Nixon White House Tapes › Topic
Nixon Tapes on State Department
111 conversations · page 1 of 2 · frequently with Nixon, Kissinger, Bull, Haldeman
When State Department comes up
Related topics: William P. RogersForeign PolicyHenry KissingerPresidential communicationWhite House operationsPublic relationsDiplomacyPresidential schedulingVietnam WarSecond term reorganizationPersonnel managementForeign AidEconomic policyPeople's Republic of China
President Nixon met with H.R. Haldeman and various staff members, including Peter Flanigan, Henry Kissinger, and John Ehrlichman, to deliberate on high-level personnel appointments, government reorganization, and legislative strategy. A primary focus was identifying a strong, business-oriented candidate for an ambassadorial role to navigate international economic negotiations and counter State Department bureaucracy. The group also discussed managing the President’s public image regarding economic policy, the Alaska pipeline, and Vietnam, while addressing the need to discipline administration officials who publicly diverged from official policy. The President emphasized a preference for direct, high-level policy control and instructed his staff to bolster communication efforts and strengthen the administration’s political messaging.
On February 22, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 1:37 pm and 1:43 pm. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 455-017 of the White House Tapes.
President Nixon met with his task force leaders and advisors to discuss the legislative strategy for the Task Force on International Development proposals and the challenges of securing Congressional support. Key participants included Rudolph Peterson, Peter Peterson, Clark MacGregor, and Henry Kissinger, who debated the jurisdictional split of foreign assistance programs between the State and Defense Departments. The group emphasized the need to integrate foreign aid with broader U.S. economic and trade policies, and Nixon tasked MacGregor with coordinating closely with Congressional leadership to ensure the proposals moved forward without significant delays.
On March 2, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator met in the Oval Office of the White House at 11:59 am. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 461-007 of the White House Tapes.
President Nixon and H. R. Haldeman met to coordinate upcoming staff meetings regarding domestic and foreign economic policy involving Henry Kissinger, Peter Peterson, and John Ehrlichman. Nixon also collaborated with staff members Marjorie P. Acker and Rose Mary Woods to finalize a personal letter addressed to British Prime Minister Edward Heath. The President explicitly directed that a copy of the correspondence be delivered to Ambassador Walter Annenberg for his personal files, while strictly prohibiting its distribution to the State Department.
President Nixon and Peter G. Peterson discussed the communication strategy for the administration's ongoing diplomatic initiative with the People's Republic of China. Nixon emphasized the importance of framing the outreach as a direct presidential initiative while cautioning Peterson to avoid creating the impression that the policy was designed to provoke the Soviet Union or exploit tensions. The President instructed Peterson to handle internal State Department opposition as 'deep background' information and to maintain an air of confidence when addressing critical media outlets regarding the Vietnam War.
President Nixon and Alexander Haig discussed the Israeli proposal for a Suez Canal withdrawal, a diplomatic development encouraged by Henry Kissinger to secure a temporary period of stability in the Middle East. Haig expressed concern that the State Department might react negatively to the proposal's initial toughness, potentially leading to a premature rejection by the Egyptians. They concluded that the administration should allow the diplomatic process to play out for now, with the President reserving potential intervention with Israeli leadership for a later stage.
On April 19, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 6:32 pm and 6:50 pm. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 002-003 of the White House Tapes.
President Nixon, Henry Kissinger, and H. R. Haldeman met to strategize the opening of diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC), focusing on the logistics of a secret emissary mission to arrange a potential presidential summit. They debated the merits of using public versus private envoys, ultimately favoring a clandestine approach to maintain leverage and control over sensitive issues like Taiwan and the Vietnam War. The President emphasized his desire to manage these negotiations personally through Kissinger to ensure the initiative remained under strict White House control rather than through the State Department.
On May 4, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 1:11 pm and 1:12 pm. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 042-084 of the White House Tapes.
On May 12, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 10:12 am and 10:25 am. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 003-008 of the White House Tapes.
On May 18, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 9:33 am and 9:34 am. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 003-058 of the White House Tapes.
On May 19, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 1:14 pm and 1:18 pm. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 003-066 of the White House Tapes.
President Nixon calls George W. Ball to express appreciation for Ball's instrumental role in lobbying Democrats to defeat the Mathias Resolution. Ball highlights a growing sense of isolation and suspicion among senators regarding foreign policy, recommending that the administration improve congressional relations through small-group briefings on sensitive topics like Soviet negotiations. Nixon acknowledges the need for better communication and suggests coordinating these sessions through Secretary of State William P. Rogers to mitigate institutional friction between the State Department and the White House.
President Nixon and Henry Kissinger met to refine the public announcement of a breakthrough in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), focusing on the precise wording to characterize the agreement and its potential to improve U.S.-Soviet relations. Beyond the announcement, they reviewed recent legislative successes, including the defeat of the Mathias amendment, and discussed strategies for improving communication with the State Department and key congressional allies like Senator John C. Stennis. The President emphasized the need for strict secrecy regarding the negotiations until the simultaneous release in Washington and Moscow to prevent leaks and maximize the political impact.
On May 28, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 8:47 am and 9:08 am. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 003-165 of the White House Tapes.
On May 28, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 12:21 pm and 2:39 pm. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 003-176 of the White House Tapes.
President Nixon met with H. R. Haldeman and Henry Kissinger to discuss the administration's political strategy regarding the Vietnam War, press relations, and international economic policy. The group addressed criticism from figures like Clark Clifford and Senator Edward Kennedy, while emphasizing the importance of projecting positive movement in peace negotiations and foreign initiatives. Additionally, Nixon directed his staff to adopt a tougher stance on international loan policies and foreign leaders, specifically targeting Salvador Allende in Chile and bureaucratic resistance within the State Department.
President Nixon met with H. R. Haldeman and Henry Kissinger to discuss personnel changes within the State Department and strategic shifts in U.S. foreign policy. The conversation focused on the need for more "vigorous" and loyal leadership in diplomatic postings, specifically criticizing the performance of Graham A. Martin in Italy and exploring potential roles for Peter M. Flanigan. Additionally, the group reviewed the status of U.S. relations with China, the Soviet Union's internal leadership dynamics, and plans for managing international expropriation issues.
President Nixon met with Arthur K. Watson, U.S. Ambassador to France, and Col. Richard T. Kennedy to discuss sensitive foreign policy matters, including a controversial proposed loan involving Algerian oil and the administration's firm stance against expropriation without adequate compensation. Nixon expressed strong disapproval of the State Department's handling of the deal and directed his staff to ensure that no U.S. policy encourages foreign entities to seize assets without fair payment. The participants also touched upon the negative impact of recent leaks, such as the Pentagon Papers, and addressed administrative and funding matters related to the U.S. embassy in France.
President Nixon, Peter Flanigan, and H. R. Haldeman discuss the retirement of John S.D. Eisenhower and address a misleading New York Times report regarding the appointment of his successor. The President expresses frustration over the lack of initiative from the State Department and Secretary William P. Rogers concerning diplomatic assignments. To address the leaks and administrative delays, Nixon directs Flanigan to have someone follow up with Rogers to clarify the situation regarding personnel appointments.
President Nixon met with Congressman Wilmer D. Mizell and the Arizona State University baseball team, coached by Bobby Winkles, to discuss their upcoming participation in the Pan American Games in Cali, Colombia. The group outlined plans to conduct baseball clinics for local youth in Colombia as a form of cultural diplomacy, a program the President agreed to support through coordination with the Department of State. During the visit, Nixon offered encouragement to the athletes and distributed presidential mementos, including cufflinks and golf balls.
President Nixon and Henry Kissinger met to strategize the upcoming presidential summit with the People's Republic of China (PRC), focusing on maintaining tight control over negotiations and logistics to preserve the President's diplomatic leverage. The two discussed their concerns regarding premature visits to China by other U.S. officials and politicians, agreeing that such unauthorized contact could complicate the administration's foreign policy goals and limit Nixon's freedom of action. Additionally, Nixon emphasized the importance of ensuring that the historical record correctly reflects that the PRC initiative was a product of his direct collaboration with Kissinger, rather than an achievement of the State Department.
President Nixon and Donald Rumsfeld met to discuss Rumsfeld's future career options within the administration, balancing his interest in Illinois politics with potential high-level federal appointments. They evaluated several possibilities, including a role as NATO ambassador, an Under Secretary position at the State Department, or a specialized roving envoy role focused on Latin America and other regions. The conversation also touched upon broader administration goals, the necessity of strengthening the State Department's internal administration, and political assessments of various Republican figures, including Iowa's Lieutenant Governor Roger Jepson.
President Nixon and Alexander P. Butterfield met to coordinate the logistics and scheduling for an upcoming high-level meeting at the State Department. The discussion focused on confirming the attendance of key economic advisors, including John B. Connally, Arthur F. Burns, and Paul W. McCracken, and addressing gaps in the briefing materials. Butterfield assisted the President in refining departure times and initiating a follow-up call to Alexander M. Haig, Jr. to ensure administrative preparations were finalized.
President Nixon, H. R. Haldeman, and John Connally met to discuss public relations strategy, the effectiveness of the President's recent economic speech, and the complex challenges of international trade and monetary policy. The participants expressed deep distrust of the State Department bureaucracy and foreign service establishment, agreeing on the need to bypass traditional diplomatic channels to manage international pressures and trade negotiations. Nixon and Connally decided to form a small, secure, and loyal team of experts to handle secret trade negotiations and global outreach, while maintaining a tough, cynical stance toward foreign partners to protect American interests.
On September 14, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon and Stephen B. Bull met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 5:35 pm and 5:39 pm. The Old Executive Office Building taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 278-035 of the White House Tapes.
On September 14, 1971, Henry A. Kissinger and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 6:18 pm and 6:35 pm. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 009-007 of the White House Tapes.
President Nixon directed Alexander Haig to demand an immediate report from the State Department regarding the legitimacy of current foreign leaders in countries receiving U.S. aid. Nixon expressed frustration with the State Department's interpretation of his request, clarifying that he wanted to specifically identify which leaders had participated in contested elections that met American standards. He ordered Haig to ensure the department delivered this prioritized list within 15 minutes.
President Nixon and Alexander Haig discuss the need for a briefing regarding the democratic legitimacy and election histories of various foreign nations receiving U.S. aid. Nixon expresses frustration with the pace of the administrative staff, directing Haig to ensure the State Department produces a concise fifteen-minute report. The President intends to use this data to evaluate the political background of current foreign leaders in relation to American democratic standards.
President Nixon directed Alexander M. Haig, Jr. to coordinate with the State Department to produce a report quantifying the impact of conditioning U.S. foreign aid on the requirement that recipient nations hold contested, democratic elections. Nixon requested a simplified categorical analysis showing how many countries would be disqualified from receiving various forms of assistance, including loans, grants, and PL 480 shipments, under such a policy. The President emphasized that this data should be easily obtainable and expressed frustration that the administration had not already prepared such an assessment.
On September 22, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon and Manolo Sanchez met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 7:09 pm and 7:56 pm. The Old Executive Office Building taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 279-054 of the White House Tapes.
President Nixon and H. R. Haldeman discussed the exclusion of Arthur Burns from an invitation list for a Japanese dinner event. To avoid personal friction with Burns, Nixon instructed Haldeman to shift the responsibility to the State Department, claiming the agency exclusively curated the guest list. The two agreed on this strategy to manage Burns's expectations and protect the White House from appearing at fault.
President Nixon and Henry Kissinger met to coordinate administrative strategy regarding sensitive foreign policy and domestic legislative issues. The discussion centered on silencing speculation about Kissinger's upcoming trip to the People's Republic of China, managing State Department leaks, and addressing the ongoing textile negotiations with Taiwan and Japan. Additionally, Nixon directed Kissinger to clarify the administration's stance on the Byrd Amendment regarding Rhodesian chrome and advised Senator Hugh Scott on navigating upcoming Senate votes to ensure the success of his Phase 2 economic announcement.
President Nixon and Henry Kissinger discuss the progress of preparations for Nixon's upcoming diplomatic initiatives, including a review of a briefing book regarding Japan. The two men assess the delicate geopolitical balance of informing the Japanese government about the planned U.S.-USSR summit without causing alarm, noting that the Chinese leadership has maintained silence on the matter. Additionally, Nixon criticizes the State Department's efficiency compared to Kissinger's National Security Council staff and requests that Kissinger mobilize political and economic support from figures like George Meany and corporate executives during his travels.
On October 26, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 8:35 am and 8:49 am. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 012-129 of the White House Tapes.
President Nixon directs Peter M. Flanigan to follow up on staffing changes following Vice President Spiro Agnew’s recent trip to Southeast Asia. Agnew communicated requests from foreign leaders regarding the replacement of U.S. ambassadors in Singapore and Kuwait, the latter due to concerns over the incumbent's personal issues. Secretary of State William P. Rogers has already committed to these personnel changes, and Flanigan is tasked with overseeing the execution of these appointments.
On October 26, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 11:42 am and 1:41 pm. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 013-011 of the White House Tapes.
On October 26, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 1:40 pm and 1:41 pm. The Old Executive Office Building taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 303-001 of the White House Tapes.
On October 26, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 1:47 pm and 1:50 pm. The Old Executive Office Building taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 303-004 of the White House Tapes.
On October 26, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon and William P. Rogers met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building from 1:50 pm to 1:51 pm. The Old Executive Office Building taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 303-006 of the White House Tapes.
President Nixon met with his senior advisors, including Henry Kissinger, H.R. Haldeman, and Ronald Ziegler, to discuss the political fallout of the United Nations' vote to expel Taiwan and seat the People's Republic of China. Nixon expressed frustration with the State Department and perceived efforts by Secretary of State William Rogers to undermine his China policy and independent diplomatic efforts. The group focused on controlling the narrative regarding the UN vote, specifically by emphasizing the 'shocking' and 'disrespectful' conduct of delegates who celebrated the U.S. defeat, rather than dwelling on the vote itself, to channel public and Congressional anger away from the administration. Consequently, they decided to adopt a low-key approach regarding future announcements of Nixon’s China trip and to avoid a public, high-level meeting with Ambassador George H.W. Bush to minimize media speculation.
On November 2, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 12:43 pm and 12:47 pm. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 611-017 of the White House Tapes.
On November 2, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 1:15 pm and 1:30 pm. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 013-072 of the White House Tapes.
On November 2, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 1:15 pm and 1:30 pm. The Old Executive Office Building taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 300-002 of the White House Tapes.
President Nixon and H. R. Haldeman met to review the guest list and preparations for an upcoming White House dinner for Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. Nixon expressed frustration with the inclusion of certain activist and State Department-recommended guests, ordering a more exclusive list that prioritized political allies and restricted White House staff attendance. Additionally, they discussed strategies for disseminating the President's welcoming remarks to ensure they were framed correctly in the press.
President Nixon and Henry Kissinger discussed the People's Republic of China’s inaugural speech at the United Nations and the State Department's recommendation for an immediate, aggressive rebuttal. Both men agreed that a hasty response would be counterproductive, with Nixon specifically expressing suspicion that the State Department was attempting to sabotage his upcoming trip to China. Consequently, they decided to ignore the immediate pressure to respond and instead planned to study the speech carefully before issuing a measured, dignified statement later in the week.
In this Oval Office meeting, President Nixon and Henry Kissinger coordinate U.S. foreign policy regarding the escalating military tensions between India and Pakistan. Kissinger expresses frustration with the State Department's perceived insubordination, advocating for a firmer stance against Indian military aggression while aligning more closely with Pakistani interests and Chinese diplomatic positions. The President directs Kissinger to issue sharp, clear warnings to both India and the Soviet Union regarding U.S. expectations, while strategically delaying UN Security Council involvement to better assess Chinese objectives.
In this meeting, President Nixon first met with Arthur A. Fletcher and Kenneth R. Cole, Jr. to discuss the promotion of an economic development initiative aimed at supporting schools and securing campaign funding for the 1972 election. Following a brief photo opportunity, Henry A. Kissinger joined the President to address diplomatic frustrations regarding the State Department's resistance to executive directives concerning the conflict between India and Pakistan. The two concluded that the President would reassert his authority to ensure that his administration's policy, which favored a less pro-Indian stance, was implemented without further bureaucratic obstruction.
President Nixon and Henry Kissinger discussed strategies to support West Pakistan during the Indo-Pakistani War, including authorizing a back-channel request for the Shah of Iran to provide military aid in exchange for future U.S. compensation. They finalized plans to announce an $86.8 million aid cutoff to India while ensuring humanitarian assistance to Pakistan remained unaffected. Additionally, the President reviewed scheduling logistics for an upcoming meeting with John B. Connally and addressed concerns regarding potential Soviet interference in the conflict.
On December 7, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon, White House operator, and unknown person(s) talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 8:06 am and 6:51 pm. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 016-035 of the White House Tapes.
President Nixon and H.R. Haldeman discussed the escalating tensions regarding the India-Pakistan conflict and Henry Kissinger's frustration with the State Department's perceived obstructionism. Kissinger specifically cited Secretary of State William P. Rogers's recent speech as a "disastrous" act that undermined ongoing diplomatic efforts and threatened his broader negotiation strategy regarding the Middle East and the Soviet Union. The participants evaluated the necessity of a Kissinger-led media backgrounder to clarify the administration's position, while also briefly coordinating the President's upcoming schedule with Maurice Stans.
On December 26, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 12:16 pm and 1:43 pm. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 017-103 of the White House Tapes.
On December 26, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 1:45 pm and 2:34 pm. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 017-107 of the White House Tapes.
On January 3, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at 9:19 am. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 018-001 of the White House Tapes.
On January 3, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 4:44 pm and 5:15 pm. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 018-013 of the White House Tapes.
President Nixon and H.R. Haldeman discussed strategies for managing public perception and internal administration frictions following the India-Pakistan War. The conversation covered the need to defend Henry Kissinger against criticism from the State Department, the potential value of releasing a factual administration white paper, and concerns regarding leaks by columnist Jack Anderson. Additionally, they reviewed positive press coverage of Pat Nixon’s recent travels and touched upon the character and loyalty of staffers like Charles Colson.
On January 26, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 10:12 am and 10:17 am. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 019-094 of the White House Tapes.
President Nixon met with H.R. Haldeman and Henry Kissinger to discuss environmental planning, upcoming administrative scheduling, and the strategic management of public perception regarding Vietnam peace negotiations. Kissinger updated the President on recent North Vietnamese diplomatic maneuvers and the administration's efforts to rebut critics in the press, specifically focusing on the "nine-point" peace plan. Nixon directed his staff to maintain pressure on State Department officials to produce policy papers for the upcoming China trip while opting to meet with André Malraux to gain insights into Chinese leadership.
President Nixon and Stephen B. Bull discussed the tactical handling of Secretary of State William Rogers regarding his involvement in the funeral arrangements for fallen New York City police officers Gregory P. Foster and Rocco Laurie. Nixon sought to manage Rogers’ public position to prevent negative press coverage and potential internal dissent from within the State Department. The President concluded that while Rogers' attendance would be strategically beneficial, he preferred not to force the issue if Rogers remained reluctant.
United States Secret Service agents met in the Oval Office of the White House on an unknown date, sometime between 6:59 pm on March 6, 1972 and 7:54 am on March 7, 1972. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 678-008 of the White House Tapes.
President Nixon met with H. R. Haldeman, John Ehrlichman, Henry Kissinger, and others to manage the fallout and public relations surrounding the recent trip to the People's Republic of China, specifically addressing Secretary of State William P. Rogers' perceived alienation from the process. The participants discussed strategies to neutralize negative press coverage and mitigate perceived leaks from the State Department, while also deliberating on the upcoming US-Soviet summit. Additionally, the conversation touched on various domestic political matters, including the ITT case, busing policy, 1972 campaign financing, and the political maneuvers of Democratic candidates.
President Nixon and Alexander Haig coordinate the scheduling of an upcoming meeting with Henry Kissinger at the Executive Office Building. The conversation briefly reviews Secretary of State William P. Rogers' recent, successful press conference regarding foreign policy and his role in the Peking summit. Nixon also discusses his firm rejection of State Department involvement in his meetings with heads of state, emphasizing the need to maintain presidential control over diplomatic proceedings.
President Nixon and Alexander Haig discuss the return of Henry Kissinger and coordination issues between the National Security Council and the Department of State. Nixon expresses strong resistance to the idea of allowing a State Department official to join his team, emphasizing the need to maintain control over his advisory structure. The discussion touches upon broader geopolitical strategy, noting the distinct leadership dynamics between Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev and Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai.
On March 8, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 1:58 pm and 2:39 pm. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 021-037 of the White House Tapes.
President Nixon called Deputy Secretary of State John N. Irwin, II to commend his skillful handling of a critical Washington Star article by George Sherman. Nixon characterized the journalist's report as a deliberate attempt to create discord between the White House and the State Department, a tactic he compared to past efforts against John Foster Dulles. The President praised Irwin's affirmative response to the press, reinforcing their unified stance against media efforts to stir internal departmental conflict.
On March 9, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 2:30 pm and 2:39 pm. The Old Executive Office Building taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 322-037 of the White House Tapes.
President Nixon held a brief meeting with Deputy Secretary of State John N. Irwin, II to commend his handling of a recent public statement. Nixon praised Irwin’s professional conduct and ability to manage departmental criticism and internal gossip. The conversation served primarily as a brief expression of presidential support for Irwin's performance regarding sensitive State Department communications.
President Nixon and Henry Kissinger discuss the management of sensitive diplomatic backchannels, specifically regarding the People's Republic of China and upcoming U.S.-Soviet summit negotiations. Nixon expresses deep frustration with State Department leaks and bureaucratic resistance, reaffirming his intent to centralize control over foreign policy and minimize the State Department's role in sensitive communication. They also strategize on managing Secretary of State William P. Rogers by keeping him occupied, while preparing personal outreach to international leaders to maintain foreign support for the President's diplomatic initiatives.
President Nixon and Henry Kissinger discussed the upcoming announcement of Nixon's trip to the Soviet Union, including the timing and delegation, with a particular focus on Mrs. Nixon's participation. They also debated the appointment of a new ambassador to Cambodia, considering Charles Whitehouse and Admiral Horacio Rivero, Jr., with Nixon favoring a military figure to oversee U.S. aid and military assistance.
President Nixon and John Connally discussed unauthorized public statements made by Treasury official Nathaniel Samuels, CEA Chairman Herbert Stein, and CEA official Marina Whitman regarding international monetary affairs and economic policy. Connally expressed frustration that these statements contradicted the administration's official position and could undermine his upcoming speech to the Foreign Policy Council in New York. Nixon assured Connally that he would stop these officials from making independent statements and that Connally's speech would represent the sole administration position.
President Nixon and Henry Kissinger met to finalize administrative or strategic details involving the Sixth Fleet's home port in Greece and diplomatic positioning regarding Israel. The discussion suggests a focus on maintaining geopolitical stability in the Mediterranean while managing interdepartmental relations with the State Department. The participants confirmed their course of action, signaling a decision to move forward with their established diplomatic objectives.
President Nixon consulted with Ronald Ziegler and Alexander Haig regarding the administration's public response to allegations of ITT involvement in Chilean politics. The discussion centered on a recent State Department denial concerning controversial statements attributed to Ambassador Edward M. Korry, which had been leaked by columnist Jack Anderson. Nixon and his aides agreed to deflect further inquiries by referencing the President’s previously stated policy positions on Latin America and Chile.
President Nixon and H.R. Haldeman met to discuss administration strategy regarding the Vietnam War, press relations, and upcoming domestic initiatives. Nixon expressed frustration with the State Department's perceived lack of long-term vision, contrasting their cautious, tactical approach with his own administration’s bold foreign policy maneuvers such as the opening to China. The conversation also touched upon the inefficiencies of Great Society social programs and transitioned into a wide-ranging, personal discussion regarding the political influence and historical shift of the Jewish American electorate.
On April 13, 1972, Henry A. Kissinger and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 4:38 pm and 4:46 pm. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 022-123 of the White House Tapes.
On April 17, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 2:28 pm and 2:36 pm. The Old Executive Office Building taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 331-003 of the White House Tapes.
President Nixon and Henry Kissinger met to discuss managing public and media perceptions regarding ongoing Vietnam peace negotiations and the progress of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). Nixon expressed frustration with leaks originating from the State Department, which he believed were inaccurately portraying the administration's stance on cease-fire offers. Kissinger briefed the President on the necessity of controlling the narrative surrounding SALT negotiations to avoid appearing to accept strategic inferiority, specifically regarding submarine limitations. The two agreed on a strategy to maintain a unified public position while downplaying recent press speculation about breakthrough agreements.
On May 19, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon and unknown person(s) met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 1:58 pm and 3:20 pm. The Old Executive Office Building taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 339-025 of the White House Tapes.
President Nixon initiated this brief call to reach Deputy CIA Director Vernon A. Walters after discovering that CIA Director Richard Helms was unavailable. The primary purpose was to coordinate a forthcoming meeting regarding sensitive matters involving Soviet leadership and concerns over potential information leaks from the State Department. Nixon also signaled an intent to discuss the protection of the CIA and provided specific instructions to be relayed to relevant personnel.
President Nixon and Henry Kissinger discussed a range of foreign policy and administrative issues, focusing on the U.S. approach to the recent murder of Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics and the resulting diplomatic tensions. They coordinated strategy for Kissinger’s upcoming trip to Moscow, aiming to secure agreements on trade and security issues while ensuring the President receives credit for diplomatic breakthroughs. Additionally, the pair engaged in preliminary post-election planning, emphasizing the President's desire to overhaul personnel in the State Department and other key agencies to ensure greater loyalty and alignment with his administration's goals.
President Nixon met with H.R. Haldeman, Charles Colson, and other staff members to discuss political campaign strategy, personnel changes within the State Department and the administration, and the ongoing fallout from the Watergate break-in. The group explored potential responses to Democratic criticisms and lawsuits, specifically weighing the merits of appointing an independent, bipartisan commission led by former Supreme Court Justices to review the federal investigation. This strategy was intended to neutralize charges of a 'whitewash' and demonstrate that the administration was conducting an exhaustive, unbiased inquiry into the scandal.
President Nixon and Henry Kissinger discuss concerns regarding the safety of British citizens in Uganda amid political instability and the potential for a massacre. Nixon expresses deep frustration with the State Department's perceived pro-African bias and lack of transparency, particularly regarding atrocities in Burundi and past policy failures in Nigeria. To address the crisis, they decide to coordinate a secret, low-key logistics and evacuation plan with the British via General Andrew Goodpaster and a civilian Defense Department official, while also planning to gather intelligence from the Belgian ambassador.
President Nixon and Henry Kissinger discuss strategies for addressing instability in Uganda and the humanitarian crisis in Burundi, reflecting Nixon's intense frustration with the Department of State's perceived bias and lack of communication. Nixon directs Kissinger to coordinate secret contingency planning with the British to ensure the safety of foreign nationals in Uganda and to obtain an independent, private assessment of the situation in Burundi from the Belgian ambassador. Additionally, Nixon expresses deep irritation regarding leaks from the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, promising to purge the bureaucracy following the upcoming election.
President Nixon and H.R. Haldeman discuss the pending departure of Secretary of State William P. Rogers and the subsequent reorganization of the State Department for the second administration term. Haldeman reports on concerns raised by Henry Kissinger regarding the transition and the hiring of new personnel. Nixon asserts that he will personally oversee all senior appointments to ensure staff loyalty and insists that the terms of Rogers's departure be finalized, emphasizing the critical need for confidentiality to prevent premature leaks.
President Nixon directs Rose Mary Woods to notify his associates that his upcoming Florida trip will be delayed by one week to accommodate Henry Kissinger’s return from Paris and to coordinate with his Cabinet’s return from abroad. The two also discuss the impending resignation of U.S. representative Gordon H. Scherer, which stemmed from a disagreement with State Department instructions regarding a treaty for the protection of journalists. Nixon agrees to consult with George H.W. Bush on the matter and mandates that a congratulatory telegram be sent to West German Chancellor Willy Brandt regarding his electoral victory.
President Nixon, H.R. Haldeman, and John Ehrlichman met to strategize the second-term administration reorganization, focusing on personnel changes and reining in the influence of key advisors. They discussed the forced departure of Herbert G. Klein, the management of Henry Kissinger’s growing public celebrity and professional friction with Secretary of State William Rogers, and the need to exert tighter presidential control over ambassadorship selections. The group further coordinated tactical appointments within the State Department, specifically intending to use Kenneth Rush and William J. Casey to assert greater administrative oversight.
President Nixon dictated a memorandum at Camp David to record his assessments of key personnel and organizational strategies for his second term. He evaluated potential cabinet roles, including the performance of Kenneth Rush and William J. Casey, and expressed his intent to maintain executive control over foreign policy decisions rather than delegating them to the State Department. Additionally, he reflected on recent interactions with prominent figures such as Nelson Rockefeller and James R. Schlesinger regarding administrative shifts and Republican National Committee leadership.
President Nixon met with Peter Flanigan to review ambassadorial appointments and strategy for his second-term administration. The discussion focused on replacing non-performing or aged diplomats with individuals possessing strong economic backgrounds capable of influencing European political leaders. Nixon explicitly tasked Flanigan with taking personal responsibility for vetting candidates and managing the appointment process to prevent back-channel influence from Henry Kissinger or campaign contributors like Maurice Stans. Additionally, the two discussed organizational restructuring within the State Department and proposed consolidating certain European ambassadorial posts to enhance administrative efficiency.
President Nixon met with Ronald Ziegler, H. R. Haldeman, Henry Kissinger, and Stephen Bull to coordinate the second-term reorganization of the State Department and other federal agencies. The group discussed managing press leaks, the implementation of a 'youth movement' to bring fresh talent into government, and the strategic replacement of several senior officials, including the transition of leadership at the Republican National Committee from Robert Dole to George H. W. Bush. Additionally, the President reviewed the status of Vietnam peace negotiations with Kissinger, emphasizing the need for strict confidentiality and preparing contingency plans for responding to potential North Vietnamese treaty violations.
President Nixon met with H.R. Haldeman and Gordon Strachan to discuss personnel strategies for his second term, emphasizing the need to purge disloyal bureaucrats and replace them with loyal, courageous appointees. The conversation then shifted to a meeting with Frank Shakespeare and James Keogh, where they evaluated the loyalty of State Department and USIA officials, discussed potential appointments, and lamented the perceived cultural elitism within the media and government bureaucracy. Later, Alexander Haig joined the President to review the status of Vietnam peace negotiations, with Nixon firmly insisting that options for resuming intensive bombing must remain open despite ongoing diplomatic consultations.
President Nixon and H. R. Haldeman met to coordinate extensive second-term personnel changes, including appointments within the State Department and the IRS, while managing political friction with the tax bar. They also discussed the President’s public relations strategy, his upcoming diplomatic schedule, and potential roles for Julie Nixon Eisenhower in the East Wing. The conversation concluded with a brief check-in with Julie Nixon Eisenhower regarding personnel transitions and family matters.
On December 29, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon and Camp David operator talked on the telephone at Camp David at 5:06 pm. The Camp David Study Table taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 158-020 of the White House Tapes.
President Nixon directs Stephen B. Bull to coordinate with the Kennedy family and the State Department regarding a potential reception for visiting foreign dignitaries attending the upcoming funeral/memorial services. Drawing a comparison to the protocol followed after Dwight D. Eisenhower's death, Nixon emphasizes the need for discreet inquiries to determine if such a diplomatic gesture is appropriate. He delegates the final recommendation to the State Department while expressing a personal willingness to host the event if deemed necessary.
On December 29, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon and Camp David operator talked on the telephone at Camp David at an unknown time between 6:52 pm and 7:02 pm. The Camp David Study Table taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 158-031 of the White House Tapes.
On December 29, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon and Camp David operator met in the Aspen Lodge study at Camp David at an unknown time between 6:52 pm and 7:02 pm. The Camp David Hard Wire taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 237-039 of the White House Tapes.
President Nixon consulted with Stephen B. Bull regarding the logistical planning and protocol for the upcoming memorial service for former President Harry S. Truman. The discussion centered on managing the attendance of international dignitaries and heads of state, specifically contrasting the scale of this event with the more elaborate funeral arrangements for Dwight D. Eisenhower. Nixon expressed concern over the time-consuming nature of reception lines and requested that the State Department ensure clear communication regarding the expectations for these visiting delegations.
On December 30, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon and Camp David operator talked on the telephone at Camp David at an unknown time between 12:37 pm and 12:38 pm. The Camp David Study Table taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 158-052 of the White House Tapes.
President Nixon met with Stephen B. Bull to address the lack of clear White House coordination regarding the upcoming memorial service for Harry S. Truman. Concerned by potential confusion and mishandled press inquiries, Nixon questioned why the State Department appeared to be leading arrangements rather than the White House. He directed Bull to clarify the situation and coordinate an official statement to ensure the public understands the nature of the religious service and the planned delivery of a eulogy.
President Nixon directs Press Secretary Ronald Ziegler to enforce a strict information blackout regarding a sensitive timing issue, specifically tasking Ziegler with instructing Alexander Haig to police the Pentagon's compliance. Nixon expresses frustration over perceived malicious leaks from the State Department and demands that Ziegler silence members of the Domestic Council, including staff under George Shultz. The conversation serves as a directive to centralize control over communications and neutralize internal dissent across key executive departments.
President Nixon and Stephen Bull discussed the logistics for an upcoming visit to the State Department to meet with Secretary of State William P. Rogers. They reviewed the schedule for a proposed luncheon and an event involving the unveiling of a bronze plaque, while dismissing the idea of a large address to Foreign Service officers. Nixon ultimately deferred to Rogers's preferences regarding the luncheon guest list and the format of the visit.