Nixon White House Tapes › Topic
Nixon Tapes on Congressional relations
835 conversations · page 1 of 9 · frequently with Nixon, Haldeman, Kissinger, Bull
When Congressional relations comes up
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| Month | Conversations |
|---|---|
| Feb 1971 | 2 |
| Mar 1971 | 18 |
| Apr 1971 | 27 |
| May 1971 | 39 |
| Jun 1971 | 45 |
| Jul 1971 | 15 |
| Aug 1971 | 21 |
| Sep 1971 | 41 |
| Oct 1971 | 21 |
| Nov 1971 | 51 |
| Dec 1971 | 23 |
| Jan 1972 | 22 |
| Feb 1972 | 19 |
| Mar 1972 | 15 |
| Apr 1972 | 17 |
| May 1972 | 21 |
| Jun 1972 | 25 |
| Jul 1972 | 11 |
| Aug 1972 | 7 |
| Sep 1972 | 17 |
| Oct 1972 | 26 |
| Nov 1972 | 6 |
| Dec 1972 | 37 |
| Jan 1973 | 81 |
| Feb 1973 | 45 |
| Mar 1973 | 56 |
| Apr 1973 | 22 |
| May 1973 | 59 |
| Jun 1973 | 44 |
| Jul 1973 | 2 |
Related topics: Vietnam WarPublic relationsForeign PolicyLegislative strategyWatergatePresidential schedulingWhite House operationsPolitical strategyEconomic policyHenry Kissinger1972 electionPrisoners of WarWilliam E. TimmonsPress relations
President Nixon consulted with various staff members regarding administrative matters and staffing inquiries. The primary focus of the discussion involved evaluating the professional background and political reliability of Joseph E. Parker, a Washington insider with extensive experience in Congress and agricultural policy. Nixon sought to assess Parker's suitability for a potential role, specifically noting his Democratic affiliation and his reputation for being savvy on Capitol Hill.
President Nixon, H.R. Haldeman, and several staff members met to discuss administrative scheduling, public relations strategies, and domestic political polling. The President emphasized a preference for radio over television for addressing the public, citing its effectiveness for targeted messaging and avoiding excessive media scrutiny. Additionally, they reviewed recent polling data regarding Congress and discussed personnel arrangements, including the roles of Bryce Harlow and Donald Rumsfeld in managing intergovernmental relations.
President Nixon met with Representative Daniel H. Kuykendall to express gratitude for his legislative support and his efforts regarding international assistance programs. The brief discussion highlighted the President's appreciation for Kuykendall's work, including his ongoing contributions to administration goals. The meeting served as a brief gesture of goodwill and encouragement for the congressman’s continued cooperation.
President Nixon met with Republican congressional leaders and cabinet members to discuss rural development initiatives and solicit support for the administration's policy agenda. Secretary of Agriculture Clifford Hardin and staff provided an extensive briefing on the status of rural America, highlighting demographic shifts and explaining the mechanics of proposed federal revenue-sharing programs designed to foster economic growth. Participants also reviewed legislative priorities, including the upcoming vote on the supersonic transport (SST) appropriation and other pending congressional business.
President Nixon and H.R. Haldeman discussed administrative scheduling, including upcoming meetings with Congressional leaders like Mike Mansfield, and reviewed recent polling data regarding the Vietnam War and the Laos operation. They analyzed the effectiveness of the administration's public relations efforts, with Nixon emphasizing the need for Cabinet members and Congressional allies to take a more proactive role in defending administration policies. Additionally, they evaluated potential staffing and media strategies, noting the importance of maintaining credibility and focus amid ongoing criticism of the military incursion.
President Nixon met with Representative Silvio O. Conte and a delegation from Whately, Massachusetts, to accept a commemorative gift celebrating the town's bicentennial. The brief meeting included informal introductions, photograph arrangements, and the signing of autographs. The participants also briefly touched upon Congressional relations, specifically mentioning Representative Daniel H. Kuykendall and Treasury Secretary John B. Connally.
President Nixon met with various staff members and advisors to refine the administration's political and legislative strategy, specifically regarding the textile quota issue and relations with key Congressional leaders like Wilbur Mills and John Byrnes. The President finalized plans to issue a statement on textile legislation while balancing pressure from the industry against the strategic risks of legislative entanglement. Additionally, the President discussed methods for managing Republican Congressional relations through targeted meetings and evaluated strategies to counter negative media coverage through the use of news tapes.
President Nixon and Secretary of the Treasury John Connally met to discuss pressing economic and administrative issues, primarily the potential government loan guarantees required to prevent the financial collapse of the Lockheed Corporation. They also addressed the ongoing DuPont brokerage case and the need for internal reforms, including the potential for salary reductions among affected stakeholders. Nixon instructed Connally to coordinate with David Packard and others to develop a strategy for seeking Congressional authorization to provide the necessary financial stability for Lockheed.
President Nixon checked on Representative William M. Colmer’s recovery following a recent surgery and discussed plans for a future lunch meeting during the upcoming Easter recess. The two men also briefly touched upon the President’s travel schedule to California and Nixon’s support for F. Edward Hébert in his public opposition to a CBS news story. The conversation concluded with Colmer reaffirming his commitment to supporting the President's legislative agenda and the military.
President Nixon met with Representative Samuel S. Stratton to express appreciation for his public support of the administration's Southeast Asian policies. The two discussed the ongoing Laotian operation, with Nixon emphasizing that the mission’s goal was to disrupt North Vietnamese supply routes rather than occupy territory. Nixon also addressed the challenges of maintaining public and congressional support, noting that the ultimate political perception of the operation would depend on its final outcome.
On March 17, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 3:44 pm and 3:48 pm. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 467-037 of the White House Tapes.
President Nixon met with Representative LaMar Baker to offer well wishes regarding Baker's recent surgery. The brief, informal conversation focused on the physical recovery process following the procedure. No substantive policy matters or official administrative decisions were discussed during the encounter.
On March 19, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator met in the Oval Office of the White House at 12:32 pm. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 470-010 of the White House Tapes.
On March 19, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 12:52 pm and 1:05 pm. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 470-014 of the White House Tapes.
President Nixon met with Congressional leaders Hugh Scott and Gerald Ford, along with staff members, to strategize on critical legislative and foreign policy challenges. The participants focused on securing support for the Supersonic Transport (SST) program to prevent Soviet market dominance and discussed messaging strategies regarding the ongoing military operations in Laos and Vietnamization. Nixon emphasized the importance of executive leadership and bipartisan cooperation while addressing concerns over Congressional polling pressures and upcoming milk price support decisions.
President Nixon met with House Minority Whip Leslie C. Arends to discuss legislative strategy, defense spending, and the upcoming congressional briefing regarding the Laos operation. The two men addressed concerns over Federal Communications Commission activities and the potential impact of network regulation, while also touching upon the status of various presidential nominees. The President emphasized the importance of ensuring bipartisan participation—specifically including Democrats—in the scheduled briefing to maintain support for his foreign policy initiatives.
President Nixon met with H. R. Haldeman and Stephen Bull to discuss strategies for improving the administration's public relations and enhancing support among Congressional allies. The discussion focused on mobilizing staff, specifically figures like Clark MacGregor and Donald Rumsfeld, to champion administration policies such as the Supersonic Transport (SST) and Vietnam troop withdrawals. Nixon emphasized the need for a more proactive, enthusiastic approach from his team to counteract negative narratives, and Haldeman presented findings from recent polling and questionnaires that highlighted the President’s perceived strengths in hard work and family values.
President Nixon and H. R. Haldeman met to coordinate the President's upcoming schedule, specifically focusing on his California trip and the importance of avoiding premature political maneuvers while Congress is in a volatile cycle. They discussed the administration's messaging on the Vietnam War and the Laos operation, noting the necessity of portraying the withdrawal as a strategic decision rather than a retreat. Additionally, the President and Haldeman assessed the performance of Vice President Spiro Agnew, debated the value of public appearances and campus dialogues, and touched upon personnel matters, including upcoming meetings with the Congressional Black Caucus and adjustments to presidential communication strategies.
President Nixon and Henry Kissinger met to discuss strategies for managing public and political fallout following the Vietnam War's Lam Son 719 operation. They analyzed negative media coverage, particularly a Washington Post article, and deliberated on how to frame the operation's results as a strategic success to boost morale. Additionally, Nixon planned his upcoming April 7th speech on troop withdrawals and discussed managing congressional relations with Democratic leaders like Hale Boggs to maintain support for his Vietnam policy.
President Nixon met with his national security team and Secretary of the Treasury John Connally to discuss the ongoing Vietnamization strategy, the military situation in Laos, and the administration's efforts to manage Congressional and media opposition. Nixon emphasized the importance of maintaining his planned withdrawal schedule to ensure the stability of South Vietnam and warned that setting an arbitrary Congressional deadline would lead to a strategic failure. The group also addressed the inaccuracies in press coverage regarding South Vietnamese troop casualties and coordinated their messaging for upcoming legislative briefings.
President Richard Nixon and H.R. Haldeman met to discuss administration priorities and strategic planning. While the audio quality is significantly degraded due to tape malfunctions and background noise, the participants addressed legislative relations and the sequencing of administrative objectives. The conversation ended inconclusively with no formal decisions preserved on the record.
President Nixon met with H. R. Haldeman and Henry Kissinger to discuss White House strategy regarding the ongoing Vietnam War, Congressional relations, and the national economic recovery. Amidst frustration over a lack of support from mainstream establishment figures, the President directed his staff to replace moderate names with stronger, conservative allies on official lists and committees. The participants also reviewed positive indicators in the economy, specifically retail and automotive sector data, to assess the Administration's standing.
President Nixon coordinated an unscheduled meeting with Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield to discuss an upcoming, highly sensitive announcement regarding Vietnam policy. Nixon sought to brief Mansfield privately to prevent leaks that had plagued previous communications involving South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu. The two agreed to hold a discreet meeting at the Executive Office Building that morning, while keeping the encounter off the official record to avoid political friction with Republican leadership.
President Nixon and Congressman Gerald Ford discuss their mounting concerns regarding House Majority Leader Hale Boggs, whom they characterize as mentally unstable and prone to substance abuse. Due to fears that Boggs cannot be trusted with sensitive information, the President decides to exclude him from an upcoming briefing with congressional leaders. Nixon instructs Ford to consult with Speaker Carl Albert to restructure the meeting to include only Ford and Albert from the House, ensuring that classified matters regarding Vietnam negotiations can be shared securely.
President Nixon and Representative Gerald Ford discuss strategy for managing sensitive legislative meetings, specifically seeking to limit attendance to key congressional leaders like Carl Albert to maintain confidentiality. Nixon expresses frustration with political criticism of the FBI and explores ways to bypass public disclosure concerns by restricting the group size for upcoming discussions. The conversation concludes with a plan for Ford to coordinate the meeting logistics while Nixon emphasizes his desire to share confidential insights without the risks associated with larger, record-heavy briefings.
President Nixon met with Rogers C. B. Morton, Ted Stevens, and several staff members to discuss the status and legislative strategy for the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act. The participants reviewed the challenges of moving the bill through the House and Senate, specifically noting the roles of key legislators like John P. Saylor and James A. Haley. During the meeting, which included a photo session, the President emphasized the historical significance of the legislation and encouraged the team to continue their efforts to secure its passage.
President Nixon and H. R. Haldeman met briefly to review the President’s upcoming schedule involving key Congressional leaders and administration officials. The discussion focused on coordinating meetings with individuals such as Allen J. Ellender, Richard B. Russell, Patrick J. Buchanan, and Melvin R. Laird. The short exchange served primarily as a logistical check to clarify the status and alignment of these pending appointments.
President Nixon met with key Congressional leadership, including Hugh Scott, Robert Byrd, Robert Griffin, Gerald Ford, and Carl Albert, to brief them on his upcoming televised address regarding Vietnam policy. The discussion focused on the administration's plan for troop withdrawals, the handling of the Prisoner of War (POW) issue, and the strategic rationale behind ongoing U.S. air operations in Southeast Asia. Nixon emphasized the need for flexibility in negotiations and stressed that Congressional support was essential to maintaining a credible bargaining position against North Vietnam.
President Nixon and Henry Kissinger discuss the positive public and media reception of the President's recent televised speech on Southeast Asia. Kissinger praises the delivery and content of the address, while Nixon expresses frustration with members of Congress and his own cabinet, indicating he will no longer cater to them. The conversation concludes with Nixon affirming his resolve to pursue a more aggressive military strategy in Vietnam should North Vietnam remain intransigent in negotiations.
President Nixon and Vice President Spiro Agnew discuss the public and media reception of the President's recent television address regarding the Vietnam War. Agnew offers praise for the speech's effectiveness and highlights an uncharacteristically positive analysis from CBS regarding the administration's withdrawal commitments. Nixon expresses frustration with congressional critics and reaffirms his commitment to his Vietnam policy, while instructing Agnew to relay to Bob Hope that a specific segment of the speech was inspired by their previous conversation.
President Nixon calls Senator Robert C. Byrd to personally thank him for his public support regarding the President's recent speech on the Vietnam War and troop withdrawal policy. The two discuss the logistical difficulties of including Byrd and Senator Robert P. Griffin in exclusive White House briefings due to procedural tensions with House leadership. Nixon reassures Byrd of his intent to ensure their continued participation in future briefings, suggesting that private meetings may be arranged to bypass formal scheduling constraints.
President Nixon and H. R. Haldeman discussed strategies for managing political opposition, specifically focusing on the performance of Cabinet members. Nixon reflected on recent counsel from John B. Connally, who urged the administration to adopt a more aggressive, confrontational approach when dealing with Congress. The discussion emphasized the need for stronger executive leadership and decisive action to counter critics like Edmund Muskie.
President Nixon and Henry Kissinger discuss ongoing South Vietnamese military operations and recent diplomatic back-channel communications with Soviet officials regarding Berlin and potential summit prospects. Kissinger reports on his briefing of Senator Mike Mansfield concerning the President's upcoming announcement regarding China policy. The pair finalize plans for Clark MacGregor to notify key congressional leaders, including Gerald Ford, Carl Albert, and George Aiken, about the impending policy shift.
On April 14, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon and H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 3:07 pm and 4:20 pm. The Old Executive Office Building taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 248-015 of the White House Tapes.
President Nixon and Charles Colson discussed recent positive economic indicators, including stock market growth and a favorable Gross National Product increase, as a means to boost public confidence. The conversation then shifted to managing political opposition regarding the Vietnam War, with Nixon instructing Colson to pressure congressional "doves" and specifically requesting that Senator Edward Brooke hold off on public criticism for 30 days. Nixon planned to offer Brooke a private briefing on May 15, 1971, to secure this short-term cooperation while downplaying the administration's recent overtures toward the People's Republic of China as a concern to his political rivals.
President Nixon and Charles Colson discuss strategies for securing congressional support for the administration's policies, specifically focusing on neutralizing opposition to the Vietnam War and the China initiative. They review the loyalties of Republican senators like Edward Brooke and William Saxbe, noting that these members' public support is effectively confusing and stalling liberal critics. Furthermore, they discuss the political utility of forthcoming poll data and the potential for anti-war protests to inadvertently strengthen the administration's core coalition.
President Nixon and Charles Colson discuss strategies for managing legislative relationships within the House and Senate. The conversation touches on the necessity of maintaining firm positions with lawmakers and addresses concerns regarding public or political sentiment. Colson notes his intention to handle specific tasks, including a planned trip to Seattle, as part of the administration's broader outreach and political strategy.
President Nixon met with H.R. Haldeman, Charles Colson, and other staff members to discuss political messaging strategies and the management of congressional relations. The group focused on fostering a more optimistic, disciplined tone among Republican supporters while strategizing ways to critique opposition figures like Senator Edmund Muskie. Additionally, they deliberated on media presentation tactics, specifically regarding public appearances with members of Congress and how to effectively highlight the administration's policy successes.
President Nixon met briefly with Congressman Leslie C. Arends to express gratitude for Arends’ supportive remarks during an earlier meeting. The two men briefly discussed the public's changing perception of the Vietnam War and the administration's progress in achieving its objectives. Nixon emphasized his determination to maintain control over the war effort despite opposition from Democrats who feared the administration's policies might succeed.
President Nixon, Henry Kissinger, and H.R. Haldeman discuss strategies for managing political support and public opinion regarding the Vietnam War, particularly in light of recent legislative concerns. They emphasize the necessity of conveying a sense of progress to Congress to maintain support for the administration's broader policy agenda. The group also reviews the strategic distribution of favorable poll results to Republican lawmakers and touches upon ongoing surveillance regarding Congressman Hale Boggs.
President Nixon expressed frustration to H. R. Haldeman regarding a meeting with Republican Senators, specifically criticizing Clark MacGregor for allegedly prompting legislators like Howard Baker to push for an end to the Vietnam War. Nixon felt MacGregor mistakenly believed the President was uninformed on congressional sentiment and failed to effectively manage the discussion to better align with administration goals. Haldeman was tasked with holding a candid debriefing with MacGregor to address this tactical failure and was also instructed to expedite the release of relevant poll data.
President Nixon and Treasury Secretary John Connally discussed economic stability, the potential federal bailout of Lockheed, and various Cabinet personnel changes. They examined strategies to restore public confidence in the economy and assessed the leadership vacuum within Congress. Additionally, the President and Connally evaluated potential candidates for Cabinet and agency roles, emphasizing the need for effective 'salesmanship' and public relations skills in promoting the Administration's agenda.
President Nixon and Charles Colson discuss strategies to discredit anti-war veterans' protests by emphasizing the presence of radical elements and the lack of authentic veteran status among participants. They review the success of congressional allies in publicizing pro-administration views, express frustration with Senator Charles Mathias, and praise the recent political alignment of Senator William Saxbe. Additionally, they discuss upcoming negative press regarding Senator Edmund Muskie and analyze the political implications of current anti-war demonstrations in Washington.
President Nixon consulted with Henry Kissinger regarding the administration's strategic response to congressional efforts to curtail executive war powers. The discussion focused on formulating a firm stance against the Javits resolution, which sought to limit the President's authority over military engagements. Nixon directed Kissinger to ensure that representatives from the State and Defense Departments testify in direct opposition to these legislative restrictions.
President Nixon and George P. Shultz met to discuss the management of budgetary constraints and the administration's fiscal policy in relation to key congressional figures like Russell B. Long. The President sought to navigate complex appropriations challenges by re-examining current policies to better support political allies. Additionally, they touched upon scheduling matters involving Emil Mosbacher, Jr., the Coral Sea project, and coordination efforts with Gerald R. Ford.
President Nixon and H. R. Haldeman coordinate upcoming scheduling and policy preparations, including a discussion on whether to formulate an official administration position regarding a proposed $2 minimum wage. Nixon expresses clear opposition to the increase, suggesting he would prefer to avoid a definitive stance if possible. Additionally, the pair discusses recent confrontational testimony by Republican senators Hugh Scott and George Aiken against anti-war protest organizers, noting the favorable media coverage this generated.
On April 29, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at 10:08 pm. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 002-059 of the White House Tapes.
President Nixon met with H.R. Haldeman, John Ehrlichman, and Ronald Ziegler to coordinate the administration's response to the anti-war "May Day" protests in Washington, D.C., and to strategize on key legislative priorities. The participants discussed public relations efforts regarding the recent mass arrests, specifically aiming to project a unified, firm stance of support for local law enforcement. Additionally, Nixon directed efforts to secure sufficient support in Congress for the Supersonic Transport (SST) funding bill, linking its success to future technological defense initiatives like the B-1 bomber program.
President Nixon and Alexander P. Butterfield met to coordinate administrative logistics, specifically regarding the distribution of White House gifts for members of Congress. The discussion covered the inventory of items such as key chains, paperweights, and golf balls, as well as the engraving of the President's signature on cufflinks and tie clasps. Additionally, the pair addressed scheduling concerns involving Charles W. Colson and established strict access restrictions regarding specific visitors.
On May 7, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 10:40 am and 10:46 am. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 002-115 of the White House Tapes.
On May 7, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 10:40 am and 10:46 am. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 495-002 of the White House Tapes.
President Nixon and Betty Garcia held a brief, informal exchange regarding a recent interaction with a senator and his supportive stance on administration associates. Nixon expressed personal frustration regarding the senator's physical conduct during a meeting while simultaneously acknowledging his reliable political loyalty. The conversation concluded with Nixon offering well wishes for Garcia's upcoming rest and recovery from a shoulder injury.
President Nixon and Henry Kissinger met to discuss stalled Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) with the USSR and ongoing efforts to secure a peace agreement in Vietnam. Kissinger expressed frustration with Soviet stonewalling and advised that the administration adopt a tougher public stance if no progress was made by the following week. The two also coordinated plans for managing congressional pressure regarding the Vietnam War, including the possibility of publicly proposing a ceasefire deadline, and reviewed logistics for Kissinger's forthcoming secret diplomatic initiatives with the People's Republic of China.
President Nixon met with various administration officials and Secretary of State William P. Rogers to discuss legislative strategy, current foreign policy, and the political outlook of the Middle East. The President coordinated efforts with George Shultz and Clark MacGregor to build congressional support for revenue sharing and the Super Sonic Transport (SST) funding. Following these domestic agenda items, Secretary Rogers provided an extensive debriefing on his recent diplomatic tour of nine countries, focusing on the stability of Thailand, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan, as well as his efforts to engage Anwar Sadat in Middle East peace negotiations.
On May 10, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 7:12 pm and 7:15 pm. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 002-142 of the White House Tapes.
President Nixon met with his staff to discuss public relations strategies, specifically focusing on improving outreach to congressional wives and managing the public perception of the administration's accomplishments. The group reviewed the President's schedule and evaluated the effectiveness of recent social events, while also debating the political implications of shifting federal facilities and promoting key initiatives like cancer research and desalinization programs. Additionally, they touched upon legislative concerns, including the potential for a volunteer army and the reaction to Senator Mike Mansfield's resolution regarding the reduction of U.S. troops in Europe.
On May 12, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at 3:27 pm. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 003-012 of the White House Tapes.
President Nixon and Representative Gerald R. Ford discussed the successful 201-197 House vote to revive the Supersonic Transport (SST) program. The two leaders strategized on how to maintain momentum for the upcoming Senate vote, specifically identifying key Democratic swing votes and potential lobbyists like George Meany. Nixon committed to personally contacting Senator John Sherman Cooper while planning to recognize the House members who supported the administration's position.
On May 12, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon, White House operator, and H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 5:28 pm and 5:29 pm. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 003-025 of the White House Tapes.
On May 12, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 5:37 pm and 5:41 pm. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 003-030 of the White House Tapes.
President Nixon and John B. Connally discuss strategy for securing a Senate victory for the Supersonic Transport (SST) project following a successful vote in the House. They identify key senators to target for persuasion, including those influenced by public works funding and the aerospace industry. Nixon and Connally commit to personally lobbying specific legislators to secure the three additional votes needed to pass the measure.
President Nixon initiated this brief call to Senator J. Glenn Beall, Jr. to offer encouragement regarding the activities of a group of legislators referred to as the "fearsome sixsome." During the exchange, the President emphasized the importance of the Senator's return to Washington. Beall confirmed his scheduled return to the Senate for the following week before the conversation concluded.
On May 13, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 3:46 pm and 3:47 pm. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 003-047 of the White House Tapes.
President Nixon and Henry Kissinger met to discuss legislative strategy regarding the Mansfield resolution on U.S. troops in Europe and the upcoming announcement of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). Kissinger updated the President on sensitive negotiations with Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin and emphasized the political value of Nixon leading the 'establishment' on foreign policy to neutralize congressional opposition. The conversation underscored the President's goal of securing a bipartisan consensus to bolster his foreign policy agenda ahead of the upcoming congressional recess.
President Nixon and Secretary of State William P. Rogers discuss the administration's opposition to the Mathias Amendment and its potential impact on U.S. foreign policy and NATO negotiations. They express concern that the amendment’s requirements for reporting to Congress and forcing mutual force reductions would undermine diplomatic leverage with the Soviet Union. The two agree to maintain a firm stance against the proposal while planning to coordinate later to manage the legislative strategy.
President Nixon and Secretary of State William P. Rogers discussed their firm opposition to a proposed congressional amendment requiring biannual reporting on sensitive diplomatic negotiations, arguing that such transparency would undermine the administration's ability to conduct effective foreign policy. Nixon expressed his intent to maintain a hard line against the amendment, asserting that there was no acceptable compromise to offer lawmakers. The two agreed to postpone a scheduled meeting to accommodate the President's upcoming engagement with state legislators regarding revenue sharing.
President Nixon and Henry Kissinger met to discuss the status of negotiations for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and concerns regarding a potential delay or rejection of the agreement by the Soviet Union. Kissinger provided updates on his communications with Anatoliy Dobrynin, emphasizing the importance of managing the announcement timing and the need to maneuver around domestic congressional pressure, specifically the Mathias Amendment. Nixon expressed deep frustration with the lack of resolve among Republican congressional leadership and reiterated his commitment to maintaining a firm stance on foreign policy and military force levels despite political opposition.
President Nixon and Henry Kissinger met in the Oval Office to coordinate strategy regarding ongoing SALT negotiations and domestic opposition in the Senate. They discussed frustration over Soviet delays in finalizing terms and explored the potential for a major breakthrough in foreign policy, including upcoming summits and arms control agreements. Additionally, the President reviewed his interactions with Congressional leadership and expressed disdain for the lack of support from moderate Republicans and Senate colleagues regarding his Vietnam and foreign policy agenda.
President Nixon met with his staff and advisors to coordinate the strategic announcement of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) agreement with the Soviet Union. The group focused heavily on controlling the release of information to the press and Congressional leaders to prevent premature leaks and to ensure that the administration controlled the narrative regarding the agreement's historical significance. They devised a plan to conduct high-level briefings for wire services and network correspondents to shape media coverage, while also briefly discussing the termination of the Supersonic Transport (SST) project.
President Nixon and Secretary of State William P. Rogers discuss the strategic management of upcoming Congressional votes, specifically the Mansfield Amendment, and a significant breakthrough in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). To maintain leverage and avoid the appearance of political maneuvering, Nixon instructs Rogers to confidentially brief Senator Mike Mansfield about the progress on SALT only after the Senate vote concludes. They also address diplomatic logistics, including Vice President Agnew’s planned attendance at South Korean President Park Chung-hee’s inauguration and the potential for Rogers to represent the U.S. at an Atoms for Peace anniversary event in Geneva.
President Nixon met with Henry Kissinger to finalize the announcement of a breakthrough in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), emphasizing the need for a brief and controlled public presentation. Following this, the President convened a broader group of officials to address domestic policy, specifically focusing on expanding agricultural drought relief for Texas and Oklahoma and managing national economic policy, including interest rates and housing market stability. The meeting concluded with a review of upcoming congressional votes, where administration staff expressed confidence in defeating the Mathias Amendment.
On May 19, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 4:28 pm and 4:38 pm. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 501-028 of the White House Tapes.
President Nixon and H. R. Haldeman discuss legislative strategy regarding upcoming Senate votes on the Mathias and Mansfield amendments. The conversation centers on timing the floor votes to minimize opposition success, specifically noting that the Mansfield amendment is expected to be defeated. Nixon consults with Secretary of State William P. Rogers to coordinate communication with Senator Mike Mansfield, aiming to manage the debate schedule and ensure favorable outcomes for the administration.
President Nixon and H. R. Haldeman discuss the surprisingly lopsided 73-20 defeat of the Mathias resolution and the potential for subsequent parliamentary maneuvering. Fearing a legislative trap involving alternative amendments or a coordinated effort by opponents, they decide to delay a planned thank-you call from the President to Senator John Sherman Cooper. Haldeman is instructed to contact Secretary of State William P. Rogers to share the news while maintaining vigilance over ongoing Senate debates regarding the Mansfield Amendment.
President Nixon calls George W. Ball to express appreciation for Ball's instrumental role in lobbying Democrats to defeat the Mathias Resolution. Ball highlights a growing sense of isolation and suspicion among senators regarding foreign policy, recommending that the administration improve congressional relations through small-group briefings on sensitive topics like Soviet negotiations. Nixon acknowledges the need for better communication and suggests coordinating these sessions through Secretary of State William P. Rogers to mitigate institutional friction between the State Department and the White House.
President Nixon and Henry Kissinger met to refine the public announcement of a breakthrough in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), focusing on the precise wording to characterize the agreement and its potential to improve U.S.-Soviet relations. Beyond the announcement, they reviewed recent legislative successes, including the defeat of the Mathias amendment, and discussed strategies for improving communication with the State Department and key congressional allies like Senator John C. Stennis. The President emphasized the need for strict secrecy regarding the negotiations until the simultaneous release in Washington and Moscow to prevent leaks and maximize the political impact.
In this meeting, President Nixon consulted with Secretary of State William P. Rogers regarding Middle East diplomacy, emphasizing his desire to push for a peace settlement before the upcoming election season and expressing frustration with the influence of Israeli interests. Following this, the President met with Henry Kissinger and Ronald Ziegler to coordinate the upcoming public announcement of a SALT agreement with the Soviet Union. Nixon and Kissinger strategically aligned on how to brief Congressional leaders while minimizing specific disclosures about negotiating history, MIRVs, and treaty structures to maintain control over the process.
President Nixon and Henry Kissinger met to finalize talking points for a briefing with Congressional leaders regarding the impending announcement of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) agreement. They discussed the strategic framing of the announcement, specifically focusing on positioning the initiative as a personal presidential endeavor while acknowledging defensive weapons limitations. Stephen B. Bull joined the discussion to coordinate the arrival of Democratic leadership, and the group reviewed the planned script to ensure an effective presentation of the administration's progress on nuclear arms control.
President Nixon met with Vice President Agnew and a bipartisan group of Congressional leaders to announce a significant diplomatic breakthrough in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). Nixon informed the attendees of a forthcoming joint statement with the Soviet Union pledging to focus on limiting anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems and certain offensive strategic weapons. While some lawmakers advocated for immediate unilateral U.S. defense cuts to demonstrate good faith, the President and his advisors successfully urged the leaders to maintain existing defense programs during the negotiations to avoid losing vital bargaining leverage.
President Nixon and his advisors met to finalize the announcement of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) agreement and coordinate the administration's strategy for managing congressional and public reactions. The discussion focused on emphasizing the historic nature of the deal—despite its initial status as a framework—and included logistical planning for a televised address and related press briefings. Additionally, the President addressed minor White House operational concerns, such as plumbing issues in his residence, while maintaining focus on the political leverage gained through recent ABM (Antiballistic Missile) defense initiatives.
President Nixon and Representative Gerald Ford discussed the political fallout of the administration’s recent Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) announcement, noting that it successfully neutralized criticism from J. William Fulbright and congressional “doves.” Nixon emphasized that this diplomatic breakthrough was only possible because of the administration's firm stance on the antiballistic missile (ABM) program. Ford reaffirmed his support and committed to ensuring the passage of the necessary ABM authorization and appropriation measures in the House.
President Nixon spoke with Congressman Leslie C. Arends to emphasize that the recent breakthrough in Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) was a direct result of Congressional support for the antiballistic missile (ABM) program. Nixon credited the firm stance of his allies for the success of his latest announcement and the resulting silence from political opponents like J. William Fulbright. Arends agreed to convey this message to his fellow committee members, including F. Edward Hébert, to reinforce the strategic value of their legislative unity.
President Nixon met with key advisors including John Ehrlichman, George Shultz, and Henry Kissinger to navigate a broad agenda covering economic policy, domestic legislative priorities, and the recent Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) agreement. The participants discussed strategies for managing inflation and fiscal policy, coordinating economic messaging through the Quadriad, and securing congressional support for revenue-sharing initiatives. Furthermore, the President focused on maintaining political discipline regarding his SALT negotiations, successfully leveraging support from key figures like McGeorge Bundy to bolster the agreement's reception among Senate leadership.
President Nixon met with Alexander P. Butterfield to finalize the logistical and protocol arrangements for an upcoming working lunch with King Faisal of Saudi Arabia. Nixon directed Butterfield to increase the guest list to approximately 40 congressional members and industry figures, including those from the oil sector, to maximize political engagement. The President also established specific rules for the event, including a strict three-course menu, a champagne-only beverage policy, and a directive that the interpreter should not translate his English remarks during the toast.
President Nixon and H.R. Haldeman discuss administrative updates, including a scheduled meeting with Congressman Glenn Earthman regarding drug policy and the progress of internal efforts involving J. Edgar Hoover and John Mitchell. They also evaluate the political impact of recent foreign policy stances on NATO and the Soviet Union, with Haldeman noting potential influence on congressional support. The conversation concludes with a brief assessment of current market trends and upcoming scheduling logistics.
President Nixon, H. R. Haldeman, and Alexander Butterfield met to coordinate the President's upcoming schedule, specifically balancing congressional social engagements with official duties. They discussed the logistics of a congressional mixer and the necessity of rescheduling certain events to accommodate a visit from Nicaraguan President Anastasio Somoza Debayle. The group decided to shift the congressional event to the following week to ensure proper planning and to account for the President’s travel to California.
President Nixon and H.R. Haldeman discussed the need to implement a "one-man responsibility" program within the administration to increase accountability on key policy initiatives, drawing a parallel to Egil Krogh’s leadership on drug policy. The President reflected on the positive reception he received at a recent event for members of Congress, suggesting that he should host more informal, social gatherings to foster personal loyalty and capitalize on the power of the White House. Additionally, they reviewed strategies for handling economic messaging regarding unemployment, explored the benefits of utilizing Q&A formats in public appearances, and confirmed the cancellation or relocation of certain social events to accommodate renovations at the White House.
President Nixon met with Alexander P. Butterfield to coordinate administrative scheduling and later consulted with John D. Ehrlichman regarding the appointment of a new General Counsel for the Department of Labor. Nixon expressed a desire to appoint someone aligned with the administration to gain political credit with business leaders, while also vetting the candidate to avoid the confirmation difficulties associated with G. Harrold Carswell. The discussion shifted to labor relations, with Nixon expressing frustration toward business executives who criticized his stance on unions despite his efforts to manage congressional action like the Davis-Bacon Act.
President Nixon met with H. R. Haldeman, Henry Kissinger, John Sherman Cooper, and Clark MacGregor to discuss the necessity of maintaining secrecy regarding sensitive foreign policy negotiations, particularly those involving the Soviet Union, China, and the ongoing war in Vietnam. Nixon emphasized that he requires time to explore these diplomatic channels and urged Congressional leaders to support his administration's approach rather than forcing early legislative deadlines that could derail potential breakthroughs. The participants reviewed legislative strategy regarding the Vietnam War, including the potential for drafting a substitute to the Nedzi-Whalen Amendment based on Nixon's October 7, 1970, proposal to better reflect the administration's goals.
President Nixon met with Samuel L. Devine and William E. Timmons to discuss strategies for managing congressional relations, particularly regarding the administration's foreign policy and controversial domestic legislation. Nixon emphasized that his foreign policy, including arms control and diplomatic overtures to China, was strictly based on American self-interest and leveraged against Soviet and Chinese rivalries. The group also addressed the challenges of passing welfare reform (H.R. 1), the necessity of potential vetoes for fiscal control, and the political implications of managing demands from the Black Caucus. Nixon urged his guests to maintain a firm, principled stance in their respective districts to ensure the administration's legislative and diplomatic objectives were understood by the public.
President Nixon met with Peter G. Peterson, Harry S. Dent, and Peter M. Flanigan to formulate a strategy for ongoing international textile trade negotiations. The participants discussed securing favorable import terms with Taiwan and Japan while navigating the political interference of Representative Wilbur D. Mills, who was reportedly pushing for a quota bill to bolster his own political ambitions. The group decided to pursue a conditional agreement that secures the best possible terms for the industry, followed by a coordinated effort to pressure domestic industry leaders into public and legislative support to avoid a politically damaging confrontation with Congress.
President Nixon and H.R. Haldeman reviewed the President's upcoming schedule, focusing on legislative management regarding Vietnam-related amendments and securing unanimous Republican support. They also coordinated meetings with congressional leadership, various cabinet members, and administrative staff to address political strategy and media narratives. Additionally, the pair discussed private logistical concerns regarding the President’s travel to California and expressed personal frustrations regarding family acquaintances, specifically Helene and Jack Drown, whose presence the President wished to minimize during his time at the San Clemente residence.
President Nixon consulted with his personal secretary, Rose Mary Woods, to coordinate his upcoming schedule regarding the presidential yacht Sequoia and a meeting with Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird and various members of Congress. The brief discussion served to finalize logistical arrangements and ensure the President’s agenda remained aligned with his legislative priorities. No further substantive policy shifts were noted during this brief administrative exchange.
President Nixon met with Republican congressional leaders, including Gerald Ford and Leslie Arends, to discuss strategies for defeating proposed legislative amendments that would mandate a withdrawal date for U.S. troops in Vietnam. The President emphasized that setting a legislative deadline would undermine sensitive, ongoing, and potentially critical negotiations, while also damaging the U.S. position regarding the return of prisoners of war. Nixon and the leadership agreed to maintain a firm stance against these anti-war resolutions to protect executive authority and preserve bargaining power, while assuring the lawmakers that the administration remained committed to ending the war and ensuring political success for the party.
President Nixon met with Republican Congressional leaders to discuss the administration’s new, multi-pronged national strategy for combating drug abuse, emphasizing a shift toward treatment, rehabilitation, and the creation of a centralized Special Action Office. During the discussion, Nixon and his team outlined plans for increased interdiction, expanded military detoxification programs, and a firm, non-permissive stance against the legalization of marijuana. Furthermore, the participants addressed the political climate surrounding the Vietnam War, with Nixon urging support against anti-war amendments and arguing that congressional deadlines for withdrawal would undermine sensitive ongoing negotiations.
On June 15, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at 6:28 pm. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 005-082 of the White House Tapes.
President Nixon met with a bipartisan group of Congressional leaders and administration officials to propose a centralized federal office for coordinating drug abuse prevention and treatment strategies. The discussion highlighted the urgency of addressing drug addiction, particularly among servicemen in Vietnam and youth in the United States, by shifting from a fragmented, multi-agency approach to a unified, performance-based model. Participants debated the integration of law enforcement, research, and treatment programs, with an emphasis on establishing flexible, community-based solutions and securing Congressional support for new enabling legislation.
On June 17, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at 8:24 pm. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 005-122 of the White House Tapes.
John Ehrlichman and Clark MacGregor coordinate the President’s urgent delivery of documents to Congress, acting on advice from Gerald Ford that a prompt response is of the highest importance. The participants discuss scheduling a breakfast meeting to facilitate this transfer and consider expanding the guest list to include key congressional leadership, such as Mike Mansfield and Carl Albert. They conclude by confirming the logistical arrangements to ensure the President’s actions are handled effectively without negative press or legislative friction.