Nixon, Mansfield & Kissinger on People's Republic of China

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I always take my own friends, you know that.

Well, the main thing is, as I said, you know, this bomb is crazy, isn't it?

He's taking me down, taking me on hard.

The other is not so.

Good job.

So you've got to get him around the fight where he doesn't assign you no time.

Because you made that good advice last time.

That's the way to do it.

So if you don't get him on the lead, we're over.

See, that's why.

But you made that very claim.

You didn't really say you wanted him to stay.

You said it's hard for him to leave under attack.

And that's why you did it so delicately.

You want my treasure, do you see?

I was a baker and a baker and a baker.

I didn't think people would accept it.

you know, basically to be good

That's what they use.

Everything should be in time.

If we play this, if we time this right, the sequence I now see is he's a poet on the first proposition.

He thinks, and I think he's right, that we don't give them the date the first time.

We just say we are willing to give them a date if they're willing to buy the package.

Then the second time I give them the date, then if they turn it down, then when you meet you,

He thinks that you will agree to a joint announcement.

But who?

In which he asks you to withdraw by, say, October 1st, 72.

Is there an announcement, sir?

Well, sorry, why not?

Well, conditional on another thing.

Well, if they have turned it down, well, then they'll turn it down.

Then we're not committed to it, but at least then you've offered it.

We'll only offer it.

Publicly, you said a joint announcement would be made after they turned it down.

Well, my feeling is that if they accept it,

If they accept it, then we can make it as a joint announcement knowing it will be accepted.

If they turn it down, we should still make it as a joint announcement, get it turned down.

A joint offer.

Then we get it.

and that ceasefire prison, I'm gonna have to sit here and sit on my desk.

So I think we've come to a stand flat, we're gonna be down there, but don't get too tired of that.

Oh, all right, good morning.

Well, why didn't you take your weight or something?

They said, no, no, no.

Well, I mean, it's both caroling, so I'm gonna move it across the field.

There's a letter with a copy of a speech that Kennedy liked to look at.

It was made on the first national election year of the University of 1969, which

I'm dreaming and it seems to me that it fits in almost perfectly with what the President has done up to this time.

The Senator has made sign up for that match and they would like to hear this next year.

Well, I ask you to protect me against your company and your national promotion and I would not like to fail you in that decision.

I got it.

Take the gate directly.

First of all, hide in the gate.

In the light of our China policy, a direct visit to China in our agency, I think what I would do in this instance, I think it would be very important.

I would not like for you to make the offer publicly.

I would do it privately so that it doesn't give them, put them on the spot publicly.

You see, we've got these problems.

We were nurturing a very...

Now, just thinking out loud here, I think there's a chance, it seems to me, there's a chance they will bite on this.

I think the way to do it is direct.

I think it seems like you suggested you're never here.

Do you know me already?

No?

Yeah.

George Hay, the farmer ambassador here.

He used to know me from school.

But it seems to me that it is totally consistent.

With our objectives on China for you to make a visit, I think it would be, however, not a good thing to have them publicly turn you down.

And it would appear that the thing was cool.

No, Henry, do you, I haven't discussed this properly, because I knew you didn't have this this morning, but how does it sound to you?

What's the matter?

How should the game be played?

That's really going to make it sound too well.

I mean, the Senate, I had not talked to the Senate.

Ideally, if we could develop it, the idea would be...

I have a response to you.

You're the perfect man to call me.

I see nothing wrong.

Why not just make some people a little bit, have a dissent to send this kid, but then try to, and then back it up by, I could talk to the Dominican ambassador and say that, uh, that that

just suddenly that this would be very useful to have a plan.

You see, that might be very intriguing to the Chinese.

The fact is that we support the opposition to gathering a majority

The thing that concerns me, Mr. President, is that I know three or four senators who have made requests, and they've probably been approved by the State Department but not approved by P.K.

There may be another immediate

take upon the invitation.

You don't know who's going over or what group.

You don't know what the effect would be.

And it might react favorably, but by the same token, it might react unfairly.

And this way would relieve you of responsibility as far as I would be concerned.

You would be aware of it, but not necessarily with your approval or disapproval.

Thank you.

Well, as far as I'm concerned, I approve it completely.

As a matter of fact, it's your idea.

I approve it completely.

I think it's an excellent idea.

But, uh, so there's no concern about that because you're going over there to talk and see what's going on.

Let me ask Henry, what is this new, uh, what is this new insurance with the other matter?

Right.

Just, do you think this... Well, I think if we send it as an official MSN, then that's... Let me say, we're not, while the Russians naturally are watching this, and we're not going to, and we expect to, I don't want to do something

People say, why don't I send them serious, which is a direct kick at the Russians, where they could then say, well, it's all, maybe it's an arrest, they're going to cool off.

See, I want, we've got to, we've got to play both.

I want you to emphasize at the very beginning, the presidency, the moves you're going to make would be unilateral, so that they wouldn't have to react in a way which could be critical.

Your statement down in the Senate was very good, or it was, where you said, well, this is a good beginning.

In other words, it's their first step.

We've taken several.

It's their first.

The situation of what you're trying to do.

Now, we're not going to go overboard on the other.

Now, you see, for example, the questions immediately come up.

I'm not trying to say what you should say.

You should take your positions based on what you have said before.

But they immediately raised the question, when I was talking to the editors last night, well, now what about now that you've done this, how about, how about an admission, admission from the Red Chinese, or the Republicans from the United States?

How about recognition?

So I went right back and said, now look, we have taken several steps.

They have taken the first steps.

We are prepared to take other steps in the field of trade as they take steps.

Travel now is open for virtually to China like anybody else.

Trade, we've opened a number of items and we've got another list, which this is in confidence, which I'm planning in about three months.

It provided everything else.

We can speed it up.

We may make it two months.

See what I mean?

If they go, we do.

But you see, we've got three packages.

This is the first time.

Three little packages.

This is on the trade side.

We have another package.

We have two more packages on trade that we're ready to go with, and we'll move over to the next region.

But we want to, knowing the East, and particularly knowing the Chinese, if we appear as an administration over-anxious, then they hate above.

So what we're trying to do is to go step by step.

down there, or on normalization relations.

As I said last night, our long-range goal is normalization relations with China and Egypt.

And also, our long-range goal is to end the isolation of China from the Indian nations.

But that will come over a period of time.

So I'm not going to cross those bridges.

See, if I were to make a statement, go out and make a big speech for the effect.

Now we are prepared to admit that China, or the Communist China, or the People's Republic of China, or the United Nations, to expel Taiwan and to recognize China.

My guess is they treat us about the way they treat the British and the racist.

They say, who, are you recognizing us?

On the other hand, these steps, I think, are more the Chinese way of doing things.

That's my analysis.

Do you agree with it?

I agree.

And we would get it fine if we don't.

than our brains.

With your proposals, I'm not saying, because there were only five people on the floor when I made those remarks last Thursday, and every one of them said it was a good idea and they commended you for it.

See, those proposals were on trade and travel, and the travel was very important because

There, we had opened up the possibility of Americans going there, but we had not opened up until Wednesday the possibility of Chinese coming here.

Now we've dropped that door.

And that's terrifically important.

Over strong opposition, I might say, from defense and justice.

Yeah, we're going to need, well, you know, espionage on us.

I know, but that's where we are right now.

Listen.

and the Chinese had come here for a good godsend.

But Russians are a hell of a lot harder to watch than Chinese.

Everybody knows who they are.

That's why I always thought that our treatment of the Nisei was inexcusable.

I mean, looking back on that, my God, everybody could see who was a Japanese, and this idea of just herding them off in those camps was a horrible thing to do.

I mean, it was a terrible thing, as I look back on it.

happened in my own state, my state too.

They sent him up there.

He was a very compassionate man, but that's one thing where he just

quite a little more.

And I, at the time, of course, it's hard to remember now how strong the country felt because of Pearl Harbor.

It was a pretty brutal attack.

And yet, when you look at some of the facts behind it, who knows?

Who knows?

And it's awfully hard to assess why these damn wars may begin.

I've been reading that the beginnings of World War I

You can put that war on the... You can blame the Germans.

Well, if you're going to blame them, you need to say, sorry, you can blame Washington to tell a lot more.

The French, the British were pretty good, but the French and Russians were not quite that helpful.

And poor Kaiser was really going in against his will.

Kaiser didn't want him.

He went on vacation when the Kaiser's broke because he didn't think it was very serious.

He didn't come back until five days.

Well, I hope you go.

Apparently the only thing I'll be willing to do is want to make a trade.

No.

Goodbye.

I'll tell you what I'm going to cut in mine.

I'll tell you what I'm going to take this job.

If he takes your deal up, I will give you this job, and I'll take it.

Now, I won't take the majority of it, but I'll take the trip.

Well, no, I wouldn't take it.

Now, that's fair under any circumstances.

Well, I wouldn't take your job under any circumstances.

Now, I have a look.

There's nothing I'd rather do than go to jail.

Well, I think, Mr. President,

job you ever had when you were a senator.

You realize that was 20 years ago.

I know, 1950.

I was only a senator two years.

It was a good job.

I was a senator.

I was a resident of the Senate.

In fact, what I would hope, what I would hope is that when they leave it,

I had hoped that they would take yours and break me on the others.

I had rather have to take...

Good luck.

Thank you.

Thank you very much.

Nixon, Mansfield & Kissinger on People's Republic of China

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Nixon Library Finding Aid

Also recorded on April 17, 1971

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