Nixon White House Tapes › Tape 241 › Conversation 241-001

Kissinger, Trend & Camp David Operator on Nuclear negotiations

Friday, February 2, 1973 · 3:43 PM–8:50 PM ET · Camp David Hard Wire · 10 min

ParticipantsKissinger, Henry A.; Trend, Burke (Sir); Camp David Operator; Kissinger, Louis; Kissinger, Paul ("Stern")Conversation241-001 on Tape 241StartFriday, February 2, 1973 at 3:43 PMEndFriday, February 2, 1973 at 8:50 PMRecording deviceCamp David Hard WireSourceNixon Library record for 241-001 ↗

AI Summary

Henry Kissinger met with Sir Burke Trend at Camp David to coordinate U.S. and British policy regarding nuclear negotiations with the Soviet Union, including potential strategies for the upcoming summit. The participants discussed managing scientific input from outside experts and streamlining policy planning to avoid bureaucratic friction among Cabinet departments. Kissinger also briefly interrupted the professional deliberations to place a personal call to his father, Louis Kissinger, for his 86th birthday. Ultimately, Kissinger committed to taking direct control of the nuclear policy working group to ensure a unified position for forthcoming communications with the Soviets.

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Transcript (AI-generated)

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on the notion that I cannot have the six months of deliberation say we've considered it carefully and here is exactly what they want.
But I think you have an idea that we could, for example, put a clause in there that for this end the U.S. and the Soviet Union could be agreed to commission or start studying how to break this about.
So long as your creation is clear.
I understand.
I understand.
But if we could now think of how we could do some surface modification together with a clause along the lines of what I think is a rather good idea that holds out a prospect to them that may be good enough.
We might.
But I can't.
They obviously have a strategy, but they also have
of having to prove at least that he's legitimate?
Yes, he is.
And, uh... Explication, sir, could you get me New York WAA 0730?
My father's 86th birthday.
Today?
Yes.
My mother and I last year talked about it.
Yeah, why?
Because they have really made an extraordinary effort.
Yeah, yeah.
And none of this can say anything.
But I thought that all of this thing was really a natural thing.
That was my true understanding of it.
How are you?
Okay.
How did you...
I don't think you're the most un-prejudiced viewer.
Yes, I'm going to Hanoi, beginning of Wednesday.
If they want to do something to me, Secret Service is not going to protect me.
I have every confidence, however, that they don't have any intention to do anything to me.
Hey, this is absolutely fair.
Hello, Father.
Happy birthday.
I hope you had a good birthday.
But I can tell you've been getting younger since you were 16 years.
At some point it had to stop.
That's right.
John, you kept going 18 hours a day.
I... That was a very good dream.
It was a very pleasant weekend.
I have some cufflinks and some books in Washington from the inauguration.
Do you want me to send them to you?
Well, I'll... No, I'll send you some official ones.
Okay.
I'm at Camp David, and I have to go to dinner in a minute.
I just wanted to call.
Yes, and there's a dinner for the British Prime Minister, so I have to go to that.
Good morning.
Good morning.
You can call before I go.
Good morning.
Good morning.
Well, if you said the opposite, I would be really astounded.
Fine.
I think that the strategy that we ought to pursue is to change the proposals which
If we can't put in a commission or something, which appears to carry forward, which appears that they were listening to.
But you want to do this in particular CSE?
Oh, yes.
Yes.
I want to do this in particular CSE.
Well, I am now coming more and more to the view that we should move the summit to October rather than after June.
It enforces a longer period for Tokyo today.
And can it still be a policy order or not?
That's right.
I'm sure this technique is right.
And if we could be really near here, it would be quiet in this country before we can start to have a showdown.
Now, also, would you caution your scientific experts against speaking too frankly to our scientists?
Bondi spoke to Albert's scientist friend, who was actually very close to the peace community.
Now, as it turned out, my advice to this Albert professor called me to support your position.
So it turned out to be very good.
I said, do you have a raise?
Yes, I'm sorry.
As it turned out, it was for the best, because when he called, I was certain he would tell me to impose it at all costs.
But he had been told.
Well, he wasn't told.
He was only told that there was a problem with the nuclear deterrent.
And he had been told rather cleverly that it was important for you to stay in, in order to keep some edge over the treatment, and since he's wearing a deterrent, that made very good sense to him.
But what did he say?
He didn't say what it was that you were considering.
I don't know the word at all.
I don't know what that means.
It's the radical communication.
I don't think it anyway.
We got caught in an internal.
I can't tolerate that.
I can't accept that.
But I've settled that.
But I think the President is right to call to bring in some of the outside agents.
And we have to go on.
What we will do, and we'll get this done in a day or two, is that I will have to put this under control by Monday.
Every new cabinet member gets assistance.
It's idiotic because the President is going to pass on to
But if you could get some systematic thinking done.
We have got too many private groups that are really very thoughtful.
Why don't you come?
Can you come for this?
You can bring him along.
I think we should have whoever you want, but no more than one other person on this, on this nuclear business.
I must give a reply to the Soviets.
I intend to bring whoever you want on the NATO and by doing so, I am fine.
I will have one or two people working on it at the same time.
But I'm coming to this hotel.
I will take, I cannot do it myself, but I will take a person and I will reveal it myself.
That's what I mean.
You will take charge.
I will take charge.
But if I hear that, then if I say, if I can say that to them, then it is much easier for me to say that I'm still in danger.
Oh, no, no.
I will take charge of it.
And we can hide this and be all sick and all that.
Oh, yes.
And I will have to do it, but I cannot.
I'll be back.

NARA Description

On February 2, 1973, Henry A. Kissinger, Sir Burke Trend, Camp David operator, Louis Kissinger, and Paul ("Stern") Kissinger met in the Aspen Lodge study at Camp David at an unknown time between 3:43 pm and 8:50 pm. The Camp David Hard Wire taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 241-001 of the White House Tapes.

Nixon Library Finding Aid

Conversation No. 241-001

Date: February 2, 1973
Time: Unknown between 3:43 pm and 8:50 pm
Location: Camp David Hard Wire

Henry A. Kissinger met with Sir Burke Trend.

       Nuclear negotiations
              -United States [US]-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR] relations
                     -Commission
                     -Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR] strategy
                             -Internal conflict
                             -Leonid I. Brezhnev

Kissinger talked with the Camp David Operator.

[Conversation No. 241-001A]

[End of telephone conversation]

       Birthday
              -Louis Kissinger

       Nuclear negotiations
              -Efforts

Kissinger talked with Louis Kissinger and Paula Kissinger.

[Conversation No. 241-001B]

       Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, NARA Online Public Access Catalog Identifier: 597542

[See Conversation No. 186-003]

[End of telephone conversation]

       Nuclear negotiations
              -Strategy
                      -Avoidance of, obligation
                      -Commission
              -United States [US]-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR] summit
                      -Delay

**********************************************************************

[Previous National Security (B) withdrawal reviewed under MDR guidelines case number
LPRN-T-MDR-2014-008. Segment declassified on 09/15/2017. Archivist: DR]
[National Security]
[241-001-w003]
[Duration: 1m 6s]

       Union of Soviet Socialists Republics [USSR]
              -Negotiations
              -Leonid I. Brezhnev

**********************************************************************

       Nuclear negotiations
              -Scientific changes
                      -Harvard scientist
                             -Peace community
                             -Support for Great Britain
                             -Nuclear deterrence
                             -Germany

       Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, NARA Online Public Access Catalog Identifier: 597542

               -US-Great Britain policy planning
                      -Cabinet disputes
                              -Elliot L. Richardson
                              -Defense Department
                              -War office
                              -State Department
                              -Press relations
                      -President’s view
                              -Agency support
                      -Richardson
                      -Kissinger’s relations with Cabinet secretaries
                      -Private groups’ role
                      -Whitehall
                      -British representatives
               -Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR]
                      -Treaty
                              -United States [US] reply
                              -Timing
               -United States [US]- Great Britain policy planning
                      -North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] summit
                      -Working group
                              -Kissinger’s role
                              -Defense Department

       Kissinger’s schedule

Also recorded on February 2, 1973

  • 186-001 3:43 PM · 42 sec — Camp David operator, William Hirsch, and unknown person(s) talked on the telephone at Camp David at an unknown time between 3:43 pm and 8:50 pm.
  • 186-002 3:43 PM · 32 sec — William Hirsch and Charles C. ("Charlie") Sumrell talked on the telephone at Camp David at an unknown time between 3:43 pm and 8:50 pm.
  • 186-003 3:43 PM · 4 min — Henry A. Kissinger, Camp David operator, Paul ("Stern") Kissinger, and Louis Kissinger talked on the telephone at Camp David at an unknown time between 3:43 pm and 8:50 pm.
  • 186-004 3:43 PM · 3 min — Henry A. Kissinger, Camp David operator, unknown person(s), and Gen. Brent G. Scowcroft talked on the telephone at Camp David at an unknown time between 3:43 pm and 8:50 pm.
  • 186-005 3:43 PM · 3 min — Henry A. Kissinger, Camp David operator, and Cmdr. Jonathan T. Howe talked on the telephone at Camp David at an unknown time between 3:43 pm and 8:50 pm.
  • 186-006 3:43 PM · 20 sec — Charles C. ("Charlie") Sumrell and unknown person(s) talked on the telephone at Camp David at an unknown time between 3:43 pm and 8:50 pm.
  • 186-007 3:43 PM · 33 sec — Frank A. Sisco, Camp David operator, and Charles A. Grunden talked on the telephone at Camp David at an unknown time between 3:43 pm and 8:50 pm.
  • 186-008 3:43 PM · 6 min — Frank A. Sisco, Camp David operator, unknown person(s), and Farrell D. Morlan talked on the telephone at Camp David at an unknown time between 3:43 pm and 8:50 pm.

All 33 conversations from February 2, 1973 →

Cite this conversation

Conversation 241-001, February 2, 1973. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives. Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/241-001 (accessed October 15, 2026).