Nixon White House Tapes › Tape 151 › Conversation 151-009
Nixon phone call with Haldeman on Vietnam War and Henry Kissinger
Sunday, October 22, 1972 · 9:57 AM–10:09 AM ET · Camp David Study Table · 7 min
AI Summary
President Nixon and H. R. Haldeman discuss the deteriorating state of Vietnam peace negotiations following South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu's resistance to a proposed settlement. Nixon expresses a firm intent to finalize a deal with North Vietnam regardless of Thieu’s objections, fearing that continued delays or a failed diplomatic mission by Henry Kissinger to Hanoi would be politically damaging before the upcoming election. They agree that Kissinger must be restrained from traveling to Hanoi, opting instead to manage the situation through private pressure on the Soviet Union to prevent a public propaganda crisis.
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Transcript (AI-generated)
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Hello.
Morning.
Hi.
I decided I would leave today at 11.30.
Okay.
11.30, that'd be right after the, well, no.
No, that'd be about, the broadcast would be over by 11.45.
Right.
So we can go over, perhaps we can, if you want to come over after the broadcast.
Okay.
We can go over a few little odds and ends.
All right, fine.
And we can get going.
Let's see, what time is it now?
10 o'clock, almost.
Yep.
Well, Al sounded a little cheery last night.
No, it's blown up this morning.
Oh, really?
Yeah, we just talked to him.
I'll be darned.
He was throwing all the goddamn thing.
And so we're back in the soup again.
I'll be darned.
Henry's talking about rumbling around.
He may have to go to Hanoi.
He just can't do it.
I just told him.
And on the other hand, our real problem are the Russians.
And I just told him about an hour ago, tell the Russians that we'll handle the thing.
But they must not blow.
And we're, of course, blaming them for blowing it by reason of their putting the story out in advance.
Yep.
broke it off.
That isn't the real reason.
Chew is just being intractable.
But I've determined now that in view of the way Chew's handled himself, that we have no choice but to make our own deal with the North, move out, and Chew's got his own problems.
You know what I mean?
It's one of those things.
We cannot simply, I mean, from a
a political standpoint, naturally, and also from a standpoint, we cannot have America's whole foreign policy hostage to two.
Don't you agree?
Absolutely.
Now, our problem, of course, here is that before the election, it's really going to be tough.
I think two taking us on is not going to present a problem, because due to the fact that it will be, that will simply disturb the right.
I mean, the
You see what I mean?
Our problem will be, and we're the only one, our problem is going to be if the Russians, particularly the Russians, and all he goes public and takes us on, that could create an enormous doubt, you know, as to whether we know how to run the store.
It's not going to lose the election, as I have talked about, but nothing is going to do that.
But it can seriously erode the confidence factor at this point.
I mean, it gives an issue in the last two weeks that
which we don't need.
Yeah, although it keeps the whole focus on Vietnam, which is a pretty good place to have it.
Well, I know, but...
Even if it's bad.
You think so?
Yeah.
Except that they can go out then and say, ah, here it is.
They've made an offer.
We ought to take it.
We're holding up prisoners.
We're holding up peace because of two.
We're going to have one hell of a time on it because they've accepted everything we've told them.
The only thing they haven't accepted, the only thing they aren't doing is withdrawing all their forces from the South.
which, of course, they've agreed over a period of time.
But, you know, when they say they'll get out of Camberley, they'll get out of Laos.
I mean, it's just a hell of a good deal.
That's all there is to it.
Well, so, anyway...
It's a problem, but this thing was loaded with problems all along.
It was loaded with problems.
I told Al that, of course, I can imagine Henry's practically up the wall.
The poor son of a bitch is working night and day.
But the main thing is, and thank God we've got Al here, we've got to restrain him from doing something that is wrong, because...
If he goes, I think you'll agree, if he goes trotting to Hanoi and then comes back without a settlement, and then comes back, and then we have to dump you, that could have a devastating effect on our own support.
Yep.
Don't you think so?
Yep.
It's like Ramsey Clark.
Right.
It is.
It just undermines your whole base.
You can't go there.
And...
going to agree that he could go after the election or something like that.
If we could just keep the damn thing on until then, and then we just got to settle it.
I'm convinced now, in the view of two's conduct, unfortunately, that we'll have to settle and ram it down his throat, either takes it or not.
And he'll have to take it, or commit suicide.
Yeah.
Well, that's too bad, boy.
I was so tickled last night at midnight.
Oh, I know.
I finally had it.
I talked to him.
It's the first time he's been optimistic on it.
Well, fortunately, I told him, I said, Al, I've got this message, but let's remember that something could happen.
I'll understand.
I mean, I'm basically more pessimistic because I know how, frankly, subtle and devious a fellow like Chew is, you know.
And Henry is not very good at reading, that sort of thing.
He wants to believe what he wants to believe.
Well, we're all that way to an extent.
But he's done a hell of a job, though, here.
A hell of a job, Jesus Christ.
But the problem is holding the Russians and the others in line.
But he cannot go to Hanoi.
He'll come back furious.
I don't know, don't you totally agree that would be the worst thing we could do?
I sure do.
From our point here, if it has to be done for some other reason, then maybe we have to pay the price.
No, no, no, but the other reason, the reason for his going to Hanoi is to keep them from blowing at this point.
But that's too high a price, because if he goes, a jewel blow.
You know what I mean?
It's just not the right thing to go ahead and hand to Hanoi at this point.
Well, Hanoi, in effect, has already blown in a sense.
I mean, that news briefing is out.
They put out their story.
And frankly, in a sense, that was a blessing because a lot of people figure, oh, well, is it true or isn't it?
Although we'll get a few editorials suggesting we ought to take this deal and so forth and so on.
I'll tell you, though, the whole thing is so complex that I think it's not going to be understood.
I think we can keep it confused if we can just—Hanoi having blown, the Russians—
The main thing is we've just got to have a private side deal with the Russians.
That's important.
Nobody's going to believe in all I bought.
They're just not going to believe them.
You know what I mean?
In this country, they're still the enemy.
But the Russians, I don't want them starting to take cuts at us because they have an enormous propaganda thing that they could do.
So we work on it.
NARA Description
On October 22, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon and H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman talked on the telephone at Camp David from 9:57 am to 10:09 am. The Camp David Study Table taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 151-009 of the White House Tapes.
Nixon Library Finding Aid
Conversation No. 151-9
Date: October 22, 1972
Time: 9:57 am - 10:09 am
Location: Camp David Study Table
The President talked with H.R. (“Bob”) Haldeman.
[See Conversation No. 223-18]
The President's schedule
-Departure time
-The President’s forthcoming radio address
-Haldeman's schedule
*****************************************************************
BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 1
[Personal returnable]
[Duration: 2m 23s ]
END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 1
*****************************************************************
Vietnam negotiations
-Peace settlement
-Alexander M. Haig, Jr.’s previous mood
-Setback
-Nguyen Van Thieu’s rejection
-Henry A. Kissinger
-Possible trip to Hanoi
-Soviet Union
-Blame
-Leak of story
-Thieu’s reaction
-Future settlement
-Possible deal with North Vietnam
-Thieu’s behavior
-Thieu’s survival
-Impact on US foreign policy
-Impact on forthcoming election
-Thieu’s behavior
-US right
-Publicity from Soviet Union and North Vietnam
-The President’s view
-Vietnam focus
-Haldeman’s view
-Proposals
-Possible accusations from opposing candidates
-Prisoners of war [POWs]
-Cambodia and Laos
-Kissinger’s efforts
-Haig's role
-Kissinger’s possible trip to North Vietnam
-Thieu
-W. Ramsey Clark
-Election
-Chances of settlement
-Thieu’s conduct
-Possible US response
-The President’s view
-Haig’s view
-Kissinger
-The President’s view
-Kissinger's work
-Soviet Union, Hanoi
-Kissinger’s possible trip to Hanoi
-Effect on Thieu
-Hanoi
-Newsweek story
-Complexity
-Soviet Union
-Possible deal
-Hanoi’s credibility
*****************************************************************
BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 3
[Personal returnable]
[Duration: 3m 13s ]
END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 3
*****************************************************************Also recorded on October 22, 1972
- 151-008 9:45 AM · 10 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Camp David operator talked on the telephone at Camp David at an unknown time between 9:45 am and 9:57 am.
- 223-016 9:45 AM · 13 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and unknown person(s) met in the Aspen Lodge study at Camp David at an unknown time between 9:45 am and 9:57 am.
- 223-017 9:45 AM · 8 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Camp David operator met in the Aspen Lodge study at Camp David at an unknown time between 9:45 am and 9:57 am.
- 223-018 9:57 AM · 3 min — President Richard M. Nixon and H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman met in the Aspen Lodge study at Camp David from 9:57 am to 10:09 am.
- 151-010 10:09 AM · 9 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Camp David operator talked on the telephone at Camp David at an unknown time between 10:09 am and 10:10 am.
- 223-019 10:09 AM · 13 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Camp David operator met in the Aspen Lodge study at Camp David at an unknown time between 10:09 am and 10:10 am.
- 151-011 10:10 AM · 6 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Alexander M. Haig, Jr. talked on the telephone at Camp David from 10:10 am to 10:16 am.
- 223-020 10:10 AM · 4 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Alexander M. Haig, Jr. met in the Aspen Lodge study at Camp David from 10:10 am to 10:16 am.
Cite this conversation
Conversation 151-009, October 22, 1972. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives. Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/151-009 (accessed October 10, 2026).