Nixon White House Tapes › Tape 720 › Conversation 720-004

Nixon, Kissinger & Haldeman on Vietnam War and Naval blockade

Friday, May 5, 1972 · 8:55 AM–10:09 AM ET · Oval Office

ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President); Brennan, Peter J.; Woods, Rose Mary; Bull, Stephen B.; Kissinger, Henry A.; Haldeman, H. R. ("Bob"); [Unknown person(s)]Conversation720-004 on Tape 720 (tape position 00:10:13–01:26:15)StartFriday, May 5, 1972 at 8:55 AMEndFriday, May 5, 1972 at 10:09 AMRecording deviceOval OfficeSourceNixon Library record for 720-004 ↗

President Nixon met with Henry Kissinger and H.R. Haldeman to finalize the decision to initiate a naval blockade and intensified bombing campaign against North Vietnam, a move Nixon viewed as essential to prevent a defeat in the war and preserve American credibility. The discussion focused on coordinating the strategy to ensure secrecy, managing potential friction with Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird and Secretary of State William Rogers, and addressing the geopolitical implications of a confrontation with the Soviet Union. Nixon directed his team to maintain a facade of normalcy to mask the impending escalation while simultaneously emphasizing the necessity of absolute loyalty and silence from his staff to prevent leaks.

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11:10to get him aboard.
11:14You can spare him.
11:17I just want you to know that that's my personal rule.
11:23But as you know, it's your decision, and I just want you to know that.
11:30Right.
11:31That's pretty great.
11:32Right.
11:32Good.
11:32I had a very good talk yesterday with a friend of yours, the vice president of Teamsters up there in New York.
11:40They call him Joe T. Yeah, yeah, yeah.
11:44He is quite a fellow.
11:46He had, he had, the, this was down for the pay board.
11:49He brought in, brought him in and a couple others and I talked to him.
11:53But he's a strong, strong man.
11:55He was talking about an interesting thing.
11:57He'd apparently been to St. Patrick's on the day that, apparently some of the nuns had been demonstrating and had rolled something down the aisle.
12:05Boy, he was really, really sure that if his wife hadn't been there, he'd have gone out there and made us get out.
12:11Yeah.
12:19Yeah.
12:20Well, we may have to take some stronger action here in the near future, and we do.
12:25I hope you support it.
12:28But the main purpose being, the main purpose being, we've got to get our POWs out and turn everything around.
12:34Because what is happening, I can tell you, is that there is this obvious nature of fighting.
12:40And all, they're all sort of tanks as bravely as men, but the Soviet Union has given the North Vietnamese huge tanks, big guns.
12:48They're, you know, they're supporting, at the day, 11, 11 new weapons systems that we've never seen before.
12:54Well, that sort of thing is pretty, pretty rough, you know, when they're coming in.
12:58And so, uh, but, uh, their own land, our Air Force and Navy are just doing a wonderful job.
13:03That's all we've got in there, you know, but they are, without that, the South Vietnamese would be gone.
13:08But...
13:16Yeah.
13:17Well, I think we can deal with that.
13:18That's right.
13:21Well, same thing.
13:22I always say that everything is spiritual.
13:26We've got the best guys on our side.
13:29Right.
13:30Good to talk to you.
13:38At the end of the letter, Henry is back.
13:41I'll check whether he's free.
13:45Yeah, I want to see him this morning.
13:56Well, Tricia was great.
13:59Barbara Walters, Pat said it, Tricia, that, you know, Barbara Walters, I thought, was really mean.
14:05She always is.
14:07But in particular, the fact that he looked pretty, smiled.
14:17Well, she talked to her about the hecklers on the war, about, this is how tough the questions were, about what the McGovern and these guys are appealing to the people who are anti-establishment.
14:32And there's some Bibleology that says anti-establishment really means anti-administration.
14:37She doesn't say that means anti-those people and everybody, but Patricia handled all of these things very well, very calmly.
14:46She looked absolutely gorgeous.
14:48She just looked so pretty.
14:50They asked for such a thing that they all went and said, what do you think the people's opinion or the world's opinion is of you?
15:04Patricia, and she says, well, I don't know, she said, there's a lot of, I've heard a lot of things, I wouldn't call this or that, but she said, you know, when you're only, when you weigh 95 and you're 5'3", they have long blonde hair.
15:20You have, people just take that as an impression.
15:23But she, then she went on, she said, but I have opinions.
15:27I like to know what's going on.
15:28I like to, issues.
15:30Oh, she was just great.
15:33And she was, I thought she was very good, very good.
15:41Yeah, it's hard for her.
15:46She's going to be hard for all of them to go through that.
15:57She's very tough.
15:57She's strong.
15:58She doesn't want to get under your skin.
16:01She looks at women and... She never takes anything from you.
16:07She, uh, she said you were doing what you thought... She doesn't, she doesn't, no matter what she asks, she looked right at her and didn't show any reaction and, and, uh...
16:21said you were doing what you thought was right on everything, and oh, I know, you know, that anti-establishment thing.
16:28She said, well, you were driving them.
16:30You were trying to get Revenue Sheriff to get the government back to the people, and then she certainly helped the Congress to that.
16:39I mean, she showed knowledge all the way through.
16:41She was very, very good.
16:46Julie was in here this morning sometime, probably 11.30 or so in the afternoon.
17:02One thing that you might...
17:21Okay, I'm gonna ask you guys.
17:26That's raising that subject to the use of planes and so forth.
17:30Again, I know that it will be raised, raised by things that we're going to handle about once a day as far as I'm concerned.
17:36You know, when we say, well, the president's going, the president, that's what's next.
17:41He goes, it's a political case.
17:42I'm not going.
17:43Of course, we pay for it.
17:45But my guy, when Julie goes out to California, goes to Texas to speak at a pharmaceutical convention, what in the hell is that for the profit of a public event?
17:54We have it all paid for, that's the point, if there's any problem.
17:59Have you heard some bitches about it?
18:01I haven't even heard what's happened, but I don't know what the problem is.
18:05The Democrats will start calling because these kids are so good, you see, and Pat and Barbara.
18:10And I think if they do, it's the easiest thing.
18:12But at the moment, I don't know.
29:07Could I ask you one question?
29:08I read a letter to our ambassador in the Dominican Republic saying that Don Jackson is retiring.
29:15It's an old letter from his old friend here.
29:17I would appreciate any of the receipts.
29:18I've got written letters.
29:19I've got an old time personal friend from California for 25 years who remembers Don Jackson as retired.
29:35I agree to all of these things.
30:05That's a build-up to the summit, and I didn't think we'd be in this sort of situation.
30:11That's right.
30:14We're in our situation now.
30:15In fact, I've got to go up tonight again to give a speech to the Asia Society about your giant trip.
30:22But that's easy to tell.
30:25But the thing that I find interesting is
30:28We had, I'll get you the list, it really had the absolutely tough people of New York there.
30:35That was something done, actually it was, I thought I was doing it for the Russian center at Columbia, but it turned out it was done by them in cooperation with Time Live, which I didn't understand.
30:48But it's all these tough people.
30:51And somebody heckled me about Vietnam, and I again made an impassioned speech about dignity.
30:56I said,
30:57I don't want to be heckled.
30:59This president is saving the dignity and honor of America.
31:03Hadley Donovan was there.
31:04What happened when you said that?
31:06They got up and applauded.
31:07They didn't just applaud and answer the question.
31:11It's rare enough that you get applauded when you answer the question.
31:15But the people jumped up and gave you a standing ovation.
31:18You've got to say it in just those terms.
31:21Yeah, that's great.
31:21I just talked to Peter Brown at his opening trade, asking him to loan us a manhunt.
31:29He said, well, for four years, I just wish we could get the papers to print just a little more of why we're there and what's all involved, you know.
31:40I'll tell you, we'd be dead if it weren't for television.
31:42I mean, these television speeches that I've made about it, which were three months ago, I really doubt them, too.
31:48That's why Johnson failed, because he didn't go on and explain it any more.
31:53These were the heads of...
31:55most of the big corporations.
32:01And I said, what is it that we want?
32:05What will you people say if your president puts a communist government into power in a country where 40,000 Americans have died?
32:14Can you look yourself in the face after that?
32:18And to my amazement, a time writer got up and said, I want
32:23to support it, so Donovan told him to sit down, and he got up again and said, I want to support what he said, and if the trench had held on at the end of the end for another month, then... Good.
32:33Yeah, great.
32:34So, uh... That's good.
32:36Rose, as I told you, I want you to go to New York.
32:39No, I already told them I'm not going, so...
32:44But this is the last piece I'm committed to making.
32:46Thank you.
32:51And I would suggest that you, uh, you might as well go over the weekend and go up to Camp David.
32:58I don't know what I'll be doing when I'm staying in London.
33:01Don't you think you should go?
33:03Why don't you go for a couple of days?
33:04I'll, I'll, I'll stay, I'll just stay here until you want me something.
33:07I told him yesterday I wouldn't come this weekend.
33:09I'll go to see him another time.
33:10But there isn't anything I have for you.
33:12There isn't?
33:13Okay, fine.
33:14No, then I think maybe I'll have you up today, just in case, every night.
33:19I was going to ask you to do something today that is very important.
33:33I want you to be rather than cool, particularly outgoing.
33:40Come here.
33:42I want you to play them like they play us.
33:44I'd be very curious.
33:47I'd act as if everything was going ahead on schedule.
33:49I would act very, very nice.
33:51You could say how gracious we are, how pleased Mr. Nixon is with the graciousness of Mr. Green and all that.
34:00Because now that the die is cast, we're going to play this in the most vicious way that we can with those bastards.
34:08Let me give you...
34:12But first of all, I'm going ahead on all the planning.
34:14I don't think that might be the order for tomorrow.
34:18That's right.
34:19I heard it.
34:21But I could be excused from the FIAT meeting.
34:23And one of my staff members, I think if they could, I could work with Moro this morning to make sure that the plan is right.
34:30Yes.
34:30I have to listen to them, I think.
34:35That's a scary thing and I would not tip our hand at all now to anybody that we are banning.
34:40Somebody in the White House is talking too much.
34:44Because Robert was on this morning and said we were considering a blockade, you're getting mad and you're... You know, it could be good speculation that he said he was taught from the White House.
34:53But I don't think... Christ's sake, this is... Well, it's certainly nobody who knows.
34:59It's not that strong.
35:00It may be that...
35:02I don't talk to anybody.
35:08Bob wouldn't talk.
35:10No, it could easily be.
35:13No, Bob would never do it.
35:15It could be Scali.
35:16That's Scali.
35:17Who the Christ would have told Scali?
35:20Nobody.
35:21None of that is speculated.
35:22It is based on information.
35:23No one could know.
35:26But what I'm going to say...
35:27I couldn't agree more.
35:28I told Bob, and I know this is the one...
35:34People were quite upset or speculating about it.
35:54rather than being angry and even considering a blockade.
36:01Now, you have got to really sit on everybody and, as I said, I want you to handle it totally the other way.
36:09Now, this includes Erwin, it includes Moore, it includes Colston, it includes Scali.
36:14You know what I mean?
36:16We just cannot have these leaps.
36:18You know, I don't know.
36:18They aren't in action.
36:19I mean, it is, it goes, you might as well,
36:23Relax and enjoy it, because there's nothing we can do about it.
36:26It isn't rather this morning.
36:28It's everybody.
36:30And the Wall Street Journal has a thing today.
36:33They're about 1 o'clock a.m.
36:38Rather said, and he didn't say White House staff, he simply said, another bold U.S. military move seems underway.
36:45Wider targeting of North Vietnam sites, blockade of Haiphong, and though less likely, an amphibious landing in North Vietnam, a barb in the U.S. air-sea power, guiding a player, or these possibilities show how determined Nixon is to act.
36:58You still have the State League.
37:00Keatley has another article saying that you are willing to settle for it.
37:05Keatley says the U.S. is ready to settle for less.
37:08On the terms far less they will be U.S. than once thought of as a side-line alliance of the world.
37:13That's that constant running, stately.
37:15Yeah, but then he goes on and says, if North Vietnam doesn't go along, the nation's prepared to give them a lot more war with no end in sight.
37:23Okay, okay, well.
37:24And then he says, as U.S. defies peace, it means a ceasefire and U.S. withdrawal with some settlements of honor and return of D.O.W.s.
37:33And he went off on that.
37:36And that's what the state has been putting in.
37:37That's the state line.
37:39Well, the state has done it.
37:41Who is that, Solomon?
37:42I frankly think that after Roger has read that cable on ceasefire.
37:48What cable?
37:49That we sent?
37:50No, that where President mentioned we should have a ceasefire.
37:54He's put the whole state machinery to work to push that.
37:58Because he figures if it comes out... What price did he give the cable for?
38:01Well, it was a mistake in judgment of faith.
38:04He wanted it.
38:05But he was in a hell of a spot, because I just called him up and said, I'm on the way down.
38:13And so he just cut out in some parts, and he had left that one in by mistake.
38:17See, their defense had a briefing yesterday, too, where they did a thing on Soviet arms.
38:28Oh, that was right.
38:29Yeah, but see, all of this is giving...
38:33giving rise to speculation, plus your remarks in Texas, which they keep going back and saying.
38:39that something more is going to come up.
38:43And the product and everything, and a number of them have, several of them have mentioned blockade of high volume.
38:48Others, they have removed volume and are handling it on high volume.
38:52And then they end up .
38:54It is a problem.
38:54I just want to be sure that we don't tell anybody around here.
38:59That's just not one living, breathing soul.
39:02Mark, that all says you're preparing another major escalation with airstrikes.
39:06Mark and Charles, Mark and Cal.
39:11Well, who the hell's talking to him?
39:13They're just making it up.
39:16Sure they are.
39:17They're picking it up out of the indicators that they're getting.
39:21They're not citing any sources.
39:22When they have sources, they use them to back up what they're saying.
39:26I thought I heard Robert say that White House sources said something.
39:29Maybe so.
39:30He didn't last night.
39:31This morning, he said.
39:33In the morning show, I think he did say that.
39:37Okay, good.
39:38Thank you.
39:39Anyway, that's just to be sure.
39:42I want you to get the quiet side and sit there.
39:45No, I didn't say anything about Vietnam, period.
39:50I didn't.
39:51There's a question that came up.
39:53Somebody asked whether there was another line.
39:56Well, I guess that was it.
39:58We're taking it.
40:00Good.
40:01We're all settled.
40:02Good.
40:04Absolutely not.
40:06Okay, well, I figured, I just figured, I just know what it is.
40:10It's sometimes well-intentioned people who talk about things and all this.
40:16Nobody knows what the plan is.
40:23On what they're planning to do, I'm meeting with Mora and his planning group shortly after 10.
40:34And we're going to get, you don't have to bother with it unless you want to see it.
40:45I'll have to shoot you that number there to take notes so that we know what, by our game plan, of what has to be done when.
40:57We have to bring State in on Sunday, starting Sunday morning as soon as we call Rogers back.
41:02I think we have to get
41:04Alexander, I feel I must put before you this consideration, Mr. President.
41:09We must do something drastic.
41:10There's no question about it.
41:13The advantage of a blockade is that it commits us irrevocably.
41:16And after that, it drops, and there's no turning back.
41:21It's a great advantage.
41:23And the other side must then do something.
41:26The disadvantage is that it confronts the Soviets most directly.
41:30That's the thing I said to you this morning.
41:32They can hardly step back from that.
41:35They may, but... Now, my Soviet expert thinks it is more likely that they step back from a blockade than from a bombing, but...
41:43The disadvantage of bombing is that you put it so effectively yesterday and they expect it.
41:49And they thought it's already been discounted.
41:52The disadvantage of bombing is that it will trigger every goddamn peace group in this country.
41:57It's all a blockade.
42:00And...
42:01Neither does that.
42:03It's the line of major escalation that they're all talking about.
42:07And either a blockade or a bombing would have triggered a feature.
42:11So we have no doubts about that.
42:15But it's hard to turn off a blockade.
42:16That's right.
42:18I mean, for you to turn off, you can always stop bombing for a day or two or a week or two weeks.
42:26And therefore...
42:27So then it would be an infection.
42:29The bomb...
42:31We cannot have the stop-and-start thing again, even around and around and around.
42:39I understand the problems.
42:40There's that problem in France a lot, whether it's the Soviet Union, the Indians, the Chinese.
42:45Those are no problem, but the Chinese are a problem, too.
42:49But in a way, of course, it's also a question of degree, a prolonged farming of Hanoi and Haifa.
42:55They have to react.
42:56We'll do the same thing.
42:58We'll send the question.
42:58The other thing is the bombing has been done before.
43:00It's the same old routine.
43:03In fact, the bombing, bombing, bombing, bombing, stop the bombing, stop the bombing.
43:07So they're going to say, lift the blockade, lift the blockade.
43:10On that point, this is a strong case.
43:12The blockade is not as good a target as the bombing in terms of the riots.
43:18Well, of course, there's got to be bombing, too, with the blockade.
43:20Oh, I understand.
43:22People are going to look at the blockade.
43:25The blockade is going to be so overwhelming in terms of its economic relations.
43:29I understand.
43:30The main point is, when you talk about raising these points, which you've got to raise, there are no other choices, no.
43:36The choice is sure.
43:37There's a choice of a two-day talk and then go back and say, I hope to Christ that they will not negotiate about something.
43:44And it isn't going to happen.
43:48Exactly.
43:49Do you have another evaluation or situation?
43:51What is it this morning?
43:54Well, it's quiet again.
43:56Well, then they go to talk again.
43:58That's what always happens when it's quiet.
44:00Oh, yeah.
44:01Well, what it proves is two things.
44:02One is they're weaker than we think.
44:04I mean, take Khantou.
44:08It shouldn't have taken them two weeks to go from Dakto to Khantou.
44:14If they had really a lot of stuff, they would have just rolled into it.
44:19But they're sort of inching up to it again.
44:21They're taking a lot of casualties.
44:23On the other hand, they're doing it methodically, and they'll soon be attacked again.
44:32And it's a tragedy, of course, they wouldn't do it.
44:42If we had one American division to go into the Panhandles, they'd be finished.
44:48We got an American regiment to land, for Christ's sakes, and then finish this damn thing.
44:54It's frightening to death.
44:56You know, they go off two divisions off the attack in the South Vietnamese and mine each forward even.
45:03Oh, I know.
45:06You know, I know.
45:08But...
45:08I don't know about the... Henry, the argument's me.
45:12We've been around this track about 18 times, but the...
45:17I must say, it's very compelling to me when you say if we go the bombing route, we're going the same way expected.
45:31And frankly, it's almost certain it's going to work.
45:40The blockade may not work either.
45:42But the blockade has got to work.
45:44It may not work fast enough.
45:45I mean, there's no way the blockade cannot work.
45:49It's already, even that one bombing of Haifang, incidentally, they've got such a contraction in the port now that there's one Polish trader that has to wait a month in Hainan to be able to get into the port.
46:03I, in fact, have to say, Mr. President, you keep talking about your instincts.
46:09I think your instinct was right.
46:10We should have hit soon after that first strike again.
46:18And the other hand, we have positioned what we have to do now.
46:20We sure have.
46:22The porter is in on the right of the line.
46:26Yeah.
46:28Nobody's blaming us.
46:29I mean, this is... You don't think so?
46:30No.
46:31That hasn't started yet.
46:33I was thinking that maybe you ought to give a background on it so as to get the weekly new magazine and so forth, not a background on it.
46:42And it'll lay the rest of the whole position with regard to the... You see, we can't repeat too often what our position is and say we've altered this, we've altered this, we've altered this, we've altered this, and they've turned it all down, okay?
46:52Of course, that may...
46:54I'm just writing it by you for a moment.
46:56That may project upwards the...
47:02Well, I can't do back...
47:04I can't do background work anymore because they'll get upset, but I can talk to Hubbard and Schecter.
47:07Oh, that's...
47:08But if you want to read the news magazine.
47:10Yeah, they won't be interested in that type of work.
47:23Yeah, you could talk to him.
47:24It's probably all right.
47:26Just lay the rest, put the record straight.
47:28It's at least worth doing that.
47:29And I can do another method.
47:29You might be frank with him.
47:33It was free.
47:37That at least gets it to him where it counts.
47:44Well, your point is, are you... No, I'm still for the blockade.
47:50Yeah, I mean, my point is bombing.
47:53You know, the other exercise is one that we've been serious about.
47:59No, I'm strongly for the bombing, too.
48:02Yeah, no, no, no.
48:04You favor the bombing.
48:06I want my blockade to be the other one.
48:14Another advantage of the blockade is that you can go to the American people, but you can't go to the American people.
48:20About 40% of that, the American people, they were 26.
48:24And you can rally the American people for a blockade, but you cannot rally them.
48:28That's right.
48:30That's right.
48:30And that's not an inconsistable...
48:32It's a hell of an considerable thing.
48:34...factor.
48:38The blockade has the advantage that it's... First, it's a total commitment.
48:45It's decisive.
48:45I mean, in the end, let's face it, in the end, we've got to figure out, we could probably lose the election and so on and so on.
49:01But in the end, with a blockade, we'll win the war.
49:05Well, if you win the war, you won't lose the election.
49:07Yeah.
49:11You see, that's the problem.
49:12The blockade, we know damn well in eight months we'll have it at their knees.
49:19Oh, I think with bombing it will happen quicker.
49:22With bombing before they can get alternative routes organized.
49:28So, my view is...
49:31The banque is to grouse the people, it puts it to the Russians.
49:34I mean, the only advantage, as I told you earlier, a second earlier, of the, which the line of common came up with, is to, is to start bombing again.
49:49And then, if the Russians still do not break off the sign,
49:58You see, the bombing blockade then has this possible advantage, which I ran by you yesterday.
50:09You bomb.
50:10After bombing, the reference glitched, but it did not resolve itself.
50:16Then, we continued on.
50:22And I suppose we can go to the summit.
50:32If you bomb enough, they'll break off the company.
50:34There's no question about it.
50:37Well, then, that perhaps is the conventurism, because we can't bomb unless you bomb enough.
50:44We can't bomb and then have, but you can't bomb and then have them kicking us around while we're in Moscow.
50:51You see, that's the point you made, which is tremendously compelling.
50:55I cannot be in Moscow at a time when North Vietnam means a rampage through the streets of Hue, or for that matter, through the streets of Khartoum.
51:28But let's go by it again and give the case as best as we can.
51:43Hearing what we can, we bomb.
51:45That's very important.
51:47Yeah, we bomb.
51:49We bomb.
51:50We bomb.
51:50We bomb.
51:51We bomb.
51:53Well, the main thing is to get it done, to get it going, so that it's going to affect the battles and so forth.
52:11You've heard from Abrams, incidentally.
52:13I wrote a cable, I sent a cable to Funker saying that I thought
52:19that we will begin to lose patience with Abrams, that every time we want to do something, we just want to make sure that there are no confusing signals being given to Abrams, and therefore I want him to know that any authentic words from the President comes from me to bunker to Abrams.
52:34There are no other authentic words.
52:38If anyone tells him that you want something that is not true unless it comes from me to bunker,
52:46That doesn't mean he shouldn't carry out military orders when they try to analyze you.
52:50Now it turns out that he did get cross-signals.
52:56So Laird, that bachelor, has been talking to him.
52:59The cross-signals were about the bombing?
53:03No, that you probably...
53:03I would not...
53:04I believe, and Mora believes, that Mora told Abrams that you would welcome a request from Abrams.
53:10That Laird told Abrams that you would welcome a request from Abrams
53:14that gave you an excuse not to bomb Hanoi and Haifa.
53:21Yeah, mortar like this, rust like this.
53:25And Frank has two-thirds confirmed it.
53:30He's hilarious, so crazy that he's capable of that.
53:33Oh, yes.
53:33Clearly he's capable of that.
53:35But why would Larry want to say that?
53:38Why, because Laird has got political ambitions and he's positioning himself on the peace side of things.
53:53But that he doesn't believe.
53:57He doesn't believe that.
54:03Now, I don't want to drag you off what you've decided, because I think we ought to keep on this course now.
54:08I just want you to consider we should go on this as if we were going all out on it.
54:20And I'm saying this to you.
54:21I'm not saying it to Haig or to Morrow or to Conway or to anyone else.
54:25I mean, we still have a few pieces that are going to come in.
54:28We still have to get the Russian to fly.
54:31So if it doesn't come by the end of the day, it's too late.
54:35But I'm sure it will come today.
54:37Yes.
54:42See, another problem you face is you bomb Hanoi and I bomb.
54:48And then the Russians do to you what they did to me.
54:51They come and we'll talk about it.
54:53Then you've got to stop again.
54:55Of course, you could say, fine, but I won't stop now until... You could, well, put it that way, especially Romano and I, and the Russians say, look, you come and we'll have sort of a pause while we have the summit, as we did at the Chinese summit.
55:13And if you remember, I said that it's a possibility, that it could happen.
55:17Because we shouldn't look back to the Chinese.
55:18I mean, I suppose we were bombing the North China Sea.
55:21I suppose.
55:22Look, let's read that out.
55:23Everything's all right.
55:23We'll bury this very good time and we'll cool it.
55:25That'd be the tradition of where we're going.
55:29We go, then we come back, we start bombing again.
55:32The problem is, we're bombing the Hanoi and I bombed it.
55:43It's very heavy.
55:50Well, I know it's so important, except for the Israelites.
55:53I know.
55:55High law.
55:55All right.
55:56Bombing of the door.
55:57We'll have to be prepared.
56:03The great, the conclusive argument to me in favor of the blockade is that you cross the Rubicon, that what they are trying to do to you is to kill you now.
56:15And I'm not sure.
56:16I said this to this group last night.
56:18They said, what are their Russian intentions?
56:21I said, look, there's nothing that the Russians would rather do than get rid of the president.
56:25He's the only thing that stands between them and dominating the world.
56:31I said, now that's very true.
56:32That is true.
56:33But I was amazed by that group.
56:36Well, you said it well.
56:38That's why I hear it.
56:42So, I don't believe they started out trying to overthrow the president.
56:47But if he gets too vulnerable at home, then you people are, or whoever starts nagging at him, is responsible.
56:56But what I think the...
56:58Those people are sensible enough, for Christ's sakes, to think, to know that Humphrey or Goebbels or Kennedy would be passage for the Russians, aren't they?
57:05Oh, yeah.
57:07Don't I get it?
57:11Oh, yeah.
57:11Okay.
57:11It was, I must tell you, I had a, these last two evenings have been amazing in this respect, because usually I get mad that... Oh, Commie's point, of course, he's pretentious, but Commie talks to other people.
57:22He's part of the polls and everything, he thinks that we've got...
57:30You see, I say, you know, one question was, how do you defend escalation?
57:36I said, I'm not going to defend escalation.
57:39I said, that's not the issue.
57:40There are only two issues.
57:42One is, does the United States put a communist government...
57:46into power and ally itself with its enemies to defeat its friends the second issue is do we can any president permit 60 000 americans to be made hostages and will be shame and indignity not direct our whole domestic uh structure those are the only also i think the issue that how can the united states stand by after offering peace in every order
58:10and do nothing in response to an enormous enemy escalation.
58:14We're only responding to an enemy escalation.
58:17That's the real point.
58:18See, I think what the North Vietnamese are saying to themselves is, all right, they know we're going to fight.
58:24I mean, they know.
58:26And they say to themselves, all right, we're going to take this.
58:36And...
58:36I think they're prepared to take the line.
58:39Yeah.
58:39Four...
58:41You see, I'm a bloke.
58:47And there's nobody that's more aware, because I, like you, are the one who recently was arrested.
58:53So we both get the wrong view, which goddamn you Americans do.
59:02That's why I said that when we put off the publication plan, we wanted to cancel the summit first, which I think we're absolutely right not going to do.
59:13That was good advice from the Board of Commerce.
59:15He had seen something that I had not seen, and I led you into that.
59:18I led you out of that.
59:19Yes, I did, because I remember what Eisenhower did, but I had really forgotten.
59:24Well, I didn't hurt Eisenhower.
59:25The Russians canceled the summit.
59:26I didn't hurt him.
59:28God damn it, the American people don't like to be kicked around.
59:30Didn't our guys in Ireland and the dominant Japanese cancel this trip?
59:34Remember?
59:34Absolutely.
59:35All right, now, to divert me, the Spice Brothers, and I'll never forget, when I got stoned in Caracas, they helped me.
59:43People thought it was great.
59:46Now, it depends how you react to it.
59:49Here's the problem.
59:51Looking at the long view behind me,
59:57You might turn it around.
1:00:00It runs a better chance of keeping the sons alive.
1:00:03The Russians can live with all that.
1:00:05Or you might not be able to live in a blockade.
1:00:07All right.
1:00:10That's the advantage of that.
1:00:12But we constantly come back to the, basically Henry, to the fundamental problem and compete with his, you know, his animal-like decisiveness.
1:00:26Which I also have, except that I have, through many years, I've put more layers and stuff on it.
1:00:33But Connelly comes quickly to the point.
1:00:34He says, look, the summit is great.
1:00:37I hope you don't knock it off.
1:00:39I think you can do both.
1:00:40And I hope you can do both.
1:00:41I think you will do both.
1:00:42But, he says, even if you don't, if you're going to go first, then it's first.
1:00:46You've got to remember, you can do without the summit.
1:00:51But you cannot live with a beaten Vietnam.
1:00:54You must win the war in Vietnam.
1:00:55Or put it another way, you must not lose in Vietnam.
1:01:00That's crystal clear.
1:01:02So everything's got to be measured against what wins or loses in Vietnam.
1:01:06And here is the weakness of fine.
1:01:10Fine might turn the war in Vietnam around.
1:01:16The blockade, certainly.
1:01:21The blockade must finish that.
1:01:24What I hear you saying, Clear, is that I think that's what I'm convinced of.
1:01:27I mean, the blockade's saying, win the war.
1:01:29The blockade kept you across the Lusitania.
1:01:31There's no way to end it without the blockade.
1:01:34Well, everybody knows then that I've thrown down the bomb, and there it is, and they want to pick it up.
1:01:40And, you see, they're not going to lift the blockade, as I have said.
1:01:43Well, it's an old man.
1:01:44Bombing's not an old man.
1:01:47Farming, they cannot do it.
1:01:48This is the argument for the blockade now.
1:01:50It heightens the chances of a confrontation with the Russians.
1:01:53That's right.
1:01:54It will start Chinese screaming.
1:01:56That's right.
1:01:57And you'll be accused of having blown everything of your foreign policy, which is, on the other hand, an advantage.
1:02:03Great sadness for me.
1:02:04Great sadness for me.
1:02:05We've got to end the foreign policy.
1:02:08You had me wrong here.
1:02:09The minute it all goes down the tube, we will be remembered as Farrakhan Luce as the one who went to China.
1:02:15And in the future, that'll work out.
1:02:16That's the best that you can – actually, if you get re-elected, it will make your foreign policy.
1:02:22It's the same as the laws operation.
1:02:24Everyone said that you've now broken it with the Chinese, and three months later, we were there.
1:02:31And a year later, you were there.
1:02:34So I think it won't – And if you come back to the fundamental point, as I took you up to that advantage, and I showed you that little place we looked at –
1:02:45We think this whole great big wide world, everything rides on it.
1:02:48He had to get rid of her away.
1:02:50He had to get rid of her away.
1:02:52We didn't flush it.
1:02:53We did not.
1:02:56Never.
1:02:57Flush it.
1:02:58Get out of it any way possible.
1:03:01And conduct a sensible foreign policy with the Russians and with the Chinese.
1:03:05We'd do it.
1:03:06We ought to do it.
1:03:07We ought to do it.
1:03:09Because there's so much at stake.
1:03:12There's nobody else in this country at the present time, with the exception of Khan, in the next four years that can handle the Russians and the Chinese and the big game in Europe and the big game in Southeast Asia, do you know what I mean?
1:03:24And the big game in the Japanese five years from now.
1:03:27Who could help us if we're all right?
1:03:29So that's the statement.
1:03:31That's why I, the only reason that I had any doubts earlier this week was that I had to face up to the fact, as I saw the inevitability of my government, our country,
1:03:42Or at the other possibility is Teddy, who might be the worst of the three.
1:03:48Certainly.
1:03:48But anyway, many other companies, because I saw that, felt that they were going to be the worst for sure.
1:03:54But Teddy would be so stop and start that he might get us an even worse struggle.
1:03:58Anyway, because I vote for peace, and I'm supposed to run right off the bat rather than cause the cost of all this slaughter.
1:04:04So my point is...
1:04:07I had to put that in the equation.
1:04:12Therefore, I had to go down the line and say, how in the hell can we save?
1:04:16How in the hell can we save the presidency?
1:04:26And, frankly, the presidency.
1:04:29And that saving is something I have considered to go on.
1:04:33And I don't think there's any way you can do it.
1:04:37I don't think there's any way you could do it.
1:04:39And at the same time, I've temporized Vietnam.
1:04:45I have reached the conclusion that we're in a situation where Vietnam is here.
1:04:53And I'm trying to be a conscious player to the large scale.
1:04:56I've taken an offer.
1:04:57Have we really offered this?
1:04:58I don't know whether we have.
1:05:00We don't have one.
1:05:01You can put your hand on it.
1:05:05Mr. President, you and I know perhaps the only ones.
1:05:13They had given us a face-saving way out.
1:05:16I was prepared to take it.
1:05:19You told me because you told me that.
1:05:21They warned us out, but...
1:05:24in a humiliating way.
1:05:25They want us to put a communist government into power.
1:05:28God damn it.
1:05:29Let's face it, if they had accepted our May 31st proposal last year, they would have taken over Vietnam within a year or two.
1:05:35I'll say.
1:05:37Thank God.
1:05:38I know.
1:05:38I still wish they had, nevertheless.
1:05:41Of course.
1:05:42But it isn't that we've been intransigent in our office.
1:05:45Not at all.
1:05:46You see, if we could survive past the election...
1:06:01And then Vietnam goes down and the U.S. doesn't make any difference.
1:06:05But we have no way to survive past the election.
1:06:08There's the other argument for bombing.
1:06:10Maybe we could bomb, not blockade.
1:06:12Still haven't suffered.
1:06:14I think they're going to kill you.
1:06:17They're going to put you into the Johnson position.
1:06:19This is the other argument for the blockade.
1:06:21They're going to have you as the bomber.
1:06:24The guy, when I looked at that DRV, said they wanted you to break off the peace talks yesterday.
1:06:30So you are the guy who doesn't talk.
1:06:32I hope they don't, but it got across that they helped to break them off.
1:06:35Oh yeah, it got across, but all of this is minor because these peace groups are going to keep...
1:06:41The headlines are, we broke off from oxygen.
1:06:44So that six months from now, three months from now, it's forgotten that there was an invasion, and therefore... Let me put it this way.
1:06:51I know you've been thinking about this very much as I have.
1:06:57But I've heard, I come back to the fundamental point.
1:07:02Leaving the present town so far.
1:07:12No, sir.
1:07:12You could have.
1:07:12You could have.
1:07:14Perhaps you could have a smart draft, Colonel.
1:07:16That's impossible.
1:07:17It could be.
1:07:18Well, they did.
1:07:18It would have been a safe country.
1:07:19But, Mr. President, they're more likely to draft you.
1:07:21They will not draft you.
1:07:21Very good.
1:07:22My point is, we have to face this now.
1:07:29Leave me out of it.
1:07:31Leave the governor out of it always.
1:07:34The United States of America at this point cannot have a viable foreign policy if we are humiliated in Vietnam.
1:07:42We must not lose in Vietnam.
1:07:45It's as cold as ice.
1:07:47Right?
1:07:47I agree.
1:07:48And they have not given us any way to avoid taking the money.
1:07:52And since they have not, we must draw the sword.
1:07:55So the blockade is on.
1:07:57And I must say that I, as an athlete, by one thing understood.
1:08:01You said boxing, that's...
1:08:05Moore is right.
1:08:06The surgical operation theory is all right.
1:08:08But I want that place, whenever the planes are available, bomb the smithereens during the lock-in.
1:08:15If we draw the sword out, we're going to bomb those bathrooms all over the place.
1:08:19And let it fly.
1:08:20Let it fly.
1:08:20That's the only point.
1:08:21We can do all of this without killing too many civilians.
1:08:23I don't want to kill civilians.
1:08:26I don't try to kill any.
1:08:27But God damn it, don't be so careful that you don't knock out the oil burger tanks.
1:08:31Oh, God no.
1:08:32See my point?
1:08:32God no.
1:08:33Those have to go.
1:08:37Would you please still study the dikes situation?
1:08:40I don't think it's 200,000.
1:08:42I don't think that what really is involved in the dikes, I think I know that country because I've been up to Hanoi.
1:08:51I have.
1:08:54What is involved there is these low kind of things, you know, the purposes really for the rice lands and the rest.
1:09:01The people could get the hell out of there.
1:09:03It isn't a huge dam of torrents of water without star deletions, but it'll do it.
1:09:10Now, if that's the case, I don't think it will.
1:09:14Do you see my point?
1:09:15I want that studied.
1:09:18I will.
1:09:21You see, we've got to come back, and I think you're exponentially right to raise these questions with me, and I know why you're raising them, because I...
1:09:30It's like you raised them for the same reasons you raised questions before it came to me.
1:09:35I mean, the addressable allows, because you know that I have to consider these things, and you know I should state, and I think I appreciate that you're raising them.
1:09:43But we come back to the fundamental point, and I ask this question before you go on.
1:09:51Isn't there a serious doubt that bombing without a blockade may not accomplish our goal of preventing a loss in Vietnam?
1:10:01And second, is it not also true that a blockade plus surgical bombing will inevitably
1:10:12have the effect of bringing North Vietnam to its knees.
1:10:16Unless the South Vietnamese collapse.
1:10:17So the South Vietnamese collapse, but they still have to give us our prisoners.
1:10:22We've got something.
1:10:23America's not defeated.
1:10:24That's my point.
1:10:26America's not defeated.
1:10:28We've got our prisoners.
1:10:31There's one other thing we have to think about.
1:10:32It's obvious that he's collapsed.
1:10:34I don't know whether that collapse theory is going to hold out anyway.
1:10:38I just hope I'm not too polyamorous, but I think that those lines are covered all the time.
1:10:45Well, they're going to lose Khantoum, but to me what is so fascinating is that two weeks ago they were routed, and they still haven't moved against Khantoum.
1:10:54Now, for all I know, they may take him next week.
1:10:57And if they take three weeks to build up from provincial capital to provincial capital, we're going to kill them.
1:11:02Do you notice they set up a government quandary?
1:11:06Remember you've always said that's what they would do.
1:11:10What the hell is quandary?
1:11:11So they have a government quandary.
1:11:14We're in the northernmost province of South Vietnam.
1:11:19So if they continue to take these losses,
1:11:23and then every succeeding push in military region three, either because they're regrouping or because they've run out of seed.
1:11:31Yeah, when you talk to them, that answers my question.
1:11:35Is it not true?
1:11:36Is it not true?
1:11:37Can you?
1:11:38Is it not true that insofar as our goal of preventing the loss of Vietnam... Black David's better.
1:11:45It's not only better, but it's the only way that is relatively sure.
1:11:48What the hell else have you got?
1:11:51That's right.
1:11:56I think it is right.
1:11:58I think that the other tickets ran out.
1:12:04They will not let us out, Mr. President, in a way that saves our dignity.
1:12:09How did they let us out?
1:12:24Not in the circumstances.
1:12:29Not in the circumstances.
1:12:33Also, the blockade, the blockade across the surgical line, I think you would agree, if psychology has anything to do with South Vietnam's will to resist, I don't know if it affects them at all.
1:12:45My God, it'll be dramatic to tell.
1:12:47Oh, it should affect them a little bit.
1:12:50Because they'll know that we're in, and the guys can't.
1:12:53And also, if John Connolly makes a complaint, won't it have some effect on the normality of the case?
1:13:00Oh, yes.
1:13:00And if we drop leaflets and make it clear what happened.
1:13:02There may be one other point.
1:13:03I don't think we can send Hague over there.
1:13:07We need him here while this is going on.
1:13:11I think Alderman agrees with us, too.
1:13:12The trouble is, while these things go on, first of all, you may want to send me off.
1:13:16I mean, supposing...
1:13:19Can I send anybody over there?
1:13:23That's the point.
1:13:23I need to send somebody over there as a cop to watch that son of a bitch eat him.
1:13:28I mean, the cop is right.
1:13:30He should be fired.
1:13:31Well, I would consider sending Dupuis, who is a tough, mean son of a bitch.
1:13:35Where is Dupuis?
1:13:36He's in the pandemic now.
1:13:38He's got the reputation of being a nut cutter.
1:13:41You get him in here and tell him what you want, and hey, can I tell him?
1:13:45Sure, and he's first.
1:13:47He was first division commander.
1:13:48But I don't believe him years back.
1:13:51He's a tough little son of a bitch.
1:13:53But I don't want him to go over there and suck his.
1:13:56Well, he was first division commander.
1:13:58His trouble is that he's going to be tactless.
1:14:00But let Bunker smooth that out.
1:14:02But he's got to go over there and leave.
1:14:04And he's going to be a direct line of communication to us and report to us as to what the situation is.
1:14:10Send him over on a mission for two weeks.
1:14:12No, I think he would rather replace Abrams.
1:14:15Oh, good.
1:14:16Good Christ, if we can get April to replace.
1:14:20God damn, I don't know.
1:14:22Is he got too many friends?
1:14:25Bunch of cold areas.
1:14:29Do you want to buy that boat for me?
1:14:31Oh, certainly.
1:14:32Another thing, Mr. President, is...
1:14:33I'd much rather replace you.
1:14:35We ought to get layered in on this.
1:14:37I know he's a son of a bitch.
1:14:38I know he'll try to screw us.
1:14:40But that's nothing compared to what he's going to do to us if this thing was cranked up without it.
1:14:44All right.
1:14:45Why should I go today?
1:14:46Tomorrow morning.
1:14:48Tomorrow morning.
1:14:50You're authorized.
1:14:50And on Sunday morning, I'll get Alex Johnson when the court answers back.
1:15:02You know, it's a crime if I have to do both Larry and Roger's in a time of agony.
1:15:10There are some of which you see each other.
1:15:11Oh, let us do that.
1:15:12I mean, you've got to talk to them for one hour, because otherwise the bastards will say you.
1:15:23Yeah.
1:15:25But I'll do it, Dr.
1:15:25I'll do it.
1:15:26Boy, I've got to find the base.
1:15:26But that cable from Bunker, it's really sickening.
1:15:29I'll bring it in when I see you later.
1:15:30Don't ever tell me about it.
1:15:33I can see what he did.
1:15:34In other words, he encouraged Abrams.
1:15:35He said to him, Abrams, the same way he says to me, the president will be heart-sick when he sees this briefing of Hanoi and Iceland because you'll see there's nothing good there.
1:15:44I've got the photographs.
1:15:46We'll get more of the preview on it if you want to.
1:15:50But then he undoubtedly called Abrams and said, look, the president is under great pressure.
1:15:55He'd appreciate it if you gave him a good military reason that you need peace.
1:15:59And Bunker, who is a good old soldier, would not say that there were misleading signals coming from Washington.
1:16:08Morder said so, and Rush said so.
1:16:10Rush told me that Lamb goes around the Pentagon saying that he talks to you all the time.
1:16:16Well, so anyway, anyway, anyway.
1:16:20All right.
1:16:21Brant Laird did it, but he was swearing an absolute goddamn secrecy for a change.
1:16:27The belief in the blockade is that if he's not to talk to Rogers and say, now, now I want to be by a candidate.
1:16:36The president was frankly disappointed in the way that you and Rogers colluded.
1:16:41Use that term at the time.
1:16:43Can't believe it.
1:16:45And also, at the time, the EC-120, you know, at the time, you can't believe that's the best you can.
1:16:52He said, it just looked like that.
1:16:54He said, it was made very rough.
1:16:55Now, your DOE considers it to be
1:16:57He considers you to be wild, you're hard-line, you're strong.
1:17:02He needs you now.
1:17:03Please help him and tell him the President was enormously grateful the way he helped him on Salt.
1:17:08Now we need you here.
1:17:09Tell him to die his cast.
1:17:11He's made up his mind.
1:17:12He's thought this thing true.
1:17:13It's his own decision.
1:17:14He's going to do it and this is it now.
1:17:17This is it.
1:17:18Now you support it and you and and and and and
1:17:22Let's not have a situation where it's said that the Secretary of Defense joined with the Secretary of State, begging the President not to do what the President's going to do in this instance.
1:17:33I think you should talk just that way.
1:17:36Would you do that?
1:17:37I'll get to it.
1:17:38I just think it's too dangerous not to have it today.
1:17:40We can go through it as a plan.
1:17:41I hope you have a good one.
1:17:44Right.
1:17:46If you pull him back too early, you're just going to create a tremendous sensation.
1:17:52I think we ought to pull him back.
1:17:54He ought to come back at the close of Christmas Sunday.
1:17:58Which...
1:18:00I do not even cable it beforehand.
1:18:05I just cable it.
1:18:09Check his schedule.
1:18:10Maybe he's not doing much on Sunday.
1:18:12Well, he can leave Europe as late as 6 in the evening and still get my FIA.
1:18:15He should keep his team over there.
1:18:17And I think you should come by yourself.
1:18:22Your team should stay.
1:18:24I want you alone.
1:18:25Do not have your team come with you.
1:18:29You could go back.
1:18:32Well, to have him abroad...
1:18:58We can consider that tomorrow.
1:18:59There's a lot to be said for them.
1:19:01You'll have them on your hands all day Sunday, sir.
1:19:03Well, I will.
1:19:04I mean, I'm not going to see them all day Sunday.
1:19:07Obviously, we want to see them.
1:19:11I don't want to see anybody.
1:19:13I've got to work on speech.
1:19:16Let me look over his schedule.
1:19:17If he hasn't got much scheduled on Sunday, maybe you ought to come back tomorrow night and then go back to Europe and ease in position to start treating people.
1:19:25That's right.
1:19:26On this.
1:19:27On this.
1:19:27That's right.
1:19:29That might be.
1:19:30There's a lot to be said for them.
1:19:31If you enlist Mel O'Mara and say, now, Mel, I'm going to have a heart-to-heart talk with you.
1:19:36The President's got great confidence in you.
1:19:38He knows this.
1:19:39He'll say he can.
1:19:40He says there's no good choices.
1:19:41Put it all out there.
1:19:41Except don't be one of the other great congressional people.
1:19:44Write yourself this.
1:19:45Christ will be that great congressional people.
1:19:48God will take care of you.
1:19:56I think he does us more good with Congress than a pro.
1:19:58Okay, you're right.
1:20:03And then you can send somebody like a Floyd, some of us, for good.
1:20:13Well, all three of you say, I'm not going to do that.
1:20:15On this case, I'm not going to do that.
1:20:18Tell them that.
1:20:20Me?
1:20:20Me?
1:20:23Yeah, I mean, you don't do it in May.
1:20:25It doesn't have to be a long time.
1:20:37Well, I'll tell you, we can do it at 8 o'clock.
1:20:408 o'clock, 10 at night, and then else.
1:20:45That's right.
1:20:45You know what I think we ought to do?
1:20:46I think what I say is do the big four.
1:20:51Rather than the whole goddamn bunch.
1:20:53That's not to be said to do, just to be clear.
1:20:55Yeah, rather than having that whole cluster.
1:20:57Otherwise, you've got to pull it right there and all the rest.
1:21:00It will not be back in the whole cluster.
1:21:01It will be back in that place.
1:21:04That's about it.
1:21:24I do the big four.
1:21:25I let Rogers do full drive in the bottom direction.
1:21:30Let Larry do the arm services.
1:21:48I would not read the press.
1:21:50No.
1:21:51What do you think?
1:21:52Absolutely.
1:21:52I miss it.
1:21:53Don't read the press.
1:21:54Maybe not after the speech, but clearly not before.
1:21:59No, I wouldn't do it, Ben, until late at night.
1:22:02I'd do it the next morning.
1:22:04I think you should do, Ben, the next morning.
1:22:06Absolutely.
1:22:07And if you go down the line about repeating again and again and again and again and again and again and again and again and again and again and again and again
1:22:18although you can do it all right now let's go let's go you understand absolutely i understand i want you to be gracious i want you to be totally you know
1:22:42a little bit cool.
1:22:43He asked about what was the president under, what about all these stories.
1:22:47I said, I don't know.
1:22:48I mean, he looked like an only
1:23:06This is kind of like his conversation with Joe Black.
1:23:10He said, look, it's obvious you can't do it, but if you're not, we understand.
1:23:15If you're not doing it, but if you're not, we understand.
1:23:19We're going to have to handle the situation ourselves.
1:23:21We're not going to have to look at the press once we go ahead with our other things.
1:23:23They're terribly important.
1:23:30Okay.
1:23:30Don't worry about it.
1:23:31I'm not going to say it anymore.
1:23:32I'm not going to say it.
1:23:33Never look back.
1:23:37Thank you.

On May 5, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon, Peter J. Brennan, Rose Mary Woods, Stephen B. Bull, Henry A. Kissinger, H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman, and unknown person(s) met in the Oval Office of the White House from 8:55 am to 10:09 am. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 720-004 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 720-4

Date: May 5, 1972
Time: 8:55 am - 10:09 am
Location: Oval Office

The President talked with Peter J. Brennan.

[Conversation No. 720-4A]

[See Conversation No. 23-164]

Rose Mary Woods entered at 8:56 am.

[End of telephone conversation]

Stephen B. Bull entered at an unknown time after 8:58 pm.

     Henry A. Kissinger
         -Location
         -Meeting with the President
               -Time

Bull left at an unknown time before 9:14 am.

     Tricia Nixon Cox
           -Interview with Barbara Walters
                 -Thelma C. (“Pat”) Nixon's report
                 -Walters's demeanor
                 -Tricia Nixon Cox's appearance
                 -Walters's questions

                -Anti-war hecklers
                      -George S. McGovern's appeal
                      -Tricia Nixon Cox's handling
                -Tricia Nixon Cox's appearance
                -Tricia Nixon Cox's self-assessment
                -Personal strength
                -Manner
                -Comments on the President's job
                -Manner

     Julie Nixon Eisenhower
           -Meeting with the President

     Nixons' travel
         -Mrs. Nixon
         -Ronald L. Ziegler
         -Funding
         -Julie Nixon Eisenhower's public appearances
         -Woods's opinion
                -Mrs. Nixon
                -Democrats

**********************************************************************

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 2
[Personal Returnable]
[Duration: 10m 49s ]

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 2

**********************************************************************

     Forthcoming letter to Francis E. Meloy, Jr.
          -Retirement of Donald L. Jackson
          -Dictation

Kissinger entered at 9:14 am.

     Kissinger's previous speech in New York
          -Response

          -Soviet Summit
          -Asia Society
               -People's Republic of China [PRC] trip
               -Foreign Affairs Council
               -Audience
               -Columbia University/Time-Life sponsorship
               -Kissinger statement on Vietnam
                     -A heckler
                     -Hedley W. Donovan
                     -Applause

     Vietnam
          -Press reports
                -President's talk with Brennan
                -Effect of President's televised speeches
                      -Lyndon B. Johnson comparison
                -Kissinger's Asia Society audience
                      -Statement
                      -Response
                      -Donovan

     Woods's schedule
         -New York

     Kissinger's schedule
          -Speeches

     Woods's schedule
         -Camp David
               -Visit
               -President's trip
                     -Departure time

Woods left at 9:15 am.

     Soviet Union
          -Kissinger's meeting with Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
                -The President’s instructions
                     -Mrs. Nixon
                     -Irina N. Dobrynin

     Vietnam
          -North Vietnam offensive

               -US response
                    -Planning
                    -Orders to Alexander M. Haig, Jr. and Adm. Thomas H. Moorer
                    -Kissinger's schedule
                          -President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board [PFIAB] meeting
                         -Meeting with Haig and Moorer
                    -Leak on blockade
                         -Dan Rather’s report
                         -H. R. (“Bob”) Haldeman
                         -John A. Scali
                         -Haldeman
                         -John D. Ehrlichman

Haldeman entered at 9:21 am.

                         -Rather
                         -Ehrlichman
                         -Richard A. Moore
                         -Charles W. Colson
                         -Scali
                    -News reports
                         -Rather
                         -Wall Street Journal
                         -Rather report
                               -Source
                               -Melvin R. Laird
                               -Moorer
                         -State Department leak
                               -Robert Keatley [?] report
                                    -Terms for settlement
                                    -Source
                                          -William H. Sullivan
                                          -Cable about cease-fire
                                                -William P. Rogers
                                                -Leonid I. Brezhnev
                                                -Haig
                                                -Rogers
                    -Department of Defense [DOD] briefing
                         -Soviet arms
                    -Speculation
                         -President’s previous remarks
                         -Settlement
                         -Blockade

                            -Bombing
                            -Sources
                            -Marvin L. Kalb report
                                 -Sources
                            -Rather report
                                 -Sources
                                 -Haig
                -Press
                     -White House staff
                           -The President’s instructions
                     -Moorer
                -Plans
                     -Kissinger meeting with Moorer
                           -Attendees
                           -Time
                     -President's review
                           -Haldeman
                           -Notes

Haldeman left at 9:30 am.

                     -State Department involvement
                           -Timing
                           -Rogers
                           -U. Alexis Johnson
                     -Blockade
                           -Advantages
                           -Disadvantages
                     -Bombing
                           -Disadvantages
                                 -Peace demonstrations
                     -Blockade
                           -Commitment
                           -Soviet response
                           -India's response
                           -PRC response
                     -Bombing
                           -Targets
                           -Dissent
                     -Blockade
                           -Advantages
                           -Alternatives
                -Ground action

                    -Latest reports
                    -Weakness
                          -Kontum
                    -North Vietnam casualties
                    -North Vietnam attacks
               -US response
                    -US landing in panhandle
                          -Effect
               -US bombing
                    -Effectiveness
               -Blockade
                    -Effectiveness
               -Bombing
                    -Impact
                          -Haiphong
                          -Hainan
                    -President's instinct
                          -Su Nan [Sp?]
                    -William J. Porter walkout
                    -Kissinger backgrounder
                          -Talk with Henry Hubbard, Jerrold L. Schecter, and Max Frankel
               -Blockade
                    -Kissinger's view
                    -Public support
                    -Advantages
                          -Decisiveness
                          -Effect on forthcoming election
                          -End of war
               -Bombing
                    -Advantages
                    -John B. Connally's advice
                    -Advantages
                          -Soviet response
                          -Cancellation of Summit

An unknown person entered at an unknown time after 9:30 am.

               -Soviet Summit

The unknown person left at an unknown time before 10:09 am.

                     -Timing with North Vietnam offensive
                          -Public perception

                          -Hue
                          -Kontum

An unknown person entered at an unknown time after 9:30 am.

               -Bombing
                   -Timing

The unknown person left at an unknown time before 10:09 am.

               -Lines of communication
                    -Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, Jr.
                    -Ellsworth F. Bunker
                    -Instructions
                          -Abrams
                          -The President
                          -Kissinger
                          -Bunker
                          -Abrams
                          -Laird
                          -Moorer
                          -Abrams
                          -Laird
                          -Abrams
                          -Moorer
                          -[David] Kenneth Rush
                          -Bunker
                          -Laird
                                -Actions
                                -Motives
               -US position
                    -Haig
                    -Moorer
                    -Connally
               -Soviet reply to US message
               -Bombing
                    -Soviet response
                          -Effect on bombing
                    -PRC summit
                    -Effect of Hanoi and Haiphong bombing
               -Blockade
               -Soviet goals
                    -Kissinger's assessment

                 -Foreign Affairs Council speech
     -Hubert H. Humphrey, McGovern, Edward M. Kennedy
           -Dealings with Soviets
     -Connally's advice
     -Escalation
           -Issues in Vietnam
                 -Communist government
                 -Control of US policy
           -US response
                 -Peace offers
           -North Vietnam motives
-US long-term interests
     -Soviet Summit
           -Cancellation
                 -Connally's advice
                 -Public response
                       -Dwight D. Eisenhower’s cancelled trip to the Soviet Union
                       -Eisenhower’s cancelled trip to Japan
                       -The President’s trip while Vice President to Venezuela
     -Bombing
           -Soviet response
                 -Summit
                       -Comparison with blockade
     -Connally's advice
           -Avoidance of defeat
     -Bombing
           -Effectiveness
     -Blockade
           -Effectiveness compared with bombing
           -Commitment
           -Soviet Union response
           -PRC response
           -President's foreign policy
                 -Risks
                 -Legacy
                       -PRC
                 -Compared to Laos operation
-End of war
     -President's efforts
-Dealing with Soviets, PRC, Europeans, and Japanese
     -Alternatives to President
           -Connally
           -McGovern

               -Humphrey
               -Kennedy
               -Ability to conduct foreign policy
     -US stakes
          -President's incumbency
          -US foreign policy
                -Rogers and Laird
          -Disentanglement from war
                -North Vietnam terms
                      -Kissinger’s view
                      -May 31, 1971 proposals
          -Forthcoming election
                -Effect on South Vietnam
                -Blockade compared with bombing
                -North Vietnam actions
                      -Break-off of talks
                           -Responsibility
                                 -Porter
                           -Peace groups
                           -Press coverage

Forthcoming election
     -Democrats
          -Draft of Connally
               -Possibility

Vietnam
     -McGovern
     -Impact on US foreign policy
          -Humiliation
     -Blockade
          -Necessity
     -Bombing
          -Moorer
          -Extent
          -Civilian casualties
          -Targets
                -Petroleum, Oils, and Lubricants [POL] dumps
                -Dikes
                      -Civilian casualties
                      -Forthcoming study
                      -President's familiarity
                      -Evacuation of civilians

                          -Destruction
                                -Impact
               -Questions raised by Kissinger
                     -The President’s view
               -Effectiveness
                     -Coordination with blockade
                     -Relationship to averting defeat
               -Return of prisoners of war [POWs]
          -South Vietnam performance
               -Collapse
               -Losses
                     -Kontum
                     -Provincial capitals
                          -Slow movement
                     -Quang Tri
                          -Capture
                                -Value
          -Blockade
               -Effectiveness
               -Only sure option
          -Peace terms
               -Nguyen Van Thieu
               -US dignity

Stephen B. Bull entered at an unknown time after 9:30 am.

     Forthcoming PFIAB meeting
          -Delay
          -Refreshments

Bull left at an unknown time before 10:09 am.

     Vietnam
          -Blockade and bombing
                -Effect on South Vietnam
                -Effect on North Vietnam
                      -Connally's comment
          -Haig
                -Trip to South Vietnam
                      -Haldeman
          -Trip to South Vietnam
                -Abrams
                      -Lt. Col. W.E. Depuy

                  -Kissinger’s view
                  -Assignment
                        -Bunker
                  -Responsibility to the President
                  -New assignment
            -Replacement for Abrams
                  -Laird involvement
                        -Kissinger’s view
                        -Kissinger's call to Laird
-President's meeting with Laird and Rogers
      -Johnson
-Cable from Bunker
      -Kissinger’s view
      -Contents
            -Abrams
            -Moorer
            -Abrams
            -Bunker
            -Moorer
            -Rush
            -Laird
-President's meeting with Laird about the blockade
      -Kissinger's instructions
            -Secrecy
                  -Rogers and Cambodia comparison
            -President's need for Laird's support
                  -Strategic Arms Limitation Talks [SALT] comparison
            -President's decision on blockade
-Rogers
      -Meeting with the President
            -Time
            -Day
            -Kissinger's schedule
            -Day
-President's speech
-President's meeting with Rogers
-Laird
      -Meeting with Kissinger
-Briefings
      -Congressmen
            -Rogers
      -John J. McCloy
      -Announcement

                        -Time
                   -J. William Fulbright
                   -Michael J. Mansfield
                   -Rogers
                   -Laird
                   -Kissinger's briefings
                   -Press
                        -Timing
                              -The President’s view
             -Kissinger meeting with Dobrynin
                   -Manner
                   -Speculation
                   -Response to questions
                        -Chou En-lai

Kissinger left at 10:09 am.
  • 023-163 8:44 AM · 17 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 8:44 am and 8:55 am.
  • 720-001 8:45 AM · 6 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Alexander P. Butterfield met in the Oval Office of the White House from 8:45 am to 8:48 am.
  • 720-002 8:50 AM · 31 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Rose Mary Woods met in the Oval Office of the White House from 8:50 am to 8:51 am.
  • 720-003 8:51 AM · 4 min — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 8:51 am and 8:55 am.
  • 023-164 8:55 AM · 3 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Peter J. Brennan talked on the telephone from 8:55 am to 8:58 am.
  • 100-002 11:37 AM · 3 min — a White House tour group met in the Cabinet Room of the White House on an unknown date, sometime between 11:37 am on May 5, 1972 and 9:10 am on May 8, 1972.
  • 100-003 11:37 AM · 2 min — a White House tour group met in the Cabinet Room of the White House on an unknown date, sometime between 11:37 am on May 5, 1972 and 9:10 am on May 8, 1972.
  • 100-004 11:37 AM · 16 sec — a White House tour group met in the Cabinet Room of the White House on an unknown date, sometime between 11:37 am on May 5, 1972 and 9:10 am on May 8, 1972.

Conversation 720-004, May 5, 1972. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives. Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/720-004 (accessed October 9, 2026).