Nixon White House Tapes › Topic
Nixon Tapes on Diplomatic strategy
111 conversations · page 2 of 2 · frequently with Nixon, Kissinger, White House photographer, Moynihan
President Nixon met with incoming Ambassador to India Daniel P. Moynihan to discuss the strategy and tone required for his diplomatic mission, emphasizing the need for a cool, pragmatic relationship that balances U.S. interests in India with those in Pakistan and the People's Republic of China. Nixon instructed Moynihan to circumvent standard bureaucracy by using private, secure channels for sensitive communication while maintaining a non-partisan stance as a Democrat to signal U.S. bipartisan support. They also addressed specific policy issues, including the restriction of military arms sales to South Asia, the management of surplus wheat, and the resolution of long-standing debt and foreign aid agreements.
President Nixon and Henry Kissinger coordinated the preparation for Secretary of State William P. Rogers' upcoming testimony regarding foreign relations. The discussion confirmed that Rogers had been briefed on the imminent release of a U.S.-People's Republic of China communiqué. They agreed that providing Rogers with the text by the following afternoon was the appropriate strategy to handle potential congressional inquiries on the matter.
President Nixon and Henry Kissinger discussed various foreign policy matters, including the successful release of American POWs from Vietnam and the positive reception of Kissinger's recent dinner with China correspondents. They analyzed global monetary instability, agreeing that the U.S. should adopt a firm posture toward European nations regarding currency negotiations while leveraging recent positive developments with Japan. Additionally, they reviewed logistical adjustments to the President's schedule and diplomatic obligations, including a planned visit to the State Department and the rescheduling of a White House diplomatic dinner.
President Nixon initiated this call to urge Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau to maintain Canada's participation in the International Commission of Control and Supervision (ICCS) in Vietnam, arguing that Canada's presence was essential for ensuring compliance with peace agreements. Trudeau expressed concern about the political feasibility of an indefinite commitment given opposition within the Canadian Parliament and suggested that a temporary extension might be the only viable compromise. The two leaders also discussed managing U.S.-Canadian trade relations to avoid public perceptions of pressure, with Nixon promising that Treasury Secretary George Shultz would coordinate directly with his Canadian counterpart to foster cooperation.
President Nixon and Henry Kissinger met to discuss diplomatic strategy, specifically focusing on the status of Vietnam and the upcoming schedule for General Alexander M. Haig, Jr. The discussion included the formulation of official statements and considerations regarding U.S. relations with the Soviet Union. The participants evaluated the effectiveness of recent diplomatic maneuvers and established parameters for future communications.
President Nixon met with David K. E. Bruce to discuss Bruce’s upcoming mission to the People’s Republic of China, emphasizing the strategic importance of the U.S.-PRC relationship as a counterbalance to the Soviet Union. The two men reviewed geopolitical dynamics, including the situations in Cambodia, Japan, and India, while Nixon reiterated the need to maintain a strong U.S. military presence in Europe to reassure Chinese leadership. Nixon directed Bruce to operate as his personal envoy, utilizing back channels to bypass standard bureaucratic hurdles within the State Department.
President Nixon and Henry Kissinger discuss logistics and planning for the upcoming visit of Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, specifically focusing on the itinerary for Camp David and the presidential yacht, the Sequoia. Kissinger updates the President on the Soviet Union's attempt to offer a non-aggression treaty to China, noting that the Chinese rejected the overture due to their ongoing relationship with the United States. The participants resolve to maintain flexibility regarding the Brezhnev schedule while ensuring the Soviet leader's security concerns are addressed.
President Nixon and Henry Kissinger met to coordinate the upcoming visit of Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev and manage the accompanying diplomatic strategy, including the preparation of communiqués and the involvement of U.S. allies. A significant portion of the discussion focused on scheduling a briefing for Senator J. William Fulbright and his committee, which Kissinger ultimately moved to the following morning to ensure he could provide a more comprehensive and detailed update. The participants also discussed the necessity of maintaining international perceptions and the importance of presenting a unified administrative stance regarding ongoing negotiations.
President Nixon and Henry Kissinger coordinated a strategic communication effort to influence Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev ahead of his upcoming visit. Kissinger was instructed to contact Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin to convey that Congressional leaders held a positive reaction toward the President's diplomatic initiatives, specifically emphasizing the progress on Most Favored Nation (MFN) status. This action aimed to reassure the Soviet leadership and build momentum for negotiations despite delays in the summit's business agenda.
President Nixon and Henry Kissinger met briefly in the Oval Office to continue discussions regarding ongoing international negotiations or intelligence matters. The dialogue, which appears to be a segment of a broader exchange, focuses on the strategic feasibility of obtaining specific terms or information. No definitive policy shift is finalized in this short duration, as the participants weigh the necessity and availability of their objectives.
President Nixon, Henry Kissinger, and West German Foreign Minister Walter Scheel met to coordinate a unified Western strategy for the upcoming "Year of Europe" initiative. The participants discussed the importance of balancing Atlantic partnership with European cooperation, emphasizing the need for a substantive, philosophically grounded declaration rather than a mere procedural communique. They also explored leveraging the Soviet Union's interest in an all-European summit to secure diplomatic concessions, while stressing the importance of maintaining close, personal channels of communication with European allies—particularly France and Great Britain—to ensure a cohesive stance.