Nixon & Kissinger on Watergate and National Security Council

Transcript (AI-generated)

This transcript was generated automatically by AI (WhisperX) and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Names and numbers are often wrong; speakers are not identified. Do not cite it as authoritative — verify against the audio and the finding aid.

Download transcript (.txt) · JSON data

Well, I've read that in the paper notes now, that he and Krogh, but I knew that Erlichman was investigating the Penitentiary and the absentees.

I knew that.

But I didn't know that Krogh and Young were the two people who were doing it for him.

And I never knew about Erlichman, except for that one thing.

I knew on the India-Pakistan thing that he interrogated Wellman, but I didn't know what else they did.

Because that was never given to me.

That was never given to me.

I did some young work and all that sort of thing.

But that's all right with me.

But I guess he was on your staff and didn't have any money.

He started out on my staff originally.

And then, frankly, he couldn't take the pay and his interests were more in domestic affairs.

So he transferred to...

He transferred to this donor organization.

No, I mean, I won't run away.

But you had no...

The things I know about from first-hand knowledge, which, if they come out, I will, of course, have to...

It's the task in 1969 that the FBI did.

Sure.

But those were done by Uber.

Yeah.

I mean, I won't volunteer that.

That I knew about.

But to my knowledge...

I think it was the only one I remember now.

I think the only one I remember now.

Oh, yes.

Oh the fact that the leaks had to stop

But I won't say anything.

You can say he was on the, if they ask.

They ask, I'll say he was on the NSC payroll.

Yeah, in the White House, he was not.

He began your payroll with the transfer of domestic duties two years before.

Why don't you put it that way?

Yeah, but he stayed on my payroll.

Why don't you just say that he came to the White House on your payroll

but not on your payroll at the time well not on the earth but not on the nsc staff that's what i include at that time i mean because people people move from step to step

interim period.

I'll go along with any arrangement.

But it's a tough situation to have both Rogers and Haig.

I have highly God for him and I I've got

I know I thought he wasn't loyal to me at the end.

I thought he was responsible for a lot of the news stories that I had been to so often in the negotiations.

Not responsible, but he certainly made no effort.

No, you can't have that.

Now, on the... Let me turn to the Soviets for a minute, Mr. President.

On that nuclear treaty, we'll have some pitching from the Chinese and from the French.

I've got the Germans and British lined up.

And we may have a little rough spot here with the Chinese.

But I think we need to come up with a solution.

And in the long run, it will help the Chinese, too, because it gives us a pretext if we want to help them for their having violated the treaty.

that they would be breaking if they jumped the Chinese.

What the Chinese are worried about is that we use it for hegemony against them.

But if we want to act against them, we don't need a treaty with the Soviet Union.

Well, I think if it's a question of 30 days, Hague is probably tougher than Skokorov.

I have some money that you can handle.

Harvey Kearns and Peter Brennan and all that.

Otherwise, I won't have the time to do that.

That's the fact of the matter.

In my honest opinion, it's that more fundamental things are needed anyway.

Oh, that's what I mean, but I can't.

I don't want Will in a hurry.

No, so... Yeah, all I want Will and Henry is buying time.

You don't want me to bring George Bush's The Inventor for Christ's Sakes to the number.

If it's a question... Or Conley.

Jesus Christ, you see my point?

If it's a question of 30 days... Well, it's a question of...

Don't you worry.

What I want you to do is from now on, like we did in the old days, you and I have got to sit down and do the board policy.

In other words, you and I will build it together, see?

And that way, and then the problems with Rogers and so forth,

you and Rogers, and we get Packard, and bring him in, you know, and Henry, if you're a master, even tell him about the things and so forth.

But I, my conviction, leave me out of it, because it really is not, I think we're going to run into a major problem if we continue to operate as we have, because here I am negotiating for the sixth treaty that's coming up, of which the State Department has never heard.

And

since we're already under attack for not following, for undermining institutions, I think a way has to be found to bring the State Department bureaucracy in.

They can never be brought in under the present situation because they're being encouraged from the top, really, in a, in a, to a competitive attitude.

That is the difficulty.

When these things flow, when these things come out, we both get a lot of mistakes in a much worse atmosphere now.

that nuclear treaty will be very controversial.

And we've got the dilemma now.

If we say, I did it on this trip, which is one way of doing it, then we'll be accused of doing it for war again.

If we tell the truth that it started at the summit, which is really the truth, and that we negotiated it the whole time, then we'll be accused of subverting the state of London.

Listen, you were right in the same way.

I know what we're doing.

And I

I mean, do you know about these things we always work on?

We're going to know the software, and then we're going to do that.

And I know how we have to do it.

But you know, now, like on the conference in Europe and America, it's a great thing to get a state to work on.

You know what I mean?

Right.

My opinion is that we have to get better control of, that we have to be able to use them more directly.

Yeah.

Or we're going to make ourselves

Everybody seems to be leaking all over the place with our penalty, starting at the White House.

And since the discipline has broken down completely, we have a massive problem next of running the government.

And I think we have to find a way of getting the bureaucracy under more immediate control, not

at all.

So when this takes sound, this can be in 30 days, 60 days.

There has to be some way of giving more direct, of avoiding.

I mean, we have done a lot of maneuvers, Mr. President, that have worked.

But we've done them by methods that are very complicated.

Yes, sir.

Now, if these methods come out, I think it may compound this general impression of

of odd procedures that the newspapers have so carefully cultivated.

And it's for this reason that I think, leaving aside Haig, it has nothing to do with Haig, that a more regular procedure has to be worked out in which one can use people like Sisko and Cecil directly.

And that can't work.

I mean, how can you use it?

You mean to work without being too safe?

But if there were a different personality there, it's just...

There will be a different personality, but you can't do it now.

You can't do it now.

I was... My bill was already talking to me about it.

And the time was actually July 1st.

And we've got to get the...

No, no, that is wrong.

You know I've always felt this way.

Well, that's the young thing.

The young thing is the minus.

The young thing is that he was not held as working under your direction at all.

No, he was.

He came here originally as a member of the staff, transferred to the, to John Irvin.

And Irvin had, in such and such a year, he had no period.

You know what I mean?

Without going on.

That's not, that's not true.

I don't think so.

I don't remember.

In 69, you remember that General Eisenhower blew his top.

At that time, it was at some

The National Security Company, I think it's, were printed, were paid them in the newspaper.

And we did some campaigning.

And you, or somebody, ordered the FBI to do it.

And then the reports came in, and I saw those reports, so I... Did you?

I saw... Oh, yes, we did Lake.

We did Lake, we did Halpern, and we did... We did Lake, and we went over to... We got them again, the muskets.

So that was these reports.

Those reports came in signed by James DeHoover, so it's... No, all I mean is these were not taxed by private operators.

I, frankly, I don't even know.

I don't think I kept the reports.

I think they went to Bob.

I didn't see them.

I heard that they were gone, but I remember you told me one of them never came.

Never got in.

The lady never did it, did she?

Not that I remember.

Paul never did it, did she?

Or did he?

No, not that I remember.

But... How do you get things stopped?

Uh-huh.

Except loyalty.

Loyalty.

Well, God, it'd be helpful to Hague.

As I said, I don't want the national security.

I don't expect Hague to work in that area.

I don't want to undercut Swilcroft.

But I'll work it out with them.

Because I know this.

I know they're all now feeling everyone is going to test every institution.

And that's unavoidable in this situation.

But I'll work it out with them.

If I had a better man, I'd be sure of it.

I just haven't got anybody I can kill right now who knows how to handle the heat and the rest of the people.

Hey, another very funny experiment.

He said, yeah, I'm going to see whether he has the time for it.

And he'll do what his president wants him to do, which is what he should do.

He's got a seat back at 9, 9, 10.

And if it works, I'll call you in so that we'll... Good.

So he'll know.

I want to talk to him alone.

No, I think that's right.

He'll feel that I should.

I think you should.

So he'll be available around 9, 45.

We could... Bruce is coming in, too.

Oh, are you going to give the 10-minute radio speech for 15 minutes?

We have the text if you want to, but... Let me see if I can get to it today.

I'm trying.

I can't.

I've got a pretty heavy load of groups.

Oh, yeah.

No, you can turn it.

It's available if you want to.

Well, the signal, I mean, the signal isn't that...

I've just read it out, and I'm going to brief on it at 10.30.

Great.

I briefed on it briefly yesterday, just explaining it.

No, I don't want to answer any questions.

On Watergate, I won't answer any questions.

They asked you about the tapping and so forth and so on.

No, tapping hasn't come up yet.

Yeah, but they asked you about young and so forth and so on.

No, no.

Well, I think what they did.

After that, he transferred to John Ehrigman's cell.

Yeah, that's right.

But since the domestic cell has no funds, we continue to pay.

That's very well.

The money you asked for is in the key, though.

All right.

Thank you, Harry.

I'll work with you.

I know it's hard, but I've got everything ready.

Thank you.

Nixon & Kissinger on Watergate and National Security Council

AI Summary

Audio

Transcript (AI-generated)

NARA Description

Nixon Library Finding Aid

Also recorded on May 3, 1973

Cite this conversation