Nixon White House Tapes › Tape 276 › Conversation 276-018
Nixon & Kissinger on Vietnam War and Ceasefire negotiations
Monday, September 13, 1971 · 8:50 PM–10:15 PM ET · Old Executive Office Building · 9 min
AI Summary
President Nixon and Henry Kissinger met to discuss the status of the Vietnam War, focusing on the complexities of ceasefire negotiations and the potential for a unilateral withdrawal of American forces. They evaluated the domestic and geopolitical pressures influencing their strategy, specifically weighing the risks of diplomatic engagement with the Soviet Union versus the benefits of independent action. The conversation underscored the administration's struggle to find an honorable exit from the conflict while managing public perception and the volatile nature of the peace talks.
- Vietnam War
- Ceasefire negotiations
- Foreign policy
- Troop withdrawal
- Geopolitics
- U.S.-Soviet relations
Audio
Transcript (AI-generated)
This transcript was generated automatically by AI (WhisperX) and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Names and numbers are often wrong; speakers are not identified. Do not cite it as authoritative — verify against the audio and the finding aid.
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Henry, how are you?
Am I disturbing you?
I could come back.
No, no, no, no, no, no.
I was just, uh, looking at Paul Keyes.
Oh, yeah.
He showed up.
I never watched television, but he asked me to see his first show this season.
Yeah, he was so good.
Well, uh, that's how you go to the show, if you, um, don't know if it makes sense.
Well, I'm not going to tell you.
Did you raise her?
Did you happen to raise her?
She knows that what McGovern said isn't true.
When you say ceasefire, it means ceasefire between the American and the Vietnamese, and then not between another ceasefire.
It means no ceasefire for Laos, no ceasefire for Cambodia, no ceasefire for South Vietnam.
It's got bombing the supply lines, and they won't buy it on our troops.
It's our way of selling out.
And it's going to be by December 31st.
My father was told that.
That's all he told me.
He told me to do that for a change.
But his hand was dirty first, then my brother.
He had my brother.
That is absolutely true.
Yes, yes.
We talked about, well, that we might not withdraw.
That's true, you know.
I lied.
Even if I did not eventually withdraw, it was because they thought that you...
So they figured these principles would lead him, I mean, actually giving up these principles, none of that would take them for the fall.
But it was the usual Kanye.
It would have given us six months, would have given us a way of getting out, right?
Would have been confused, but now they figured he's so weak anyway.
And I see now that it's not a problem.
You need to go to the Unilateral Control Room.
It's mandatory, if you don't get any.
You still have a splash for the week.
I don't see two trips and all of that, at all.
It's a shot, it's a one-night-a-day.
Just two trips.
Just one.
Two is to break out the package and say,
From then, you know I was tempted, tempted to return to my home.
And believe me, I was a prisoner.
After a very short time.
Today, they will demand a ceasefire to our forces under your control.
If you can't vote, you will vote immediately.
When you're dead in filtration, they put 90,000 cunts into the pipeline last year to get 15,000 through.
They'll be able to do next March.
I'm just telling you, I'm a little drunk.
There I come on.
So it is.
So it is.
I'll find it.
And I'm just going to do it for safety.
We're doing a negotiation.
We're not going to do this.
We recognize the fact that we've come to the point of being in a situation where we're in a domestic situation.
And we have to see that these guys have nothing going for them in this area.
Our moral collapse.
That's what's driving us crazy.
If you had enough of those people to do one more strange campaign, you could drive to church.
That's what's driving us crazy.
Except for the other possibilities, to go to them and say, all right, we will redefine our policy.
Compromise, because it's a half-assed government of national compromise.
It's a half-assed government of national compromise.
It's a half-assed government of national compromise.
It's a half-assed government of national compromise.
It's a half-assed government of national compromise.
We met our forces there.
We had an agreement with Saigon, you know, not that I know of.
We're going to be alarmed, but that could happen.
We could do it this way.
I know you just like the idea of testing.
I have no interest in being affiliated to this thing.
The Soviets would be the as we could tell the Soviets.
And he makes remarks about the conceivable interest in peace.
And that's the normal as it relates to any state.
But it ought to be the pieces that they are mortified with.
They have a proposal which they ought to accept.
And offer it if it doesn't work.
What would it find them in order?
If they know well enough that we are now
Better than 40, I'm telling you now.
The thing about it is, it's a secret business, the truth to us, they say.
Almost anything but the Chinese, because that's where their paranoia works for us, because the Chinese won't make any deals with us.
One possibility war, we can just go to Paris and make that four thousand.
That's what we must do.
They do that.
I'm worried that if we do it directly to them, their normal tendency is to string us along in other demons' negotiations.
I'm working on a memorandum.
In many ways, going unilaterally is the most honorable way.
Somebody has sent a check-in.
They transferred everything I sent to them.
They want you to go ahead and take it.
I am.
But we're not.
The maiden may work for me.
It's true.
This may be the case, and this may not.
I don't know.
Right?
Now, what I would do... You don't have to decide.
On the 1st of November, today, I would have been up in two months with Joe.
That was the beginning of the...
Right.
That's the beginning of the announcement.
I wouldn't do that often.
calling the truth.
Why?
And we'll bring it on for better or worse.
It's another one of the methods that I need to use to get me through this stuff.
I was announced today to be a victim of the past, and I'm feeling it.
I'm feeling it today, too, because it's been out of this world.
People are going to say what they have to say.
It's been an announcement today.
It wasn't made by the man.
It's been out of this world.
They said this would be settled today, and I said, no, you have to understand.
They said this would be settled today, and I said, no, you have to understand.
They said this would be settled today, and I said, no, you have to understand.
They said this would be settled today, and I said, no, you have to understand.
They said this would be settled today, and I said, no, you have to understand.
They said this would be settled today, and I said, no, you have to understand.
Today was the day of the announcing day of the one that would be next week.
I had to go for an announcement that there was an impossible for the Russians.
I had to go for an announcement that there was an impossible for the Russians.
I had to go for an announcement that there was an impossible for the Russians.
I had to go for an announcement that there was an impossible for the Russians.
That's when they had two out of three of them on the set.
They sucked up.
I mean, they would be at ten.
Ten out of three.
Right.
You can't see it, but that's it.
I mean, it was great.
I mean, all I can tell is what he's doing.
And I'm not afraid of him.
I'm just careful.
I mean, it really blows me away when I talk to the president.
He said, you know, he said, I want to do this.
I'll do it.
Thank you.
NARA Description
On September 13, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building from 8:50 pm to 10:15 pm. The Old Executive Office Building taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 276-018 of the White House Tapes.
Nixon Library Finding Aid
Conv. No. 276-18/278-33 (cont.)
Also recorded on September 14, 1971
- 278-033 8:50 PM · 16 min — President Richard M. Nixon, Henry A. Kissinger, and Manolo Sanchez met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 8:50 pm and 10:15 pm.
- 074-002 8:09 AM · 1 hr 4 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Republican Congressional leaders, including George P. Shultz, Paul W. McCracken, Herbert Stein, Charls E. Walker, Arnold R. Weber, Hugh Scott, Robert P. Griffin, Gordon L. Allott, Peter H. Dominick, Wallace F. Bennett, Milton R. Young, Jacob K. Javits, Gerald R. Ford, Leslie C. Arends, John B. Anderson, John J. Rhodes, Robert C. ("Bob") Wilson, H. Allen Smith, Robert T. Stafford, Richard H. Poff, Barber B. Conable, Jr., Frank T. Bow, John W. Byrnes, William L. Springer, John D. Ehrlichman, Clark MacGregor, William E. Timmons, Kenneth E. BeLieu, Patrick J. Buchanan, and Gerald L. Warren, met in the Cabinet Room of the White House at an unknown time between 8:09 am and 10:21 am.
- 572-002 8:09 AM · 1 min — United States Secret Service agents met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 8:09 am and 10:07 am.
- 074-003 10:07 AM · 4 min — Stephen B. Bull and unknown person(s) met in the Cabinet Room of the White House at an unknown time between 10:07 am and 10:21 am.
- 074-004 10:07 AM · 29 min — President Richard M. Nixon and the Committee to Form a National Health Education Foundation, including Joseph Wilson, Joseph A. Beirne, Dr. M. Alfred Haynes, Richard McGall, J. Alexander McMahon, Walter J. McNerney, A. C. Nielson, Jr. Dr. Joseph T. Painter, Wrede Petersmeyer, Charles A. Siegfried, David Seymour, Dr. Irving Shapiro, Scott Simonds, J. Henry Smith, Dr. Melvin K. ("Morty") Duval, Dr. Robert Laur, Victor Wiengarten, Josee Laventhal, Linda Brannick, Grace Urrows, Howard Ennes, Dr. Peter Warter, Peter Meek, Levitt Mendel, Clarence Pearson, Dr. George Wheatley, Caesar Brancini, Stanley S. Scott [?], the White House photographer, and members of the press, met in the Cabinet Room of the White House at an unknown time between 10:07 am and 10:51 am.
- 572-003 10:07 AM · 13 min — President Richard M. Nixon, Gordon L. Allott, Leslie C. Arends, Clark MacGregor, Kenneth E. BeLieu, and unknown person(s) met in the Oval Office of the White House from 10:07 am to 10:21 am.
- 572-004 10:21 AM · 35 sec — United States Secret Service agents met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 10:21 am and 10:51 am.
- 572-005 10:51 AM · 16 min — President Richard M. Nixon, Francis J. Galbraith, and Alexander M. Haig, Jr. met in the Oval Office of the White House from 10:51 am to 11:07 am.
Cite this conversation
Conversation 276-018, September 14, 1971. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives. Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/276-018 (accessed October 9, 2026).