Nixon White House Tapes › Tape 160
Nixon White House Tape 160 (January 6, 1973)
14 conversations · Camp David Study Table · about 47 min of released audio
Featuring Nixon, Kissinger, Colson, Rebozo, Haldeman
President Nixon and Charles Colson discussed the need to reinvigorate the White House's "attack apparatus" to counter partisan criticism from Congressional Democrats regarding Vietnam policy and press relations. Frustrated by the lack of aggressive public relations efforts following the 1972 campaign, Nixon instructed Colson to coordinate with H.R. Haldeman to reorganize staff duties and re-establish a team of "gut fighters" capable of managing the administration's messaging. Additionally, they reviewed intelligence on Henry Kissinger’s unauthorized contacts with journalists, with Nixon ordering continued monitoring of Kissinger’s telephone calls through the FBI.
President Nixon contacted the Camp David operator to facilitate an urgent telephone call to National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger. The brief interaction served as a logistical step to establish communication between the President and his top foreign policy aide. No further policy discussions were recorded during this brief administrative request.
President Nixon directs Henry Kissinger to adopt a cold, confrontational demeanor during an upcoming meeting with Senator Mike Mansfield to pressure him regarding Congressional opposition to the Vietnam War. Nixon insists that Kissinger blame Mansfield and other Democrats for jeopardizing peace negotiations by threatening to cut off war funding, warning that the President will publicly address the nation to assign blame if the Senate persists. The President emphasizes that Kissinger must abandon conciliatory tactics and clearly communicate that Senate actions have undermined the administration's leverage in ongoing talks.
President Nixon contacted the Camp David operator to facilitate a telephone connection with his close friend and confidant, Charles “Bebe” Rebozo. The President provided specific instructions to reach Rebozo, specifying his preference to speak only if a standard phone line was available rather than a radio-equipped location. This brief exchange served as an administrative request to coordinate personal communications during the President’s stay at Camp David.
President Nixon calls his close friend Bebe Rebozo, who is currently in Key Biscayne with John Mitchell, to personally invite him to Camp David for the upcoming weekend. The conversation confirms logistics for Rebozo's travel and addresses the President's commitment to eventually host an associate of Mitchell's at the White House. The two men discuss their personal schedules and express mutual support regarding their social and political circles.
President Nixon instructed the Camp David operator to facilitate a telephone call to his Chief of Staff, H.R. Haldeman. Nixon specified that the operator should reach out to Haldeman at home but avoid interrupting him if he were out to dinner. This brief exchange served as a logistical request to establish direct communication with a key advisor.
President Nixon and H. R. Haldeman discussed the necessity of strengthening the administration's public relations and political operations to counter anticipated Democratic opposition in Congress and potential interference with Vietnam peace negotiations. The President emphasized the need to coordinate key personnel—specifically Ronald Ziegler, William Timmons, and Clark MacGregor—to move from a defensive posture to a more proactive political strategy. Additionally, Nixon reviewed ongoing efforts to manage congressional leadership roles and party activities, including the recruitment of Clarence J. Brown Jr. for candidate development and the repositioning of Robert Dole and George H. W. Bush.
President Nixon contacted the Camp David operator to facilitate a telephone connection with his personal secretary, Rose Mary Woods. He specified that if Woods were unavailable at the office, he would alternatively accept a call with Marjorie P. Acker. The operator acknowledged the request and proceeded to place the call as instructed.
President Nixon consulted with the Camp David operator regarding the status of communication lines to the White House. The operator informed the President that there was no answer from Rose Mary Woods' office. Consequently, the discussion focused on the necessity and feasibility of attempting to reach Woods at her private residence.
President Nixon instructed his personal secretary, Rose Mary Woods, to arrange for a gift to be delivered to Madame Chiang Kai-shek at the Republic of China embassy in honor of the visiting Vice President of Taiwan. Nixon specified that the gift, which was intended to come from Mrs. Nixon, should be sent to the ambassador for delivery. The two also briefly confirmed the duration of the Vice President's visit and discussed local weather conditions.
President Nixon contacted the Camp David operator to facilitate an urgent telephone connection with National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger. This brief administrative exchange served as the precursor to a high-level policy consultation. No further discussion occurred during this recording as the operator proceeded to place the requested call.
President Nixon and Henry Kissinger discussed the status of Vietnam peace negotiations and the potential for Chinese and Soviet influence on Hanoi's leadership. They evaluated the persistent demands for changes in the agreement and the role of North Vietnamese negotiator Le Duc Tho. Nixon instructed Kissinger to utilize presidential messaging to strengthen his bargaining position during upcoming sessions.
President Nixon contacted the Camp David operator to facilitate an urgent connection with General Alexander M. Haig, Jr. This brief administrative interaction served as a logistical step to initiate a high-level consultation. No substantive policy discussions occurred during the exchange, as it was strictly limited to establishing contact with the General.
President Nixon and Alexander Haig discuss the status of ongoing Vietnam peace negotiations and the psychological state of Henry Kissinger amid intense congressional and media criticism. Nixon justifies the recent bombing campaign as a necessary strategic leverage, and both men express cautious optimism that North Vietnam will seek a settlement by the end of the month. The conversation concludes with a directive for Haig to prepare for a potential mission to South Vietnam to present an ultimatum to President Nguyen Van Thieu regarding the final settlement terms.