Nixon White House Tapes › Tape 33 › Conversation 033-089

Nixon phone call with Kissinger on Vietnam War and Paris Peace Accords

Saturday, November 18, 1972 · 12:02 PM–12:08 PM ET · White House Telephone · 7 min

ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President); Kissinger, Henry A.Conversation033-089 on Tape 33StartSaturday, November 18, 1972 at 12:02 PMEndSaturday, November 18, 1972 at 12:08 PMRecording deviceWhite House TelephoneSourceNixon Library record for 033-089 ↗ · National Archives Catalog, NAID 417194393 ↗

AI Summary

President Nixon and Henry Kissinger discussed the ongoing Vietnam peace negotiations, specifically addressing concerns that the South Vietnamese government was attempting to delay or obstruct the process. Kissinger reported that Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker was encountering resistance from South Vietnamese officials, but the pair agreed that the U.S. could not delay the Paris negotiations or risk an open break with Saigon at this stage. Nixon instructed Kissinger to maintain a firm stance and finalize the best possible agreement, opting to manage the South Vietnamese response after the terms in Paris were settled.

Audio

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NARA Description

On November 18, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger talked on the telephone from 12:02 pm to 12:08 pm. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 033-089 of the White House Tapes.

Nixon Library Finding Aid

Conversation No. 33-89

Date: November 18, 1972
Time: 12:02 pm - 12:08 pm
Location: White House Telephone

Henry A. Kissinger talked with the President.

       Kissinger's location
             -Washington, DC

       President's schedule
             -Dictation

       David Ben-Gurion
            -Letter to the President
                  -Sense of history
                  -Vietnam
                  -The President's People’s Republic of China [PRC] trip
            -Acquaintance with Kissinger

       John J. McCloy
             -Letter to the President
                   -Comparison with Abraham Lincoln
                          -Civil War
                          -Doves

       Vietnam negotiations
                                              - 91 -

                            NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY

                                                                   Conversation No. 33-114 (cont’d)

            -South Vietnamese response
                   -Telephone call from Ellsworth F. Bunker
                          -Message
                   -US response
                   -Memorandum to Bunker
                          -Objection to settlement agreement
                                 -William H. Sullivan
                   -Presidential response
                          -Possible letter
                   -Paris
                          -Settlement agreement text
Show the rest of the log (45 more lines)
                   -Bunker
                   -Negotiations
                          -Delay
                   -Hanoi
                   -Nguyen Van Thieu's Options
            -Settlement agreement
                   -US options
                          -Bilateral action
                   -Cease-fire
                          -Laos, Cambodia
                   -South Vietnam’s bargaining position
                          -Kissinger’s forthcoming trip to Paris
                                 -Announcement
                          -Bunker's response
            -Cambodia

*****************************************************************

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 1
[National Security (B) withdrawal reviewed under MDR guidelines case number LPRN-T-MDR-
2014-013. Segment exempt per Executive Order 13526, 3.3(b)(1) on 04/11/2018. Archivist: DR]
[National Security]
[033-089-w001]
[Duration: 3s]

       CAMBODIA
                                            - 92 -

                           NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY

                                                           Conversation No. 33-114 (cont’d)

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 1

*****************************************************************

       Vietnam negotiations
            -Cambodia
                   -Norodom Sihanouk
                        -Relations with North Vietnamese
                        -Comment to Algerian ambassador
                              -Soviet Union
            -Settlement agreement
            -Alexander M. Haig, Jr's position on South Vietnam
            -South Vietnamese position

Transcript (AI-generated)

This transcript was generated automatically by AI (WhisperX) and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Names and numbers are often wrong; speakers are not identified. Do not cite it as authoritative — verify against the audio and the finding aid.

Download transcript (.txt) · JSON data

Click a timestamp to play from that point; the page address then links to that moment (e.g. #t=125).

Mr. President, I have Dr. Kissinger calling you now.
Fine.
Thank you.
President on the line, sir.
Hi, Henry.
Mr. President, you in New York or Washington?
No, I'm here.
Oh, fine, fine.
I'm just back dictating about scores of letters to my friends.
Boy, I've told you, nobody knows after an election how much you've got to do on that.
I've got to work that in in my spare time.
But I had to come down here to finish off a lot of them.
I had a very nice letter from Ben Gurion, you know.
Oh, isn't that nice?
I wrote him a note, and he, with his great sense of history, hell, he didn't talk about Vietnam or the other thing.
He said the greatest moment was China.
And he said, because by that you may help to bring about the day when the peoples of the world can—well, he didn't put it this way.
I did.
People of the world can be friends and so forth, you know.
But I mean, with that
But the old man's like an Old Testament prophet.
Do you know him?
Yes, yes.
He's a remarkable man.
Yeah.
Yes, I've met him.
Go ahead.
What do you have?
We've also had a really very warm letter, which I'm sending to you from McCloy.
Oh, yeah.
Which compares what you went through with what Lincoln went through during the Civil War.
And they are a version of the Dove.
So I've sent it over to you.
Uh-huh.
And you might want to take a look on it.
What I wanted to mention and check with you is, we had a phone call from Bunker, we haven't had the actual message yet, saying that now apparently the South Vietnamese are beginning to kick over the traces again.
Oh, Christ.
And I believe that we just have to continue now and get the best agreement we can, and then face them with it afterwards.
How are they kicking it over?
Well, they've apparently submitted a memorandum to him, which he just said the news is not good, and their ambassador here has also raised some questions with Sullivan.
It's their old pattern.
What they always do is they first read what you give them, then they raise a few technical objections, and then they just keep escalating it.
Well, shall I send him another letter?
No, I think we now have to wait, Mr. President, until we see at least what's going to happen in Paris.
And once we have the text of an agreement in Paris, we'll have a new situation.
So Bunker says that they're kicking over the traces and just being unreasonable as hell.
Is that it, Curt?
That seems to be the case.
But we can't delay the negotiation, and we can't tell Hanoi that we're having trouble.
No, sir.
We're going to play it like an accordion.
All right.
When you really come down to it, though, I just can't see how Chew's got any other choice.
God damn it.
We've told him we're doing everything we can, and that's going to be it.
But on the other hand, the idea of just making a bilateral thing, Henry, is...
It's repugnant.
It's repugnant because we lose everything we've done.
You know what I mean?
People said we could have done that years ago.
Well, if we can get a ceasefire in Laos and Cambodia, and we can, of course, say we've put them in a position where they can defend themselves.
But it's going to be a miserable exercise.
Well, it may not be.
You just can't tell.
We do it bilaterally.
This may be bargaining on their part, knowing that you're going to Paris.
Basically, I really don't know where the hell they're going to go.
And they're still making all the preparations as if there will be a ceasefire.
Right.
I know, sir.
But I just wanted to check with you whether it is in accord with your...
your views that we proceed negotiating.
We can't wait any longer for coordinating.
Well, what would be the choice otherwise?
I mean, you wouldn't go?
That's right, and ask for another delay, but I think that's almost impossible.
Well, you couldn't do that.
I mean, not after all, but I would simply go—you mean they—don't you really think they're trying to strengthen the bargaining position before you go to Paris, isn't it?
Or— I think that's one possibility, that they're just trying to prove that if they're going to cave, they're going to do it afterwards, not before.
And probably that they figure since they'll get less than what they agreed to, they better ask for more.
Well, I think you tell Bunker to play it damn tough.
He is, isn't he?
Oh, yeah.
In which Shianook says that, uh,
his interests were completely sold out by the North Vietnamese.
He said this to the Algerian ambassador.
It was one of the most shocking examples.
And it's an example of U.S.-Soviet pressure, and that it's the Soviets who pressed the North Vietnamese into yielding.
Well, go right ahead on the same track.
Do the very best that you can.
Haig has no doubts about going ahead now, does he?
Oh, no.
No, no.
He's completely with it.
And feels that we have to do it.
Haig is against an open break with them before the negotiation, as I am.
Oh, absolutely.
Yeah, no.
Go negotiate now.
When they kick over the treasurer, they're making public statements.
No.
No, no.
This is a private communication.
Yeah, yeah.
All right.
Just go ahead.
Do the very best you can.
Get the very best agreement you can.
That's all right.
Okay.
Okay.
Fine, Henry.
Fine.

Also recorded on November 18, 1972

  • 033-084 11:45 AM · 6 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 11:45 am and 11:47 am.
  • 033-085 11:47 AM · 12 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at 11:47 am.
  • 033-086 11:55 AM · 7 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 11:55 am and 11:57 am.
  • 033-087 11:55 AM · 21 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 11:55 am and 11:57 am.
  • 033-088 11:57 AM · 4 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Leonard Garment talked on the telephone from 11:57 am to 12:01 pm.
  • 033-090 12:12 PM · 2 min — President Richard M. Nixon and John D. Ehrlichman talked on the telephone from 12:12 pm to 12:13 pm.
  • 033-091 12:13 PM · 7 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 12:13 pm and 12:15 pm.
  • 033-092 12:15 PM · 5 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger talked on the telephone from 12:15 pm to 12:20 pm.

All 36 conversations from November 18, 1972 →

Cite this conversation

Conversation 033-089, November 18, 1972. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives (NAID 417194393). Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/033-089 (accessed October 30, 2026).