Nixon phone call with Kissinger on Vietnam War and Air strikes

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Hello.

Okay.

Hello.

Mr. President.

Oh, yeah, you said you had a report from Hague, huh?

Yes, let me sign it down for you.

First, he reported that from all he has been able to learn...

The strike yesterday was enormously successful.

And he said, multiple fires, highly successful loss, and second has been opened.

That's the good thing.

You can't tell them to expand the storm.

Sure.

He discussed our general scheme with Duncan, because he had to be informed in case anything flows, and he was enthusiastic about the process.

Then he said he'd spend an afternoon in the third floor of his federal college.

We've been holding together a most tenuous situation around the whole route of Route 13 from Lafayette to Lafayette.

The only factor, or the principal factor, which has prevented a major debacle has been USA, especially G62.

The situation in and around that line was far worse than I had anticipated.

Three enemy units, main force units, reinforcements are tanked until we have been deployed against one of the armistice districts.

Yesterday, that was validated.

You know, sometimes the situation stabilizes in and around that line.

Now yesterday was validated due to massive use of air strikes and artillery support.

And then he goes into the tactical situation saying that the enemy has now attacked the 22th ground and his division also.

His division has been supported well and is expecting considerable punishment on the enemy.

I spoke to their commander who is very aggressive and intrepid.

and that will mean the 3rd Corps command has a demand to blow up to a reception of another 2,000 tanks.

Yes, I'm very tempted to save the head of the 3rd Corps, but I believe our venture holds, and if by the end of this month, the enemy will be driven out of the 3rd Corps with great loss.

As of now, Hollingsworth estimates that the enemy has lost enough to 50 tanks.

There are many T-54s in this bag, these are big tanks.

Yesterday, the legal forces in our tribe started destroying tanks with infantry and defense weapons.

As a result, the morale of the Garrison is clearly being pushed to prove.

Then, uh, into the depression that grew in my overall...

The air of the countries that are within our help, the weather, what is very evident is the major north-eastern capital of the world.

There are only a few signs of sea-sea infrastructure viability and all serious threats are coming from the enforcement.

It is a pursuit of nationalistic spirit and evidence.

But I'm sure that the fragile is the piece that upsets my sense of it.

And he goes, in fact, to tomorrow, he goes to the high court.

And then I report him to a court where he has sent on a fee of... Yeah.

Yeah, which is not...

Despite the heavy fighting, the court would have brought him up to the situation that he's in now.

He was an interesting sideline of the enemy's curve as he wasn't strong in the end when they reached the attack.

They found the public attitude was very pessimistic in part because of the absence of any overview of the course.

Once U.S. aircraft began to be seen, the attitude shifted markedly.

All the Vietnamese interviews were encouraging about the manned U.S. naval air reinforcements.

I, uh, well, I believe

The enemy has tempted the earth.

As of now, I believe we have a good basis for confidence.

The situation is all together, but there may be some problems if we have the evidence to lie.

Following this, we will have some rebuilding to do, before making new enemy efforts to have them to lie.

But the subsequent efforts should be far less virulent and should be easily contained.

But the enemy has definitely heard that it is too fast to go with the best of your own situation.

So I'll stay put.

Right.

At the same time, I'm convinced that you can proceed from a prosperous continent.

That the situation here will hold together for a long time.

So I think we are in a...

They may be afraid that we know something.

Arthur Burns was over, though, said.

He was, uh, said that, uh, you know, he didn't get anything very often, so I guess it was a very bit tough thing, how much was risk.

Well, of course.

Well, I think the liberal establishment, now all that matters is winning.

We know one way or the other we're going to win.

Oh, if the arbor collapses, then we'll still blockade.

I don't think we'll have to do that.

I think based on Hague's bankers, that it's going to be rough.

And if they aren't good, we've been telling them they're good.

But based on that, we've got to realize that the other side also is having some rough times.

That's what I think.

I just think that we've got to, if we don't know an iron,

I assume, as I've often said, Abrams is using all that power that he can now in the battle zone.

He will, won't he?

Oh, no question.

There's no question.

Thank God he's got them there.

Well, if it had to be for your reinforcement, Mr. President, we'd be in very bad shape.

They're going to 840 a day.

It's bound to have an effect on the air, and it also gives them a have a lot more flexibility.

It also ensures the air can't just be that bad, and we know it's not very good.

We got plenty of phantoms there.

whatever they do, they've got to, and the Russians have got to support their ally, but I think for different reasons, neither of them wants us to, wants Hanoi to kick us out of there.

What do you think?

Oh, no question.

What is the situation

You really feel that they are, I'm just trying to see what our chips are, that they are really that interested in the German treaty, or maybe they are.

Mr. President, leaving aside the fact now of this last day, the fact that they want me to go there while we are in the sand with Obama, in other words, if we were an executive that did leave last week,

yeah yeah well i'll tell you that was one

decision I was very comfortable with, and we talked about it.

But you see, that was the trouble with Johnson all along.

He'd say, well, I can't evict you out of the other thing, but if you prick somebody, the thing to do is just get his sword out and cut his heart out.

Why screw around?

And believe me, we, well, we're doing that.

We're going to get it.

After your meeting, you'll know.

I'm pretty sure that you're, well, you've got to

I don't mean to cancel it, but I just hope that it is not too indecisive.

See, that's the only thing that concerns me about it.

But that's up to us.

Let me ask one last question.

How, and we can talk about this, two things in mind.

First, I think that we ought to have, I need to do three hours over that whole thing.

I personally would like to do it.

What a situation.

Well, we'll do it then.

Just to save time during the day, I'm going to be quite busy.

Well, let me put it this way.

Suppose that we...

I suppose I may probably go to the campaign Tuesday, anyway.

I suppose then you could come up Wednesday.

I could come, as I got back from New York, go straight up to the campaign and spend the night.

the next day, we'll just sit there and cry out of that place, because I think we need to be totally by ourselves to go over these things.

Right?

I think that's what we want.

So let's plan it.

So I plan it for Wednesday morning, Wednesday morning.

We'll hold it for Wednesday morning.

We'll be up there.

Now, the other thing we've got to be thinking about is how to inform Roger's

I don't know what, do you have any thoughts on that?

Well, if, is there any possibility that it could be handled in terms of the Russians, that you're going there for the purpose of a meeting?

But we will have to bring it into the evening.

You know what I meant.

See what I'm getting at.

But by Wednesday we will know whether it's going to be there or in Paris or anywhere.

Well, by the Thursday you would wait until you left before he was told.

Yes, because he's going to drive you crazy if it's done before.

And he will go to the agreement before.

He'll call him in.

This way he can reach the bridge.

And he will be no madder one way or another.

He will simply handle it on the basis that he's going to do it.

And he has a message from Brezhnev saying that he's going to be able to do it.

He's going to be able to do it now.

And all of them can handle it much better together than they can alone.

Right.

And I think that's what they do, and he has to know in case it blows.

But by that time, we'll know whether you're going to have a meeting in Paris or not.

And the way I would start the thing up is to say that...

the Russians would be glad to get them to act.

They've asked you to come there.

It's disgusting, rather, and the North may be there.

You see my point?

Exactly.

That's the way I would talk about it.

You're basically really just a secret meeting.

I think we don't have to be totally forthright.

You see my point?

How does that sound to you?

I think so.

Because it may be, too.

It may be that they will show up.

By that time, we may know.

But even assuming you don't know, they could still show up.

Oh, definitely.

If we don't know, if we haven't had an answer by then, then it is still open.

We can just say that the Russians...

And I think then Hague should give him a lap down on this whole private meeting.

Private meeting?

That we were trying to put up in Hague.

Oh, he doesn't know that.

Because if you remember, at the best of his age, at the best of his age.

Yeah.

But...

But we tried to set that up through our usual channels at first, but nothing had come of it so far.

I have told that memorandum, talking paper that we sent over to him, as I recall, remember I told the leaders, I said, you can be confident that we have a good negotiating record since this point, but that's all for now.

That'll sort of bear that off.

He's been a good friend of mine.

I talked to him twice today.

Yeah, yeah.

Did he get the paper yet?

Yes, he got the paper.

Yeah.

Yeah, well, good.

Now, I will, as far as you're concerned, I'll just remember.

When will Hague get back?

Wednesday afternoon.

Then you would be leaving.

Do you think it's better for us to talk on Wednesday afternoon?

Better.

Let me ask you this.

Where do you want to leave from?

I thought I would go.

There's a dinner party here in town, which I thought I'd go because there's some newspaper ahead of me.

And I thought it'd be good if they saw me, then I'd leave that dinner party, get ready to go to the airport about that time.

Good.

Then people will have seen me Wednesday night.

Thursday and Friday, everybody's out of town.

Well, if you could go to keep it going Thursday night,

Well, I'll do one of them.

I'll either go to Key Biscayne or I will go to Camp David.

But if you at any rate could leave town, then I will cancel whatever I'm doing on Thursday night staying out with you.

That's right.

In fact, Camp David would be better.

Well, Camp David I think I should be a little closer to the...

And nobody ever expected to see you outside of Camp David.

You could say that you're going to Camp David.

There's no way they can check that.

See, at Key Biscayne they can, but here they can't.

How does that sound to you?

And I'll just simply say here, if we'll just simply, if the Riggler and the rest of you can't do it, well, how can we see it?

Of course they can't see it.

See, we don't let them inside the gate.

If that's the beauty, it can't be.

That would be great.

Okay, that's what we'll do.

But if you could leave Thursday night, it would have the advantage that I could cancel what I'm doing today.

Well, I am going up.

See, I have the editors here for a reception Thursday at 5 o'clock.

My intention after that reception is to fly up to Camp David, see?

So I just left that very easy.

That's not right.

That would be confirmed.

All right.

Okay.

Nixon phone call with Kissinger on Vietnam War and Air strikes

AI Summary

Audio

NARA Description

Nixon Library Finding Aid

Transcript (AI-generated)

Also recorded on April 16, 1972

Cite this conversation

Nixon phone call with Kissinger on Vietnam War and Air strikes

AI Summary

Audio

NARA Description

Nixon Library Finding Aid

Transcript (AI-generated)

Also recorded on April 16, 1972

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Cite this conversation