Nixon White House Tapes › Tape 937 › Conversation 937-015

Nixon & Scowcroft on Vietnam negotiations and Paris Peace Accords

Tuesday, June 12, 1973 · 11:17 AM–11:31 AM ET · Oval Office · 14 min

ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President); Scowcroft, Brent G. (Gen.)Conversation937-015 on Tape 937StartTuesday, June 12, 1973 at 11:17 AMEndTuesday, June 12, 1973 at 11:31 AMRecording deviceOval OfficeSourceNixon Library record for 937-015 ↗

AI Summary

President Nixon and General Brent Scowcroft met to discuss the status of stalled Vietnam peace negotiations, specifically focusing on Henry Kissinger’s ongoing efforts in Paris to finalize a communiqué. The conversation centered on South Vietnam’s refusal to accept proposed language regarding elections and territorial zones of control, which the President viewed as minor procedural hurdles. Nixon and Scowcroft expressed deep concern that a failure to reach an agreement would alienate Congress and accelerate U.S. isolationism, potentially jeopardizing the long-term survival of the South Vietnamese government.

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NARA Description

On June 12, 1973, President Richard M. Nixon and Gen. Brent G. Scowcroft met in the Oval Office of the White House from 11:17 am to 11:31 am. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 937-015 of the White House Tapes.

Nixon Library Finding Aid

Conversation No. 937-15

Date: June 12, 1973
Time: 11:17 am - 11:31 am
Location: Oval Office

The President met with Gen. Brent G. Scowcroft.

     Vietnam negotiations
          -Henry A. Kissinger’s meeting in Paris
          -South Vietnam’s position
               -Elections article in communiqué
               -Terminology
                                -27-

       NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                               Conversation No. 937-15 (cont’d)

-Wording of possible communiqué
      -Statement on elections
-Scowcroft’s conversation with ambassador Tran Kim Phoung, June 13, 1973
      -Validity of agreement
-Scowcroft’s forthcoming telephone call to Phoung
      -President’s views
             -Elections article
             -Nguyen Van Thieu
                    -Letter
      -Possible Congressional response
             -North Vietnam
             -Missing in Action [MIA]
      -President’s possible statement
             -Timing
                    -Kissinger
                          -Paris
-Kissinger
      -Two-party document
             -Value
-Potential failure to reach agreement
      -Possible duration
-Popular interest
      -Prisoners of War [POWs]
      -Draft
-Forthcoming Leonid I. Brezhnev visit
-Implications of possible failure
Show the rest of the log (38 more lines)
      -Congress
             -Thailand, Cambodia, Laos
-Survival of South Vietnam
      -Army
-Status of Paris meeting
-Communiqué
-South Vietnam’s view
      -Elections
      -Zones of control
      -Partitions
      -Psychology
                                             -28-

                   NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                                            Conversation No. 937-15 (cont’d)

           -US neo-isolationism
                 -Impact on Europe
                 -Defense spending
                 -Effects
                       -Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR]
           -President’s conversation with Phuong
           -President’s messages to Thieu
                 -Congressional support
                 -Phuong’s role
           -Kissinger’s meeting in Paris
                 -Communiqué
                 -North Vietnam
           -Possible failure
                 -Congressional response
                 -North Vietnam’s depiction of meeting
           -South Vietnam’s position
           -Henry M. (“Scoop”) Jackson
           -Outcome
           -Informing President

Scowcroft left at 11:31 am.

Transcript (AI-generated)

This transcript was generated automatically by AI (WhisperX) and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Names and numbers are often wrong; speakers are not identified. Do not cite it as authoritative — verify against the audio and the finding aid.

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Well, I guess that's a hell of a time, huh?
That's a hell of a time.
Yeah?
Is he broken up yet?
No, they're still meeting.
They're still meeting.
What are they meeting about?
Well, the GBN came in with two propositions.
One was to insert the article from the agreement about elections into the communique.
And the other one was to complain about the
the terminology of zones of control, joining zones of control.
That I think they fall off on.
My guess is that what Henry is working on is to try to get the statement on elections inserted into the communique in hopes that the GDN will come by.
It's fairly innocuous.
You know, we have quoted, the communique now does contain other quotations and problems, I'm pretty sure.
But, of course, the license is the one that the DRP is sensitive about right now.
Well, if you're going to be in the election, you may know that.
Of course.
Of course.
So why do you object?
But the way it could be handled, essentially, would you say this communication in a way that it aggregates any of these subjects?
And, as a matter of fact, it does contain language like that.
And, of course, both sides are equal.
And I called Professor Fong at the end of the day, and I said, you know, look, whether it's in there or whether it isn't in there.
The agreement is still completely valid.
The President will say something about it.
That's right.
And we have given out those.
It's hard to watch until we call in the folks and tell them to talk to me and that I will make a public statement to the effect that the article with regard to the elections is in.
Or some kind of a secret public statement that I, the President himself, would say the article with regard to that is in.
I'm going to write the President a letter to that effect, too.
Tell him.
They've got to get this thing done.
Well, it really mystifies me why they're hung up on these two reports.
Neither one of which means anything.
Neither one of them.
It mystifies me for reasons and barriers in our arms.
We don't want them to fall.
You know very well that there is not the Congress will go up the wall and they'll play right in the hands of our enemies.
If I'm always able to land some Vietnam to fail, to agree, to strengthen the rigament on everything like MIA and everything else that I've got.
That's right.
Good heavens.
And how many of you want to give me anything?
Either side.
That's right.
Either side.
That's right.
And we're going to have a terrible fight.
And Pete thinks for one minute that he's just going to sit there and get it.
He's out of his mind.
So they're looking down the gun barrel right now.
There's no question.
And we know, for example, that Ambassador Flong has reported quite accurately.
It's a conversation with you and the ones that we've had.
It's just hard to figure out what's in their minds.
They just seem to be... What if he helped the White House?
Maybe it isn't helpful.
If you want to, you can tell Ambassador Flong, the President of the United States of America, the White House of America, the United States of America, I hear you do this very well.
Well, I'll... Let me see where we are.
I suspect, you know, that by the time we can get back there for the message and get turned around to Paris, it's probably going to be over one way or another.
But I'll hold that, and if it looks like that would turn the trick, then we can do it.
It's...
I see it.
Either that's what Andy's working on now, or trying to figure out some formula for a two-party document that we can agree to without...
Okay, but I don't think that...
They can agree with you.
I don't think so.
And that's of no real value to us anyway.
Because it's the other two parties that have to convince themselves.
Well, supposedly you don't get it.
Can we go back to what the previous agreement was?
That's right.
That's right.
It just says that we are unable to reach agreement.
We'll continue to work on it.
That's right.
That's right.
I think that's right.
It'll be a, it'll be a, well, some estimates will say a terrible, terrible thing.
It isn't terrible.
I mean, it is, it's too bad in certain areas.
But as far as the public interest is concerned, it's a little shit.
They don't want to hear about the war.
They don't want to hear about the parents.
That's true.
Beth Peel had his back on the troops out of there, and he asked all their good heavens, and they all thank God.
You know, let's face it.
So there's no question about that.
So we don't need to be as desperate a concern as we were in December and January.
Oh, oh, it's a time of...
It might be time to get it all done.
But if we don't get it done, then we'll all be in pressure now.
I think the key problem, if we don't get it done, is going to be with the Congress.
There's going to be growing opposition to South Vietnam and to arguing that we can't help them.
All over South, we should visit this country.
Of course, South Vietnam involves everything the Congress wants to get out of it.
They want to get out of it.
This will be another argument to get out.
We've tried.
We can't do any more.
Let's just get out and cut our losses.
I think that, that would be the impact.
So on the other hand, there was one battle that we fought for four years to keep that going.
In other words, that battle all along, you could sink the whole thing, get out and probably go down the drain.
Well, of course, that would be the tragedy if this, if this contributes to it on such a daily basis.
Do you think they're going to survive for a while?
Oh, yes.
They're quite strong.
I think their army has now quite a good deal of a spree.
They think they can handle it.
And I think they're in pretty good shape right now.
But over the long term, if we can't shore them, it's hardly really possible.
Oh, there's no question about that.
No question about that.
This communicate how much it would help, it's difficult to say.
So I think there's still an outside chance that we might get something that we wouldn't still be needing.
Okay, but we're really, let's, what did I say, what did you say?
No, four or five articles.
Five articles.
So there's no question that they're grappling with the substance, and I guess, my guess is it's on this one point.
No significance one way or another, really.
It just doesn't matter what it is.
Well, the zones of control, I understand, they think that's a partition.
Of course it's a partition.
They're so confused on that.
It is a partition, but it's in fact a partition right now.
They came out last month and started pressing for defining zones of control.
They did.
And so then we said, fine, that's a good idea.
And now they're afraid of legitimizing the split of the country into two parts.
But it's very carefully categorized in the community.
The two parties have to agree on who controls what, and that they'll never be able to do.
They agree on where they'll station these two-party teams.
It doesn't have to be along the zones of control.
So it really does not tie into that anymore.
It's a psychological problem.
And I can understand your concern on that point.
by comparison of what they're risking.
They've got to take a harder look at the American psychology at the moment, which is basically new isolationist, bug-out psychology, not only for them, but for Europe.
That's our common thing, isn't it?
We've seen armistice events that they're talking about.
There's a feeling of withdrawal in this country, which, except for us, would lead us to a disastrous policy.
or weakening ourselves by socialism.
And in fact, we give the Russians a very heavy look at what we do.
That's right.
That's right.
I don't think it's any less than that.
But if it weren't, as you say, if it weren't for your strength, we'd all be way down the road.
Yeah.
Yeah.
It'd just be a disaster.
Yeah.
But how do you convince the GVN?
Well, we've tried.
And as I say, we know that the ambassador is recording these quite accurately.
And that doesn't happen.
It doesn't particularly make a difference.
That's right.
Well, as I say, I think the fact that he's still meeting with me gives me an outside chance that we'll be able to salvage him.
Well, knowing Henry's determination as well as his great ability to find other paths
I don't think that's a true part of the thing.
Well, I don't think it's, it's not very advantageous.
I can't imagine the North agreeing to it.
It's not very advantageous to us.
Well, it might be better if we had any kind of agreement.
It would be better if by nothing at all sides agreed that we would do this and that, you know, if people had to go meet again with regards to the GBM and other GBM technology.
Anything would be better than having to say we have the talks and they haven't done anything.
That is what I'm concerned about.
And that they don't become... Well, and that's the problem because, well, we don't have to say anything.
Just that we had talks and who couldn't agree, who couldn't agree.
The North is going to come out in gold.
And they're going to say, we had an agreement with the United States, and it was silent for weeks.
They'll be sure that the true story comes out.
And the consequences that we all fear are coming.
I don't know.
I just don't understand why the GDN can't see that.
At that point, he said, just so maybe.
We tried and tried and tried.
We got into it and tried.
So in that practice, there's no...
He's chilling.
No time to give up.
No time to enjoy the army or the little boys.
They don't want Jackson going home.
Oh, no, he...
You, the country, just too much for replying.
It's a question of what the world would look like.
That's right.
That's right.
Certainly doesn't make it any easier.
Well...
Thank you.

Also recorded on June 12, 1973

  • 040-026 10:34 AM · 3 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Howard Morgan talked on the telephone from 10:34 am to 10:37 am.
  • 937-014 11:15 AM · 12 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and unknown person(s) met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 11:15 am and 11:17 am.
  • 040-027 11:31 AM · 10 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 11:31 am and 11:34 am.
  • 937-016 11:31 AM · 10 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and White House operator met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 11:31 am and 11:44 am.
  • 937-017 11:31 AM · 18 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and unknown person(s) met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 11:31 am and 11:44 am.
  • 040-028 11:44 AM · 11 min — President Richard M. Nixon and J. Fred Buzhardt, Jr. talked on the telephone from 11:44 am to 11:54 am.
  • 937-018 11:44 AM · 12 min — President Richard M. Nixon and J. Fred Buzhardt, Jr. met in the Oval Office of the White House from 11:44 am to 11:54 am.
  • 937-019 11:57 AM · 42 min — President Richard M. Nixon, Alexander M. Haig, Jr., and Manolo Sanchez met in the Oval Office of the White House from 11:57 am to 12:36 pm.

All 85 conversations from June 12, 1973 →

Cite this conversation

Conversation 937-015, June 12, 1973. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives. Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/937-015 (accessed October 30, 2026).