Rush, [David] Kenneth
During the White House taping period, Kenneth Rush first served as the U.S. Ambassador to West Germany, where he was a chief negotiator of the significant Four-Power Agreement on Berlin in 1971. President Nixon then brought him back to Washington, appointing him Deputy Secretary of Defense in February 1972. In February 1973, Rush transitioned again, this time to the role of Deputy Secretary of State, where he remained for the rest of the taping era.
![Rush, [David] Kenneth](/images/persons/david-kenneth-rush.jpg)
President Nixon met with Henry Kissinger and U.S. negotiator Kenneth Rush to review high-stakes foreign policy developments, including progress on secret channels regarding the People's Republic of China and sensitive negotiations over Berlin. The discussion emphasized the need to link various diplomatic issues, such as the Berlin Agreement and Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks, to prevent the Soviets from isolating or dividing Western allies. Nixon directed the team to maintain strategic pressure and prepare for an upcoming meeting with West German Chancellor Willy Brandt, while acknowledging the importance of Rush's role in the ongoing negotiations.
President Nixon met with David Kenneth Rush and Colonel Richard T. Kennedy to discuss appointing Rush as the new Deputy Secretary of Defense. The President emphasized the need for a strong, independent manager who could foster cooperation between Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger while effectively managing the Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG). Additionally, the participants reviewed international policy issues, including West German election prospects and the administration's strategic handling of the India-Pakistan crisis.
President Nixon met with Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Kenneth Rush, and Henry Kissinger to express severe frustration regarding the U.S. military's handling of the North Vietnamese offensive and the poor flow of information from the Department of Defense. Nixon criticized General Creighton W. Abrams for a lack of imagination and aggressive leadership, demanding immediate, intensified use of air power and B-52s regardless of weather conditions. The President asserted his authority as Commander-in-Chief, ordering that all future military reports be provided to him directly and in an unsanitized format to bypass administrative delays.
President Nixon met with H. R. Haldeman and Henry Kissinger to finalize the decision to mine and blockade Haiphong harbor in response to the North Vietnamese offensive. The group debated the risks of the escalation to the upcoming Soviet summit and the potential for a South Vietnamese military collapse, ultimately concluding that the blockade was necessary to maintain American credibility and bargaining leverage. Nixon also reviewed the draft of his televised address announcing the policy and discussed the strategy for briefing Congressional leaders to ensure support for his actions.
Henry Kissinger and Ambassador Kenneth Rush discuss the volatile political situation in West Germany, specifically the intense pressure on Willy Brandt and Rainer Barzel to hold an immediate vote on the Moscow agreement. Kissinger explores the possibility of delaying this vote by one week to facilitate broader diplomatic maneuvering, including a potential presidential message linked to Soviet cooperation regarding the Vietnam blockade. Rush advises against direct American intervention, warning that such a move would be severely misunderstood and damaging to U.S.-German relations during a period of domestic political disarray.
President Nixon and his senior staff, including H.R. Haldeman, met to evaluate the public and political reaction to the President's recent televised speech regarding the mining of North Vietnamese harbors. The discussion focused on maintaining a firm, "hawkish" stance to emphasize the administration's resolve and ensuring that supporters mobilize to counteract potential criticism from Congress and the media. Nixon directed his team to maximize public displays of support and address logistical issues, such as jammed Western Union lines, to ensure his message of "iron determination" remained the dominant narrative.
President Nixon instructed Kenneth Rush to adopt a firm public stance during his upcoming television appearance regarding the U.S. blockade of North Vietnam, explicitly rejecting the softer rhetoric suggested by Secretary of State William Rogers. Nixon emphasized that the administration's policy is to take whatever action is necessary to halt seaborne deliveries while maintaining a commitment to a forthcoming peace offer and POW return. Additionally, the President confirmed that he had aligned Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird with this hawkish strategy and invited Rush to speak at an upcoming administration event.
President Nixon calls Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Rush to commend his recent television performance defending the administration's decision to blockade North Vietnam. The two discuss the administration’s peace proposal, emphasizing the generosity of the offer to withdraw troops in exchange for a cease-fire and the release of American prisoners of war. Nixon dismisses political criticism from the Democrats, asserting that their position is contrary to national interests and that the administration will remain committed to its current strategy.
President Nixon and Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Rush discussed the administration's firm stance on ongoing Vietnam peace negotiations. Nixon praised Rush for his public defense of the administration's policies and reiterated the government's commitment to its recent peace proposal, which offered a full withdrawal of troops within four months in exchange for a ceasefire and the release of American prisoners. The conversation underscored the administration's resolve to remain on course while pressuring North Vietnam to accept the conciliatory terms.
President Nixon met with his Cabinet and key staff to discuss the upcoming departure of Secretary of the Treasury John B. Connally and to address broader administration matters. The discussion covered the timing of administrative changes, the transition of economic policy responsibilities to George Shultz, and the status of ongoing federal investigations following the recent shooting of George C. Wallace. Connally reflected on his tenure as Treasury Secretary and his future plans, while the President reaffirmed his commitment to his current economic program and leadership agenda.
President Nixon hosted General William C. Westmoreland, his family, and various military officials in the Oval Office to formally recognize the General’s service. The primary purpose of the meeting was the presentation of the Distinguished Service Medal to Westmoreland. Nixon expressed his appreciation for the General's contributions before the group concluded the visit with a tour of the White House.
President Nixon met with the Council on International Economic Policy and senior advisors to discuss U.S. trade relations with an expanding European Community. The group debated four strategic options ranging from maintaining the status quo to aggressive confrontation, with the President ultimately directing that the administration maintain a firm, "tough" stance while avoiding specific, provocative threats until after the upcoming election. Nixon emphasized that trade policy should not be viewed in isolation but as a component of a broader strategy concerning global power balances and U.S. national security commitments in Europe.
President Nixon met with his senior military and national security leadership, including Henry Kissinger, Melvin Laird, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to align the administration on the status and defense of pending Vietnam peace negotiations. The discussion focused on the current terms of the settlement agreement, the importance of maintaining public and congressional support, and the necessity of contingency planning should North Vietnam violate the terms. Nixon emphasized that the agreement was the best obtainable outcome and instructed his team to present a unified, positive front while preparing for potential retaliatory actions if the cease-fire collapsed.
President Nixon directed Ambassador Kenneth Rush to investigate Gordon Wade Rule, the Director of the Procurement Control and Clearance Division, following the publication of an article by Rule that the President perceived as insubordinate. Nixon demanded an immediate explanation for the piece or for Rule to be removed from his position. Rush was instructed to report back to the President within thirty minutes regarding the status of the official.
President Nixon and Deputy Secretary of Defense Kenneth Rush discuss the administrative removal of Gordon Wade Rule, a career civil servant suspected of long-term insubordination. Because Rule holds civil service protections that prevent immediate termination, the President authorizes Rush to strip him of all official responsibilities and initiate formal disciplinary charges. The conversation underscores the administration's determination to discipline Rule despite his established influence among congressional allies.
President Nixon consulted with Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Rush to confirm preparations for an upcoming policy announcement. The conversation focused on ensuring the administration remained on track regarding the cessation of U.S. bombing north of the 20th parallel in Vietnam. Rush expressed support for the decision, confirming that their strategic course of action was settled and ready for implementation.
President Nixon consulted with Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Rush to coordinate efforts and ensure organizational readiness for upcoming events, likely related to ongoing diplomatic negotiations. Nixon affirmed his support for the administration's strategic path despite anticipated media scrutiny, emphasizing the necessity of resolving the situation decisively. The discussion served as a final check to ensure all parties were aligned before critical developments occurred the following day.
President Nixon met with members of the National Security Council and other senior officials to discuss the strategic balance of power between the U.S. and the USSR, specifically in anticipation of the SALT II negotiations. The discussion focused on the impact of qualitative and quantitative disparities in throw-weight, bombers, and MIRV technology on U.S. and Soviet first- and second-strike capabilities. Nixon emphasized the importance of maintaining an appearance of strategic equivalence to preserve the confidence of U.S. allies and domestic support, directing his team to refine their negotiating strategy without rushing into a premature moratorium on weapons testing.
President Nixon and members of the National Security Council met to discuss the strategic importance of Mutual Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) amidst growing congressional pressure for unilateral U.S. troop cuts. The discussion focused on maintaining a credible conventional defense posture in Europe to avoid a reliance on "tripwire" nuclear escalation, which Nixon and his advisors agreed would be untenable given the current parity in nuclear capabilities between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Participants ultimately reached a consensus to pursue negotiations that link force improvements with potential reductions while resisting domestic isolationist trends and preserving NATO's operational cohesion.
President Nixon met with his Vice President, Cabinet members, and senior staff to receive departmental updates and reinforce the administration's policy goals. The discussion spanned a wide array of topics, including minority recruitment, the status of the Watergate special prosecutor search, energy policy, and the administration's foreign policy record. Nixon emphasized the importance of maintaining a strong national defense and a unified front against political challenges while encouraging his team to continue their work with confidence.
President Nixon and Vice President Agnew met with the Cabinet and senior staff to discuss major foreign and domestic policy priorities and internal administration management. The discussion centered on upcoming diplomatic summits with Leonid Brezhnev and Georges Pompidou, negotiations with North Vietnam regarding the ceasefire, and economic challenges including inflation and energy policy. Additionally, General Alexander Haig briefed the Cabinet on the administration's efforts to stabilize internal governance, improve relations with Congress, and manage the ongoing political fallout from the Watergate scandal.
President Nixon met with his Vice President, Cabinet members, and senior staff to announce the implementation of a 60-day price freeze as part of a strategy to combat inflation. He explained that this measure, aimed at stabilizing food and gasoline prices, was a necessary pragmatic step to preempt more extreme, mandatory controls favored by Congress. Nixon emphasized his commitment to maintaining a free-market economy and tasked his Cabinet with actively promoting this policy to the public and opinion makers. He also highlighted the administration's broader accomplishments in foreign policy, including the end of the draft and the upcoming U.S.-Soviet summit.