus the military gap goes on in three states, then, then the Soviet and Indian objectives might well be realized one day.

And I find it so militarily, completely, and fussy of these two, certainly a menace if you look in person.

We do forget that we have to militarily agonize over India.

I think that's a prospect we cannot deal with with any validity.

You have been to the House of the Senate, and you, of course, have heard what the Senator said.

Of course, you know anything in this area that has to get through with the Congress, eventually.

You also were aware of the fact

very, very strong lobby against this from India then, India's friends in this country, the press and so forth and so on.

They put it on the basis that, two bases, one, that it's an armed terrorist, and completely ignore the fact that you mentioned the first fact that the Soviet Union is furnishing arms, but second, India, but second, that the US economic aid to India, which is quite substantial,

that allow them to use their budget for the purpose of a significant military building because they've got military capability on manufacturing, which you don't have.

So we gave you a lot of economic assistance.

You could then take that part of that budget and put it into arms, but you don't have that kind of factories, right?

And India has.

So we're aware of that.

In my new memory, when you give economic assistance to India, it's just like giving military assistance at the present time.

But first of all, India has substantial indigenous production there.

But that's why in mid-21st century, they don't have a tax.

They don't have a dividend.

They don't have a government.

So they can't completely economic aid directly.

Secondly, they're getting substantial Soviet.

That's right.

And US officers.

That's right.

Now what we, what basically, when you say that we will provide economic assistance to both, you're simply increasing the inequality.

Because economic assistance to Pakistan, economic assistance to India means that India has more money to put in arms.

Pakistan can't do that.

You know, because we, we, we are the biggest buyer.

Let me say that it's terribly difficult for the Congress and for the public to listen and so forth, but I've talked to Dr. Gissinger before you came in.