Nixon White House Tapes › Topic
Nixon Tapes on Defense policy
27 conversations · frequently with Nixon, Laird, Kissinger, Haldeman
President Nixon and Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird discuss the recent handling of anti-war demonstrations in Washington, D.C., as well as the proposed restructuring of the U.S. Military Command in South America (ComSouth). Nixon commends the security response to the protests and emphasizes the need to avoid any public perception that U.S. military engagement in Latin America is being downgraded. The two agree to postpone a final decision on the ComSouth command structure and staffing until Laird returns to the office, at which point they will convene a small group to evaluate the foreign policy implications.
President Nixon calls Congressman F. Edward Hébert to congratulate him on the House's decisive legislative victory regarding funding for the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) system and the B-1 bomber. The conversation shifts to the ongoing controversy surrounding the publication of the Pentagon Papers by The New York Times, which Nixon characterizes as an attack on the presidency. Nixon expresses his determination to pursue legal action against Daniel Ellsberg and his associates, asserting that those responsible for leaking the classified documents must be sent to jail.
President Nixon met with Kenneth BeLieu, William Timmons, and Clark MacGregor to discuss BeLieu's transition to his new role as Undersecretary of the Army. The President emphasized the need for stronger leadership and management within the Army and stressed the importance of maintaining close coordination between the Pentagon and the White House on legislative defense matters. The participants further deliberated on potential military leadership candidates, including Gen. Creighton Abrams, and reflected on the ongoing political challenges regarding the military draft.
President Nixon consulted with Henry Kissinger regarding the scheduling and coordination of an upcoming meeting with Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird. The President instructed Kissinger to attend the session, which was slated for that afternoon at the Executive Office Building. This conversation served to organize the administrative logistics and ensure the national security advisor's presence for the consultation with the Defense Secretary.
President Nixon and the National Security Council met to coordinate U.S. strategy regarding European security, specifically focusing on the upcoming ministerial meetings in Brussels and the push for Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks. Participants discussed the complexities of navigating negotiations with Soviet counterparts, managing the varying interests of NATO allies, and addressing the political pressures surrounding troop levels and defense burden-sharing. The conversation concluded with a consensus on the need to maintain a unified diplomatic front while carefully managing the timing and scope of potential force reductions.
President Nixon and General Alexander Haig discussed the logistics and strategic objectives of an upcoming 48-hour, maximum-effort bombing campaign in Vietnam. They emphasized the operation's psychological impact, aiming to correct enemy perceptions of weakened U.S. strength and to demonstrate the high cost of continued aggression. The conversation further confirmed that military leadership, including Admiral Thomas Moorer and General Creighton Abrams, supported the strike as a means to gain tactical intelligence and utilize superior naval and air assets.
President Nixon and Henry Kissinger coordinated strategy ahead of a National Security Council meeting involving William Rogers, Melvin Laird, and Gerard Smith. Their discussion focused on navigating complex negotiations regarding anti-ballistic missiles (ABMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) with the Soviet Union. Nixon determined that he would personally interject to override Smith’s position if necessary to ensure administration control over the defense posture.
President Nixon and Alexander Butterfield coordinated the agenda for an upcoming congressional leadership meeting, specifically narrowing the focus to a defense and China policy briefing led by Henry Kissinger. Nixon explicitly excluded Secretary of State William Rogers and Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird from the presentation to ensure Kissinger could lead the session without bureaucratic interference. Additionally, the President requested the inclusion of select committee chairmen while directing that political liaisons be excluded to foster a more candid atmosphere regarding China policy discussions.
President Nixon directs the White House operator to place a call to Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird. This request follows a private consultation between the President and National Security Advisor Henry A. Kissinger regarding national security or defense-related matters. The conversation functions primarily as an administrative step to facilitate immediate communication between the President and the Secretary of Defense.
President Nixon and Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird coordinated their public response to a New York Times report falsely claiming that U.S. bombing in Vietnam had been reduced for diplomatic purposes. Nixon directed Laird to aggressively deny these reports to maintain strategic ambiguity, stressing the importance of this stance for ongoing diplomatic efforts. Laird confirmed that he had already refuted the story during recent testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee and had prepared a media clip to ensure the denial reached a wider audience.
President Nixon and Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird discuss the public and political reception of the recent escalation in Vietnam, specifically the mining of harbors and expansion of airstrikes. Nixon encourages Laird to adopt a more aggressive, "hawkish" public stance regarding the military operations to deter North Vietnam, rather than emphasizing what the blockade is not. Laird confirms the successful initial deployment of mines and reports that airstrikes against critical targets like railroads and petroleum, oil, and lubricant (POL) depots are underway, prompting Nixon to request that commendations be sent to the forces involved.
President Nixon and Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird met to coordinate the public relations strategy and military planning surrounding the Vietnam War, specifically focusing on the recent escalation of operations. Nixon emphasized the necessity of achieving a strong psychological impact through targeted strikes on infrastructure, such as power lines, and requested photographic evidence of enemy naval activity. They further discussed managing congressional testimony and media appearances to ensure a unified, aggressive message that conveys the administration's resolve and authorization to achieve victory.
President Nixon consulted with an unidentified individual regarding an upcoming press conference involving Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird. The discussion centered on the strategic messaging surrounding Vietnam policy and coordination for the briefing. This consultation served to align the administration's public stance on ongoing military developments in the region.
President Nixon and Alexander Haig met to discuss concerns regarding Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird and his stance on an ongoing, sensitive political or military issue. Nixon expressed a desire to move away from Laird’s current position and instructed Haig to coordinate with relevant staff members to quiet the matter. The pair agreed that maintaining positive reporting would be essential to successfully distancing the administration from this long-term liability.
President Nixon met with Henry Kissinger, Senator John Stennis, and White House staff to coordinate legislative strategy regarding defense policy and the Vietnam War. The discussion focused on securing support for the military procurement bill and countering congressional efforts, such as the Mansfield amendment, that sought to limit the administration's leverage in Vietnam negotiations. Nixon and Kissinger also updated Stennis on recent diplomatic communications with the Soviet Union and China to ensure a unified front in upcoming SALT II and defense authorization hearings.
President Nixon and Press Secretary Ronald Ziegler discuss media messaging strategies regarding controversial administration issues, specifically the General John D. Lavelle case and defense policy. Nixon instructs Ziegler to distance the White House from the details of the Lavelle court-martial by deferring to the Department of Defense's position. Furthermore, the President outlines a rhetorical strategy for arms control, emphasizing that ongoing U.S. defense programs were essential to securing agreements with the Soviet Union and should be framed as a necessary precursor to future disarmament progress.
President Nixon and Henry Kissinger met to analyze the ongoing military situation in Vietnam, specifically focusing on North Vietnamese offensives and South Vietnamese counter-operations. The discussion encompassed political strategy regarding the 1972 election, including criticisms of George McGovern’s defense proposals and the impact of the Watergate scandal on the administration. They also reviewed personnel issues, such as the potential replacement of General John D. Lavelle and staffing for diplomatic posts, while coordinating their messaging for upcoming press engagements.
President Nixon and Charles Colson discuss campaign messaging strategy, specifically focusing on the administration’s credibility and the successful transition to an all-volunteer military. They emphasize leveraging the reduction of draftees and the withdrawal of troops from Vietnam as key accomplishments to highlight during the reelection campaign. Nixon underscores the importance of publicizing these defense-related achievements to bolster his political standing against opponents.
President Nixon and Charles W. Colson discussed political strategy for the 1972 campaign, focusing specifically on how to counter Democratic nominee George S. McGovern. They analyzed McGovern's vulnerabilities regarding his defense budget proposals and his position on amnesty for Vietnam War draft evaders. The President directed Colson to emphasize that deserters must 'pay the penalty' for their actions, regardless of the war's conclusion, to effectively attack McGovern's credibility with the public.
President Nixon met with his senior staff and campaign advisors to assess his 1972 reelection strategy, focusing on framing the debate against George McGovern around key issues like Vietnam, welfare, busing, and national defense. The group discussed the necessity of moving from a defensive posture to an aggressive offense by highlighting the radical nature of McGovern's positions to the general public. Additionally, the President met with James Hodgson and other officials to review progress on veterans' benefits and education programs, confirming plans to maintain support among Vietnam-era veterans as part of the broader campaign effort.
President Nixon and Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird met briefly to discuss political messaging and the strategic framing of administration policies in response to critics. They focused on countering adversarial rhetoric by emphasizing the administration's accomplishments rather than allowing opponents to define the public narrative. The President stressed the importance of seizing control of the debate to ensure his administration's perspective on national priorities takes precedence.
President Nixon directs John K. Andrews, Jr. on the content and themes for an upcoming defense radio speech. He instructs Andrews to emphasize the necessity of maintaining military superiority, specifically naval strength, to protect smaller nations like Israel, while arguing that a nuclear deterrent is insufficient for localized conflicts. Nixon also requests that the draft incorporate a quotation from André Malraux regarding the unique, unintended nature of American global power and the nation's lack of intent for territorial conquest. Andrews commits to providing a draft by the end of the day for the broadcast scheduled for Saturday.
H. R. Haldeman and Ronald Ziegler coordinated a last-minute schedule change regarding President Nixon’s upcoming addresses, swapping the planned “Defense” speech with the “One America” speech. Haldeman directed Ziegler to announce that the Defense speech was being postponed by one day to allow for further editing and to maximize its strategic impact. Ziegler agreed to relay these instructions to Gerald Warren to ensure the public announcement reflected the revised schedule.
President Nixon met with his aide Stephen B. Bull to coordinate his daily schedule and upcoming logistical arrangements. The discussion focused on managing meetings with H.R. Haldeman and Charles W. Colson, as well as the President's planned travel to Camp David. They also reviewed preparations for his impending radio address regarding national defense policy and reviewed details from the previous day’s campaign trip.
President Nixon and H. R. Haldeman coordinated a brief, private meeting at the Dogwood cabin to discuss an upcoming afternoon appointment with Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird. The President sought to consult with Haldeman regarding the substance of the Laird meeting before it took place. Haldeman agreed to the request and prepared to head to the cabin immediately following his lunch.
President Nixon consulted with the White House operator to facilitate a communication regarding military aid. This brief interaction served to establish a connection for official business pertaining to defense policy or international assistance. No further substantive details regarding the specific parties or strategic directives were captured in this fragment of the recording.
President Nixon instructed the White House operator to place an urgent call to either Secretary of Defense Elliot L. Richardson or Admiral Thomas H. Moorer. This outreach served as a direct request for consultation with key national security and defense leadership. The operator acknowledged the directive to secure one of the two officials immediately.