Nixon White House Tapes › Topic
Nixon Tapes on Trade policy
49 conversations · frequently with Nixon, Bull, Shultz, Kissinger
President Nixon met with his key advisors to strategize on complex textile trade negotiations with Japan, focusing heavily on the complicating influence of Representative Wilbur Mills. The participants evaluated the viability of voluntary Japanese import controls versus potential restrictive domestic legislation. Nixon and his team sought to coordinate their administrative position to balance industry pressure, congressional involvement, and diplomatic relations with the Japanese government.
President Nixon and Henry Kissinger met to discuss persistent tensions between the White House and the State Department, specifically addressing Kissinger’s frustrations with Secretary of State William Rogers and his own potential resignation. The conversation encompassed broader foreign policy concerns, including the military situation in Laos, trade negotiations, and strategic arms limitations. Nixon reaffirmed his support for Kissinger’s role, prioritizing the need to manage bureaucratic leaks and unfavorable media coverage while coordinating future diplomatic strategies for Vietnam and the Middle East.
President Nixon met with his economic and agricultural advisors to discuss political strategies regarding the dairy industry and legislative support. The group, including George Shultz, John Connally, and Clifford Hardin, addressed the necessity of securing political backing from powerful dairy organizations while balancing the economic implications of milk price supports. Nixon emphasized the importance of securing credit for any concessions made to these groups and coordinating closely with Congressional leaders, such as Speaker Carl Albert and Wilbur Mills, to manage these interests effectively.
President Nixon met with Peter G. Peterson to finalize the procedural strategy and organizational focus for an upcoming Council on International Economic Policy (CIEP) meeting. They discussed the President’s intent to position Peterson as his primary representative to streamline decision-making on sensitive trade issues, including textiles, agriculture, and footwear quotas. The discussion also addressed potential coordination efforts involving David M. Kennedy, Henry Kissinger, and other cabinet members to handle complex economic negotiations with foreign officials.
President Nixon met with leaders of the American Farm Bureau Federation, including William J. Kuhfuss and Roger Fleming, along with White House staff, to address tensions between the administration and the farm community. The discussion focused on agricultural trade policy, legislative challenges in a Democrat-controlled Congress, and the perceived failure of the administration to reduce farmer dependency on government programs. Nixon pledged closer communication through his staff and identified several legislative priorities, including farm labor relations and strengthening farmers' negotiating power, to foster a more cooperative political alliance.
President Nixon met with Australian Prime Minister John G. Gorton and General Alexander M. Haig, Jr. to discuss geopolitical relations, the Vietnam War, and the management of international racial and religious conflicts. The conversation covered Australia's role in Southeast Asia, the treatment of POWs, and the broader historical responsibilities of Western powers in maintaining global stability. Nixon also reaffirmed his support for trade, specifically regarding Australian beef imports, and presented Gorton with a commemorative gift before the meeting's conclusion.
President Nixon and H. R. Haldeman discussed adjusting the President's public appearance schedule, specifically weighing potential engagements with the American Legion and the Veterans of Foreign Wars for the 1971 and 1972 calendar years. The President also outlined a strategic objective regarding international trade policy, directing that trade relations with the People's Republic of China be normalized to the same status as those held with the Soviet Union and other communist nations. These directives served as key instructions for the administration's upcoming domestic and foreign policy communications.
President Nixon and H.R. Haldeman reviewed the President's upcoming schedule, prioritizing discussions on trade strategy with Peter Peterson and managing the political fallout from ongoing anti-war demonstrations. Nixon expressed frustration with the bureaucratic process regarding sugar quotas and requested tighter control over the administration's interactions with the Business Council. Furthermore, they discussed the government's firm response to recent mass arrests of protesters and the potential to leverage public support for the police and administration.
President Nixon and Secretary of State William P. Rogers coordinated their public messaging in preparation for an upcoming presidential press conference. They discussed maintaining a noncommittal stance on Middle East arms sales to Israel and ongoing Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks, while expressing sympathy for the domestic political pressures faced by Egyptian leader Anwar el-Sadat. Furthermore, the two men agreed on the necessity of bolstering American morale through more patriotic, upbeat public events and symbolic displays, such as those involving martial music.
President Nixon, Henry Kissinger, and Alexander Butterfield met to coordinate strategy regarding ongoing Vietnam peace negotiations and broader geopolitical concerns, including trade and upcoming summits. The discussion focused on the administration's frustration with the lack of progress in Vietnam negotiations, the political challenges posed by domestic anti-war sentiment, and the necessity of maintaining a firm stance to ensure the survival of South Vietnam. Nixon directed his staff to expedite decision-making and secure a more assertive military and diplomatic posture to avoid being perceived as weak during the troop withdrawal process.
President Nixon met with staff and diplomats in two distinct sessions to coordinate logistics for Tricia Nixon’s upcoming wedding and to discuss foreign policy strategy regarding the Soviet Union and China. During the first segment, Nixon and his aides finalized guest lists, entertainment plans, and security arrangements for wedding-related social events, specifically managing the inclusion of personal friends and family members. In the second portion, the President pivoted to a strategic review of trade and foreign policy with Jacob Beam and Helmut Sonnenfeldt, focusing on the potential for utilizing trade incentives, such as grain deals and commercial credits, to improve U.S. relations with Communist powers and expand American diplomatic leverage. Nixon emphasized a desire for a more assertive, hard-line administrative image while exploring the practical utility of trade restrictions as a tool for Cold War maneuvering.
President Nixon and H. R. Haldeman coordinated the arrangements and personnel for upcoming meetings, specifically focusing on the participation of Peter G. Peterson, John B. Connally, and Henry A. Kissinger. The President instructed Haldeman to ensure that key stakeholders were properly briefed, emphasizing the importance of candid discourse regarding trade policy. This discussion solidified the agenda and attendee list intended to address significant economic and trade-related priorities.
President Nixon met with his staff and businessman Donald McI. Kendall to coordinate administration messaging, discuss drug policy, and review foreign relations. The group focused on refining the President's public rhetoric regarding federal drug enforcement efforts, with Nixon expressing frustration with current speechwriting and emphasizing the need for a more decisive, impactful message. Kendall provided an extensive briefing on international affairs, specifically regarding Greece, Iran, Egypt, and Japan, advocating for a pragmatic trade policy that prioritizes American economic interests over traditional foreign aid paradigms.
President Nixon and Peter G. Peterson met to discuss the deteriorating U.S. balance of payments and the potential for a bold, secret economic initiative to address rising unemployment and trade deficits. Peterson argued that traditional economic measures were insufficient and politically risky, instead proposing a temporary import surcharge and export rebate system to stimulate the economy. The President authorized Peterson to coordinate with John Connally, George Shultz, and Paul McCracken to develop a confidential plan, while emphasizing the need for absolute secrecy to prevent market instability.
President Nixon met with John B. Connally, George P. Shultz, and other key advisors to finalize the details and strategy for his upcoming economic program, which centered on addressing inflation, international monetary instability, and the potential closure of the gold window. The participants debated the timing and logistics of announcing major policies, including a potential wage and price freeze, import taxes, and budget adjustments to stabilize the U.S. dollar. The discussion also addressed the need for rigorous preparation for a forthcoming meeting at Camp David to ensure a unified, decisive presentation of the economic package that would preempt negative market speculation and build public support.
President Nixon met with John Connally and Arthur Burns to strategize on U.S. economic policy and international negotiations regarding the global monetary system and trade. The President emphasized that while he would rely on the technical expertise of his advisors, his primary goal was to project strength and prioritize American national interests ahead of the 1972 election. Nixon instructed Connally and Burns to resist the influence of the established bureaucracy and to maintain a firm, unified front when bargaining with foreign leaders over currency revaluation and import surcharges.
President Nixon reached out to William W. Keeler to express gratitude for his public support of the administration’s economic package, particularly regarding investment tax credits and the deferral of federal pay raises. Nixon emphasized the necessity of these policies to curb union wage demands and countered pressure from foreign nations to eliminate the import surcharge. To bolster Treasury Secretary John B. Connally against media criticism, Nixon requested that Keeler personally contact Connally to convey his continued support for the administration's firm trade stance.
President Nixon and Treasury Secretary John Connally met to strategize on the administration's upcoming economic initiatives, specifically regarding Phase II policies, the import surcharge, and the U.S. stance ahead of an International Monetary Fund (IMF) meeting. They discussed the necessity of maintaining a firm, unilateral negotiating position to counter foreign criticism and protect American economic interests, while also coordinating the timing of public announcements to maximize political control. Additionally, Nixon consulted with his staff on personnel matters, including the future of Robert McNamara at the World Bank, a campaign contribution from Armand Hammer, and the appointment of Romana A. Banuelos as Treasurer of the United States.
President Nixon met with John Ehrlichman and CIA Director Richard Helms to discuss the President's access to sensitive, classified intelligence documents, specifically concerning past operations like the Bay of Pigs and the assassination of Ngo Dinh Diem. Nixon emphasized his need for full information regarding historical foreign policy and intelligence "dirty tricks" to prepare for upcoming diplomatic negotiations and to manage political exposure. Following this, Nixon met with David Kennedy, Henry Kissinger, and Peter Peterson to strategize on high-stakes textile trade negotiations with Japan, where they aimed to secure an agreement by applying pressure while maintaining the credibility of the U.S. position.
President Nixon and Secretary of State William P. Rogers discuss plans for a diplomatic initiative toward Latin America, emphasizing the need for a high-profile tour to demonstrate commitment. They deliberate on potential policy gestures, such as addressing import surcharges and preferential trade treatment, to provide substance to the visit. Additionally, the conversation touches upon personnel choices for the delegation and assesses the decreasing intensity of the Vietnam War in terms of U.S. casualty rates.
President Nixon met with George Shultz and John Ehrlichman to strategize on international economic policy, specifically addressing the U.S. surcharge, currency convertibility, and the role of the Federal Reserve. A central goal of the discussion was managing the complex relationships between the Treasury Department, international allies like Japan and European nations, and domestic economic advisors. Nixon emphasized the need for a unified strategy that maintains U.S. independence, while Shultz was tasked with brokering better cooperation among staff to ensure policy decisions are implemented effectively and without bureaucratic interference.
President Nixon, John Connally, and George Shultz met to discuss a multi-faceted strategy for handling international economic and foreign policy challenges, specifically in response to the United Nations vote on Taiwan's expulsion. They agreed that the United States must move toward a more assertive, bilateral approach to foreign relations, prioritizing national interests over traditional multilateral institutions and the demands of European allies. Nixon decided to move forward with a new international economic offensive, tasking Connally with navigating trade negotiations during his upcoming trip to Japan while keeping the strategy tightly controlled to prevent bureaucratic leaks. The President also emphasized the need to bypass the State Department's traditional channels to ensure that U.S. interests, particularly regarding trade and monetary policy, were handled with greater efficiency and independence.
President Nixon and Nelson Rockefeller discussed the political impact of Robert Finch’s upcoming trip to Latin America in the context of the U.S. 10 percent import surcharge. Rockefeller advised the President that the surcharge's removal should be announced prior to the trip to ensure Finch receives a positive reception. Nixon agreed with the strategy, noting his administration's plan to prioritize Western Hemisphere nations for trade concessions and pledging to have George Shultz coordinate the timing and negotiations.
President Nixon met with his Cabinet and staff to discuss high-stakes domestic and foreign policy issues, including the administration's stance on school desegregation and busing, and potential vetoes regarding child development and welfare legislation. The President also briefed Secretary of Commerce Maurice Stans on his upcoming trip to the Soviet Union, emphasizing that trade should be treated as a strategic tool rather than an over-eager pursuit. Nixon instructed Stans to maintain a shrewd bargaining position and to subtly convey the administration's political strength to Soviet leadership to influence diplomatic negotiations.
President Nixon met with Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau to engage in a broad-ranging discussion on bilateral relations and major international crises. The leaders addressed economic tensions—specifically regarding U.S. trade measures, foreign capital investment in Canada, and the importance of maintaining a sound U.S. economy—while also consulting on the escalating India-Pakistan war. Nixon and Kissinger emphasized the necessity of a multilateral approach to monetary issues and expressed their desire to maintain a stable balance of power in South Asia despite the conflict.
President Nixon and Secretary of the Treasury John Connally met to strategize on impending international monetary negotiations and domestic tax legislation. Connally advised the President on the necessity of securing trade concessions and achieving currency realignment before agreeing to remove the import surcharge or modifying the gold standard. They specifically discussed the political strategy for upcoming bilateral meetings with foreign leaders, including French President Georges Pompidou, aiming to leverage US economic standing to reach a favorable multilateral agreement.
President Richard Nixon and evangelist Billy Graham discussed a range of political, diplomatic, and cultural topics, including the recent International Monetary Agreement and ongoing trade negotiations led by John Connally. The two also addressed geopolitical tensions, specifically U.S. military retaliatory strikes against North Vietnam and the regional instability caused by the India-Pakistan War. Additionally, Graham expressed his support for the Nixon administration, characterizing the current era as a major religious revival in America while commending the President’s leadership.
President Nixon and Secretary of State William P. Rogers coordinated their strategy for an upcoming trade initiatives meeting, emphasizing a need to appear supportive of free trade while avoiding actual legislative action during an election year. Nixon explicitly instructed Rogers to manage the presentation to ensure that controversial tariff proposals would be effectively stifled without political fallout. The two also discussed personnel matters, including the decision to decline an appointment for Frederick M. Eaton and the planned announcement of Willis C. Armstrong as Assistant Secretary of State.
President Nixon dictates a confidential memorandum to Secretary of State William P. Rogers to guide his upcoming discussions with Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin ahead of the Moscow summit. The President emphasizes a cautious approach toward the summit agenda, specifically regarding the Middle East, Vietnam, and SALT negotiations, while urging Rogers to avoid premature commitments or explicit references to linkage. Nixon further instructs that US trade and credit concessions should be utilized as strategic bargaining chips rather than early giveaways. Finally, the President mandates that these sensitive guidelines remain restricted to Rogers and Henry Kissinger to maintain tactical control over the diplomatic process.
President Nixon met with Soviet Minister of Foreign Trade Nikolai Patolichev, Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin, and senior U.S. officials to discuss the expansion of U.S.-Soviet economic and trade relations ahead of the upcoming Moscow summit. Patolichev outlined Soviet interest in obtaining credit for large-scale projects and Most Favored Nation (MFN) status, while Nixon emphasized his desire to transcend specific technical hurdles to establish a historic, long-term economic partnership between the two superpowers. The meeting served to reaffirm high-level commitments to future cooperation, with Nixon signaling his willingness to use his executive authority to reach significant agreements with General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev.
President Nixon consulted with Herbert Stein to provide cautionary instructions regarding Federal Reserve Chairman Arthur Burns' upcoming trip to Argentina. Nixon expressed skepticism regarding the long-standing health justifications for restricting Argentine beef imports and tasked Stein with coordinating with Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz to ensure Burns did not inadvertently make unsustainable trade promises. This conversation served to manage potential diplomatic fallout and domestic political complications surrounding international trade policies.
President Nixon and Richard K. Cook discussed the status of a hides bill that had recently passed both houses of Congress despite administration opposition. While Nixon expressed concern over the political ramifications regarding shoe prices and cattlemen, Cook advised that the administration could frame the defeat as congressional obstruction. The two men also strategized on upcoming legislative efforts, specifically regarding the need to secure the neutrality of Speaker Carl Albert by leveraging the influence of former Speaker John W. McCormack.
President Nixon met with United Paper Makers International Union leader Joseph P. Tonelli and members of his administration, including Secretary of Labor James D. Hodgson, to discuss labor relations and union support for the administration's policies. Tonelli expressed strong approval of Nixon's foreign policy and his approach to economic stabilization, while the group discussed specific legislative concerns regarding pulp and paper industry trade. They also addressed the importance of establishing the National Commission for Industrial Peace to improve labor dispute resolution as an alternative to economic strikes.
President Nixon met with Representative Joe D. Waggonner, Jr., Richard K. Cook, and Helmut Sonnenfeldt to discuss Waggonner's upcoming diplomatic trip to Romania to attend the Bucharest Trade Fair. The President briefed Waggonner on how to advocate for Most Favored Nation (MFN) trade status with Romania, emphasizing that the U.S. should frame such trade normalization as standard treatment for nations with positive relations rather than as special favoritism. Additionally, the participants discussed political strategy for the 1972 campaign, congressional cooperation, and personal security concerns regarding the President.
President Nixon met with Irish Prime Minister Jack Lynch to discuss the ongoing sectarian violence in Northern Ireland, the potential for a peaceful settlement, and Irish-American trade relations. The discussion covered the political complexities involving the British government, the status of the UDA and IRA, and specific civil aviation disputes regarding landing rights and North Atlantic tariffs. Nixon directed Peter Flanigan to review the aviation and investment concerns, and the two leaders agreed to frame their public statements as a constructive, ongoing diplomatic review of these sensitive bilateral issues.
President Nixon and Henry Kissinger met to discuss upcoming diplomatic strategy, specifically focusing on an impending meeting with British Prime Minister Edward Heath regarding trade, monetary issues, and nuclear treaties. The discussion also addressed the administration's global strategy concerning the Soviet Union and China, alongside managing the shifting public sentiment regarding the Vietnam War. Additionally, they reviewed logistical concerns for upcoming travel, including coordinating Kissinger’s schedule and addressing the problematic behavior and public statements of Vice President Spiro Agnew.
President Nixon met with George Shultz, John Ehrlichman, and others to strategize the communication and rollout of pending economic policies, specifically currency devaluation and trade packages. Nixon and his advisors agreed to separate the announcements to ensure the trade initiatives remained a positive, standalone narrative, fearing that tying them to the complex and potentially controversial devaluation would dilute their impact. Furthermore, they discussed engaging with Congressional leaders like Wilbur Mills to advance legislative goals, including welfare reform, and debated the necessity of incorporating Henry Kissinger into future economic policy deliberations.
President Nixon met with representatives from the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) and later George Shultz to discuss strategies for promoting administration policies, specifically regarding federal spending, trade, and energy. The President emphasized the need for NAM to mobilize its grassroots membership to pressure Congress on fiscal responsibility and trade policy, while Shultz provided an update on the chaotic international monetary situation and the administration's defensive stance. Additionally, the President and Shultz consulted on personnel management, focusing on the need for Labor Secretary Peter Brennan to appoint loyal and competent managers and evaluating potential candidates like Patricia Hitt for administration roles.
President Nixon met with Sir Christopher Soames and administration officials to address the growing trend of isolationism in both the United States and Europe and its potential impact on trans-Atlantic relations. The discussion focused on complex trade negotiations, the role of an enlarged European Economic Community, and the necessity of maintaining unified Western political and economic strength in the face of competition from Japan and shifting global powers. Nixon emphasized the political difficulty of passing trade legislation in a protectionist-leaning U.S. Senate and urged European leaders to cooperate on a balanced approach to trade and energy security to prevent an ugly confrontation.
Stephen B. Bull contacted President Nixon regarding an urgent decision required on piano tariff rates before the existing escape clause expired at midnight. Bull sought approval to deliver the memorandum from Peter M. Flanigan for the President's signature. Nixon instructed Bull to send the document over, noting that Manolo Sanchez would handle the delivery to ensure the deadline was met.
President Nixon met with his congressional leadership, including Hugh Scott and Gerald Ford, to discuss the administration's legislative strategy, specifically focusing on the management of upcoming vetoes and the difficulty of securing Senate support compared to the House. The group reviewed efforts to promote public awareness of administration programs, the political implications of specific budget cuts, and strategies to recruit Democratic candidates to the Republican Party for the 1974 election cycle. Additionally, Nixon emphasized the need to handle the trade bill with the Soviet Union delicately to accommodate both the administration's foreign policy goals and the concerns of the Jewish community regarding Soviet emigration.
President Nixon, George Shultz, and Henry Kissinger met to discuss international economic and diplomatic strategy, specifically focusing on the upcoming European monetary crisis and U.S.-Soviet relations. The group strategized how Shultz should handle European leaders, such as Helmut Schmidt, by providing leadership on currency stability without committing to unsustainable massive interventions. Regarding the Soviet Union, the participants agreed to prioritize trade and rapprochement while tactfully avoiding public focus on the issue of Soviet Jewry to ensure the success of pending trade agreements and upcoming summits. Additionally, the President provided guidance on managing relations with France during its upcoming elections and discussed administrative appointments and labor-management initiatives.
President Nixon met with a large group of Republican freshman members of the House of Representatives to cultivate support for his legislative agenda, specifically focusing on budget discipline, fiscal responsibility, and the use of the presidential veto. During the discussion, Nixon framed his foreign policy approach as one of strength and mutual respect, citing recent successes in relations with the Soviet Union and China as evidence of the need for a robust defense posture. The President encouraged the representatives to maintain party unity on key votes and emphasized his commitment to assisting in their reelection efforts.
In this meeting, President Nixon, H. R. Haldeman, and John Dean discussed strategies for managing the unfolding Watergate scandal and associated congressional investigations. They focused on ways to contain the political fallout, including potentially limiting the scope of Senator Sam Ervin's hearings and establishing a favorable narrative regarding the White House's lack of prior knowledge. Additionally, the participants reviewed legislative priorities with Wilbur Mills regarding tax and trade policy and considered the political utility of providing access to presidential records for sympathetic journalists.
President Nixon initiated this call to urge Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau to maintain Canada's participation in the International Commission of Control and Supervision (ICCS) in Vietnam, arguing that Canada's presence was essential for ensuring compliance with peace agreements. Trudeau expressed concern about the political feasibility of an indefinite commitment given opposition within the Canadian Parliament and suggested that a temporary extension might be the only viable compromise. The two leaders also discussed managing U.S.-Canadian trade relations to avoid public perceptions of pressure, with Nixon promising that Treasury Secretary George Shultz would coordinate directly with his Canadian counterpart to foster cooperation.
President Nixon met with William E. Timmons to discuss the effectiveness of recent social gatherings for Congress members in fostering partisan support and building a stronger team atmosphere. The two reviewed attendance lists for White House receptions and religious services, strategizing on how to use "wildcard" invitations to include specific Republican and "responsible" Democratic lawmakers. Nixon also directed Timmons to refine the guest selection process for upcoming meetings on energy and trade issues, focusing on key committee leadership to ensure legislative priorities remained on track.
President Nixon and George Shultz discuss a legislative setback regarding trade and immigration policy, specifically focusing on the political maneuvers of Senator Henry Jackson. The two evaluate the risks of enforcing certain provisions versus finding ways to circumvent them, ultimately deciding to accept the legislative situation as it stands. Nixon expresses deep frustration over the impact of these political obstacles on diplomatic summits and plans to shift the burden of blame for any potential failures onto congressional opponents.
President Nixon met with Melvin Laird and Alexander Haig to discuss personnel shifts and the restructuring of responsibilities within the White House staff. The conversation focused on reassigning George Shultz’s duties, specifically moving him out of his energy portfolio to prioritize trade policy. The participants also touched upon the organizational roles of Roy Ash and other administrative adjustments to long-term policy management.
President Nixon and Alexander Haig discuss political maneuvering regarding Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield and potential press exploitation of ongoing controversies. Nixon expresses concern that opponents intend to build up negative coverage over the summer to damage the administration. He directs Haig to thoroughly vet these developments and considers retaliatory measures, such as imposing tariffs, to counter the perceived political threat.