Nixon White House Tapes › Tape 16 › Conversation 016-037

Nixon phone call with Kissinger on India-Pakistan War and United Nations

Tuesday, December 7, 1971 · 11:31 PM–11:41 PM ET · White House Telephone · 10 min

ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President); Kissinger, Henry A.; [Unknown person(s)]Conversation016-037 on Tape 16 (tape position 01:11:28–01:21:27)StartTuesday, December 7, 1971 at 11:31 PMEndTuesday, December 7, 1971 at 11:41 PMRecording deviceWhite House TelephoneSourceNixon Library record for 016-037 ↗ · National Archives Catalog, NAID 417191323 ↗

AI Summary

President Nixon and Henry Kissinger discussed a significant diplomatic victory at the United Nations General Assembly, where a resolution calling for a ceasefire and withdrawal in the India-Pakistan War passed by a lopsided margin. They interpreted the vote as a validation of U.S. policy and a rebuke to India, the Soviet Union, and domestic critics like John Kenneth Galbraith and Senator Edward Kennedy. Kissinger and the President planned to leverage this momentum by mobilizing political allies to attack liberal dissenters and draw public attention to the hypocrisy of critics who had previously opposed U.S. actions in Cambodia.

Audio

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NARA Description

On December 7, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon, Henry A. Kissinger, and unknown person(s) talked on the telephone from 11:31 pm to 11:41 pm. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 016-037 of the White House Tapes.

Nixon Library Finding Aid

Conversation No. 16-37

Date: December 7, 1971
Time: 11:31 pm - 11:41 pm
Location: White House Telephone

Henry A. Kissinger talked with the President.

     India–Pakistan War
          -United Nations [UN] General Assembly Session
               -Vote
                     -Romania
               -Issues
                     -Withdrawal
                     -Ceasefire
               -Opposition
                     -Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR]
                     -India
                     -East European communists
                     -India
                           -Bhutan
                           -Nepal
               -Frank F. Church
               -Edward M. Kennedy
               -New York Times
               -Time
               -Helen A. Thomas
                     -Reaction to Kissinger’s backgrounder
                     -Forthcoming columns
               -Indian aggression
               -Pakistan
                     -Refugees
               -Ronald L. Ziegler
               -Liberals
               -UN Security Council
                     -Vote
               -Vote
                     -India
                     -US recommendation

               -Abstentions
                     -British
                     -French
                     -Edward R.G. Heath
                           -Rhodesia
Show the rest of the log (102 more lines)
                           -Pakistan
               -John B. Connally
                     -British
               -Vote
                     -Evaluation
               -Peoples Republic of China [PRC] influence
               -Albania
               -Ceasefire
               -Withdrawal
               -India
               -UN Security Council
                     -Vote
               -Liberals
                           -Reaction
                     -Harvard University
                     -John Kenneth Galbraith
                           -Interview
                                 -Dinner for Kissinger
               -Galbraith’s view
                     -India
                     -Rhodesia
                     -South Africa
                     -India
                           -Moral judgments
               -Moral judgments
                     -Portugal
                     -Cambodia
                           -US action
               -Significance of vote
                     -Leonid I. Brezhnev itinerary
                           -Warsaw

[President conferred with an unknown person]

     India–Pakistan War
          -United Nations [UN] General Assembly Session
               -Brezhnev

                    -Unknown letter

******************************************************************************

[Previous National Security (B) withdrawal reviewed under MDR guidelines case number
LPRN-T-MDR-2012-005. Segment declassified on 06/23/2016. Archivist: DR]
[National Security]
[016-037-w001]
[Duration: 13s]

     India–Pakistan War
          -United Nations [UN] General Assembly session
               -People’s Republic of China [PRC]
               -Indians

******************************************************************************

     India–Pakistan War
          -United Nations [UN] General Assembly Session
               -Galbraith
                     -UN
               -World opinion
                     -India
               -UN
               -Kissinger’s backgrounder
                     -Press
               -Liberals
                     -Kennedy
                     -Church
               -Domestic strategy
                     -Hugh Scott
                     -Charles W. Colson
                     -Clark MacGregor
                     -Spiro T. Agnew
          -Fighting
               -Kissinger’s predictions
                     -East Pakistan
                           -Massacre
                     -West Pakistan

******************************************************************************

[Previous National Security (B) withdrawal reviewed under MDR guidelines case number
LPRN-T-MDR-2012-005. Segment declassified on 06/23/2016. Archivist: DR]
[National Security]
[016-037-w002]
[Duration: 1m 5s]

     India–Pakistan War
          -Fighting
               -Jordan
                     -Joseph J. Sisco
                           -[Hussein, King of Jordan] Hussein ibn Talal
                                 -Reluctant to send forces
               -Iran
                     -Mohammed Reza Pahlavi
                           -Conversation with Henry A. Kissinger
               -Israeli reaction
                     -Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR]
                     -Indian support
                           -Support for Arabs
                                 -Pakistan

******************************************************************************

Transcript (AI-generated)

This transcript is incomplete. The transcription skipped stretches of speech — roughly 1 minute of this recording (about 9% of it) is represented by only a few words. Listen to the audio rather than relying on the text below; a corrected transcript is queued.

This transcript was generated automatically by AI (WhisperX) and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Names and numbers are often wrong; speakers are not identified. Do not cite it as authoritative — verify against the audio and the finding aid.

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Hello.
Yeah.
Okay.
Hello.
Hi, Henry.
How are you?
Okay.
I just wanted to tell you we just won in the general assembly 104 to 11.
Oh, Christ.
With each Romania voting for them.
Oh, damn.
What was the issue?
Exactly as we wanted it, withdrawal and ceasefire.
And do the Russians vote the other way?
Of course.
And the Indians?
Yes, the Russians, the Indians, and East European communists.
Yeah.
And a few border states of India, Bhutan, and Nepal.
Oh, what the hell.
They are practically... Well, they shouldn't be in the United States.
Exactly.
Well, Nepal is all right, but they're scared to death.
Well, isn't that a... Now, doesn't that prove something?
Well, we ought to...
I mean, it's the goddamn, I must say...
These churches, Henry, and these Kennedys and the New York Times and Rust and Time, look at that boat, shouldn't they?
Well, Helen Thomas came up to me this evening and said, thank God for what you did at the background.
Did she?
Yeah.
She got the point, huh?
Yeah.
She said she's going to ride on it for the next three days.
Good.
But did she get the point that... She said we should have done it three weeks ago.
Well...
We weren't in a position to claim it.
We weren't in a position to claim Indian aggression.
Well, we could have done all the stuff saying what we've done among Pakistanis.
They're refugees, but we've been saying it, but nobody really would write it, would they?
Well, we've got to keep after it now.
I think they'll order it tomorrow.
You know, these damn liberals, what can they say?
Security Council 11 to 2 and the General Assembly 100 and...
Yeah, well, is anybody questioning whether that vote, do they realize that is on the issue we've been talking about?
It really is against India, isn't it, this vote?
Oh, yes.
It's exactly what we've recommended.
The British and French have said, I can understand the French and British.
We ought to put it to him that if he gives it up, we will have no choice but to treat him like just another country.
Well, we're treating him like just another country anyway.
The way they're acting, I mean, what the hell?
You know, when you come right down to it, why should we stand up for him on something like Rhodesia, which really affects boats in our country, whereas something like Pakistan doesn't sure as hell affect boats in England?
If John Connolly told you, gosh, I must have told you,
They were the toughest in Rome.
Oh, yes, yes, yes.
He talked, I know, about that.
They were tougher than Mark, as I put it, Mark, John, I said they were more gallows than the French.
Well, this boat is good, though.
This is a good boat.
It's a magic boat, and, you know, people worried about influence in the U.N. Yeah?
Of course, the Chinese swung a few boats our way, too, by then.
You think they did?
Oh, sure.
I think I'll paint your mood, of course, with us.
It's one of the big victories.
You know, it won't get us anything.
Yeah.
Except if, as the basis was recently in the season four, then we can now take another slice of bait out of it.
Because they said in effect, withdrawal and... And ceasefire.
Ceasefire and withdrawal.
That's right.
They call on both sides to cease fire and withdraw from the Confederate territory.
And the Indians have just said, lightly, they will not do that.
Correct.
That's right.
The security council was vetoed, so it had no form of standing, but still it was 11 to 2.
And those miserable liberals, I had been invited to go to Harvard on Thursday.
They were going to give a reconciliation, of course.
Oh, is that right?
Did they change their minds?
Not all day.
Galbraith gave an interview to the judge in which he said the dinner is for me, not as a board of your policy, so I canceled the dinner.
Oh, Galbraith, of course, is a pro-Indian all the way.
And when I canceled the dinner, he said, well, you can't pass moral judgment.
What in the name of God did they do?
What about Portugal?
What about Cambodia?
When we went into Cambodia, where we were defending our own troops and American tribes.
Boy, isn't that the truth.
See, that's a very good analogy.
Come to think about it, that we went into Cambodia, but we were solely going into the surface, defending our own forces.
But we were being attacked from there, as a matter of fact.
And at the invitation of the government.
The invitation of the government.
They have more evidence.
This is a number of them.
No, they have a double standard.
But nevertheless, nevertheless, this U.N. vote must have some significance that we can get people to talk about it.
And we must have shaken Gresham up a bit, too, because he's canceled his trip to Warsaw and flown back to Moscow.
Yes, just a second.
Yeah, go ahead, Rod.
You must have asked.
He's canceled his, he's cut short his stay in Moscow, in Warsaw, and flown back to Moscow.
Yeah.
I mean, we should have sent him a real stemwinder of a letter, very polite, but...
You know, the thing that I like about this is the moral.
And Gopar said we should judge what the people of the U.N. did and then that too.
Oh, yeah.
The Indian lovers are a breed apart.
But by God, they don't rule in the U.N., do they?
No.
No, so if world opinion amounts to anything, I don't believe it does.
Yeah.
Well, let's let it amount to something when it's on our side.
You know, like I said, use the U.S. when we can.
It's always been used against us.
Now, for once, we're going to use it for what we can.
Huh?
I'm glad to hear that.
I'm glad to hear that.
Well, anyway, I think it's a good thing you look at the background.
I'm sure it had a good effect.
Of course, as you know, as you know, it's... Oh, well, the wires...
The most important thing is, as you know, the race is holy hell with the liberals.
It's a funny thing.
I don't know.
This vote, though, this vote.
I think we ought to go on the attack now against Kennedy and Trudeau.
Maybe we ought to, not only we,
Why, in the name of God, can't we get Scott and some of those guys ready?
They feel that way.
That's right.
They ought to do it.
I'll get a hold of them.
Figure what you do.
I think the folks will tell him to stir up some of those guys.
You'll know how.
By God, they ought to really go on and slice him up.
Let Agnew try.
What do you think?
I think we ought to do it.
Because we'll turn out to be on the right side of this, and the Indians will look worse and worse.
What do you think is going to happen?
I think they'll take it.
I think there'll be a massacre.
You mean they will take Eastpac?
Yeah.
I don't think they'll leave.
Oh, yes, that's right.
Then what will they do about Westpac?
They'll move through there, and then you think they'll force Westpac?
No, they may also receive fire at Westpac.
After smashing the army, they'll smash the Westpac.
They'll do that, too.
There's fighting going about as well.

— 1 min 6 s with no transcribed speech —

Well, it'll be an interesting morning.
Okay, Henry, thank you.

Also recorded on December 7, 1971

  • 631-009 6:10 PM · 5 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Alexander P. Butterfield met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 6:10 pm and 6:28 pm.
  • 631-010 6:10 PM · 13 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Alexander P. Butterfield met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 6:10 pm and 6:28 pm.
  • 631-011 6:28 PM · 33 min — President Richard M. Nixon, H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman, Ronald L. Ziegler, unknown person(s), White House operator, and William P. Rogers met in the Oval Office of the White House from 6:28 pm to 7:04 pm.
  • 016-036 6:51 PM · 5 min — President Richard M. Nixon and William P. Rogers talked on the telephone from 6:51 pm to 6:55 pm.
  • 631-012 7:04 PM · 19 sec — Stephen B. Bull and unknown person(s) met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 7:04 pm and 7:07 pm.
  • 016-038 11:41 PM · 6 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 11:41 pm and 11:45 pm.
  • 016-039 11:45 PM · 23 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger talked on the telephone from 11:45 pm to 11:46 pm.
  • 016-040 11:52 PM · 3 min — President Richard M. Nixon, White House operator, and Henry A. Kissinger talked on the telephone from 11:52 pm to 11:54 pm.

All 18 conversations from December 7, 1971 →

Cite this conversation

Conversation 016-037, December 7, 1971. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives (NAID 417191323). Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/016-037 (accessed November 1, 2026).