Nixon White House Tapes › Tape 152 › Conversation 152-007

Nixon phone call with Haldeman on Vietnam War and Peace Negotiations

Monday, October 30, 1972 · 10:44 AM–10:48 AM ET · Camp David Study Table · 5 min

ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President); Haldeman, H. R. ("Bob")Conversation152-007 on Tape 152StartMonday, October 30, 1972 at 10:44 AMEndMonday, October 30, 1972 at 10:48 AMRecording deviceCamp David Study TableSourceNixon Library record for 152-007 ↗ · National Archives Catalog, NAID 417175591 ↗

AI Summary

President Nixon and H. R. Haldeman discussed managing the messaging surrounding pending Vietnam peace negotiations while awaiting a crucial communication from North Vietnam. They decided to prevent Secretary of State William P. Rogers from making public statements until the message was received to avoid premature speculation. Conversely, they authorized Vice President Spiro Agnew to aggressively attack Senator George McGovern's position on aid to South Vietnam to maintain political pressure. Ultimately, the President emphasized the need for poise and restraint to project stability despite domestic distractions like the Watergate scandal.

Audio

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NARA Description

On October 30, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon and H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman talked on the telephone at Camp David from 10:44 am to 10:48 am. The Camp David Study Table taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 152-007 of the White House Tapes.

Nixon Library Finding Aid

Conversation No. 152-7

Date: October 30, 1972
Time: 10:44 am - 10:48 am
Location: Camp David Study Table

The President talked with H.R. (“Bob”) Haldeman.

[See Conversation No. 222-11]

        Vietnam negotiations
            -The President’s conversation with Henry A. Kissinger
                 -North Vietnamese message
                 -Possible North Vietnamese action at Paris peace talks
                     -John D. Ehrlichman’s view
                     -Acceptance of talks, delay, break-off of talks
                     -US response
                          -Type
                 -Domestic and foreign policy matters
                     -Watergate
                     -Kissinger, Ehrlichman
                     -Charles W. Colson
                 -William P. Rogers’s possible statement
                     -The President’s orders
                 -George S. McGovern’s statements
                     -Vice President Spiro T. Agnew’s response
                 -North Vietnamese message
                     -Rogers
                     -Kissinger’s previous conversation with Rogers
                     -Kissinger’s forthcoming conversation with Colson
                 -McGovern’s position on aid to South Vietnam
                     -Agnew’s response
                 -Rogers’s possible statement
                     -Timing
            -Status
                 -US response to North Vietnamese message
                 -McGovern’s responsibility
                 -Public knowledge
                     -The President’s view
            -Critics
                 -Colson

Transcript (AI-generated)

This transcript was generated automatically by AI (WhisperX) and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Names and numbers are often wrong; speakers are not identified. Do not cite it as authoritative — verify against the audio and the finding aid.

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I talked to Henry and he said they expected they were supposed to get a message around two or three o'clock.
But he said that Ehrlichman was overreacting to what he said.
That's what I thought.
He said he had laid out three options or three policies.
He always does.
He says that the third one is one, he says they might agree to talk.
Two, they might agree.
might say that they would talk later and I would postpone or something.
Or a third that they might say, no, we're not going to talk at all and blow up the thing.
He said, however, he had pointed out that the third was in his opinion not a very likely thing, but that we ought to, of course, have possible contingencies in the event that it moved in that direction.
Yeah.
But I said, well, I suppose it does.
He said, you're not going to throw up your hands and say all is well and be so.
On the contrary, he said, we just simply say we're taking the offensive and say that we're not going to make a bad agreement.
We've agreed on the general principles and we're going to make the right kind of agreement and that's the only thing.
This is simply a delay and we will continue
So it's just one of those cases.
It seems generally speaking when the domestic things get like Watergate and the rest, they make Henry—he overreacts when something foreign policy happens.
John overreacts.
It's inevitable.
Well, I thought that's what it was because Chuck didn't have that— Roger should not go out today, obviously, until after we hear this.
We've got to see what this message is.
So I told Henry that.
He'd already talked to Rogers, so that's it.
He should not go out.
He can't go out until we get the message, of course, because we don't want to get out on a limb until we see what the hell the message is, because Rogers would be out there with everything hanging out.
They might just chop it off.
On the other hand, Henry has prepared something for Agnew to say to take on McGovern, which he can do.
Agnew can do.
We don't want Rogers getting out and speculating about what
what their answer's going to be, because we don't know what it's going to be.
But we will know at two o'clock.
But I've already covered that.
You don't need to do anything about it.
I want to cover it with Chuck, though, because Henry was supposed to call.
Henry had already talked to Rogers and said he would call Colson as soon as I hung up.
So you can tell him, too, but just be sure he understands.
As far as Rogers is concerned, we've got to wait until we get the message around three o'clock.
As far as Agnew is concerned, he can blast the hell out of McGovern.
because he's out anyway and should.
He can blast him immediately but without speculating at all.
He can just go out and say this is really an unconscionable thing that he has done.
So we want to have Agnew hit hard as hell today at McGovern that he would leave his poor people defenseless and so forth and so on.
But Rogers should be held until after we get the message so we know what the hell he's going to be shooting at.
Okay.
And actually then we'll see what else is the following day.
Okay.
You can see the logic of this.
Sure.
Yep.
See, for our Rogers.
Their argument before our Rogers going was to preempt whatever North Vietnam did.
Too late.
It makes a lot more sense not to.
We've already gotten a message from them saying that a message is going to be delivered.
Right.
Well, preempt it.
We will have said something before.
To have been on the record, but to lay the groundwork for charging, if it does blow, charging McGovern with the blow.
I think it's too cute.
I think so, too.
Too cute.
There isn't enough time.
Well, plus we're going to know in a few hours anyway.
We're going to know in three hours, the situation is.
So we can charge him anyway.
Charge him anyway.
He's obviously held it up.
But we may not want to.
Even regardless of what they do, Bob, we don't want to be in a position of getting jittery and jumping up and down and hysterical and emotional and all that crap.
Because the point is, as far as the people are concerned,
Let them feel things are going along pretty well and this is just the, you know, the birth pangs of an agreement.
That's the way to handle it.
Handle it with a little bit of poise.
That's what we need here.
That's what everybody's got to do is have a little poise.
Not to, you know, yak, yak, yak.
Tell Chuck, I mean, to crack him on the other things.
Okay.
There are a lot of other things to hit on, aren't there?
Yes, sir.
You know.
Sure are.
Bang the shit on him.
Plenty of things.
Okay.
Right.

Also recorded on October 30, 1972

  • 152-004 9:33 AM · 11 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Camp David operator talked on the telephone at Camp David at an unknown time between 9:33 am and 10:33 am.
  • 222-007 9:50 AM · 15 min — President Richard M. Nixon and H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman met in the Aspen Lodge study at Camp David from 9:50 am to 10:25 am.
  • 222-008 10:25 AM · 10 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Camp David operator met in the Aspen Lodge study at Camp David at an unknown time between 10:25 am and 10:33 am.
  • 152-005 10:33 AM · 9 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger talked on the telephone at Camp David from 10:33 am to 10:43 am.
  • 222-009 10:33 AM · 6 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger met in the Aspen Lodge study at Camp David from 10:33 am to 10:43 am.
  • 152-006 10:43 AM · 9 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Camp David operator talked on the telephone at Camp David at an unknown time between 10:43 am and 10:44 am.
  • 222-010 10:43 AM · 14 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Camp David operator met in the Aspen Lodge study at Camp David at an unknown time between 10:43 am and 10:44 am.
  • 222-011 10:44 AM · 4 min — President Richard M. Nixon and H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman met in the Aspen Lodge study at Camp David from 10:44 am to 10:48 am.

All 19 conversations from October 30, 1972 →

Cite this conversation

Conversation 152-007, October 30, 1972. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives (NAID 417175591). Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/152-007 (accessed November 2, 2026).