President Nixon spoke with Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau regarding the International Commission of Control and Supervision (ICCS) in Vietnam. Nixon emphasized the importance of Canada's continued participation, despite pressures to withdraw, and assured Trudeau that the U.S. would use its influence to encourage cooperation with the ICCS and compliance with ceasefire provisions. They discussed the critical timing of Trudeau's decision following the withdrawal of U.S. troops and POWs, with Nixon suggesting a delayed withdrawal would be "extremely helpful" to avoid a "devastating psychological blowback." Nixon also mentioned he would discuss the matter with Secretary Shultz.
This clip of the conversation was cut from the tape by the National Archives (catalog record ↗).
NARA Description
On March 22, 1973, President Richard M. Nixon and Pierre E. Trudeau met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 3:48 pm and 4:01 pm. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 887-022 of the White House Tapes.
Nixon Library Finding Aid
Conversation No. 887-22
Date: March 22, 1973
Time: Unknown between 3:48 pm and 4:01 pm
Location: Oval Office
The President talked with Pierre E. Trudeau.
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[Previous National Security (B) withdrawal reviewed under MDR guidelines case number
-33-
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM
Conversation No. 887-21 (cont’d)
LPRN-T-MDR-2014-010. Segment declassified on 11/20/2017. Archivist: DR]
[National Security]
[887-022-w001]
[Duration: 13m 57s]
[See Conversation No. 044-015]
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Transcript (AI-generated)
This transcript was made by an AI model listening to the recording (gemini-3.8-flash) and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Speaker names are the model's inference from the voices and the participant list. Words and names can still be wrong — verify against the audio and the finding aid before citing.
NixonSure. Sure. Well, I always say that's why they pay you the big salary. Yeah.
NixonLet me tell you, I, uh, I, I called you. I wanted to let you know that I have sent you a note by courier. I deliberately have sent it just on a personal basis because I didn't want to to to be in any way, uh, it's public in a sense of putting pressure on and so on. And, uh,
Nixonand I wanted to just chat with you about it briefly on the phone. It's, it's in with regard to this very, very difficult problem for us, and I course I know for you too, of of the, uh, ICCS. Uh, I know you,
NixonI know that as far as your decision is concerned, it's one of those things where where very strong pressures for, uh, to move in a direction to to leave it. Let me say that on on our part, just so that you will know that,
Nixonand it's a certainty though, that, uh, uh, all countries, not just ours, are are convinced that, uh, that Canada's continued participation is essential. Uh, we've checked with uh with that certainly. In fact, that's the reason we, well,
Nixontalked in the first place, I'm sure, because everybody universally agreed. The second point is that, on our part, we uh with the GVN, where we do, will have some success, and even later with the North Vietnamese, where we may have some some success as we look down toward aid and the rest,
Nixonuh that, uh, we believe we can have considerable influence in getting cooperation with the ICCS, and comply with the provisions. Also, on our part, that we are working at the highest level through our friends in the in the government level, and we can impossible, but also
Nixonwith the Hungarians and Poles, because they've been, as you know, as usual with these, uh, arrangements, they've been, uh, less than objective, and we're trying to use our influence. And we have some, particularly with the with the Poles, because of some things they want for us, and perhaps with some of the Hungarians.
NixonThe The way I look at it at this point is that this is a this is a difficult time right now. It's difficult because, uh, the, uh, the, as the final American troops leave and, uh, leave, and all the POWs return, uh, as the ceasefire is, uh, still has its violations on both sides,
Nixonuh, this would appear to be a very discouraging time. On the other hand, it's a time that is, is critically important in terms of of, uh, really uh making it come together. And we think that, uh, that your decision, your decision at this time, uh, could be,
— 3 min 56 s with no transcribed speech —
Nixonand you know, but I can assure you that our influence would be used with all parties concerned. We know that we've got, we know that our influence can be very, very important with so many groups.
NixonYes, I think that actually I haven't discussed that [unintelligible] I would say that that would be very helpful. Oh, it would be very helpful. Because you see if you if you remove off now or within a month, it would just crush everybody. They'd say, "Oh, it's all off." But within a few months, that will give us an opportunity to work for other
Nixonuh for other solutions. But I think I think this is the critical time. This period right after everybody's out on the 28th of March. So that that would be extremely helpful, yes. So
NixonYeah, because they might they understand that, understand the problem then. Right.
NixonRight. Right. A and I would say a fall back position would be extremely helpful. But, of course, we would prefer the other. But I I know the I know the situation which you may be confronted with. But you see, if we did if did that, the VN seems to me highly responsive to if if, for example, we just drop in hand and say, "Well" Well, you can see the psychological blowback would be pretty devastating.
NixonIt'll be up As I say, it does not do it, because if they listen to [unintelligible] legislation uh, that I uh It has to, they have I wanted to have something in writing. But I'm also, uh, the call my call was, uh, trying to spell out my general feelings in more detail, and I think if you could reflect that to your cabinet, I would appreciate it.
NixonAs a matter of fact, I I had I think it's just must have been the message that was sent to Congress. Uh, I didn't get that or, so, I'm afraid I'm not I'm not, but supposedly let us say that you and I talked about it anyway, and that we both Yeah.
NixonAbsolutely. I think that you could say that we uh you and I talked and that because of the fact that we have this long-time relationship and friendship, and so forth, that uh uh that I uh that I will uh assume responsibility on my part to, and I urge to see that our various officials that have to do with this and talk about it because we're not looking for any
Nixonconfrontation, we're looking for cooperation and uh you're you're welcome to say that, that's a very fine Yeah.
NixonWell, Shultz is just getting back. In fact, he's coming in in five minutes from Europe. I will mention it to him, and I'll have him call your uh opposite number, if you like. No, but w- but what Let me say, let me just say that I think that if you could tell your people when you when you uh talk to your press corps, you could say that I also told you that I was going to discuss the matter with uh Mr. Shultz, means since since he's already been to Europe, I'm going to tell him about my talk with you.
NixonRight. Cuz you see he is Shultz is our top economic man as well as Secretary of the Treasury, so we'll uh But you can say that uh, yes, we do want to cooperate and he is walking through cab, working some of these problems out.
NixonNo, well, that's the point. It- It- And I would think, too, that I wouldn't think that Canada, you know, your role has been so constructive that you'd want to get a lot of, be in a position that even though it might not be the case where your withdrawal, they'd say, "Oh, my God, if the Canadians had stayed on, it might have worked." That's really the point.
NixonWell, I'll- I'll appreciate it very much, and, well, uh fine. Fine.
Also recorded on March 22, 1973
887-020 3:43 PM · 25 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 3:43 pm and 3:48 pm.
887-021 3:43 PM · 25 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 3:43 pm and 3:48 pm.
044-015 3:48 PM · 15 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Pierre E. Trudeau talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 3:48 pm and 4:01 pm.
044-016 4:01 PM · 9 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 4:01 pm and 4:02 pm.
887-023 4:01 PM · 10 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator met in the Oval Office of the White House at 4:01 pm.
887-024 4:01 PM · 2 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House at 4:01 pm.
044-017 4:02 PM · 2 min — President Richard M. Nixon and William P. Rogers talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 4:02 pm and 4:05 pm.
887-025 4:02 PM · 3 min — President Richard M. Nixon and William P. Rogers met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 4:02 pm and 4:05 pm.
Conversation 887-022, March 22, 1973. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives (NAID 417182977). Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/887-022 (accessed November 16, 2026).