Richard M. Nixon
Richard M. Nixon served as the 37th President of the United States from January 1969 until his resignation in August 1974. In February 1971, he ordered the installation of a secret voice-activated taping system in the White House to preserve a historical record of his administration. Until the system's existence was revealed and dismantled in July 1973, the tapes captured Nixon directing major foreign policy initiatives, such as the opening to China, as well as his central role in the Watergate cover-up.
What Nixon talks about on the tapes
White House operations 4,654Presidential scheduling 4,037Presidential communication 2,299Public relations 1,746Vietnam War 1,719Logistics 1,631Manolo Sanchez 1,592White House communications 1,427White House administration 1,358Henry Kissinger 1,313Foreign Policy 1,160Camp David 1,101
Conversations (21,010)
— Page 103 of 211President Nixon met with an unidentified individual in the Old Executive Office Building to record and deliver dictation intended for his personal secretary, Rose Mary Woods. The conversation served as a logistical session for the processing of administrative or presidential materials. No further details regarding the substance of the dictated content are available.
On May 10, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon and Rose Mary Woods met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 1:05 pm and 3:35 pm. The Old Executive Office Building taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 337-022 of the White House Tapes.
President Nixon dictated a memorandum for Henry Kissinger expressing his dissatisfaction with the CIA's psychological warfare and propaganda efforts. He directed the CIA to urgently develop and implement new programs, including broadcasts and leaflets, targeting the Hanoi area. The proposed propaganda would emphasize North Vietnam's isolation due to international shipping blockades and aim to instill terror in the North Vietnamese population. Additionally, Nixon instructed that domestic South Vietnamese propaganda should focus on boosting morale by highlighting successful military actions and addressing existing morale issues.
President Nixon and Rose Mary Woods discussed administrative logistics, including the distribution of commemorative gifts from recent events, and reflected on his recent Duke Law School reunion. The conversation transitioned into a review of domestic and international reaction to Nixon's speech regarding the blockade and mining of North Vietnam, noting high public approval ratings. The two also exchanged views on the erosion of American social institutions, the mistreatment of Vietnam veterans, and the perceived influence of left-wing ideology in American schools.
On May 10, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 3:55 pm and 3:59 pm. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 024-066 of the White House Tapes.
President Nixon dictates a memorandum concerning various administrative and political matters, including a legal plea involving an individual named Jackson in North Carolina and correspondence regarding Marilyn Phillips. The discussion also touches upon concerns regarding FBI appropriations and broader sociocultural critiques of religious institutions and their perceived lack of patriotism. The brief session focuses on capturing specific directives and recollections for future follow-up.
President Nixon consults with the White House operator to discuss political developments regarding Senator Hollis and the Democratic caucus. The conversation focuses on the Senator's surprise decision to publicly oppose the Democratic caucus vote, which Nixon views as a significant and positive political development. The exchange reflects Nixon's interest in tracking legislative dissent and internal party dynamics.
President Nixon and Charles Colson discuss the positive performance of Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird during a recent televised press conference regarding the Vietnam War. Impressed by Laird’s intensity and effectiveness, the President directs Colson to coordinate a follow-up meeting with H. R. Haldeman. The brief call serves to facilitate immediate staff consultation on how to leverage the momentum from the press conference.
President Nixon and Charles Colson discuss an unidentified public statement or legal case that they both believe has been handled effectively. The conversation focuses on the strategic merits of this development and brief commentary on the political implications of recent diplomatic maneuvers involving China. No specific policy decisions were reached, as the brief exchange primarily centers on evaluating the public relations value of current events.
President Nixon met with his senior advisors and staff to strategize on managing public opinion and political messaging following his recent decision to blockade and mine North Vietnamese ports. The discussion centered on utilizing favorable polling data, countering media criticism, and coordinating consistent rhetoric among administration officials and Republican allies. Nixon also made key decisions to restrict access to government facilities like the Sequoia and Camp David, while rejecting a proposal to meet with liberal Republican senators to avoid being put in a politically compromising position.
President Nixon and H. R. Haldeman met to review the public reception of the administration's recent decision to blockade North Vietnam and to discuss the political implications for the upcoming election. They examined a large volume of telegrams and correspondence from diverse supporters, including veterans, religious groups, and business organizations, as evidence of strong public approval. Additionally, the pair engaged in personal reflections on the President's disciplined lifestyle compared to his predecessors and reviewed potential candidates for Supreme Court appointments.
President Nixon met with an unknown individual to discuss the aftermath of the attempted assassination of George Wallace. The participants exchanged commentary on Wallace’s controversial rhetoric, debating the extent to which his political style incited hostility. Additionally, the conversation briefly touched upon Senator Jacob Javits and the political skill of John Connally.
President Nixon and Henry Kissinger met briefly to coordinate logistical arrangements for an upcoming visit from a Soviet trade delegation. They specifically discussed the seating protocol and the intended duration for the President's meeting with the representatives. This discussion ensured that official interactions with the Soviet officials were properly structured before the delegation's arrival.
President Nixon met with his aide Stephen B. Bull to coordinate administrative logistics regarding a scheduled telephone call with Alexander M. Haig Jr. The brief discussion centered on the timing and specific purpose of the upcoming conversation with Haig. No further policy developments or major decisions were recorded during this short briefing.
President Nixon and Press Secretary Ronald L. Ziegler met briefly to coordinate logistics regarding an upcoming meeting with a Soviet trade delegation. The discussion focused on managing the public perception of the event, specifically addressing the size of the delegation and the arrangements for official press photography. The brief exchange served to finalize Ziegler's role and presence during the delegation's visit to the White House.
President Nixon met with his aide Stephen B. Bull to coordinate the presentation of gifts to Soviet representatives. The discussion focused on the selection of cuff links and the logistical scheduling for the gift-giving ceremony. This brief consultation ensured that the appropriate items were prepared for upcoming diplomatic interactions.
President Nixon met with Soviet Minister of Foreign Trade Nikolai Patolichev, Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin, and senior U.S. officials to discuss the expansion of U.S.-Soviet economic and trade relations ahead of the upcoming Moscow summit. Patolichev outlined Soviet interest in obtaining credit for large-scale projects and Most Favored Nation (MFN) status, while Nixon emphasized his desire to transcend specific technical hurdles to establish a historic, long-term economic partnership between the two superpowers. The meeting served to reaffirm high-level commitments to future cooperation, with Nixon signaling his willingness to use his executive authority to reach significant agreements with General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev.
President Nixon met with Alexander P. Butterfield to debrief on a recent meeting, specifically inquiring whether any significant issues were addressed. Butterfield characterized the interaction as a routine business courtesy call rather than a high-stakes negotiation. Despite the informal nature of the exchange, he confirmed that they discussed substantive matters involving trade relations, including agricultural and industrial products.
President Nixon, Henry Kissinger, and Ronald Ziegler met to discuss the political fallout and public messaging strategy following Nixon's decision to mine North Vietnamese harbors. The group analyzed the unexpectedly mild reactions from the Soviet Union and China, concluding that a Soviet summit remains highly likely despite the escalating conflict. Nixon and Kissinger also reviewed military operations in South Vietnam, with the President proposing the strategic use of tank deployments based on his study of World War I tactics.
President Nixon met briefly with an unidentified individual to coordinate logistical arrangements regarding his schedule at the Executive Office Building. The discussion focused on the necessity of managing time for transition between locations. This brief interaction concluded quickly as the President departed the Oval Office.
On May 11, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 11:22 am and 11:32 am. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 024-071 of the White House Tapes.
On May 11, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 11:22 am and 11:32 am. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 024-072 of the White House Tapes.
On May 11, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 11:22 am and 11:32 am. The Old Executive Office Building taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 338-037 of the White House Tapes.
On May 11, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon and Charles W. Colson talked on the telephone from 11:32 am to 11:33 am. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 024-073 of the White House Tapes.
President Richard Nixon met with Special Counsel Charles Colson in the Old Executive Office Building for a brief discussion. Due to the lack of a transcript for this minute-long engagement, the specific substance of their exchange remains unrecorded. Consequently, no definitive policy decisions or developments can be attributed to this particular meeting.
President Nixon held a brief, informal telephone conversation with his daughter, Tricia Nixon Cox. The exchange served as a personal check-in between the President and his family member. No official policy matters or significant administrative decisions were recorded during this brief interaction.
President Nixon and his daughter, Tricia Nixon Cox, engage in a brief, informal exchange regarding their schedules and upcoming plans. The President encourages Tricia to remain at her current engagement rather than rushing, before suggesting a meeting later at a school with her husband, Edward Cox. No significant policy or political matters are addressed during this short personal interaction.
President Nixon and H. R. Haldeman met to review the President’s daily schedule, specifically discussing an upcoming breakfast meeting with Wilbur D. Mills and a session with Soviet Minister of Foreign Trade Nikolai S. Patolichev. The conversation included a reference to former President Harry S. Truman in the context of the meeting with Mills. No further substantive policy decisions or developments were recorded during this brief administrative exchange.
On May 11, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 11:43 am and 11:49 am. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 024-075 of the White House Tapes.
President Nixon met with H.R. Haldeman and Charles Colson to discuss strategies for bolstering public and congressional support for the recent escalation of the Vietnam War, specifically the blockade. The participants reviewed favorable polling data and analyzed the effectiveness of media messaging and public relations efforts led by allies like Senators Hugh Scott and Robert Griffin. The discussion focused on framing the blockade as a necessary, rational move and discrediting Democratic critics and anti-war protesters as being out of step with the American public.
President Nixon and Senate Minority Leader Hugh Scott discuss recent public support for the administration's Vietnam policy, specifically focusing on the favorable response to Nixon’s blockade decision as evidenced by Erie County poll results. Scott praises the President's recent rhetoric and language, leading Nixon to request that Scott share his colorful phrasing directly with Chuck Colson for use in future White House communications. Both parties agree on the strategic importance of using favorable polling data to bolster their public position.
On May 11, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 11:51 am and 11:56 am. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 024-077 of the White House Tapes.
President Nixon called Senator Robert P. Griffin to commend him for his public support of the administration's Vietnam blockade policy. The two discussed Griffin’s recent confrontational exchange with Senator Frank Church on the Senate floor regarding shifting Democratic positions on cease-fire proposals. Nixon reaffirmed his confidence that the blockade strategy would succeed and encouraged Griffin to maintain pressure on political opponents.
President Nixon, Henry Kissinger, and H.R. Haldeman met to coordinate strategy regarding the escalation of the Vietnam War and the upcoming Soviet Summit. The discussion focused on the effectiveness of recent U.S. air strikes against North Vietnamese infrastructure, the ongoing blockade of Haiphong Harbor, and the potential impact of these actions on relations with the Soviet Union. The participants decided to restrict public statements from Secretary of State William P. Rogers to avoid undermining the President's peace offer or creating diplomatic confusion as the administration prepared for the Moscow summit.
President Nixon met with an unknown individual to briefly discuss his upcoming schedule and logistical arrangements regarding a visit with his longtime valet, Manolo Sanchez. The conversation centered on the President's personal movements and the coordination of his car transport. No significant policy decisions were recorded during this brief administrative exchange.
President Nixon met with an unknown individual to discuss adjustments to his official schedule, specifically regarding a planned visit with his valet, Manolo Sanchez. The brief exchange reflects the President’s intent to manage his time and personal interactions while coordinating daily logistical arrangements. No major policy decisions were reached during this short administrative consultation.
President Nixon met with an unidentified individual to discuss a diplomatic communication received from the West German government. The conversation focuses on an analysis of a response from Egon Bahr, described as mild in tone and notably silent regarding the upcoming summit. The participants assess the implications of the German feedback, which appears to express subtle dissatisfaction with recent decisions without escalating tensions.
President Nixon and Henry Kissinger met to evaluate the Soviet Union's moderate response to the U.S. naval blockade and mining of North Vietnamese ports. They discussed managing diplomatic communications regarding the upcoming Moscow summit, specifically ensuring that Soviet interests and the German Treaty were handled without jeopardizing the President's scheduled visit. Kissinger provided updates on his recent interactions with Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin, and the two agreed to keep the State Department and Secretary of State William P. Rogers largely uninformed of these sensitive negotiations to maintain control over the administration's Vietnam policy.
President Nixon met with his aide Stephen B. Bull to coordinate the scheduling of his upcoming appointments. The discussion focused on finalizing the timing for meetings with Secretary of State William P. Rogers and National Security Advisor Henry A. Kissinger. They also addressed the logistics for the President's departure via helicopter to Camp David, where he was scheduled to be joined by Charles G. "Bebe" Rebozo.
President Nixon and H. R. Haldeman met to discuss legislative strategy regarding Vietnam, specifically addressing potential Congressional resolutions on funding cutoffs. They debated the merits of adopting a "sense of Congress" resolution to preempt more restrictive amendments and explored ways to manage public and Congressional support for the administration's policies. Additionally, the President decided to postpone a meeting with POW wives to ensure it served as an effective public relations event, while also dismissing concerns about current anti-war demonstrations as largely confined to radical students rather than the broader public.
On May 11, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at 3:39 pm. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 024-079 of the White House Tapes.
President Richard Nixon and First Lady Pat Nixon engaged in a brief telephone conversation. The exchange consisted of personal matters that were subsequently identified as returnable and withdrawn from the public record. No substantive policy discussions or administrative actions occurred during this brief interaction.
President Richard Nixon and First Lady Pat Nixon held a brief meeting in the Oval Office to discuss personal matters. The conversation appears to be a casual check-in regarding the activities and events of the preceding month. No significant policy decisions or official government actions were recorded during this short exchange.
President Nixon initiates a brief administrative interaction with the White House operator to place an outgoing telephone call. The conversation serves a purely functional purpose to facilitate official communication. No substantive policy matters or strategic developments are discussed during this brief exchange.
President Nixon met with Alexander P. Butterfield to coordinate logistics for an upcoming trip to Camp David. The discussion centered on arranging secretarial services and establishing standby procedures for the visit. Butterfield confirmed that the necessary personnel would be prepared for the trip.
President Nixon met with Rose Mary Woods and Stephen B. Bull to discuss administrative arrangements for his upcoming schedule and receive updates on staff matters, including the recovery of Manolo Sanchez. The discussion included a review of positive public and personal feedback regarding the President's recent television address concerning the Vietnam blockade. Additionally, the President addressed potential implications for the Soviet Summit and coordinated logistics for an upcoming meeting with Secretary of State William P. Rogers.
President Nixon met with William Rogers, Henry Kissinger, and H. R. Haldeman to discuss the administration's strategic posture regarding the Vietnam War, the upcoming Soviet Summit, and managing congressional relations. Amidst concerns over potential leaks and the risk of the Soviets canceling the summit, the President emphasized the importance of maintaining a firm, low-key public stance to maximize pressure on North Vietnam. The group also evaluated the political risks associated with congressional attempts to limit presidential war powers and reviewed the ongoing naval and military operations, including B-52 strikes.
President Nixon met with Stephen B. Bull and Alexander P. Butterfield to finalize logistics for several upcoming events, including a meeting with John Cardinal Krol and a large reception in the Blue Room. Discussions focused on scheduling the Cardinal’s visit aboard the Sequoia and coordinating protocol for the reception, specifically the introductions of guests and the flow of the receiving line. Nixon emphasized the need for efficient crowd management and clear identification of attendees to streamline the social proceedings.
President Nixon met with John B. Connally and Stephen B. Bull to discuss the transition of the Treasury Secretary position from Connally to George P. Shultz, including plans for an upcoming cabinet announcement. The conversation also covered international affairs, specifically the blockade of North Vietnam and negotiations with the Soviet Union, as well as the President’s desire for tighter controls on the political and professional appointments of Jewish individuals within his administration. Additionally, Nixon and Connally explored future post-resignation roles for Connally, including diplomatic missions to Latin America and an appointment to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB).
President Nixon met with George Shultz and later John Connally to finalize Shultz's appointment as the new Secretary of the Treasury, replacing the outgoing Connally. The discussion covered the upcoming formal announcement and cabinet meeting, the transition of responsibilities, and the need for a firm economic strategy regarding the budget and international monetary policy. Additionally, they reviewed potential leadership changes, specifically the appointment of Caspar Weinberger to head the Office of Management and Budget, while briefly noting the continued domestic support for the President’s Vietnam War policies.
On May 15, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 4:00 pm and 5:10 pm. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 024-081 of the White House Tapes.
President Nixon met with Donald Kendall and Peter Flanigan to coordinate strategy for upcoming trade negotiations with the Soviet Union, specifically regarding the Pepsi-Vodka agreement and Most Favored Nation (MFN) status. The participants emphasized the importance of maintaining high-level control over economic diplomacy to prevent lower-level bureaucratic gridlock and discussed leveraging credit offers to secure long-term grain commitments. Additionally, Nixon and Kendall exchanged frustrations regarding the lack of political support from the business establishment, contrasting it with the perceived necessity of building a new, more reliable coalition.
President Nixon met with George Shultz, Caspar Weinberger, and H.R. Haldeman to discuss the immediate aftermath of the attempted assassination of George Wallace and to formalize upcoming cabinet shifts. The group reviewed the details of the shooting and coordinated the administration's public response and schedule. Additionally, Nixon confirmed the appointment of George Shultz as Secretary of the Treasury and Caspar Weinberger as Director of the Office of Management and Budget, emphasizing the necessity of a stringent fiscal policy and budget control.
On May 15, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 5:06 pm and 5:10 pm. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 024-082 of the White House Tapes.
President Nixon met with Alexander P. Butterfield to receive an urgent update regarding the assassination attempt on Governor George Wallace, including details about the assailant, the victims, and the severity of Wallace’s injuries. Following this, the President consulted with H. R. Haldeman and First Lady Pat Nixon to assess how to handle a scheduled Blue Room reception in light of the national tragedy. They ultimately decided to restrict press access to the event to avoid optics that would appear inappropriate given the gravity of the shooting.
On May 15, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator met in the Oval Office of the White House at 5:06 pm. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 724-010 of the White House Tapes.
President Nixon and First Lady Pat Nixon discussed the appropriateness of holding a scheduled Blue Room reception following the attempted assassination of George Wallace. Concerned that appearing in a festive public setting while the nation was in crisis would be insensitive, the couple weighed options including cancellation or excluding the press. They ultimately reached a tentative plan for the First Lady to host the event alongside curator Clement Conger while excluding media coverage to maintain decorum.
President Nixon met with his aide, Stephen B. Bull, in the Oval Office to address administrative matters regarding the executive schedule. The primary focus of the discussion concerned the President's upcoming meeting with Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman. No substantive policy decisions were recorded during this brief administrative briefing.
On May 15, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon, White House operator, and H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 5:16 pm and 5:21 pm. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 024-084 of the White House Tapes.
Following the assassination attempt on Governor George Wallace, President Nixon and John Connally discussed the political fallout and the immediate need to provide enhanced Secret Service protection to other presidential candidates, specifically Senator Edward M. Kennedy and Representative Shirley Chisholm. The participants deliberated on how to frame these security measures publicly while bypassing legal obstacles that previously barred the Secret Service from covering non-candidates. During the discussion, Connally recounted his personal experience surviving the John F. Kennedy assassination, providing a grim context for the ongoing concern over the safety of political figures.
President Nixon and First Lady Pat Nixon consult on whether the President should attend a scheduled Blue Room reception following the shooting of presidential candidate George C. Wallace. Concerned that a jovial appearance would be inappropriate given the somber political climate and historical parallels to the Kennedy assassinations, the couple discusses alternative options, including having a surrogate read remarks or making a brief, solemn appearance. The President concludes the call without a final decision, opting to confer with H. R. Haldeman before committing to a course of action.
President Nixon, H.R. Haldeman, John Connally, and Eugene Rossides discussed the immediate expansion of Secret Service protection for presidential candidates following the assassination attempt on George Wallace. The group specifically evaluated the security needs of Edward M. Kennedy and Shirley Chisholm, while dismissing candidates deemed inactive. Nixon ordered that protection details be prepared for both Kennedy and Chisholm, pending further investigation into the status of other potential candidates.
President Nixon called Cornelia Wallace to express his concern and offer prayers following the assassination attempt on her husband, George Wallace. Mrs. Wallace provided an update on the Governor's condition, noting the presence of a bullet near his spine and ongoing medical complications involving his liver. The President offered encouragement by comparing the resilience of politicians to Theodore Roosevelt's experience after being shot, emphasizing George Wallace's reputation as a fighter.
Following the assassination attempt on Governor George Wallace, President Nixon and John Connally directed Treasury official Eugene Rossides to immediately assign Secret Service protection to various presidential candidates. Connally coordinated the dispatch of agents to Edward Kennedy and Shirley Chisholm, while also instructing Rossides to provide a reduced security detail for other candidates like Wilbur Mills and Patsy Mink. The participants further discussed the status of other candidates' travel plans and the logistics for releasing official statements regarding these expanded protective measures.
President Nixon, H. R. Haldeman, Charles Colson, and other staff members met to discuss the immediate aftermath and implications of the assassination attempt on Governor George Wallace. The President expressed intense frustration with the lack of information and the perceived incompetence of the Secret Service, repeatedly ordering his staff to bypass them and mobilize the FBI to take control of the investigation. Nixon specifically emphasized the need to determine the assailant's identity and political motivations—particularly any potential ties to anti-Vietnam War sentiments—to prevent media speculation or a repeat of the perceived failures following the John F. Kennedy assassination.
Hours after George Wallace was shot, President Nixon, H.R. Haldeman, and Charles Colson spoke with Secret Service Director James Rowley via telephone. The primary focus was the identification of the gunman, Arthur Bremer, and his background, with an immediate concern about whether he would be perceived as a "left-wing nut" or a right-wing one. Nixon and Colson also briefly discussed the positive reception of Nixon's Vietnam policy and the upcoming Moscow trip, contrasting it with negative press coverage. An action item was for Rowley to provide detailed information on Bremer to the White House before the press released it.
President Nixon, H.R. Haldeman, and Charles Colson discuss the investigation into the shooting of George Wallace, focusing on jurisdictional authority to involve the FBI. Nixon expresses a deep distrust of the Secret Service and directs that the FBI be ordered to take the lead in the investigation based on the federal nature of the victims. The participants explore legal justifications for this federal oversight, specifically citing the status of the officials targeted in the attack.
On May 15, 1972, H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman, White House operator, Charles W. Colson, and President Richard M. Nixon talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 6:45 pm and 7:07 pm. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 024-098 of the White House Tapes.
On May 15, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at 7:07 pm. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 024-099 of the White House Tapes.
Secret Service official Thomas J. Kelley briefs H. R. Haldeman and President Nixon on the identification of Arthur Herman Bremer as the suspect in the assassination attempt on Governor George Wallace. Kelley details Bremer’s background, including his purchase of the weapon and prior arrest record, while confirming that no other conspirators are currently suspected. The participants discuss security measures to ensure the suspect’s safety while in custody at the hospital to prevent a situation similar to the murder of Lee Harvey Oswald by Jack Ruby.
President Nixon, H.R. Haldeman, Richard Kleindienst, and Charles Colson discussed the aftermath of the attack on George Wallace. Kleindienst reported that three individuals were in custody, charges were filed under a Civil Rights Statute, and FBI agents were assigned to ensure the seclusion of the assailants to prevent any premature press contact. Haldeman emphasized the importance of managing the press to avoid perceptions of a cover-up, drawing a parallel to the Kennedy assassinations.
President Nixon, John Ehrlichman, and H.R. Haldeman discussed the handling of the investigation into the assassination attempt on George Wallace. Nixon expressed frustration with the slow pace and lack of information, ordering Ehrlichman to take immediate control and ensure the assailant was interrogated and protected, drawing a parallel to the perceived mishandling of the John F. Kennedy assassination investigation. Ehrlichman assured the President that W. Mark Felt was personally responsible for the assailant's safety and interrogation, with regular progress reports to be provided.
Charles Colson requested John Ehrlichman through the White House operator, but was informed that President Nixon was already on the phone with H. R. Haldeman. The operator advised Colson to wait as Ehrlichman was on an outside line and might be disconnected. Colson then stated he would have Ehrlichman call back.
President Nixon, H.R. Haldeman, and Charles Colson received an update from W. Mark Felt regarding the investigation into the attack on George C. Wallace. Felt confirmed the assailant was Arthur Bremer, provided details about his background and the weapon used, and assured Colson that the FBI was taking full responsibility for Bremer's safety and the investigation, including questioning him as soon as medically possible. Colson relayed rumors about potential Kennedy connections and anti-war radicalism, urging Felt to ensure these avenues were explored during the interrogation.
On May 15, 1972, Charles W. Colson, White House operator, President Richard M. Nixon, and Kenneth W. Clawson talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 7:42 pm and 7:57 pm. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 024-111 of the White House Tapes.
Following the assassination attempt on Governor George Wallace, President Nixon and his aides, including H. R. Haldeman and Charles Colson, discussed strategies to manipulate public perception of the assailant's political affiliations. They explicitly directed staff to leak a story portraying the gunman as a supporter of Democratic candidates George McGovern and Edward Kennedy to associate the act with the political left. Additionally, the President reviewed the security implications for his own public appearances and coordinated with John Connally regarding future travel assignments.
On May 15, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 7:59 pm and 8:02 pm. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 024-114 of the White House Tapes.
President Nixon spoke with John and Nellie Connally by phone, discussing the success of a Blue Room reception and Mrs. Nixon's role. The President informed Nellie Connally of plans to send her and John on a trip to Colombia, Brazil, and Argentina after the Moscow Summit to report on its outcomes and strengthen relations, addressing Nellie's security concerns. John Connally also reported on the attack on George Wallace and agreed to call the President if any issues arose.
President Nixon met with Nellie L. Yates and briefly conferred with FBI Associate Director W. Mark Felt following the attempted assassination of Governor George Wallace. The conversation centered on the implications of the shooting, with Nixon drawing historical parallels to the assassinations of Robert F. Kennedy and the wounding of John B. Connally. Nixon emphasized the need for a thorough FBI investigation to avoid the controversies associated with previous high-profile political shootings.
President Nixon spoke with W. Mark Felt regarding the investigation into the assassination attempt on George C. Wallace. Felt reported that the assailant, Arthur H. Bremer, was physically stable but disturbed and required constant observation. The FBI had searched Bremer's apartment, finding writings that suggested mental instability, including titles like "How to Become Notable." Nixon emphasized the need for thorough follow-up to avoid criticism similar to that following the Kennedy assassination and noted Bremer's prior arrest for carrying a concealed weapon. Felt assured the President that the FBI was fully responsible for the investigation and would ensure no slip-ups.
On May 15, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 8:18 pm and 9:16 pm. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 024-117 of the White House Tapes.
On May 15, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 8:18 pm and 9:16 pm. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 024-118 of the White House Tapes.
On May 15, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 8:18 pm and 9:16 pm. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 024-119 of the White House Tapes.
On May 15, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 8:18 pm and 9:16 pm. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 024-120 of the White House Tapes.
President Nixon initiates a brief interaction with the White House operator to facilitate a telephonic communication. This contact serves as a logistical administrative step to connect the President with another party for further discussion. No substantive policy matters or major decisions were recorded during this brief exchange.
President Nixon held a brief, unsuccessful attempt to place a telephone call through the White House operator. The interaction ended quickly without the President successfully reaching the intended party. No substantive policy matters or administrative decisions were documented during this short exchange.
President Nixon held a brief, procedural exchange with the White House operator to facilitate an outgoing communication. The interaction focused on the logistics of placing a telephone call through the White House switchboard. No substantive policy discussions or significant political developments occurred during this brief administrative contact.
President Nixon held a brief, unscheduled interaction with a White House operator while working in the Old Executive Office Building. Although the specific substance of the exchange remains unrecorded, the interaction reflects the routine administrative communication required to manage telephonic operations during the President's evening hours. No substantive policy decisions or historical actions are documented as a result of this connection.
President Nixon and First Lady Pat Nixon discussed the aftermath of the attempted assassination of George Wallace, specifically reviewing his medical condition and the political ramifications regarding public sentiment. They also coordinated their respective roles and attendance for an upcoming Blue Room reception, including the specific inclusion of Janet Neff. The conversation highlights the personal stress of the political climate and the logistical challenges of maintaining official appearances following the shooting.
President Nixon and First Lady Pat Nixon briefly discussed their immediate schedule and logistical arrangements during a short late-evening meeting. The President inquired about the First Lady's recent activities and potential media engagements, while coordinating plans related to a planned visit to a grave site. The exchange focused primarily on organizing their respective movements for the remainder of the evening.
On May 15, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 9:19 pm and 9:23 pm. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 024-122 of the White House Tapes.
On May 15, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 9:19 pm and 9:23 pm. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 024-123 of the White House Tapes.
President Nixon consulted with a White House operator to confirm the successful completion and mutual understanding of a previous communication. The brief exchange served as a follow-up to ensure that the intended message had been clearly conveyed to the recipient. No further actions were required, as both parties expressed satisfaction that the matter had been handled effectively.
President Nixon held a brief, unscheduled meeting with a White House operator in his Old Executive Office Building workspace. The interaction appears to be a routine administrative exchange, as no substantive policy or political discussions were recorded. The meeting serves primarily as a record of the President's immediate access to telecommunications support staff during late-evening hours.
President Nixon and Charles Colson discussed the investigation into the attack on George Wallace, with Nixon emphasizing the need for careful handling to avoid the mistakes made in the Kennedy assassination investigation. Colson reported that he had gained FBI control over the investigation, which had initially been hampered by the Secret Service, and detailed information about the attacker, Arthur Bremer, including his past arrests and mental state. They also touched upon potential political leanings of Bremer and the timing of a presidential visit to Wallace.
President Nixon and Charles Colson briefly discussed the aftermath of the attempted assassination of Governor George Wallace, which had occurred earlier that same day. They exchanged remarks regarding the governor's medical condition and physical injuries, as well as the initial response to the incident. No major policy decisions were made during this short, informal check-in regarding the shooting.
President Nixon and John Ehrlichman discussed the arraignment and custody of Arthur H. Bremer, the assailant of George C. Wallace, with Ehrlichman relaying FBI Director Felt's reports on Bremer's mental state, refusal to speak without an attorney, and the FBI's security measures. Nixon emphasized his desire for close control over the investigation, drawing a parallel to the "badly handled" John F. Kennedy assassination investigation, and instructed Ehrlichman to ensure the press is aware he is monitoring the situation, while also pushing for the swift appointment of an attorney for Bremer.
President Nixon and John Ehrlichman briefly discuss concerns regarding the absence of a formal list and the political activities of Hubert Humphrey and a figure identified as McGarrett. The exchange highlights the President's unease regarding these developments and his subsequent decision to refrain from contacting an unspecified individual. The brief meeting serves to monitor ongoing political monitoring efforts and potential outreach strategies.
President Nixon and Henry Kissinger discussed the aftermath of the assassination attempt on George Wallace, including the investigation into the perpetrator and the decision to provide protection for other political figures like John Connally, Edward Kennedy, and Shirley Chisholm. They also reviewed the status of ongoing negotiations with the Soviet Union regarding the upcoming summit, SALT, and a recent spy case, as well as the military situation in Vietnam and plans for Kissinger's meeting with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin.
President Nixon and Henry Kissinger discuss the security assessment and handling of the individual responsible for the attempted assassination of Governor George Wallace, who had occurred earlier that day. Nixon expresses concern regarding the potential for leaks and mismanagement, explicitly instructing Kissinger to withhold related information from Secretary of State William Rogers. The conversation focuses on ensuring the matter is handled securely and that the assailant’s radical background is contained without triggering the public scrutiny experienced during previous political assassinations.