Nixon phone call with Trudeau on Vietnam War and Canada-U.S. Relations

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Hello.

Mr. President?

Yes.

Thank you.

I have the Prime Minister.

There you are.

Hello.

One moment.

I'll ring the Prime Minister.

Mr. President.

Hello, Mr. Prime Minister.

How are you, sir?

I understand you're busy on the floor today.

We had a rather rough time in the House, but it's part of the usual practice, and I'm sure you're very busy too.

You don't mind it, huh?

Oh, no.

It's a different pace.

We used to have more long-term planning.

Now we're pretty well living on a day-to-day basis, and that's rather exciting.

Sure, sure.

Well, I always say that's why they pay you the big salary, you know.

Let me tell you...

I do it for less.

I know, I know.

I called you.

I wanted you to know that I have sent you a note by courier.

I deliberately have sent it just on a personal basis because I don't want to...

be in any position where it's public in the sense of putting pressure and so forth and so on.

And I wanted to just chat with you about it briefly on the phone.

It's with regard to this very, very difficult problem for us and of course I know for you too of the ICCS.

I know that as far as your decision is concerned, it's one of those things where there will be very strong pressures for you to move in a direction to leave it.

Let me say that on our part, just so that you will know, as I'm sure you know, that

all countries, not just ours, are convinced that Canada's continued participation is essential.

We've checked whether that's certainly, in fact, that's the reason that we wanted Canada on the first place, because that was universally agreed.

The second point is that on our part, we

with the GDN, where we will have some success, and even later with the North Vietnamese, where we may have some success as we look down the road toward aid and the rest, that we believe we can have considerable influence in getting cooperation with the ICCS to comply with the agreements provisions.

Also on our part, that we are working at the highest levels through our friends at the

at the super government level in Peking and Moscow, but also with the Hungarians and the Poles, because they've been, as you know, as usual in these arrangements, they've been less than objective, and we're trying to use our influence.

And we have some particularly with the Poles because of some things they want from us and perhaps

some of the Hungarians.

The way I look at it at this point is that this is a difficult time right now.

It's difficult because as the final American troops leave, as all the POWs return, as the ceasefire still has its violations on both sides, it would appear to be a very discouraging time.

On the other hand,

It's a time that is critically important in terms of really making it come together and we think that your decision at this time could be and very likely would be crucial in that respect.

In other words, I just don't see it working, the ICCS, without Canada's continuing participation at this time.

I wanted to tell you, too, that I put this in the note that I sent to you, which, as I said, it's just for between you and me and not anything that you have to be concerned about in a public sense because we don't want any idea that any impression that

the U.S. is trying to exert pressure on Canada.

But I wanted to present it to you in terms of the interest which I know you have, as we do, toward trying to develop a mechanism which can have at least an uneasy peace in that part of the world.

Well, Mr. President, your phone call is certainly very timely because we've got a special meeting of Cabinet tomorrow to discuss the report of the Secretary of State, Mr. Sharp, who's just back from Vietnam.

And I hope that the note by Koryo could come to me before too late tonight.

Do you think that's a possibility?

As a matter of fact, I think we sent it up a plane.

Just, I...

Let me see if we're on its way.

It's on its way already and it's only an hour.

I would think you'd get it perhaps within by, well, when I say close of business, you should have it by 5 or 6 o'clock maybe.

That's very helpful.

Certainly the phone.

And also, of course, in your conversation in the cabinet, you are welcome to.

And I would appreciate your conveying to them the impressions I've given you in this call, which go a bit beyond the note, as a matter of fact.

Because let me say, I would not call you in this way if I did not feel that you're

that Canada's participation was enormously important.

And also I would not call if I thought that the whole thing was worthless.

In other words, I'm not trying to get you to continue to be involved in basically a sinking enterprise.

But it's one of those things where I know the foreign minister who's been very good, and we greatly appreciate it.

He's been concerned by what he saw.

But we think there are some factors that now will begin to work that can be helpful.

And if you could...

You could delay your... Let me say, if you're going to move negatively, I would think it's very helpful to consider what we have to say here.

Well, let me say that we found your support at Paris and Mr. Rogers' support for our points of view very helpful.

We didn't convince the other people, but we were certainly grateful for indications by Mr. Rogers that

that he thought we were being reasonable and realistic about this.

Oh, yes, that's a report he gave to me.

When you say that you don't think it would work without our participation, really the question we're asking ourselves is would it work even with participation?

Well, at the present time, Mr. Prime Minister, it is my judgment

that it can.

It's like everything else.

I can't guarantee it because our experience, as you know, the world's experience with these joint commissions has not been a very happy one.

But at the present time, I think it can.

And the point that, and it's really, I do not, my note is rather brief, but I

The reason I spelled out, I haven't mentioned the Hungarians and the Poles and with the GVN and the DRV and also I may say the other powers, because that shouldn't be in a note, but I can assure you that our influence will be used with all parties concerned.

We know that our influence can be very, very important in this whole thing, too.

Well, undoubtedly it can.

Could I...

Could I perhaps put this question to you?

Our position in Parliament, as you recognize, may be a bit difficult if we decide to stay on.

Is there any merit in us looking at a situation where we'd stay on for a reasonably short and limited period?

I mean, one alternative is to pull out

at the end of the month or at the end of one more month, or the other would be to try and stay several more months, but not an indefinite period.

If we have to have a debate in Parliament, it may be that that is the only kind of compromise we can make.

In other words, rather than just saying we're staying on, which I don't think would carry the day in Parliament,

Would it be of any use to sort of stay on for a few more months, but not an indefinite period?

Yes, I think that actually I haven't discussed that with any of Roger Hale's people, but I would say that would be very helpful.

Oh, it would be very helpful, because you see, if you were to move off now or within a month,

It would just depress everybody.

They'd say, oh, well, it's all up.

But within a few months, that would give us an opportunity to work toward other solutions.

But I think this is the critical time, this period right after everybody's out on the 28th of March.

So that could be extremely helpful to us.

Well, I'm very obliged for the phone call, and I'll certainly keep that in mind in discussing with the Cabinet.

But I don't have to tell you that it's not only a matter of deciding ourselves.

It's a matter of making sure that what we decide can command the majority.

In other words, the support of one or the other of the opposition parties.

Yeah, because they might.

I understand that.

I understand the problem there.

Maybe it's good that we think of a fallback position and gain some time.

I would say a fallback position would be extremely helpful.

Of course, we would prefer the other, but I know the situation that you may be confronted with.

But you see, if you could do that, it would be, it seems to me, highly responsible, too, that it...

that if, for example, you just throw up your hands and say, well, it won't work, you can see the psychological effect would be pretty devastating.

Well, I must confess that this is the main thing that Mr. Sharp has reported to me as being the argument against immediate withdrawal.

He knows it will sink it.

And we're not very hopeful of lasting peace, but he's afraid that it might look as though...

All this was for nothing if we get out at this critical time.

So I certainly will consider your notice.

If it's not in the afternoon, just so long as I have it relatively early in the morning so I can study it before capital.

It'll be up.

As I say, it does not go into the length of this, does it?

It simply states the position that I...

that are asking you to stay on.

I wanted you to have something in writing.

But I'm also, the call, my call is trying to spell out my general feelings in more detail.

And I think if you could reflect that to your cabinet, I would appreciate it.

Well, it's very helpful.

I will use your authority to talk about this phone call and the note.

Absolutely.

It would, if you allow me, it would make it easier, if it's known that I'm speaking to you, that you allow me to talk about one other subject very briefly.

Sure, sure, of course.

I have a question in the house today about the speech which you have just delivered apparently at noon.

I haven't seen a copy of it yet, but you do mention Canada and trade relations and so on.

And I was asked if I had spoken to you to express the Canadian point of view, and I haven't even seen the speech.

As a matter of fact, I think it just must have been a message that went to the Congress.

I see.

I didn't deliver it orally, so I'm afraid not.

But suppose, let us say that you and I talked about it in any event, and that we will...

All I would want to say is that I talked to you about it after it was delivered, and I expressed to you the hope that our ministers and officials would be able to find a useful and constructive solution.

Absolutely.

I think that you could say that you and I talked, and that because of the fact that we have this long-time relationship, the cabinet relationship and so forth, that...

that I will assume responsibility on my part and yours to see that our various officials who have to do with this can talk about it because we're not looking for any confrontation.

We're looking for cooperation.

You're welcome to say that.

That's a very...

Well, because if it's known that we've spoken only on Vietnam, you might sort of say it's the pressure being put on you.

That's right.

If I can say, look, we talked about Vietnam, but we also talked about trade matters.

Well, Schultz is just getting back.

In fact, he's coming in in five minutes from Europe.

I will mention it to him, and I'll have him call your opposite number if you like.

No, but let me just say that you can tell your people, when you go out and talk to your professor, you can say that I also told you that I was going to discuss the matter with Mr. Schultz when he was here.

Since he's already been to Europe, I could tell him about my talk with you.

At first rate, then I would say that there would be contact between Mr. Schultz

Right.

Because you see, he is, Schultz is our top economic man as well as Secretary of Treasury.

So we'll, but you could say that, yes, we do want to talk and be as cooperative as we can in working some of these problems out.

Well, that's very helpful, and the phone call will certainly have served two purposes.

I certainly will want to bring your arguments before my colleagues with as much strength as I can muster.

Well, I appreciate it.

I know it's tough, but it will be very helpful to the cause that we're both interested in.

It's tough, but hopefully it'll be the last chapter of it.

We hope so.

We wouldn't want it to go into another edition just through our fault.

No.

Well, that's the point that I would think, too, that I wouldn't think that Canada, I know your role has been so constructive that you wouldn't want to be in a position that even though it might not be the case where your withdrawal, I'd say, oh, my God, if the Canadians had stayed on, it might have worked.

That's really the point.

Right.

Well, I'll certainly make that argument, but I'm warning you now that we may only be able to have a kind of a second best, which we will certainly have Mr. Sharp explain to Mr. Rogers if we can't go the whole way.

Well, I'll appreciate it very much.

Okay, well, thanks very much for calling, Mr. Clark.

Nixon phone call with Trudeau on Vietnam War and Canada-U.S. Relations

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Also recorded on March 22, 1973

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