Nixon White House Tapes › Topic
Nixon Tapes on Monetary policy
31 conversations · frequently with Nixon, Shultz, Connally, Ehrlichman
President Nixon met with John Ehrlichman and George Shultz to discuss the restructuring of international monetary policy and the role of Peter G. Peterson within the administration. They debated strategies for economic coordination, specifically regarding the 'Quadriad' and the integration of international economic business into White House deliberations. The group also touched on upcoming budget preparations for the 1972 State of the Union, the potential for increased defense spending, and the need for improved public relations regarding administration public works projects.
President Nixon, John Ehrlichman, and Arthur Burns held this discussion to coordinate economic strategy and review the administration's political management of upcoming challenges. They focused on strengthening the partnership between Burns and John Connally, particularly regarding balance-of-payments policies, interest rates, and the political handling of potential steel industry inflation. Nixon also sought Burns’ perspective on international concerns, including the Berlin negotiations and German political stability, before Burns departed for a diplomatic trip to Europe.
Treasury Secretary John B. Connally updated President Nixon on his immediate public criticism of Chase National Bank for raising its prime rate from 5.25% to 5.5%. Connally informed the President that he tasked Charles E. Walker with pressuring Western banks to resist following this rate hike. President Nixon expressed full support for Connally’s strategy to discourage further increases by major financial institutions.
President Nixon convened an extensive afternoon meeting in the Oval Office with his key economic advisors, including George Shultz, John Connally, Arthur Burns, and Paul Volcker, to deliberate on pressing fiscal and monetary policy issues. The discussion focused on addressing the nation's ongoing economic instability, involving high-level strategy sessions with administration officials and cabinet members. These deliberations were critical in shaping the Nixon administration's approach to inflation and international monetary concerns, ultimately informing the direction of domestic economic policy.
President Richard M. Nixon and Treasury Secretary John B. Connally discussed critical economic strategy, focusing on the potential devaluation of the dollar and the United States' monetary position relative to European bankers and foreign leaders. The conversation also touched upon broader economic indicators, including stock market performance and unemployment, as well as the administration's public relations management. The two explored potential diplomatic actions, including coordination with Arthur F. Burns and Henry A. Kissinger, to address ongoing international economic tensions.
President Nixon and Secretary of the Treasury John Connally discussed a strategy to exert political pressure on Federal Reserve Chairman Arthur Burns regarding monetary policy. Connally reported that their coordinated 'tactic' of feigning ignorance had successfully gotten Burns' attention and prompted a shift in his outlook. They agreed to maintain pressure while maintaining a posture of plausible deniability, with Connally planning to press Burns for more positive public statements during a future meeting.
This recording captures the final preparations, technical coordination, and immediate post-broadcast critique of President Richard M. Nixon's televised address titled "The Challenge of Peace." During the Oval Office session, Nixon and his staff focused on broadcast mechanics, including camera positioning, lighting, and stage cues for his landmark announcement of a new economic policy. Following the speech, in which Nixon unveiled a 90-day wage and price freeze and suspended the convertibility of the dollar, the President discussed broadcast feedback and administrative scheduling with his team.
President Nixon met with the Council on International Economic Policy (CIEP) and key economic advisors to discuss the administration's post-August 15 New Economic Policy (NEP) and future international trade strategy. Peter G. Peterson led a presentation analyzing the shortcomings of global liberal trading systems and the challenges posed by foreign competitors like Japan, while other officials addressed the domestic economic impact, labor relations, and the status of ongoing monetary negotiations. The President emphasized the need for a firm but diplomatic approach toward Japan and directed his team to maintain the offensive on domestic economic policy while keeping options flexible regarding international monetary reform.
President Nixon, H. R. Haldeman, and John Connally met to discuss public relations strategy, the effectiveness of the President's recent economic speech, and the complex challenges of international trade and monetary policy. The participants expressed deep distrust of the State Department bureaucracy and foreign service establishment, agreeing on the need to bypass traditional diplomatic channels to manage international pressures and trade negotiations. Nixon and Connally decided to form a small, secure, and loyal team of experts to handle secret trade negotiations and global outreach, while maintaining a tough, cynical stance toward foreign partners to protect American interests.
Treasury Secretary John Connally and John R. Petty discuss logistical planning for an upcoming reception for International Monetary Fund (IMF) delegates. Connally seeks guidance on the best timing for a potential presidential event, weighing the impact of preempting the traditional U.S.-hosted reception at the Smithsonian. They also review the size and composition of the guest list, specifically concerning finance ministers, central bank governors, and their spouses, to determine how to scale the event.
President Richard Nixon and Attorney General John Mitchell discuss the recent volatility in the stock market and the public perception of the administration's economic policies, specifically regarding monetary tightening and inflation. The two men dismiss concerns over market fluctuations, noting that housing starts remain strong and that the current economic indicators should eventually lead to a market recovery. Additionally, they discuss personnel matters and potential political appointments, briefly touching upon the qualifications of candidates for judicial or administrative positions.
President Nixon and Charles Colson discuss administration strategy, focusing on upcoming Supreme Court nominations, economic indicators, and public opinion. They celebrate the strategic release of nominees with high academic credentials to neutralize criticism regarding "excellence" and "judicial philosophy." Furthermore, they review the current economic climate, expressing concerns about Federal Reserve Chairman Arthur Burns's monetary policies, and analyze recent polling data that shows rising support for the President.
President Nixon met with Henry Kissinger and subsequently Arthur F. Burns to discuss high-stakes foreign policy and domestic economic stabilization. The conversation touched upon the delicate diplomatic handling of Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, specifically focusing on managing the threat of conflict between India and Pakistan and coordinating messages to the USSR and Vietnam. Regarding the economy, Nixon and Burns reviewed the money supply, interest rates, and potential contingency plans for the Pay Board should labor leaders like George Meany resist wage stabilization policies.
President Nixon consulted with Federal Reserve Chairman Arthur Burns regarding an upcoming meeting with Congressman Wright Patman concerning national economic policy and interest rates. The President informed Burns of a planned reduction in the discount rate, intending to use this move as leverage to discourage Patman from pursuing mandatory legislative controls on interest rates. Nixon ultimately decided that Burns should not attend the meeting, opting for a one-on-one session to better manage the political rapport with Patman.
President Nixon and Peter Flanigan discuss potential candidates for ambassadorial appointments to Japan and NATO, specifically evaluating figures like Fredrick M. Eaton, Nat Samuels, and David M. Kennedy. The President emphasizes his preference for Kennedy for the NATO post while tasking Flanigan with vetting other options, including Eaton, with Henry Kissinger. Additionally, Nixon directs Flanigan to mobilize influential contacts to pressure Federal Reserve Chairman Arthur F. Burns regarding his management of the money supply.
President Nixon and Treasury Secretary John Connally coordinated their strategy for managing Federal Reserve Chairman Arthur Burns regarding monetary policy and upcoming economic discussions. They planned a two-stage approach: Connally would meet with Burns individually to prep him on the money supply, followed by a larger 4:30 PM meeting involving Nixon, Connally, Burns, George Shultz, and Henry Kissinger. This structure was designed to ensure Burns remained aligned with administration goals while providing him with a sense of inclusion in the decision-making process.
President Nixon, Henry Kissinger, and William Rogers met to coordinate strategy ahead of an upcoming visit from Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir, specifically focusing on maintaining regional military balances and encouraging diplomatic negotiations. The participants agreed that the U.S. must provide security assurances and potential future arms deliveries to Israel without creating public, provocative announcements that could derail peace efforts. Additionally, the group discussed the timing of a future European Security Conference and potential summitry with the Soviet Union, as well as managing international monetary policy and high-level diplomatic scheduling regarding Italy, Canada, and China.
President Nixon and John Connally discuss the positive public reception of a recently negotiated international monetary agreement and plan Connally's upcoming travel schedule. They also address concerns raised by economist Milton Friedman regarding the money supply, with Nixon urging Connally to leverage his influence over Federal Reserve Chairman Arthur Burns to ensure appropriate policy adjustments. They decide to schedule a formal Quadriad meeting to discuss these monetary issues further.
President Nixon and Secretary of the Treasury John B. Connally reviewed the draft of the upcoming State of the Union speech to refine its tone and specific phraseology. Connally provided editorial feedback, including the suggestion to include Canada alongside European nations and Japan when discussing monetary agreements. The pair also discussed the speech's low-key tone, specifically regarding campus unrest and foreign policy, agreeing that the language struck an appropriately subtle and effective balance.
President Nixon met with his economic advisors, John Connally, George Shultz, and Herbert Stein, to review the state of the economy and coordinate administration messaging. The discussion focused on addressing business confidence, managing the federal budget and spending, and navigating upcoming international trade and monetary negotiations. Nixon emphasized the need for a unified administration front to present an optimistic economic outlook while preparing for legislative battles, including the debt ceiling and potential gold policy changes.
President Nixon met with John Connally and key economic advisors Arthur Burns, George Shultz, and Herbert Stein to conduct an extensive review of the U.S. economy, including unemployment data, retail sales, and the federal budget. The participants discussed strategies to accelerate federal spending to stimulate growth, concerns regarding the lack of confidence among international financial institutions, and the delicate nature of ongoing trade negotiations with Europe, Japan, and Canada. Nixon directed his team to prioritize the rapid deployment of authorized funds and ordered a follow-up analysis on identifying the specific demographics of the unemployed.
President Nixon met with John Ehrlichman and George Shultz to discuss administrative strategy regarding the economy and the unpredictable behavior of Federal Reserve Chairman Arthur Burns. The President expressed frustration with Burns's independent posturing on international monetary convertibility and his management of the money supply, while the group evaluated the political risks of ongoing wage and price controls. Nixon and his advisors decided to push for a stronger, unified economic narrative while avoiding further public controversy, eventually planning a private post-China trip meeting to reassess their strategy for exiting the system of wage and price controls.
President Nixon and George P. Shultz discussed the successful Senate confirmation of Richard G. Kleindienst and upcoming Cabinet swearing-in ceremonies. The conversation shifted to critical budgetary concerns, with the President emphasizing the necessity of vetoing environmental and spending bills to curb excessive federal expenditures. Finally, they reviewed international monetary policy, specifically coordinating a stance on gold that diverged from the views held by Federal Reserve Chairman Arthur F. Burns.
President Nixon, Henry Kissinger, and Maurice Schumann met to coordinate diplomatic strategy regarding the Vietnam War and US-French relations. The discussion focused on the ongoing Paris Peace Talks, with Nixon and Kissinger emphasizing that they were approaching the limit of possible concessions before the upcoming presidential election. They expressed a desire to resolve the conflict to pivot the administration’s focus toward strengthening the Atlantic community and broader foreign policy goals in 1973. Additionally, they reviewed technical aspects of monetary policy and the potential for increased cooperation with France in facilitating a diplomatic breakthrough with North Vietnam.
President Nixon and Federal Reserve Chairman Arthur F. Burns met to discuss the international reception of U.S. economic policies, the challenges of managing money supply and interest rates, and the broader contrast between American and British labor discipline. The discussion also covered potential future travel itineraries for Burns to countries including Indonesia and Japan, as well as coordination regarding an upcoming meeting with British Foreign Secretary Sir Alec Douglas-Home. Stephen B. Bull joined briefly to assist with scheduling logistics for the President and Burns.
President Nixon met with his key economic advisors—George Shultz, Herbert Stein, Roy Ash, and John Ehrlichman—to assess the administration's economic policy, particularly the transition to Phase III of the wage and price controls. The group discussed the political and economic challenges of managing inflation, maintaining a $250 billion budget ceiling, and navigating potential labor strikes, with Nixon emphasizing the need for a unified strategy and public confidence. The participants also addressed international trade tensions, the devaluation of the dollar, and the necessity of managing Congressional relations to sustain the administration's fiscal objectives.
President Nixon met with Vice President Agnew, Cabinet members, and key staff to discuss recent foreign policy developments and economic strategy. Vice President Agnew briefed the group on his recent tour of Southeast Asian nations, while Treasury officials and Cabinet members deliberated on international monetary policy, trade barriers, and the need for a more competitive U.S. industrial posture. The President emphasized the importance of maintaining international engagement, securing legislative tools for trade negotiations, and justifying reconstruction aid for Vietnam as a strategic security necessity rather than purely humanitarian relief.
President Nixon and Patrick J. Buchanan coordinate preparations for an upcoming press conference by reviewing potential questions and developing strategic responses. They discuss handling sensitive political topics, including the monetary crisis, the Wounded Knee occupation, campaign fundraising controversies, and inquiries stemming from L. Patrick Gray’s ongoing FBI testimony regarding Watergate. The President decides to adopt a non-committal stance on active investigations, specifically regarding the Watergate and Gray hearings, to avoid prematurely addressing evolving controversies.
President Nixon met with his economic advisors—including George Shultz, Arthur Burns, and Paul Volcker—to discuss the state of the domestic economy, concerns regarding inflation, and the ongoing volatility in international monetary markets. The participants debated the merits of federal intervention in currency exchange rates versus allowing a transition to a more flexible floating regime. Nixon emphasized that any economic strategy must account for his broader foreign policy objectives and the need to maintain strong political relationships with European allies, ultimately tasking Henry Kissinger to join the group to further weigh these options.
President Nixon, Henry Kissinger, and George Shultz met to discuss the administration's strategic response to a European proposal for a "common float" of currencies. Kissinger and Shultz expressed concern that European leaders were attempting to force a policy shift without adequate U.S. consultation, using rhetoric about European integration to obscure potential damage to American interests. The President decided to draft firm letters to Willy Brandt and Edward Heath insisting on formal consultation and asserting that European integration should not serve as a substitute for Atlantic cooperation. They also addressed Shultz's upcoming trip to Europe and the Soviet Union, specifically regarding trade authority and the Jackson Amendment.
President Nixon and Henry Kissinger discussed various foreign policy matters, including the successful release of American POWs from Vietnam and the positive reception of Kissinger's recent dinner with China correspondents. They analyzed global monetary instability, agreeing that the U.S. should adopt a firm posture toward European nations regarding currency negotiations while leveraging recent positive developments with Japan. Additionally, they reviewed logistical adjustments to the President's schedule and diplomatic obligations, including a planned visit to the State Department and the rescheduling of a White House diplomatic dinner.