Conversation 872-006

TapeTape 872StartThursday, March 8, 1973 at 11:55 AMEndThursday, March 8, 1973 at 12:05 PMParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Kissinger, Henry A.;  [Unknown person(s)]Recording deviceOval Office

On March 8, 1973, President Richard M. Nixon, Henry A. Kissinger, and unknown person(s) met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 11:55 am and 12:05 pm. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 872-006 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 872-6

Date: March 8, 1973
Time: Unknown between 11:55 am and 12:05 pm
Location: Oval Office

The President met with Henry A. Kissinger.

       National Security Council [NSC] meeting
            -Kissinger’s schedule [?]
            -NSC group
            -Qualities of members
            -Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
                  -Kissinger’s opinion
                  -President's questions
                  -Private negotiations
                         -Summit
            -President's handling of meeting
                  -Kissinger’s paper
            -Need to focus on the “big picture”
            -Rolf Pauls
                  -Comments about President
                         -Compared with John B. Connally, Nelson A. Rockefeller
            -Handling of meeting
                                            -6-

                 NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                    Tape Subject Log
                                     (rev. May-2010)
                                                           Conversation No. 872-6 (cont’d)


                 -Compared to Rockefeller, Connally
                     -Decision making
                           -Nuclear Test ban Treaty
                                 -President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
                                  [PFIAB] [?]
                                       -Meeting
                                             -Study

      President's meeting with Analoliy F. Dobrynin
            -Purpose
            -Meetings at San Clemente, Camp David

      Pakistan
            -President's meeting with Mustafa Kahn and Aziz Ahmed
                  -Release of contracts
                         -President’s commitment
                               -Notification of India
                               -India’s reaction
                                     -Existing contracts
                                     -Aid package
                         -People's Republic of China [PRC]
                         -Rogers's reaction
                  -India’s production of tanks


******************************************************************************
BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 1
[National security]
[Duration: 2s]

PAKISTAN

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 1
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      Meeting with NSC
           -Television [TV] broadcast
           -President's handling
                 -Subject
                                             -7-

                  NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                     Tape Subject Log
                                      (rev. May-2010)
                                                              Conversation No. 872-6 (cont’d)


            -William P. Rogers, [David] Kenneth Rush
            -Elliot L. Richardson
                  -Discussion
            -William P. Clements, Jr.
            -Spiro T. Agnew
                  -Points raised
                         -Technology
                               -Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR]

      Strategic Arms Limitation Talks [SALT] negotiations
            -Throwweight of missiles


******************************************************************************
BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 2
[National security]
[Duration: 4s]

THROWWEIGHT

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 2
******************************************************************************


            -Missile program
            -Public relations
                  -Throwweight, launching
                  -MIRVs
                         -Verification
                         -Testing
                  -Test ban
                  -Throwweight advantage
                         -MIRV
                               -Trident
                                     -USSR’s objection

An unknown man entered at an unknown time after 11;55 am.

      President’s meeting with Kahr and Ahmed
                                            -8-

                  NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                    Tape Subject Log
                                     (rev. May-2010)
                                                           Conversation No. 872-6 (cont’d)


            -Press photographs

      Pakistan
            -Embassy functions
                -State Department
                       -Ecuador, Uruguay
                       -President’s attendance
                       -Spiro T. Agnew

The unknown man left at an unknown time before 12:05 pm.

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

Precision of thought isn't the organic characteristic of that group we have.
Well, you know, it's just as well to keep it in that general language, because when they get it out, it's a test ban and all that kind of stuff.
A test ban, I'm against.
Well, you can see what I'm saying.
Oh, you can see what I'm saying.
But I thought your question was the first.
The reason we really need to put something out from you
is so that we have a charter for that private negotiation for the summit.
Because we can't...
But you see, they need to understand what the game is all about.
It involves so many things other than this.
No, you were really superb at the meeting, Mr. President.
You came in cold.
I heard from people last night, and I heard from people.
Well, but still, it's a problem.
The main point is to get it in a context so that they see the big picture all the time, and don't get it boiled down with the tactics, the bird ground, the net making.
And so it really, you know, Paul, the German ambassador, said to me afterwards, he said, what the world has to understand is that we have four years of this president, which we must build something, because he said, when he looks over the American political scene, he sees no money.
You know, if you look at any of your...
Even Connolly, who is probably the best, if I had to support somebody... Those are the two.
But neither of them could have handled this meeting.
I mean, fond as I am of Rockefeller...
I think Connolly would have tended to decide something on the spot.
Conway had, I don't know, crude basis, Rockefeller would have... Rockefeller would have tended to the test band would appeal to him as a gimmick.
Rockefeller, what he would have done is he would have floundered through the meeting and then started studying the thing.
What I would like to suggest is that this is one term that he ought to actually be with at some point.
And I shouldn't think you could get them in for an hour and just go through this same drill and then not the whole drill, but to say, look, we want you to study it for us.
I'm getting the preview in for ten minutes, as you suggest.
Ten to one.
Good, good.
I wouldn't go into any trouble, just the mood, and how eager you are.
And you'll take it to Katte, right?
Good, good.
I refuse.
I don't know what to say to them.
Do I say that we're going to release this without any other thing?
I would say to them that you will give it very sympathetic consideration.
The reason you shouldn't is because we must notify the Indians first.
I think that the president is going to raise hell in India.
There's no question about it.
On the other hand, you can do it on the basis that you're going that you're releasing all existing contracts to them
We're also making a left-hand exception for free and rubber.
Yeah, but those we had made before, and they had already paid for it.
Oh, they already gave them, okay.
They'd already left the contracts.
And also the Indians were given that $86 million.
That we had blocked.
We'll just say, look, it's a mutual reciprocal thing, and that's the way it's going to be.
Right.
And that'll sway them.
I think if you don't do it, the Chinese... All right, that's the big game.
That's the big game.
You just got to tell him and tell our friend out there that he's got to swallow and take it.
He's got to take it.
But we have to tell Rajesh.
Mr. President, and how great... Well, India has its own production and produces 200 tanks a year.
You know, it's a shame, really, that you couldn't possibly do it.
It's a shame that sometimes a meeting like that, you couldn't have the people see it on television, with the camera hidden so that the others didn't know it.
You know, that's the kind of thing that's fascinating.
You were really, Mr. President, this was one of the very, very best meetings, because it was a really tough subject.
You can't do it cold.
We had been working on it for months.
You were light years ahead of Rogers, and
I was trying to get a head on the matter.
And Rush.
And Richardson sounds intelligent, but he's always flipping around.
He raised a few good points, but they never lead to any clemency.
He still ponders.
Yeah, and it doesn't... Once he's said it, you ask yourself, all right, so now what?
It sounds pretty good.
Clemency.
Clemency wasn't bad.
Clemency's got the right...
I think we gotta get down to some very fundamental questions, which you and I better talk about sometime, and that is... His points were the ones he always made.
It was another one.
He says that we should assume they'll catch up in technology.
The deep problem is, Mr. President, we could phony up a position for you which would look goddamn good until you analyze it.
Because unless, take this throwaway thing.
Unless you really mean to go into a massive mental program and phasing out half of the bomb, it doesn't mean anything.
I think we have to, I guess we're, I guess we have to put, having in mind the fact that we need some crack for the public, if we try to find something on throwaways, maybe something on launch and so forth and so on, but...
It may then be that it is not to our interest either to have any horsing around with birds.
I don't know.
It certainly will hold them down.
I can see the other side.
I just wonder if the bastards don't shoot so much.
After they had started testing, Mr. President, it would be a mistake to have any horsing around with birds.
The only hope we've got is to stop them now.
But we don't have to have a test bank.
No, we don't have to have a test bank.
I wouldn't go for a test van, because that always...
I would see whether we could offer that we let them have their throwaway advantage if they don't move.
If they don't move, we can keep ours.
But that would then give us a problem with Trident.
A problem with Trident.
Why is it a problem with Trident?
Well, because...
I don't think they would agree to let us keep contained.
I think they are here.
Sorry.
But we don't have to decide that yet.
We don't have to decide that yet, Mr. President.
Fine, okay.
I think we can do this.
We're going to press low on this and also the ambassador is here.
I just wonder if the batteries don't shoot so much.
Well, after they had started testing, Mr. President, it would be a mistake to have any causing around this.
The only hope we've got is to stop them now, but we don't... No, we don't have to have a test bank.
I wouldn't go for a test van, because that always...
I would see whether we could offer that we let them have their throwaway advantage if they don't move.
If they don't move, we can keep ours.
But that would then give us a problem with Trident.
A problem with Trident.
Why is it a problem with Trident?
Well, because...
I don't think they would agree to let us keep the thing.
I think they're here.
Sorry.
But we don't have to decide that yet.
We don't have to decide that yet, Mr. President.
Ah, okay.
I think we can do this.
We're going to press low on this and also the ambassador is here.
Why don't you want me to order some more?
Do you want to order any caskets?
No, I don't feel like it.
Just a drop-by.