Nixon White House Tapes › Tape 686 › Conversation 686-012
Nixon, Kissinger & Haldeman on Arms Control and Submarine Negotiations
Friday, March 17, 1972 · 12:36 PM–12:42 PM ET · Oval Office
AI Summary
President Nixon and Henry Kissinger discuss strategic concerns regarding arms control negotiations, specifically focusing on the dangers of including submarines in potential freeze agreements with the Soviets. They express skepticism about Soviet reliability in maintaining agreement discipline and worry that such a deal could inadvertently permit continued Russian naval modernization. Additionally, the President confers with H. R. Haldeman and Alexander Butterfield regarding personnel management, the need for administrative discipline, and the handling of internal communications and upcoming briefings.
- Arms Control
- Submarine Negotiations
- Soviet Union
- White House Administration
- Strategic Policy
Audio
This conversation has not yet been cut into its own clip, so the player above contains the full tape segment shared with neighbouring conversations. It begins about 00:44:15 into the tape and ends around 00:50:45.
Transcript (AI-generated)
This transcript was generated automatically by AI (WhisperX) and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Names and numbers are often wrong; speakers are not identified. Do not cite it as authoritative — verify against the audio and the finding aid.
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· Timestamps are positions within the full tape recording.
44:33It's the ceiling.
44:39for a little while, and that we just cannot go through on this.
44:45From an interest point of view, leaving aside that we can get it, because if we pay enough, we can get it.
44:53From the national interest point of view, we are better off not having submarines as part of the program and raising land in the submarine field.
45:02My fear is that if we put a freeze on submarines,
45:09they will be able to continue their program for two years in the guise of conversion.
45:14After that, they can start laying new keels and call it modernization.
45:18Moore hasn't thought this through.
45:20If they don't retire old submarines as soon as they lay the keel, they're going to have their program uninterrupted, while we're going to have one hell of a time in Congress when there's a freeze-on getting funds for it.
45:37I think the practical effect of this read will be nothing.
45:40What is the first judgment?
45:43Does he want to negotiate a submarine or not?
45:46We have no problem.
45:47We should start by asking for submarines.
45:51And I have no problem with that.
45:53The decision point will come in the latter half of April if we are not making progress on it.
46:00I'm afraid, though, that we will make progress.
46:02I think we'll get it.
46:04And I think it's not in our interest.
46:06But it's, uh...
46:07The thing to do is not to get in there.
46:10Yeah, I, I see pretty hard lines.
46:11Is this good time?
46:14Yeah.
46:15One other thing.
46:17You wanted to come in, then I thought to bring in next, uh, take him as one in the bathroom.
46:24You want to come in for ten minutes.
46:26It's not essential.
46:28Let's pull it off a little.
46:31I've had a...
46:38Well, I told him you would do it because he'd asked me to do it last year, but... Well...
46:47Yes, only two things to do.
46:49One is to say you're giving your personal attention to it, and to repeat again what you want him to do with me and what you want him to do in other examples.
47:05I can't describe it.
47:06I just thought it was sure to work out.
47:10You said that in for five minutes.
47:12Now that I told you to work out the details, how long?
47:16Those bastards, you know, they screwed us again in the announcement.
47:19Yes, it doesn't make any difference.
47:22But when I compare them to the Chinese, we work a week on the announcement.
47:29They again put out a different text.
47:31It doesn't change success, but they're simply not meticulous.
47:35I think that's the second one.
47:39We want this to be successful, and for it to be successful, we have to maintain discipline.
47:47We want to have discipline.
47:49What's in our administration, and we've also...
47:55that I put this under your direction.
47:58And on the other hand, I want to rank so that various other Secretary of State and others play a role, because they will tell you how to do it, how that's done.
48:08That's fine.
48:08That's all you need to tell me.
48:10Now, did you get it?
48:11Did you get the memorandum?
48:12Did you get the memorandum?
48:14Did you get the memorandum?
48:19Did you get the memorandum?
48:20Did you get the memorandum?
48:23Well, let me ask you this.
48:25Why don't we just do this?
48:27Why don't we take the letter after Peter's?
48:30Let's do another subject.
48:37A man would be competent.
48:38He doesn't need to take it.
48:40No, no, why don't we take the letter after Peter's?
48:44The letter's no problem.
48:46The letter will be saved by talking to the man.
48:50But Larry, we've got to have him aboard.
48:53And having him there would be bad.
48:55We'll have most of this done before.
48:58Just like it, but I think you're pulling the other hand.
49:01Look.
49:02Notice the weird thing about your boat.
49:04Here's what you did.
49:05I thought I marked it down there, of course.
49:07The way we're doing this continues to do this on the rocket.
49:13They didn't fix it, sir.
49:15Well, we said, no, sir, God damn it.
49:16It's probably not true.
49:17Why not?
49:18Why?
49:19Because the state can't negotiate on that.
49:21The state can't negotiate, in my view, on, uh, on, on, on, on, on, on, on, on, on, on, on, on, on, on, on, on, on, on, on, on, on, on, on, on, on, on, on, on, on, on, on, on, on, on, on, on, on, on, on, on, on, on, on, on, on, on, on, on, on, on, on, on, on, on, on, on, on, on, on, on, on, on, on, on, on, on, on, on, on, on, on, on, on, on, on, on, on, on, on, on, on, on, on, on, on
49:43where he feels that the thing has to be in charge.
49:48And I don't know if that's a problem we haven't accomplished.
49:54Of course, every time we have an extra cap on, we put it in the end.
49:59Yeah, that's one of the things.
50:00When the hell does he sit at the end of the seat and say, don't call me?
50:07Well, he made an issue of it.
50:08We had to divide it, and he called and made an issue, and... Well, why the hell did we come here?
50:14Somewhere else.
50:14Someone's got to draw the line, other than... Well, I'm frankly... What about here?
50:17We come back all the time.
50:20And so, we can't drive out the price of wanting to fly over Europe.
50:23I found another interesting thing.
50:26He has secret service protection.
NARA Description
On March 17, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon, Henry A. Kissinger, H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman, and Alexander P. Butterfield met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 12:36 pm and 12:42 pm. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 686-012 of the White House Tapes.
Nixon Library Finding Aid
Conversation No. 686-12
Date: March 17, 1972
Time: Unknown between 12:36 pm and 12:42 pm
Location: Oval Office
The President met with H.R.(“Bob”) Haldeman and Henry A. Kissinger.
[The conversation began in progress; this is part of Conversation No. 687-3]
The President’s schedule
National interest of the US
-Arms control
-Possible freeze on new submarines
-Effects of freeze on the Soviet Union
-Conversion
-Modernization
-Adm. Thomas H. Moorer
-US Program
-Congress
-Gerard C. Smith
-Time
-Progress
-Kissinger’s view
Alexander P. Butterfield entered at an unknown time after 12:42 pm.
The President's schedule
Butterfield left at an unknown time before 12:55 pm.
Kissinger's schedule
-Forthcoming Anatoliy F. Dobrynin meeting
-The President's attendance
Soviets
-Kissinger’s view
-Chinese
-Announcement of the President’s forthcoming trip to the Soviet Union
The forthcoming Soviet trip
-Administration
-Discipline
-Kissinger
-Role of the Secretary of State
-Memorandum to William P. Rogers
-Melvin R. Laird
-Peter G. Peterson
-Rogers
-White House
-Department of State
-Trade
Cabinet officers
-John B. Connally
David M. Kennedy
-Previous National Security Council [NSC] meeting
-North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO]
-Use of aircraft
-Secret Service
Columbia Broadcasting System [CBS]
-Arthur K. Watson story
The conversation was cut off at an unknown time before 12:55 pm.Also recorded on March 17, 1972
- 686-008 11:55 AM · 4 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Alexander P. Butterfield met in the Oval Office of the White House from 11:55 am to 12:00 pm.
- 686-009 12:00 PM · 2 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 12:00 pm and 12:05 pm.
- 686-010 12:05 PM · 2 min — President Richard M. Nixon, William Warnack, Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Marion H. Smoak, and White House photographer met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 12:05 pm and 12:11 pm.
- 686-011 12:16 PM · 3 min — President Richard M. Nixon, Tina Diver, Neil Diver, and Margita E. White met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 12:16 pm and 12:19 pm.
- 687-002 12:16 PM · 18 sec — Tina Diver, Neil Diver, and Margita E. White met in the Oval Office of the White House from 12:16 pm to 12:19 pm.
- 687-003 12:19 PM · 30 min — President Richard M. Nixon, H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman, Stephen B. Bull, Henry A. Kissinger, and John D. Ehrlichman met in the Oval Office of the White House from 12:19 pm to 1:14 pm.
- 687-004 1:14 PM · 40 sec — Stephen B. Bull and United States Secret Service agents met in the Oval Office of the White House at 1:14 pm.
- 323-029 1:45 PM · 44 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Manolo Sanchez met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 1:45 pm and 2:45 pm.
Cite this conversation
Conversation 686-012, March 17, 1972. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives. Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/686-012 (accessed October 3, 2026).