Nixon phone call with Colson on Watergate scandal and Public relations

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Yes, sir.

I just wondered how you were doing on your Smith thing.

Well, I go over at 2 o'clock to tape it, and it'll be on this evening at 7.30 following the evening news.

Oh, good.

They're going to do a half-hour special.

Good.

I've gone over it with Howard, and he was Smith, and I think he's... What kind of point are you going to make?

Well...

principally that I think it's a great tragedy, a disgrace, really, that we're trying the President of the United States in the press based on third-hand hearsay.

The London Times had a very good editorial.

Excellent editorial.

You saw that yesterday?

I don't know, but the international reaction is pretty much that way, you know.

Well, I think it is.

I think also the point that, and even frankly, they say Friday began to turn around a little.

I don't know whether we're just reading tea leaves, but

I'll tell you what we're reading in terms of the mood of the people, Mr. President.

I was up in New York this weekend at a wedding of a partner's son and a cross-section of people, I guess, above average income.

The wife, the daughter was not.

And they want to get it over with.

Most of them are saying, my God, this is just shaking the concrete of the foundations, and it's wrong, and let's stop listening to secretaries.

Well, it's quite true, too.

Chuck, for God's sakes, I mean, you take the stock market's problems now.

We're meeting with the economic people today, and we're going to get a pretty good thing by Saturday.

But, damn it, it won't change this, because basically when you have...

major leaders of the Democratic Party, the majority party, and the others, and the media, leading the news night after night with this nonsense.

They begin to worry if they've lost their minds.

It's unsettling to the American people.

It really is.

And it isn't something they can cope with, Mr. President.

It's

They don't understand.

They wonder, well, my goodness, something's wrong here.

And, you know, at least they've gotten past the point where they think the president's going to resign, thank God.

Oh, good.

And despite McCloskey, they don't feel impeachment is a great possibility.

No, no.

Look at the interviews that are being conducted around the country.

What are they showing?

Oh, hell, very strong support.

The only weak problem we have right now is the economy.

Watergate is not giving you a problem.

The economy is, but that can only be cured, as we know.

Watergate may cause part of the problem with... Well, no question on the stock market that it is.

I mean, my God, I talked to a small broker dealer this weekend.

He said, two more months and I'm out of business.

He said, I just...

Nobody, no specialist on either of these.

Nobody's buying.

Well, no specialist can maintain a market, so what you're having is just a, you know, you follow those swings and the price is stuck.

And that's just, that's the most disruptive thing of all.

Oh, yeah, yeah.

In the market.

In any event, the...

So go ahead with Smith.

You'd say first.

Why don't you, why don't you, this thing Scott here hit today, which is pretty good, is that they're, they're, they're,

if you can use sort of a vernacular, you see, that they're trying to get the president.

I want to use that Fenster World quote.

They are out to get the president.

That's right.

This is what this is, and he's totally innocent, and they know it.

Right.

They all know it, and they're out to get him.

Well, I'm going to talk about... And also, you can point out what president in history would have...

Take two men that he knows are not guilty, like Alderman Ehrlichman, and let him resign.

In other words, if the president is doing everything that he can to cooperate with these people, if he asks you about presidential papers, fuzz that up.

We can't give up on that, as you know.

Oh, no.

God, I've got a hell of a good argument on that one.

No, I wouldn't.

The point I'm going to try to make is that it is high time that those who are concerned with getting at the truth get at the truth.

talk to the people who know.

I spent hours and hours talking with the president.

I know how concerned he was with getting at the truth, and he acted just as quickly as information came to him.

And nothing was brought to him until this year.

That's correct.

And not one word.

After all, Dean could have brought it to anybody else.

I would handle Dean rather carefully, not in terms of his

in terms of not link it up to all that.

It's been up quite a bit.

What did you have in mind on him?

What I had in mind was that when I left you in the middle of February, you had had no contact with Dean.

I knew that.

The first meeting was the 27th of February, incidentally.

And it was quite apparent to me that... None at all.

I hadn't seen Dean twice.

That I can state as a fact, and I know that.

Until when you left, when you saw me in the middle of February.

That's right.

And after that, obviously, here's the point.

We had the problem of executive privilege with the Urban Committee.

We had the problem with the gray hearings when she was involved.

All of these things required, and that's what all these meetings were about, Chuck.

That's right.

And the Urban Committee.

But I can also say, Mr. President, on the 21st of March when I talked to you, at that point you were concerned that you were not being given all of the information that you should have.

Did you talk to me on the 21st?

Yes, sir.

What time of day?

It was in the evening.

What did we talk about then?

Well, I suggested to you at that point that you— Oh, that's when you suggested a special counsel, right?

Oh, I know.

That's right.

But it was on that day that you told me that you had to get to the bottom of this yourself.

Did I tell you that?

Yes, sir.

And that you had to get into it yourself, and that's what your own statement says.

Your statement of the 22nd, or the statement of the 30th, rather, of April says... Yeah, yeah, but on the other hand, be sure it's your recollection, too, because I don't want to... You were called that way, too.

Oh, yes.

And that's why... And I did say, I've got to get to the bottom of...

It was an EOP, wasn't it?

No, we talked on the telephone that evening.

You called... Oh, yes.

And the reason... Why did I call you?

Probably because of what Dean had told me.

You were asking for my recommendations.

Then you called me in Boston after I spoke up at the Middlesex Club to ask for my recommendations, which I brought in to Ehrlichman, which actually caused Dean then to go down to the U.S. Attorney and See Community.

That's really when I broke it open.

And that was your persistence.

In other words, you were driving us to bring information to you.

And as a result of your doing that, and the information that we began then to accumulate,

That actually broke the case open.

I intend to go a little further with Smith and say that I think the president, because of his driving all of us.

Incidentally, if anybody ever asks any questions with regard to, well, now when Dean presented this, you know, what he did in the 21st, which he did, you know, he said Pittman's blackmailing me and all the rest and so on, or blackmailing the president and so forth, and so forth.

passed that on to the Attorney General.

What Dean was, he, God damn, was the counsel.

Oh, sure.

He was in constant touch with Peterson.

He saw and talked to Peterson and Klein each and every day.

He had total confidence in him.

You know, I didn't dream he would keep such stuff from them.

Is that my point?

Yes, sir.

No, I think that I do have to say that I think you were ill-served in many respects, and that people were...

keeping things from you.

But as information became available to you, as you became aware, as it became aware, I moved expeditiously.

Vigorously and hard.

And hard even though it was very difficult personally.

Yeah, and even though it involved people close to you.

And I can recount the conversation when you called me in Boston and you said, we have simply got to get this thing

to get to the bottom of this thing.

I want your recommendations.

Just lay it on the line to me.

And I brought him into Ehrlichman the next day.

What day was that, Chuck?

That was, you called me in Boston on the 12th, and on the 13th I came into Ehrlichman, and on the 14th of April, John Dean went down and sought immunity.

So that I could honestly say that it was your persistent probing for the facts, and your persistent probing for the truth.

But I called you at Middlesex and asked you for your recommendation as special counselor.

Yes.

No.

Let's see.

No.

On the 21st of March.

The 21st, you mentioned that.

But what did I call you at Middlesex?

You just called to see how Julie had done.

I called to see how Julie had done.

But you said to me during that conversation, you said, we've got to get to the bottom of this thing.

I want your recommendations.

Put them in writing and get them in here as soon as you can to me.

Mm-hmm.

Which, incidentally, is what I told Haldeman, what I told Ehrlichman, and what I told Dean.

That's right.

I was trying to get him to write a report.

But I think it is clear that it was that weekend that those who had been covering up began to come clean.

And I can honestly say that it was as a result of your probing and your pressing and your pushing that the truth did finally break and come out.

I've got to say that I think you were ill-served in many occasions.

Ill-served by whom?

I'll say that the record, I'm not going to try to prejudice the rights of people who have an opportunity to do it.

But I said it'll be quite obvious as all the facts come out.

I think as all the facts come out, it'll be obvious that the president was ill-served, but that at all times he was eagerly trying to get at the truth.

And that the president is totally blameless, totally without knowledge of this case.

Well, I've got a great way to handle it.

Which I didn't know one thing about.

No, that's right.

I first talked to you in late January, and you said if you get any evidence at all, you bring it in to me.

In February, for the day I was leaving for Europe, and you said to me, that's when I said to you, I think we have to have Mitchell come out, and you said, well, that's fine if he did it, but I'm not going to make an escape cut of it.

I think that's damned admirable.

I think that if

That's a man who is saying, let's be judicious, let's get at the truth, but not prejudice innocent people or prejudice the rights of people who may be innocent.

But that's a highly commendable posture to be in.

What would you say to ask you about Dean and so forth?

I think I'm going to try as best I can, Mr. President, to tell him that...

It really isn't fair of me to express my opinions.

Exactly.

I've given every bit of evidence to our grand jury, to the federal prosecutors.

I think for you or John or Bob to track a dean, and it's hard to restrain John on this, but it won't be with you or Bob.

It's very important not to do that for reasons that the time to hit him is as if and when he gets immunity.

Well, yes, except that I think this, Mr. President.

I think the fact that he is now trying to implicate you with this information that he is putting out, there ought to be some suspicion cast about that.

Yes, he's seeking to do that.

I would say that.

I think you can very well say that.

Well, obviously, he's discredited on two grounds.

He was the president's counsel and never told him anything until March.

Right.

And second, he's seeking immunity, and that's an incentive to lie.

That's right.

Same situation with McCord.

I think McCord did good.

And McCord's Warrior Festival.

I think you could take, I think on Dean you could say, well, he's totally discredited because he had all this information and so forth.

Why didn't he say that earlier?

And second, why does he see community?

One other thing, why did we, why did Colson, not Colson, but Erlichman, you know, resign voluntarily and Dean, we requested it.

The reason is he sought immunity.

Yeah, sure.

A person who seeks immunity is pleading guilty.

Oh, absolutely.

Your position, Mr. President.

I'm going to say that I was present, and I was, when you ordered everyone in the White House to cooperate fully to answer all questions of the FBI and the grand jury.

during the summer of 1972 and into the fall of 1972.

Now, that's not the course of conduct to a man who's trying to suppress information.

As a matter of fact, we were ordered... As a matter of fact, I told everybody.

Yeah, to, by God, tell everything you knew, and if you didn't cooperate, you'd be fired.

Now, that's not cover-up.

That's right.

Also, none of us had any indication that there might have been White House involvement.

Dean told us in March that there was no White House involvement.

until March 21st when he began to raise implications.

You know what I mean?

Well, he had been involved himself, which was one of the reasons I had to say that.

That's right.

You've got to get on.

It's 2 o'clock.

You're going to do it?

Well, I go over and tape it at 2.

It'll be shown this evening.

I wish you well.

Well, I just hope I can give him a little hell of a try.

It's a drama dam to stay.

I think with Smith, he's very sympathetic to the position we're in.

Yeah.

The point is, I'd hit hard.

They're trying to get the president.

Oh, yes.

Yeah.

And it's wrong, and it's untrue.

First, it's untrue.

Second, it's unfair.

And third, it's hurting the country.

That's right.

And we've just got to stop this business of trying to get the president.

You know, particularly that it's totally wrong.

The president is above suspicion on this thing.

Yeah.

Well, that's the way we've—he's already told me the first question.

That's the—that's my opening.

So he's got to give me that shot at it.

I'll just—I'll hit him hard.

I think you can say that it's really disgraceful.

And I suppose he asks about—

Cox versus the Urban Committee, say, well, that's their fight.

Oh, sure.

I'm going to say that Senator Urban can conduct that hearing any way he wants, and Mr. Cox can conduct his investigation.

But I think that what is imperative is that we stop this kind of character assassination of the President of the United States.

That's right.

It's because of these reasons.

Sure.

Good.

Well, good luck to you.

I'll give you my best.

You will, I know.

Thank you, Mr. President.

Nixon phone call with Colson on Watergate scandal and Public relations

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Nixon Library Finding Aid

Transcript (AI-generated)

Also recorded on June 5, 1973

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Nixon phone call with Colson on Watergate scandal and Public relations

AI Summary

Audio

NARA Description

Nixon Library Finding Aid

Transcript (AI-generated)

Also recorded on June 5, 1973

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Cite this conversation