Nixon White House Tapes › Topic
Nixon Tapes on Moscow Summit
49 conversations · frequently with Nixon, Kissinger, Haldeman, Bull
Henry Kissinger contacted George Meany to provide advance notice of President Nixon's upcoming public announcement regarding a scheduled 1972 summit meeting in Moscow. Kissinger explained that the strategic goal of the summit is to balance Soviet and Chinese interests while advancing negotiations concerning Vietnam and the Middle East. He concluded the call by promising to meet with Meany in the following days to provide a more detailed briefing on the administration's foreign policy strategy.
President Nixon and George Shultz discuss the positive reception from labor leaders, specifically George Meany, regarding the administration's wage and price control proposals. Nixon briefs Shultz on his decision to have Henry Kissinger inform Meany of the upcoming announcement concerning the 1972 Moscow summit, aiming to secure labor cooperation and mitigate potential opposition. The President emphasizes the importance of controlling the narrative and instructs Shultz to release the official statement immediately to avoid it being leaked prematurely from labor meetings.
President Nixon met with a bipartisan group of Congressional leaders and key administration officials to discuss his upcoming summit in Moscow and broader U.S. strategy regarding the Soviet Union and China. The President emphasized that his administration sought to maintain a delicate balance between the two powers without appearing to collude with one against the other. The discussion underscored the importance of bipartisan support for national defense funding and the need for diplomatic engagement to prevent escalation in volatile regions like the Middle East.
President Nixon and Henry Kissinger discussed the escalating India-Pakistan War and its potential impact on U.S.-Soviet relations and the upcoming 1972 presidential election. The President expressed concern about the crisis jeopardizing the Moscow Summit and the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, while Kissinger emphasized the need to prevent an Indian attack on West Pakistan. They further explored the possibility of leveraging military actions in North Vietnam to send a strategic message to both the Soviet Union and China regarding U.S. resolve.
President Nixon and Henry Kissinger met to discuss the escalating India-Pakistan conflict and the potential necessity of U.S. intervention with the Soviet Union. Nixon affirmed his commitment to supporting Pakistan despite contrary diplomatic advice and concerns regarding the upcoming Moscow Summit. The two strategized on how to pressure the USSR to restrain India from invading West Pakistan, establishing a fallback position should their initial efforts fail.
President Nixon and an unidentified interlocutor discuss political strategy regarding Secretary of State William P. Rogers and the administration's broader policy objectives. The dialogue centers on the political optics of current war efforts, election year preparations, and the implications of the President's scheduled travel to Moscow. These reflections underscore the administration's focus on managing perceptions of policy decisions ahead of the upcoming election cycle.
President Nixon met with John Mitchell and H.R. Haldeman to manage several administrative and political crises, most notably the escalating conflict between National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger and Secretary of State William Rogers. The discussion focused on controlling leaks regarding the India-Pakistan War, resolving bureaucratic friction ahead of the upcoming Moscow summit, and managing the political fallout from Jack Anderson’s columns. Additionally, the participants addressed personnel appointments, including the search for a new Deputy Secretary of Defense and the handling of various regional primary elections.
Henry Kissinger contacted Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin to urge the Soviet government to pressure North Vietnam toward constructive peace negotiations before they launched a potential military offensive. Kissinger emphasized that while the U.S. remained willing to negotiate, including a possible meeting in Moscow, any new North Vietnamese military escalation would trigger a severe American response. The two agreed to meet for lunch on Friday to further discuss these diplomatic efforts and the status of ongoing communication channels.
President Nixon and Henry Kissinger met with photographer Ollie Atkins to pose for promotional images before transitioning to a strategic review of foreign policy and public relations. Kissinger updated the President on recent discussions with Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin regarding the upcoming Moscow summit, arms control, and potential Vietnam peace proposals. The pair also analyzed the domestic political response to Nixon's recent peace plan, expressing frustration with press criticism while noting broad public support despite media preoccupation with Kissinger's role as a secret emissary.
President Nixon dictates a confidential memorandum to Secretary of State William P. Rogers to guide his upcoming discussions with Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin ahead of the Moscow summit. The President emphasizes a cautious approach toward the summit agenda, specifically regarding the Middle East, Vietnam, and SALT negotiations, while urging Rogers to avoid premature commitments or explicit references to linkage. Nixon further instructs that US trade and credit concessions should be utilized as strategic bargaining chips rather than early giveaways. Finally, the President mandates that these sensitive guidelines remain restricted to Rogers and Henry Kissinger to maintain tactical control over the diplomatic process.
President Nixon and H. R. Haldeman met to discuss various political and administrative issues, focusing on the ITT investigation, the status of the 1972 campaign, and news media coverage. They explored strategies to manage the ITT controversy, including the potential to quiet hearings, and analyzed the President's standing following the New Hampshire primary. Later, Henry Kissinger joined the meeting to address the upcoming Moscow summit, foreign policy objectives, and the importance of maintaining White House control over foreign policy communications and negotiations.
President Nixon and Alexander Haig met to coordinate administrative foreign policy, specifically addressing the upcoming Moscow summit and the management of Henry Kissinger's role. They discussed delicate geopolitical issues, including Soviet-American relations, potential arms control negotiations (SALT), and the need to maneuver around domestic political pressures regarding Israel and Northern Ireland. Nixon emphasized the importance of maintaining tight control over the substance of foreign policy negotiations to ensure they align with his strategic objectives rather than becoming subject to outside interference or Congressional criticism.
President Nixon and Henry Kissinger met to discuss logistics and strategic communications for upcoming foreign diplomatic missions, including a stopover in Warsaw during an upcoming Soviet trip and potential visits to Iran. The conversation centered on managing public expectations for the Moscow summit and the importance of securing prime-time television coverage for Kissinger’s media appearances. Additionally, the President reviewed the political optics of the Vietnam War, emphasizing a desire to adopt a firmer stance on the conflict as part of his broader foreign policy and 1972 campaign strategy.
President Nixon met with H.R. Haldeman, Ronald Ziegler, and others to strategize on public relations, specifically regarding the media appearances of Henry Kissinger and the Nixon family. They decided to postpone Kissinger's prime-time television appearances until after the upcoming Moscow summit to maximize impact and avoid premature foreign policy debates. The group also discussed the logistics of a potential television special featuring Pat Nixon's China trip, the strategy for handling press conferences, and ways to shift the narrative regarding the administration's performance.
President Nixon and Henry Kissinger debated the geopolitical implications of the ongoing North Vietnamese offensive and the potential necessity of canceling the upcoming Moscow summit. Kissinger argued against drawing parallels between the United States and France’s withdrawal from Algeria, asserting that the U.S. status as a global superpower necessitates a more resolute response to maintain international credibility. The discussion underscored the administration's concern that any perceived retreat would fundamentally undermine American influence on the world stage.
President Nixon and Henry Kissinger discussed the logistical arrangements for upcoming U.S.-USSR relations, including a meeting between First Lady Pat Nixon and Mrs. Anatoliy Dobrynin, and the coordination of the President's planned Moscow summit. A significant portion of the conversation focused on the North Vietnamese offensive and the administration's strategic response, which included aggressive surveillance of Soviet ships and the potential use of naval mines. Kissinger and Nixon evaluated the geopolitical stakes of the Vietnam conflict, framing it as a critical test of U.S. credibility that could influence future Soviet actions in the Middle East and the viability of the Berlin treaties.
President Nixon and Henry Kissinger met to coordinate strategy regarding the Vietnam War, specifically addressing the North Vietnamese proposal for a public plenary session on April 27. They determined that the U.S. should condition its attendance at the public meeting on the North Vietnamese agreeing to a prior private meeting on April 24, aimed at breaking the diplomatic deadlock. Furthermore, they discussed the possibility of a naval blockade of Haiphong and emphasized that Nixon’s upcoming trip to Moscow must be contingent upon substantive progress regarding Vietnam, with the President prepared to cancel the summit if necessary to protect his administration's political standing.
President Nixon and Henry Kissinger discuss the tactical situation in Vietnam, specifically the successful use of B-52 strikes and air power to stabilize the defense around Route 13 and An Loc. The two review reports from General Alexander Haig and General James Hollingsworth, expressing confidence that South Vietnamese forces can withstand current enemy pressure. Additionally, the pair coordinates arrangements for Kissinger's upcoming trip to Moscow, including a strategy to manage Secretary of State William P. Rogers's involvement and the planning of a private, secure meeting at Camp David to finalize preparations.
President Nixon and Henry Kissinger discussed strategies for managing the North Vietnamese Easter Offensive while maintaining the possibility of the upcoming Moscow summit. They agreed to adopt a "tough as nails" negotiating stance on Vietnam, rejecting North Vietnamese proposals that were contingent on halting U.S. bombing, while keeping the diplomatic channel to the Soviet Union open. Nixon emphasized his determination to protect the U.S. position, signaling his willingness to authorize a naval blockade if diplomatic pressure and military action failed to curb Hanoi's aggression. The President also directed his staff to maintain a calm, public-facing posture while intensifying criticism of political opponents who appeared to align with the enemy's interests.
President Nixon met with Ronald Ziegler and Henry Kissinger to coordinate the administration's public posture regarding military actions in Indochina, specifically the recent bombing of Haiphong and the presence of Soviet ships. Kissinger briefed the President on his communications with Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin and journalist Stewart Alsop, emphasizing the administration's determination to maintain a firm stance despite concerns over the upcoming Moscow summit. The group finalized plans for the President to meet with Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird and Admiral Thomas Moorer to ensure consistent testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
President Nixon, Henry Kissinger, and Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird met to evaluate the ongoing military situation in Vietnam and coordinate strategy ahead of Kissinger's upcoming summit preparations in Moscow. The participants expressed frustration over unauthorized press reports suggesting internal administration discord regarding air strikes, emphasizing the need for a unified front to project strength and pressure North Vietnam. Nixon sought to maintain leverage for his potential Moscow visit, specifically discussing the tactical efficacy of air campaigns, the strategic value of a potential naval blockade, and the importance of maintaining a firm stance against North Vietnamese aggression to ensure favorable negotiation outcomes.
President Nixon and Henry Kissinger met to evaluate the status of the Vietnam War and the strategic implications of increased U.S. bombing operations ahead of Kissinger’s upcoming trip to Moscow. They discussed the effectiveness of recent air and naval strikes, specifically noting the pressure being placed on North Vietnam and the diplomatic necessity of demonstrating strength to the Soviets. Nixon emphasized the importance of maintaining military momentum to ensure a strong bargaining position, while both men weighed the risks and potential fallout of a naval blockade on the upcoming Moscow summit.
President Nixon met with H. R. Haldeman to discuss the impending resignation of Treasury Secretary John Connally, focusing on the political timing and the need to frame his departure as a supportive transition rather than a sign of administration instability. They strategized on potential replacements, specifically identifying George Shultz as the ideal successor due to his expertise and free-market philosophy. Additionally, the President and his staff coordinated a cover story for Henry Kissinger’s secret diplomatic mission to Moscow, deciding to utilize a fake 'periodic staff planning session' at Camp David to distract the press.
President Nixon met with H.R. Haldeman to discuss high-level administration strategy, including preparations for Henry Kissinger’s upcoming trip to Moscow and the management of sensitive Vietnam negotiations. The President expressed frustration with Kissinger’s tendency to engage in philosophical digressions during diplomatic talks and instructed that specific, direct messages be relayed regarding the necessity of prioritizing a Vietnam settlement over broader summit discussions. Additionally, they reviewed domestic political issues, including the ITT case, upcoming press strategy, and staff transitions, while Nixon emphasized his desire to reduce his own preoccupation with negative media coverage.
President Nixon and Henry Kissinger met to refine the President’s upcoming Vietnam speech and discuss the ongoing military and diplomatic situation. Nixon expressed frustration over bureaucratic delays in executing his military orders and emphasized his determination to bypass Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird. The two also analyzed the political impact of the North Vietnamese offensive, the potential effects of Nixon's upcoming summit in Moscow, and the administration's need to maintain a projection of strength against domestic critics.
President Nixon met with South Korean officials Kim Yong-sik and Dong Jo Kim, along with Alexander Haig, to reaffirm U.S. security commitments to the Republic of Korea (ROK) amidst the ongoing North Vietnamese invasion. The discussion centered on maintaining a strong defense posture, the modernization of ROK forces, and coordinating strategy ahead of Nixon's upcoming summit in Moscow. Nixon assured the delegation of continued U.S. support despite domestic congressional opposition and emphasized the strategic importance of resisting communist aggression in both Vietnam and Korea.
President Nixon, Henry Kissinger, and H.R. Haldeman met to coordinate the media strategy and final preparations for the President’s upcoming speech on the Vietnam War. They discussed the administration's decision to withhold advance copies of the speech from the press, opting instead to have Kissinger personally brief television networks to ensure control over the narrative regarding North Vietnamese aggression and South Vietnamese resilience. Additionally, the participants reviewed the status of Soviet diplomatic relations, including the status of strategic arms limitation talks and the logistics for the President's upcoming Moscow summit.
President Nixon met with H. R. Haldeman and Billy Graham to discuss the upcoming televised address regarding the Vietnam War. Graham offered personal encouragement and political support for the President’s handling of the conflict and his planned trip to Moscow. The President used the time to rehearse the speech, soliciting feedback from Haldeman on its tone and messaging to ensure it projected strength and resolve while avoiding the appearance of defeatism.
President Nixon and H. R. Haldeman met to coordinate messaging regarding upcoming foreign policy developments, specifically focusing on the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) and the President's planned visit to Moscow. They discussed managing public and press perception of the administration’s Vietnam strategy and reviewed the internal dynamics of the State Department versus the White House. The conversation also included a critique of Henry Kissinger’s media interactions and his efforts to cultivate a public image amidst high-stakes international diplomacy.
President Nixon and Alexander Haig met to discuss the precarious military situation in Vietnam, specifically the South Vietnamese defense against a major North Vietnamese offensive. Nixon expressed deep skepticism regarding the upcoming Moscow summit, questioning the morality and political viability of hosting Soviet leaders while their military aid fueled the ongoing assault on U.S. allies. The two men evaluated the strategic options, including a potential intensification of American air strikes and the possibility of canceling the summit entirely to demonstrate resolve. Ultimately, Nixon emphasized that the primary objective was to bolster the South Vietnamese military's will to fight while acknowledging the significant risks and political fallout associated with their military response.
President Nixon consulted with advisor Harry Dent regarding ongoing North Vietnamese military offensives and their potential impact on his upcoming diplomatic trip to Moscow. They evaluated the political risks of visiting the Soviet Union while Soviet-supplied weaponry was being used against South Vietnamese forces, specifically considering the possibility of postponing the summit. The conversation also touched upon the status of current Democratic primary races and Nixon's efforts to maintain public support for a firm military response in Vietnam.
President Nixon and Charles Colson discuss the political fallout and public perception of ongoing military engagements, specifically addressing the risk of potential battlefield losses impacting the President's scheduled trip to Moscow. Nixon emphasizes the necessity of maintaining resolve despite negative projections, drawing a parallel to his steadfast support for J. Edgar Hoover. The conversation highlights the administration's efforts to manage both foreign policy objectives and domestic law-and-order optics during a period of strategic uncertainty.
Secret Service agents discussed domestic political sentiment regarding the President’s handling of the Vietnam War and the upcoming Moscow summit. The participants reviewed internal polling data indicating strong public support for the bombing of North Vietnam despite the ongoing conflict. They ultimately advised against canceling the summit, arguing that public opinion favored maintaining the diplomatic engagement regardless of the military situation in Southeast Asia.
President Nixon met with his close confidant Bebe Rebozo to discuss the ongoing military escalation in Vietnam, specifically the mining of North Vietnamese harbors and planned bombing raids on railroad yards. Nixon expressed confidence in the effectiveness of these measures despite concerns that they might jeopardize the upcoming Moscow summit. The two also touched upon domestic political fallout, noting the opposition from Democrats and Senator Edward Kennedy regarding these foreign policy actions.
President Nixon initiated this call to apologize to Nelson Rockefeller regarding an unauthorized public release of a presidential letter to Cardinal Cooke concerning abortion, which Nixon blamed on administrative error. The two also discussed Nixon's recent speech on Vietnam, with Rockefeller expressing strong approval of the President's actions and willingness to support the administration despite potential backlash from liberal critics. Nixon reaffirmed his commitment to the Vietnam strategy, noting that he would not proceed with the Moscow summit if Soviet aggression continued, while the two men commiserated over the partisan nature of political opposition.
President Nixon met with Nelson Rockefeller to apologize for an unauthorized letter that caused public embarrassment for the New York Governor. Nixon distanced himself from the leak, labeling it a "coup" and vowing to identify the culprit within his administration. Additionally, the two discussed the geopolitical implications of the upcoming Moscow summit in the context of ongoing international tensions.
President Nixon and Henry Kissinger met to discuss the strategic implications of the recently implemented blockade of North Vietnam and the ongoing North Vietnamese offensive. They analyzed the potential impact on the upcoming Moscow summit, the status of domestic political opposition, and the military situation in regions like Hue and An Loc. The President reaffirmed his decision to maintain the blockade, viewing it as a necessary display of strength to prevent a collapse in South Vietnam and to secure his position during an election year.
President Nixon met with Soviet Minister of Foreign Trade Nikolai Patolichev, Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin, and senior U.S. officials to discuss the expansion of U.S.-Soviet economic and trade relations ahead of the upcoming Moscow summit. Patolichev outlined Soviet interest in obtaining credit for large-scale projects and Most Favored Nation (MFN) status, while Nixon emphasized his desire to transcend specific technical hurdles to establish a historic, long-term economic partnership between the two superpowers. The meeting served to reaffirm high-level commitments to future cooperation, with Nixon signaling his willingness to use his executive authority to reach significant agreements with General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev.
President Nixon and Henry Kissinger met to evaluate the Soviet Union's moderate response to the U.S. naval blockade and mining of North Vietnamese ports. They discussed managing diplomatic communications regarding the upcoming Moscow summit, specifically ensuring that Soviet interests and the German Treaty were handled without jeopardizing the President's scheduled visit. Kissinger provided updates on his recent interactions with Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin, and the two agreed to keep the State Department and Secretary of State William P. Rogers largely uninformed of these sensitive negotiations to maintain control over the administration's Vietnam policy.
President Nixon and Henry Kissinger discussed the political and security implications of the attempted assassination of George C. Wallace, including the status of suspect Arthur H. Bremer and the intensification of candidate protection measures. They reviewed the impact of the shooting on upcoming diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, specifically addressing progress on SALT negotiations and preparations for the impending Moscow summit. Additionally, the conversation touched upon the ongoing North Vietnamese offensive and the status of U.S. bombing operations in Vietnam.
President Nixon met with Alexander P. Butterfield, Stephen B. Bull, and H. R. Haldeman to review administrative materials and schedule updates. The discussion focused on routine paperwork, logistics regarding the upcoming presidential trip to Moscow, and the scheduling of meetings for key staff members including Alexander Haig and Charles Colson. The participants also addressed staff correspondence and procedural matters related to the President's daily agenda.
President Nixon and Henry Kissinger met to discuss urgent matters of foreign policy and national security strategy during a critical period of the Vietnam War and ahead of the upcoming Moscow summit. The brief discussion focused on evaluating international developments and refining the administration's diplomatic maneuvers. This exchange highlights the close coordination between the President and his National Security Advisor regarding sensitive global engagements.
President Nixon met with Yugoslavian representative Toma Granfil and advisor Helmut Sonnenfeldt to discuss diplomatic relations and upcoming geopolitical objectives. The discussion centered on fostering strong bilateral ties with Yugoslavia, including the exchange of birthday greetings for President Josip Broz Tito, and clarifying the objectives of Nixon’s impending trip to Moscow. Nixon emphasized his commitment to maintaining independent state sovereignty and pledged to provide Tito with a personal, frank report on the outcomes of his Soviet negotiations.
President Nixon and his personal secretary, Rose Mary Woods, discuss logistical preparations and travel concerns ahead of an upcoming trip to Moscow. The conversation shifts to the difficulties of funding support staff and personnel for official travel, specifically noting that government funds cannot cover these expenses for certain individuals. Nixon directs Woods to coordinate with other staff to finalize these arrangements, emphasizing the need for external financing.
President Nixon, Henry Kissinger, and H.R. Haldeman met at Camp David to coordinate strategy for the upcoming Moscow summit and address domestic concerns regarding Vietnam and institutional opposition. Kissinger detailed the successful navigation of complex negotiations with the Soviet Union, including the SALT agreement and various bilateral accords, emphasizing the necessity of Nixon's personal oversight in achieving these breakthroughs. The group also discussed the logistics of upcoming television addresses and public diplomacy, while Nixon expressed deep frustration with the Ivy League establishment and anti-war critics, vowing to shift federal funding away from resistant institutions.
President Nixon and Harry S. Dent discuss the positive political reception of Nixon's recent summit in Moscow and the administration's ongoing military strategy in Vietnam. The conversation emphasizes the public's approval of the President's firm negotiating stance regarding missile reductions and infrastructure requirements. They also evaluate the viability of a campaign schedule for a physically incapacitated political figure, concluding that a traditional campaign approach is likely untenable.
President Nixon and Henry Kissinger discussed the positive results of the recent Moscow Summit, noting Soviet leaders' desire to strengthen personal ties with the President. They also assessed the deteriorating situation for North Vietnam, with Nixon reiterating the administration’s strategy to attack presidential candidate George McGovern's proposal to visit Hanoi as a form of surrender. Finally, they coordinated the logistics for announcing Kissinger's upcoming trip to China and his subsequent testimony before the Senate, aiming to minimize political backlash by controlling the timing and narrative.
President Nixon and John Mitchell discussed the political climate following the President’s recent trip to Moscow and its influence on congressional behavior. The conversation centered on the favorable outcome of a recent legislative vote, noting that even political opponents like Senator Charles Percy had shifted their stance. Nixon expressed a desire to maintain a firm, aggressive posture in his administration's dealings, emphasizing that he should not become overly conciliatory or 'tender' following tough confirmation processes.
President Nixon met with speechwriter Raymond K. Price, Jr. to dictate a memorandum regarding the administration's recent activities. The discussion focused on administrative matters concerning the Kennedy Center, the President's recent trip to Moscow, and the drafting of a message of sympathy. Nixon directed Price to utilize specific recording equipment to facilitate the transcription of these official communications.