Nixon phone call with Kissinger on Vietnam War and Paris Peace Accords

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Hello, Mr. President.

Hi, Henry.

What are your morning report today?

We got a message that the North Vietnamese will have a message to deliver to us about 2 o'clock this afternoon.

And of course, we don't know what it is.

Well, the only reason I called or Ehrlichman called up here saying that he got the impression you said everything had been

going to blow up tomorrow.

We had to be prepared.

He wants me to make a speech in Chicago, and I just want to be sure that I know about it, see?

I told you earlier.

He tends to get a little excited, but I just— I said there are three possibilities.

One is that they'll accept another meeting.

The other, that they'll stall.

And the third, that they'll go into a partnership.

in which they go for all the marbles and say they'll break off the talks.

Right, right.

That I didn't consider the last one very possible.

Well, that's the one that he got excited about, Henry, apparently.

That it's worthwhile to think about.

Sure, sure, sure.

Well, they might.

They might.

But if they do it, Mr. President, I still believe that we'll be in a position to capitalize on it, because we can stick with what's been done.

I think we can still capitalize on it, because our position would be that we are willing to sign a good agreement.

We are not willing to sign an agreement that is unsatisfactory.

Right.

Well, as a matter of fact, I think that on the merits, I think we can capitalize on it.

The only problem we have to be aware of—and it's not going to be fatal, but it'll hurt some—is that people's expectations have been built up, not by us, but by the media.

And as a result, those expectations will be rather severely shocked.

But we can take care of that.

But we'll say that they're just trying to blackmail us, and we maintain our position.

I don't think it's going to happen.

But what I think is important, and I'm preparing some talking points for you, Mr. President, is that we don't create so much euphoria that our negotiating position gets blown, that the other person knows we cannot afford these talks to break down after the election.

That's right, that's right.

And therefore, I think that the theme that you had been stressing, that significant progress has been made.

Well, you see, that's all I have said, but I don't know whether others may be going a little beyond that, because— Others are going beyond it, but I will do it strongly that you don't go beyond it.

Well, that's, in fact, the only thing I've said either place, you know, is just that we have made progress, and that's that.

I'm preparing some talking points.

But I'm not sure I want to say much more than that, unless they break off.

That's right.

I think you should say significant progress has been made, but we will not sign anything.

I would hit that until all its provisions are right.

Right.

I think that's a good— Well, of course, the point is that—are they—are you planning to—what about the idea of having Rogers go out today and hit that point?

Well, I think the trouble with Rogers going out today is while that message is in transit, I really don't think it's a good idea.

He can go out tomorrow when we know what to say.

Of course, it's quite interesting that the governor would make the position, make the statement that he would renegotiate the agreement so as to cut off all aid to South Vietnam.

What do you think of that?

I think Agnew ought to hit that one.

What do you think of that?

I think it's a disgrace.

I think the man is a total horror for his dad.

Just to think of that, Henry, that he would, after we, when we have an agreement to allow these poor damn people to defend themselves, he'd say no.

We're not going to sign such an agreement.

Buckley has written a very good article that he sent me a copy of.

I talked to Higg about that.

I said it had to be done.

Well, actually, he ought to shut up.

This week.

He just ought to shut up this week.

That's all there is to it.

I don't believe, as far as the North is concerned, thinking of their options.

If they go blowing, Henry, they're looking at a hell of a problem because they can cut our lead, but our lead is so great that we're going to be in, and if they blow, we're going to bang the hell out of them, and they know it.

I'm not so sure.

I think it's highly unlikely that they'll blow completely.

What they may try to do is to leave you a little bit.

But they've been extremely silent.

What they may do to absurd things, walk out of the talks saying there's no other, nothing else to talk about except the agreement.

They won't break the agreement, they'll just say they'll refuse to renegotiate it.

We'll maintain the position that it was never completed, and we insist that it be discussed.

Well, I'm perfectly happy to put out anything tomorrow.

In fact, it would be good to have something in Chicago that I could say that would make news, to the effect that we are ready to make an agreement.

I mean, we'll have to wait and see what they say today.

But the most important thing is the right agreement, and we're not going to make a bad agreement simply because of the time.

I think you should say that, Mr. President, because if after the election day is stolen, I think we ought to ban it.

In fact, I wanted to call you.

I want to have a meeting today with the military to get them to go all out until there is a ceasefire so that we whittle down their forces as much as possible.

Of course, of course.

Well, maybe I ought to get back there and ream them out a little less.

I'm trying to finish these three speeches, but they don't, they don't amount.

When the border is here, there's no need for you to do it, but you might want to do it when the border is back.

Yeah, well, no, I'll be back tonight, but I meant, you see, I'm finishing these speeches for the, well, I have three more speeches to do before the, before...

I don't think there's any need to do it, Mr. President, today.

I think Wednesday is time enough.

Well, I would like to be able to make a good—not long—three or four minutes in Chicago where I hit straight out as to what this thing is.

Now, I've been saying privately this, but I have never said it publicly yet, this idea that we will not make—that the most important thing is to make the right kind of agreement, not just to end the war, but to end the war in a way that will build a peace and so forth.

That's what I would say tomorrow.

Yeah.

I've used the term major breakthrough.

That's as far as I've gone.

But we will not sign it, and we will not do it until we have the right agreement.

That's right.

What we want now is to have, we don't want just a temporary peace, we want a permanent peace.

Oh, yeah.

Well, I can hit that thing very well.

It's probably better for me to go out first then, rather than have Rogers go out.

I think it's better.

I don't know exactly what to say.

It also has you in the strong position, which is where your natural allies are.

Yeah.

These goddamn liberals are absolutely dying.

You think so?

I was at a dinner last night and Clayton said he wasn't here.

He said, we can't let you go.

You'll prove what Johnson did was right.

We can't submit it.

There's got to be an investigation right afterwards.

He said that?

Yeah.

He really meant it?

Oh, yeah.

What's he mean?

That he didn't want it?

It can't be a success.

Whatever happens, it can't be a success.

Yeah.

They're dying, too, because of the election, aren't they?

Oh, yeah.

They had this fellow Appel from the New York Times who was assistant.

Oh, yes.

And he said he wished he could say—you know, he's an all-out McGovern fan—he said he wished he could say there was some structure in McGovern's major.

But there's no way that the Appel can see him coming close in seven of the ten majors.

He's not going to come close in any of them.

I can assure you.

But Apple, of course, the totals have got Montgomery to support it.

But let them screen.

Well, fine.

You then will let me know at 2 o'clock.

I'll let you know as soon as we have the message.

It's more likely to be 3.

Oh, sure, of course.

Well, I'll stay here in any event until then.

By the time he gets back to the phone, it will be 3 o'clock.

Stay here until 3 o'clock.

Now, is it your view then that Roger should not go out today?

That's correct.

Have you passed that to Colson?

No, but I've talked to Roger to not call Colson.

You can call Colson and tell him, we've got to wait until we hear the message and that that's my direction.

Right.

Because the idea, as far as McGovern is concerned, Agnew's around, let him pop him a little on this.

I think Agnew should pop him and we're drafting a statement for him.

And he can pop him right now.

That's right.

The idea of really go shooting.

Hold on.

He can do it any minute.

Fine.

Good luck.

Okay.

Thank you.

Nixon phone call with Kissinger on Vietnam War and Paris Peace Accords

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Also recorded on October 30, 1972

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