Nixon phone call with Rogers on Mansfield Amendment and SALT negotiations

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Hello.

Secretary Rogers.

Wasn't that a great vote?

Yeah, 63-26.

And I understood that, is Matthias the one that they expect the most trouble on?

No, this was an attempt to water...

I didn't watch this one.

What was this one?

Well, this was a vote, this was a...

amendment by Nelson to amend Mansfield's to make it a little less harsh.

So this means that the Mansfield thing is clearly defeated.

What about Mathias?

Well, now, Mathias is one that has quite a lot of support.

We don't know how the vote's coming out on that, but I've sent Stennis a letter.

That's the one I talked to you about yesterday, which says, in effect, negotiate with the Warsaw Pact to reduce our forces on a mutual basis.

The next paragraph says negotiate with your NATO allies to do it on a unilateral basis.

So I've written a pretty strong letter.

Stennis has it, and he can use it if he wants to.

I had one idea that I'd like to run by you for a minute.

And it's highly delicate, but it might be worthwhile in relation to our relations with Mansfield.

And just think about it.

Think about it.

I deliberately am not going to inform the leaders of the meeting until after the vote, because I think it would be interpreted as, you know what I mean, they say, ah, there's, you know, they were sort of trying to, see, we wouldn't tell them what it was about, and it would be considered as a power play.

I think this is a good thing to wait, in other words, we'll call them around 6.30 at night after they have voted.

Now, however, I wondered if possibly

If you thought well of it, or you can't do it with Fulbright, but I wondered if with Mansfield, who is totally trustworthy, that you might go to see him and say, now look, Mike, I think you should know that after the vote, I think you should know that there's been a significant development in assault.

we learned about it last night, that the President did not want to, thought it would be unfair and a power play to have it confused with this issue, but that we are going to call after the vote for a leaders' meeting tomorrow, that utmost secrecy is required, etc.,

Now, here's my reasoning, and I don't get anybody else, I don't know, around here that trusts Mike as much as I do.

But what I meant is most people don't think she did, but I mean like the only ones, and I've only talked to Bob about it and Bob Holliman.

But here's the view that I have, just running it out before you respond on it.

It would first sort of heal, you know, the rough edges of Mike's, you know, attitude here.

Now, we understand Mike's never going to be with us.

He's not going to be with us on troops, and he's not going to be with us in Vietnam.

But on the other hand, Mike cannot be as hard on us if we're decent to him.

As you know, he's been awfully nice to us.

In other words, he really has.

He's said good things.

Second thing, it really shows, Bill, it seems to me, a pretty damn decent line with these senators.

Can you imagine how a Kennedy or a Johnson would have played this sort of a thing?

They'd have tried to do this to influence the vote.

Third, Mike will know that we leveled with him, that we didn't just figure up something right after the vote to call them together.

But you could say, now, Mike, we've known about this.

We've had a development.

It just occurred.

The president wants you to know

He asked me to tell you, he wants you to know that it's coming, that he's going to be calling the leaders, asking for a meeting tomorrow at 10.30.

It must be kept in absolute secrecy so far.

What do you think of the idea?

No, I think it's a good idea.

Good idea.

Could, well, now... Well, I could go up to see him.

Well, I think you ought to, yeah.

See, because he'll have to be on the floor, but if you could go up to see him, and you could say that I have a... Yeah, I can tell him.

I can...

But isn't it a good idea?

I think so.

Yeah, and I would...

i just i wait let's just say it just you're there's no question in your mind that he will not say anything we just don't want the word salt to get out any time before no i won't even tell him saul i'll just say there's been a development in his significant field that's significant that we didn't want to do anything about until after the vote i want him to know it and we'll that he'll be calling you that you'll be calling him after the vote or something yeah we'll be calling what else would be calling that but we'd be calling for to get the leaders together tomorrow

tomorrow morning for a meeting we're going to call the leaders but we wanted him to know that this was going to happen that we did not want to because it is a significant development we did not want to do it today so that it appeared would have any effect on the the issues involved in the vote i think it's a good good ploy i talked to jerry smith and i think he's going to be all right i explained to him the situation he's going to see you and i told him that as far as he was concerned that uh

that there was a limit to what you could tell him, but that obviously he knew that he was thinking along these lines.

And I told him that I was quite sure that you were favorably disposed to the general approach of this kind.

Well, after all, he and his people are going to be the ones that are going to bring it off.

I mean, the negotiations now have to take place.

They're going to bring it off, and they're going to be... Well, I think what he's got to do, he's going to have to indicate that

uh he knew in a general way but not specifically enough so he had any responsibility to advise his colleagues well he can be totally totally candid on that because we didn't i didn't know until last night and approximately 5 30 or 6 o'clock about that time that they would go i mean that they that was that was the time before they even they even uh before they approved the uh the uh

The letter text.

Did he mention that?

I think there's one sentence in there that's awfully poor in English.

Maybe that was too late.

Well, in the public announcement?

Yeah.

I'll tell you why we can't change that.

That is not our...

The public announcement bill, they prepared.

They prepared a Russian and English text.

I hope it reads better in Russian.

Well, it's terrible.

It's terrible.

And when I saw it on...

In fact, I saw it on...

when they were still hanging out.

I think I saw it Friday.

I said, my God, that is terrible.

They came back.

You understand, I have not talked to DeBrain at all.

My January message was forwarded, and I have not seen him in this period because I didn't want to get into it.

But he came back and he said, well, to change the...

any part of the public of the announcement at this point would require another meeting of the 15 because they've done this at the highest level apparently at the at the congress and that therefore and i just so therefore since the substance was not changed but it is terrible language agree to agree to agree but you see this is theirs not ours now the letter the letter on the other hand uh the exchange of letters involves a joint that's a joint proposition but that that isn't going to

No, none of that can be made public.

The letters will never be made.

I gave the copy back to Bob.

I just do not have a copy over here.

I need one I can look at.

No, you should have the copy of the letters.

You keep them there.

But the letters are there.

But you see on the public announcement...

If we tried to change it, I just didn't think it was worth getting into it now.

And I agree, when I read it, I'm going to feel embarrassed.

But that is not, that is basically, that is totally their text, not ours.

And frankly, it's better from the standpoint of substance, even though the language is bad, than the letter itself.

Because it's more concrete text.

on the linkage.

Right.

A couple of other matters.

One, we've got to have a delegation to go present at Park's inauguration.

Agnew wants to go.

Agnew.

I was going to recommend him.

I didn't want to talk to him until I talked to you.

Yeah, good.

That's fine.

I'd like for him to go.

I think it's good for him to have that kind of visibility.

You saw Utah and made a suggestion about Adams for Peace in Geneva.

Obviously, this is not something you'd want to consider.

I thought it also, he suggested possibly, what he's trying to do is get the Chinese there as well as the Russians.

I think what I'll do is say it's no, as far as you're concerned, and probably no as far as I'm concerned.

But

Well, let's see what he has in mind.

Where does he want to do it?

In Geneva?

In Geneva.

What they're having, you know, it's the one where President Eisenhower made his Adams Peace Proposal, and it's the anniversary of the thing I've forgotten, 10th or something, and 15th.

And what he had in mind was to try to invite all governments, including Russia and China,

And he thought not all to participate at the same time, but just be there.

And he thought it could extend the Chinese thing.

Well, obviously, you don't want to go.

No, I shouldn't.

Not at this point.

Would you keep yours open a little?

It seems to me I'd just keep mine open a little.

I think you should keep yours open because it might be, if this thing sorts out, it might be that it would be good for having you go.

It depends, really.

walking the tightrope between the Russians and the Chinese, and I just don't know.

Well, this one, you could play it either way.

What I'll do is keep it open.

In other words, you could go and make a speech and not even see the Chinese.

I think you could say, well, by the same token, or you could go and make a speech and see them.

Well, he said that you could.

What I meant is that it just might be an opportunity for us.

Well, that's what I mean.

You can keep your options.

When's the date?

September 6th or that week.

Keep it open, but have in mind the fact that as I told you today, there is a possibility that they'll come back with an offer.

And if that does, that just knocks everything else out.

Because you'll have to go to the other place.

Okay.

One other thing you said.

Oh, one other thing.

Laird is being

I will see Laird at 2 o'clock.

He's being briefed now.

And he has been told that the only person in the government, because naturally he'll be sensitive about it, the only person in the government that knew that I had made this approach, you know, which has now been accepted, was you, the judgment informer, which is true, of course, because you were the only one that I did say that I was going to send a message or a letter.

But Laird will be sensitive about this, and I just want you to know that

But we've, I've, Henry's briefing him on the papers and then I'm going to see him.

But he will be, he will be told that if he raises it by, you can say that you had to know because of other, but we haven't told Smith.

And the reason we haven't, we didn't want to get the thing debated until we knew we had a deal.

Okay.

Okay, fine.

Thank you.

Nixon phone call with Rogers on Mansfield Amendment and SALT negotiations

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Also recorded on May 19, 1971

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