Nixon White House Tapes › Topic
Nixon Tapes on Senate relations
22 conversations · frequently with Nixon, Kissinger, Haldeman, Ziegler
Henry Kissinger requested that the White House operator place a telephone call to Senator John Sherman Cooper at his residence. The brief exchange served as a logistical request to initiate direct communication with the Senator. No further substantive policy matters were discussed during this brief administrative interaction.
President Nixon, H.R. Haldeman, and Ronald Ziegler met to discuss the public and political fallout following the President's April 7, 1971, speech on Southeast Asia. A primary concern was the misleading interpretation by Senator Hugh Scott and others regarding the President's position on a fixed date for troop withdrawal, which Nixon insisted must remain flexible to avoid jeopardizing negotiations and the return of POWs. Additionally, the participants reviewed the administration's economic message, criticized the current "packaging" of their legislative programs, and discussed strategies for future media appearances and press briefings to ensure staff discipline and message consistency.
President Nixon and H. R. Haldeman discussed economic recovery, specifically citing the performance of the stock market as a signal of public confidence that could bolster the administration's image. They focused on political strategy, emphasizing the need for Senator Robert Dole to champion the President's policies and effectively manage Republican criticism in the Senate regarding the China initiative. Finally, the President urged Haldeman to ensure active administration intervention in the Texas drought and grain shipment crisis to maintain a public perception of decisive, activist leadership.
President Nixon and Henry Kissinger discuss strategies to contain political fallout following a controversial, off-the-cuff remark made by General Creighton Abrams regarding military operations in Laos. To avoid granting the issue undue prominence or prompting a restrictive Senate resolution, they agree to distance the White House from the incident by referring all press inquiries to the Department of Defense. The conversation also touches upon shifting Soviet military dispositions in Eastern Europe and the broader geopolitical implications of U.S.-Soviet relations on the People's Republic of China.
President Nixon met with Senator John L. McClellan, Clark MacGregor, and Kenneth E. BeLieu to discuss legislative priorities, national defense, and the President's political standing. The participants addressed concerns regarding U.S. military strength relative to the Soviet Union, the importance of maintaining nuclear deterrent credibility, and the economic necessity of supporting American industries like steel and aviation. Additionally, the President and Senator McClellan reviewed the progress of the Arkansas River navigation project and discussed pending appointments and committee activities within Congress.
President Nixon met with his aide Stephen B. Bull to review logistical details regarding the President's daily schedule. The discussion centered on the timing of meetings with Henry Kissinger and a recent delegation of Senators. Nixon acknowledged that the length of the Senate session had exceeded his initial expectations, requiring adjustments to his departure plans.
President Nixon met with George W. Ball to express personal gratitude for Ball's bipartisan assistance on legislative efforts, specifically regarding the Senate. The discussion touched upon the strategic importance of bipartisan cooperation and the tactical necessity of keeping key senators involved to ensure legislative success. Nixon also signaled that an upcoming announcement would reflect the administration's ongoing progress on these policy objectives.
President Nixon met with H. R. Haldeman, John Ehrlichman, and Henry Kissinger to strategize their public and political response to the leak of the Pentagon Papers and the ongoing Vietnam peace negotiations. Nixon emphasized a desire to appear dignified while shifting the burden of declassification to Congress, simultaneously plotting to expose the perceived duplicity of previous Democratic administrations. The President signaled a tough stance against Senate interference, warning that if negotiations with North Vietnam were derailed, he would prioritize a military escalation over a fixed withdrawal date.
H. R. Haldeman and Treasury Secretary John Connally coordinated lobbying efforts to secure support for the Lockheed loan guarantee legislation. They reviewed the status of various senators, noting disappointing results from President Nixon's outreach to Barry Goldwater and George Aiken. The pair strategized on further persuasion tactics, specifically requesting presidential contact with J. Caleb Boggs while agreeing to abandon efforts to influence William V. Roth, Jr. due to perceived conflicts of interest.
President Nixon and Press Secretary Ronald Ziegler held a brief meeting to coordinate administrative scheduling and communications strategy. The discussion centered on aligning the President's upcoming availability with National Security Council meetings and legislative matters in the Senate. The participants concluded with an intent to finalize these logistical arrangements in the following week.
President Nixon and Press Secretary Ronald Ziegler coordinate media strategy regarding the administration's foreign aid program, specifically emphasizing its role as a pillar of the Nixon Doctrine. They plan to have Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird and Secretary of State William Rogers present the defense and policy justifications for foreign assistance to counter recent Senate opposition. Additionally, the President arranges a photo opportunity with Laird and Henry Kissinger to signal a unified executive front and confirms the timing for an upcoming announcement regarding the First Lady’s schedule.
President Nixon telephoned Senator John C. Stennis to express his gratitude for the successful passage of the Stennis amendment regarding the foreign aid program. The two discussed the strategic necessity of the legislation, with the President emphasizing that the aid is essential for maintaining U.S. foreign policy and facilitating the withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam, Korea, and Cambodia. Nixon credited Stennis's hard work in the Senate for securing this legislative victory despite a difficult political environment.
President Nixon and Senator Hugh Scott discussed a strategy to resolve a legislative impasse regarding a continuing resolution for foreign aid. Scott reported that he secured an agreement among key senators, including J. William Fulbright, to extend the funding through December 1st while allowing Chairman Allen J. Ellender to move the resolution through committee. The participants noted that while Fulbright remained focused on including restrictive language like the Mansfield Amendment, he was willing to compromise on funding levels and drop demands regarding the Cooper-Church Amendment.
President Nixon and Secretary of State William P. Rogers coordinate their upcoming schedules and discuss the positive reception Rogers received from Senate leadership regarding U.S. policy in East Pakistan. Rogers reports that lawmakers, including Mike Mansfield and J. William Fulbright, supported the administration's firm stance toward India. The two also touch upon diplomatic relations in South America, strategies for NATO burden sharing, and preparations for an upcoming meeting with foreign ministers.
President Nixon instructed the White House operator to place a telephone call to Senator Robert P. Griffin. This brief administrative exchange served as the precursor to a direct consultation between the President and the Senator. No further substantive policy discussions were recorded during this connection.
President Nixon and Senator John C. Stennis discuss the need for a confidential briefing regarding the upcoming U.S.-Soviet summit. Nixon directs Henry Kissinger to contact Stennis to explain sensitive strategic information necessary for managing Senate reactions before the summit. Additionally, the two men agree to arrange a future private, off-the-record meeting to discuss broader, undisclosed policy concerns away from the cabinet and aides.
President Nixon and former President Lyndon B. Johnson engaged in a brief discussion regarding the political risks of replacing leadership within a specific government agency during a contentious legislative period. Nixon expressed his reluctance to remove the current director, citing the need for institutional stability while facing a significant political struggle in the Senate. The conversation served as a moment of informal political alignment between the two presidents regarding the management of federal appointments.
President Nixon and Henry Kissinger discussed the positive results of the recent Moscow Summit, noting Soviet leaders' desire to strengthen personal ties with the President. They also assessed the deteriorating situation for North Vietnam, with Nixon reiterating the administration’s strategy to attack presidential candidate George McGovern's proposal to visit Hanoi as a form of surrender. Finally, they coordinated the logistics for announcing Kissinger's upcoming trip to China and his subsequent testimony before the Senate, aiming to minimize political backlash by controlling the timing and narrative.
President Nixon met with his aide Stephen B. Bull to review and finalize the details of his upcoming schedule. The primary focus of the discussion was the coordination of a forthcoming meeting with a group of Senators. Bull received instructions regarding the logistical arrangements for this session, which was slated to occur in the Cabinet Room.
President Nixon consulted Secretary of State William P. Rogers regarding the political pressure to appoint a special prosecutor for the Watergate investigation. Nixon expressed concern over how to advise incoming Attorney General Elliot Richardson on handling the potential Senate resolution. The two agreed to approach the issue cautiously, viewing the push for a special prosecutor as a tactical challenge to the administration’s authority.
President Nixon met with Secretary of State William P. Rogers to discuss the need for a new legal counsel to handle mounting administrative and legal pressures. The conversation centered on the importance of expressing confidence in Attorney General Elliot Richardson regarding his dealings with the Senate, as well as the search for a seasoned, trusted individual to serve as a personal legal advisor. Nixon expressed urgency in finding a candidate who could operate independently of White House staff to navigate these sensitive government matters.
President Nixon initiates a request to speak with Senator Edward J. Gurney via the White House operator. The primary purpose of the brief communication is to facilitate a direct telephone connection between the President and the Senator. No further substantive discussion is captured on the recording beyond this administrative request.