Nixon White House Tapes › Tape 2 › Conversation 002-108

Nixon phone call with Haldeman on Cancer legislation and David Packard

Thursday, May 6, 1971 · 8:53 AM–9:11 AM ET · White House Telephone · 11 min

ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President); Haldeman, H. R. ("Bob")Conversation002-108 on Tape 2 (tape position 03:50:59–04:07:02)StartThursday, May 6, 1971 at 8:53 AMEndThursday, May 6, 1971 at 9:11 AMRecording deviceWhite House TelephoneSourceNixon Library record for 002-108 ↗ · National Archives Catalog, NAID 417188175 ↗

AI Summary

President Nixon and H.R. Haldeman discuss administrative adjustments to cancer research legislation to ensure direct presidential oversight, as well as strategies to address Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard's threatened resignation over the Lockheed decision. Nixon emphasizes his intent to take a personal lead on the cancer initiative to bypass bureaucratic inefficiencies within HEW and the NIH. Regarding Packard, they confirm that John Connally is actively working to persuade him to remain in his post by emphasizing his past contributions and the potential for upcoming policy successes.

Audio

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NARA Description

On May 6, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon and H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman talked on the telephone from 8:53 am to 9:11 am. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 002-108 of the White House Tapes.

Nixon Library Finding Aid

Conversation No. 2-108

Date: May 7, 1971
Time: 8:53 am - 9:11 am
Location: White House Telephone

The President talked with H. R. (“Bob”) Haldeman.

     Reception at Department of Agriculture
          -Clifford M. Hardin
          -Martha L. W. Hardin

     Agriculture
          -Output
          -Income
          -Comparison

     Cancer legislation
         -Edward M. (“Ted”) Kennedy
         -National Institute of Health [NIH]
         -Department of Health, Education and Welfare [HEW]
         -Report to President
         -Haldeman
                -Public relations
                -Appointments
                      -Edward L. Morgan
                      -Kenneth R. Cole, Jr.
         -President's program
         -John D. Ehrlichman
         -HEW and NIH programs
                -Elliot L. Richardson
         -President’s involvement

     William P. Rogers
          -Reports

     Lockheed decision
         -John B. Connally
         -David Packard
         -Henry A. Kissinger
         -Melvin R. Laird
         -Haldeman's role
         -President's possible meeting with Packard
         -Packard's possible resignation
         -Vietnam
Show the rest of the log (39 more lines)
         -Kissinger
         -Connally
         -Importance
         -Justification
         -Defense contractors

     Business Council

     Economic indicators
         -Unemployment figure
         -Prices

[Transcript #1: A transcript of the following portion of this conversation was prepared under
court order from December 1978 through March 1979 for Special Access 8, Ronald V. Dellums,
et al. v. James M. Powell, et al., No. 71-2271. The National Archives and Records
Administration produced this transcript. The National Archives does not guarantee its accuracy.]

[End of transcript]

     Connally
         -Support for President
         -Vietnam
         -Lockheed
         -Leadership
         -Compared with George W. Romney and John A. Volpe
         -Peter G. Peterson

[Transcript #2: A transcript of the following portion of this conversation was prepared under
court order from December 1978 through March 1979 for Special Access 8, Ronald V. Dellums,
et al. v. James M. Powell, et al., No. 71-2271. The National Archives and Records
Administration produced this transcript. The National Archives does not guarantee its accuracy.]

[End of transcript]

     Demonstrations

[End of transcript]

Transcript (AI-generated)

This transcript is incomplete. The transcription skipped stretches of speech — roughly 6 minutes of this recording (about 51% of it) is represented by only a few words. Listen to the audio rather than relying on the text below; a corrected transcript is queued.

This transcript was generated automatically by AI (WhisperX) and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Names and numbers are often wrong; speakers are not identified. Do not cite it as authoritative — verify against the audio and the finding aid.

Download transcript (.txt) · JSON data

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I had a couple things though.
One, I want the hardened nuts on the stairs to stand in the line.
Right.
They can be at the bottom of the stairs.
Yep.
Second thing.
They have an interesting figure in agriculture.
I've been working over here.
Right.
And they say that output per man hour in agriculture went up 3% in agriculture.
Right.
Output per man hour in industry went up 150%.
Now, the point is, then they go...
The point that I want to make here is what did agriculture income go up in the last 20 years in the history of agriculture?
It's probable that they can't figure it out because it's too complicated for them to go through computers, but I could do it if I had more.
I'm going to cheat the papers on them.
Let them try what you're doing.
Tell them I want to try to get that.
All right.
Now, if they can't get it, don't talk to me about it.
Try to find some way they can get around it.
Okay.
But it's a very interesting comparison to me.
Right.
If we can get it.
Right.
And...
Another thing, I have just looked over the cancer thing, and I've proved it.
I've made several notes on it.
I'm not satisfied with anything they've done.
Because all of them leave it on the internet.
Well, one, the Kennedy approach, which breaks too much China.
The one that they finally come up with is one of these in the NIH.
What they missed, Bob, is
The key point is that there must be a report to the president so that it's the president's decision.
So I have modified it all in terms of that.
I went over and asked Judith to take charge of the PR side of the company.
I asked Judith to take charge of the business points of the body, even outside of government, if that's necessary.
So the president's chosen to do that.
I would like for you to pick somebody, or for Erlich to pick somebody on the staff, that was a market type, maybe it's cold, that will be my man.
Because if they report to me on the program, and ultimately I want them to, I'm going to find out how one of these, how one of these programs works at GW and NIH.
The trouble is that Elliot's too damn busy.
You know, he doesn't have a lead in his boss.
He can't.
He's better than I do.
He's got his secretary for medicine.
I'm going to take the personal charge of this.
Take a look at it.
I'll send it over.
This way we don't break the chain.
We leave NIH and
What you do here is to leave it in the goddamn engine
Exactly.
But figuratively, it reports to you.
That's right.
And then, of course, then I can be in charge of the...
I'll have a dinner, or a reception, or I'll bring the people in.
I can have a meeting from time to time, and they come in and report to you.
Well, you go over there.
Exactly.
And a seminar or something.
Yeah.
Well, I think this really will do it.
Okay, what else is new this morning?
No, major things.
Roger's got a pretty big play.
I saw that, but I told you it's new.
Yeah.
So, uh...
Nothing happens.
Good mileage on it.
The reports didn't indicate any breakthroughs.
No.
Not yet.
The only other thing we've got is a problem that I think Connelly is going to handle alright, but Packard has apparently just totally flipped on the basis of the Mach-E position.
And it's more of a
somebody and it got through to Henry that was going to resign today with a blast at us for the Lockheed decision.
And Henry, for some reason, was in the middle of working it out with Packard and Blair.
And I got into it late last night and suggested that Conley be brought into it, which they had felt they should do.
Conley got in, called Packard, and I think he's working it out with Packard.
But we'll have to see.
You may have to see Packard this morning.
Yeah, that's right.
Later on.
But John's going over to see him.
John talked to him last night, and he's going over to see him this morning.
And he's at least got him now that we're, he may resign, but he will not say anything.
And he thinks he can stop him from resigning.
Well, he should.
The point is that he didn't want to.
He was in it from the military standpoint.
Well, but we knew he was, as Conley pointed out, his opposition was fully known and fully stated at all times.
And it was a close decision.
And it was a close decision.
We know that.
We know that.
And Conley can make the point that Packer's too big a man to be full of love just because he's one decision.
Well, I think this involves other people.
I'm convinced of this.
Right.
Right.
Yeah.
Should not do it.
Well, not now.
Well, it would be too damn bad for him to do it on the base of the Vietnam.
At the moment, he's taken all the heat.
It's downhill rough here.
And now there's some things going to happen.
His family's going to send her down, and her kids are going to be all right.
Well, the other thing, too, is that Henry ought to take him on the mountain.
I don't know if anything's going to happen in some other area.
Yeah.
But he did, apparently.
Henry worked hard on it.
Henry was the most subtle one.
But that's the thing to tell him.
Look, Dave, you're just ready to have some breakthroughs.
Don't leave at a time like this.
Leave with a victory, rather.
Absolutely.
It's hard to work with a goddamn good soldier over there.
Working with Laird.
But on the Lockheed thing, we knew all the time.
We had to think of a job.
That's what it got down to.
Well, good.
I'll see him.
I'll be glad.
Well, I don't know that you'll have to, John, but I want you to know how, because Conley may want to talk to you about it, but Conley, he is a great guy.
I mean, just as soon as he got word of this, he just moved in and made the phone call, called back and reported on him.
Just so that Henry is aware of it.
Henry's aware of the importance of it.
Yeah.
Yes.
They're told about some of these other things over here?
Yeah, yeah.
Well, that's it.
He's paid all the price.
I mean, he's leaving just as the cookies start to arrive.
Uh, if I, well, he may just admit the best last night.
I mean, it's a lot.
well that's it you've been shooting signals up for five days five days long before that well yeah he knew it before that but i mean publicly it was pretty clear on saturday so he told henry apparently he was upset because connelly had made the justification on the basis of national national security i don't think he did he didn't no we checked the record on that and that uh
And Packard backed off of that with Conley.
Packard said, I wasn't upset with you at all on it, or what you said.
I just think it's the wrong decision.
It destroys everything I've tried to do in making defense contractors honest.
And Conley made the point that you really put the squeeze on these people.
So we're all for that.
You've gotten credit for it.
There's no way we're going to do something like that.
Well, what's the thing worth it on?
Now, another thing that occurred to me...
That might be a good time to get close.
You've got to have your warning clear on it.
But it's what if it's that once they're all at the business end, they're all at the business end.
What's the unemployment figure?
I don't have an idea.
I don't know.
I don't know.
I don't know.
I don't know.
I don't know.
Oh, that's what I'm getting at.
One of those, right here to the left.
No, we're coming down.
It all varies.
Sure.
Yeah.
Did you have any further reactions about that?
Yeah, they're working hard to try and escalate that because everybody's convinced that he is.
Well, isn't it interesting that the president's given much more.
Well, you see, what happened is there was no reason to remain of it.
What he said was that at an Iona College dinner in New York, that Iran came in with a ticker.
Well, it finally got on the ticker.
It hadn't gotten on.

Also recorded on May 6, 1971

  • 002-102 8:37 AM · 4 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 8:37 am and 9:10 am.
  • 002-107 8:37 AM · 2 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 8:37 am and 8:51 am.
  • 493-001 8:45 AM · 7 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Alexander P. Butterfield met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 8:45 am and 8:55 am.
  • 493-002 8:55 AM · 21 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 8:55 am and 9:00 am.
  • 493-003 9:00 AM · 49 min — President Richard M. Nixon, H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman, White House operator, Manolo Sanchez, Gerald R. Ford, and Alexander P. Butterfield met in the Oval Office of the White House from 9:00 am to 10:00 am.
  • 002-103 9:10 AM · 7 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at 9:10 am.
  • 002-104 9:20 AM · 5 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Gerald R. Ford talked on the telephone from 9:20 am to 9:26 am.
  • 493-004 10:00 AM · 44 sec — President Richard M. Nixon, Stephen B. Bull, and unknown person(s) met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 10:00 am and 10:08 am.

All 36 conversations from May 6, 1971 →

Cite this conversation

Conversation 002-108, May 6, 1971. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives (NAID 417188175). Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/002-108 (accessed November 6, 2026).