John W. Dean III
John W. Dean III began his service in the Nixon administration as Associate Deputy Attorney General from February 1969 to July 1970, when he transitioned to Counsel to the President after his predecessor, John Ehrlichman, became chief domestic adviser. Serving as White House Counsel throughout the majority of the taping period, Dean acted as Nixon's primary legal advisor and became deeply involved in orchestrating the Watergate cover-up. He famously warned Nixon of a "cancer on the presidency" in March 1973 and began cooperating with federal prosecutors, which led to his dismissal in April 1973.
393 conversations about John W. Dean III → (where Dean is the subject, not only a participant)
Key conversations
- Dean’s first Watergate meeting with the President 779-002 · September 15, 1972
- March 13, 1973: Dean briefs Nixon 878-014 · March 13, 1973
- “A cancer on the presidency” 886-008 · March 21, 1973
- “Stonewall it” 422-033 · March 22, 1973
When Dean is on the tapes
What Dean talks about on the tapes
Watergate 25Executive privilege 19Richard Nixon 14Watergate investigation 11Ronald L. Ziegler 9Legal strategy 8White House staff 6Public relations 5Presidential scheduling 5Grand Jury 5White House strategy 4Press strategy 4
Conversations (68)
President Nixon met with Turkish Ambassador Targut Menemencioglu, Emil Mosbacher, Christopher Van Hollen, and General Alexander Haig to discuss the volatile political situation in Pakistan, including the growing autonomy movement in East Pakistan and the role of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. They also touched upon Turkey's internal political climate, the strategic importance of CENTO, and the need for continued US support for Pakistan, particularly regarding military equipment. Later, Nixon conferred with Chief Justice Warren Burger, John Mitchell, and Edward Wright on judicial matters, including the National Courts Center proposal and the American Bar Association meeting in London.
President Nixon and H.R. Haldeman discussed the President's upcoming speech on Vietnam, the loyalty and effectiveness of White House staff and cabinet members, and potential successors for Vice President Spiro Agnew, including John Connally. They explored the constitutional process for filling a Vice Presidential vacancy and debated Agnew's political viability due to his controversial public image and potential health concerns. The conversation also touched upon the national economy and the President's schedule following his speech.
President Nixon, John Mitchell, H.R. Haldeman, and John Dean discussed the Supreme Court's recent decision on school busing. The primary focus was on the implications of the ruling, particularly its distinction between de jure and de facto segregation, and how the administration should respond publicly. They debated the strategy for a public statement, aiming to emphasize compliance with the law while distancing the White House from actively promoting busing or racial balancing, and ensuring the burden fell on local school authorities and district courts. The conversation also touched on potential Supreme Court resignations and the broader political landscape.
President Nixon met with Henry Kissinger, H.R. Haldeman, and John Dean to discuss the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) with the Soviet Union, including potential US positions and public disclosure strategies. A significant portion of the conversation focused on Vietnam, particularly the political fallout from the Laotian incursion, the sentiment for withdrawal in the Senate, and strategies for announcing troop withdrawals and ending the draft. They also touched upon domestic issues like welfare reform and the public relations challenges posed by anti-war protests and veteran demonstrations.
President Nixon instructed John Dean over the telephone to take no action regarding a group of veterans, emphasizing that law enforcement should not interfere with their activities. Nixon wanted to ensure no "word is out" that the veterans were being targeted and suggested Dean stall any inquiries by claiming the situation was too late to address or temporary. Dean confirmed he understood and would coordinate a meeting with the Attorney General to discuss the matter further, agreeing with the President's directive to "do nothing."
President Nixon and John W. Dean III discussed the anticipated anti-war demonstration on Capitol Hill. Dean inquired about the protestors' plans and the preparedness of the Capitol Police, to which Nixon confirmed the police were ready and had not requested federal assistance. They also touched upon the demonstrators' internal dissent regarding tactics, specifically mentioning Rennie Davis's proposal for a Lincoln Memorial gathering that was rejected by other groups.
President Nixon and H.R. Haldeman discussed several critical issues, including the political handling of the Texas drought and potential legislation, the upcoming "Decade of Service" dinner for John Tower, and the dedication of the Lyndon B. Johnson Library. They also addressed concerns about Democratic leadership in Congress, potential Republican-Southern Democrat coalitions, and strategies to combat rising unemployment in key states, particularly California, by leveraging defense contracts and inter-agency coordination. The conversation touched upon media coverage of demonstrations and the Kent State anniversary, with Nixon expressing frustration over perceived biased reporting.
President Nixon met with Walter E. Washington, Jerry V. Wilson, and other officials to discuss the recent Washington D.C. demonstrations. The primary focus was on the successful management of the protests, emphasizing the combination of firmness and restraint employed by law enforcement. Nixon expressed his appreciation for their efforts in maintaining order and preventing serious violence, while also acknowledging the significant costs associated with the overtime and logistical support required. The discussion also touched upon the effectiveness of the military's role and the challenges posed by media coverage and legal challenges.
President Nixon convened a meeting with Vice President Agnew and his Cabinet to discuss the upcoming joint announcement with the Soviet Union regarding strategic arms limitation talks (SALT). The core issue was breaking the deadlock, with the US seeking limitations on both offensive and defensive weapons, while the Soviets initially focused only on defensive ones. A breakthrough was achieved through a high-level communication in January, leading to an agreement to jointly announce that both sides would concentrate on limiting Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) systems this year, while also agreeing on certain measures for offensive weapon limitations. The announcement aims to create favorable conditions for further negotiations, with the understanding that the hard work of negotiation will continue in Vienna and Helsinki.
President Nixon, along with Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Dean, and Ziegler, discussed the timing and format of announcing a new economic program, including potential television speeches, wage and price freezes, and import taxes. They also reviewed Ehrlichman's recent press briefing on declassification efforts related to historical foreign policy events like the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Pentagon Papers. A key decision point was whether to prioritize domestic economic measures or focus initially on international monetary stabilization by closing the gold window, with a preference emerging for the latter to manage international speculation and allow for a more positive domestic announcement later.
President Nixon met with legal scholars Paul Freund, Julius Goebel, Jr., Charles Fairman, and L. Quincy Mumford, along with John W. Dean III, and a White House photographer. The meeting, which included a photo opportunity, focused on the presentation of books, including volumes on the Supreme Court and Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.'s bequest, and discussions about book binding, microfilm, and the President's writing and dictation methods. Nixon also presented gifts, including cufflinks and pens, and the group touched upon historical legal figures like Holmes and Frankfurter, and the use of Holmes's bequest.
President Nixon met with his attorney Frank DeMarco, Jr. and White House Counsel John W. Dean, III to finalize personal tax-related matters. The participants discussed the closure of specific financial or legal business, with DeMarco expressing relief upon the conclusion of the affair. No further substantive policy matters were recorded during this brief encounter.
President Nixon met with White House staff including Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and Dean, as well as his wife Pat and photographer Alexander Butterfield, in the Oval Office. The primary topic of discussion revolved around Ehrlichman's schedule. The meeting was brief and included personal elements, with a White House photographer present at the outset.
President Nixon met with John Dean and H.R. Haldeman on the day of the first Watergate indictments. Nixon praised Dean's handling of the situation and discussed using government power against political enemies. They also discussed the possibility of the Democratic National Committee planting a bug, the ongoing FBI investigation, and strategies to counter potential negative press and congressional hearings. Nixon expressed a strong desire to use government agencies to retaliate against political opponents after the election.
President Nixon met with newspaper magnate Samuel I. Newhouse and White House Communications Director Herbert G. Klein to discuss Newhouse's extensive newspaper holdings and potential antitrust concerns. John Dean joined later to discuss the administration's philosophy on media ownership, emphasizing support for successful businesses against public interest group challenges. Nixon expressed a strong preference for supporting established businesses, viewing antitrust actions as potentially harmful to U.S. competitiveness and an attack on the business establishment. The conversation also touched on specific Newhouse newspapers, union impacts, and a gift of presidential cufflinks and pins for Mr. and Mrs. Newhouse.
President Nixon met with H.R. Haldeman, John Dean, and other White House staff and officials to discuss the unfolding Watergate investigation, including potential Senate inquiries and the appointment of minority counsel. They also touched upon White House social events, foreign policy matters involving Kissinger and Laos, and political strategy regarding campaign funds and personnel appointments. A key development was the President's decision to meet privately with Senator Howard Baker regarding the Watergate investigation.
H. R. Haldeman and John Dean discussed strategies for encouraging the Senate Select Committee, specifically Senator Howard Baker, to broaden their inquiry to include Democratic campaign irregularities. Haldeman proposed leveraging opposition research, such as potential communist financing and the activities of Dick Tuck within the McGovern campaign, to create a more balanced investigation. They acknowledged a current lack of hard documentation but agreed to continue compiling and sharing any available materials to support this offensive approach.
President Nixon met with John Dean and Stephen Bull to discuss the upcoming Senate Watergate hearings and the administration's strategy for handling executive privilege claims. Key topics included the appointment of minority counsel, communication with Attorney General Kleindienst and Senator Baker, and the potential for leaks from the FBI. Nixon and Dean agreed to revise a statement on executive privilege to allow for informal discussions while barring formal testimony before committees, and discussed how to manage Kleindienst's testimony and potential fallout from FBI investigations.
President Nixon met with John Dean and Stephen Bull to discuss strategy for upcoming Senate hearings, particularly regarding executive privilege and the nature of testimony. They debated the merits of written interrogatories versus in-person questioning and the potential for leaks. The conversation also touched upon judicial appointments, the role of the press, and past investigations, including the FBI's actions and the Vesco affair. A significant portion focused on managing public perception and legal challenges related to the Watergate investigation.
President Nixon met with John Dean and Manolo Sanchez to discuss the implications of FBI Director Gray's statements regarding the availability of FBI records to Congress. Nixon expressed strong opposition to Gray's apparent willingness to provide raw FBI files and agents for briefings, emphasizing historical precedent where the FBI maintained strict confidentiality. They also touched upon a 1968 bugging incident, with Dean relaying Attorney General Kleindienst's assessment that Cartha D. DeLoach's statements about the incident were likely untrue and potentially perjurious. Nixon instructed Dean to warn DeLoach through Kleindienst that his statements were being investigated and he should tell the truth.
President Nixon and Henry Kissinger discussed the upcoming press conference, the release of Prisoners of War (POWs), and the international conference on Vietnam. They also reviewed past foreign policy decisions, particularly those made during the Kennedy administration concerning the Berlin Wall and the Skybolt missile, contrasting them with Nixon's own crisis management. Additionally, they touched upon National Security Council meeting structures, personnel changes within the Treasury Department, and the ongoing negotiations with Israel regarding military aid and Middle East peace.
President Nixon and John Dean discussed the Watergate investigation, specifically focusing on precedents for releasing information to Congress and the implications of a past "freeze" order that restricted FBI information sharing. They reviewed historical examples, including the Dr. Condon case and the Harry S. Truman precedent, to distinguish the White House's current posture on executive privilege from past actions. Nixon emphasized the importance of providing information through interrogatories rather than formal hearings to avoid a "circus." The conversation also touched upon Attorney General Kleindienst's loyalty and his close relationship with John Mitchell, whom Nixon identified as the most vulnerable figure in the unfolding scandal.
President Nixon and John Dean discussed the strategy for dealing with Senate investigations into the Watergate affair, particularly focusing on the confirmation hearings for L. Patrick Gray III as FBI Director. They debated the extent of cooperation with the Senate committees, the implications of releasing "raw files," and the use of executive privilege. Dean reported on conversations with Senator Eastland and concerns about Senator Baker's stance, while also outlining plans to prepare witnesses and manage potential testimony regarding former White House staff.
President Nixon met with John Dean and H.R. Haldeman to discuss the Watergate investigation and strategy for upcoming Senate committee hearings, particularly concerning L. Patrick Gray III's nomination for FBI Director. They strategized on how to question Gray about past FBI practices and potential abuses during the 1968 campaign, aiming to deflect criticism and protect the administration. The conversation also touched upon President Nixon's schedule, social events, and foreign relations, including preparations for Leonid Brezhnev's visit.
President Nixon and John Dean discussed the ongoing media coverage and investigations related to the Watergate break-in and its aftermath. Dean reported on efforts to counter "innuendo" and "character assassination" in the press, particularly concerning Dwight Chapin's hiring of individuals for opposition research. They also touched upon the lack of media attention to the FBI's investigation into bugging devices found at the Democratic National Committee, and strategies for introducing specific questions into congressional hearings to address these issues, including the role of Senators Hruska and Gurney.
President Nixon, H.R. Haldeman, and John Dean met to discuss strategies for responding to the Senate Watergate Committee and the confirmation hearings for L. Patrick Gray as FBI director. They coordinated messaging and potential defenses, including the possibility of withholding testimony. The conversation also touched upon ambassadorial appointments and the political implications of John Connally's party switch.
President Nixon and John Dean discussed preparations for a press briefing by Ronald Ziegler and Dean's potential appearance before the Senate Judiciary Committee regarding the Watergate investigation. They debated the White House strategy for responding to Senate inquiries, particularly concerning a possible subpoena for Dean and the implications for future testimony. Nixon advised Dean to consult with Ziegler and others, emphasizing the need to maintain flexibility in their response while avoiding direct involvement of Haldeman and Ehrlichman.
President Nixon instructed John Dean to hold off on releasing certain papers to the press until further review, specifically mentioning a concern about "Howard's mad" regarding the law. The conversation focused on managing the release of information and potential compromises, with Nixon advising Dean to "step off" any requests for finality and to seek the views of the "other party" before proceeding. The goal was to avoid Nixon being "pulled into her way and her way" and to find a compromise on the information to be released.
President Nixon met with John Dean, Ronald Ziegler, Richard Moore, and Stephen Bull to strategize responses to ongoing Watergate investigations and Senate inquiries. Key discussions focused on managing public statements, the administration's use of executive privilege, and the potential testimony of key figures like Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and Colson. They debated how to handle press inquiries and congressional subpoenas, aiming to control the narrative and minimize damage to the administration, particularly concerning the testimony of L. Patrick Gray.
President Nixon called John Dean to inquire about the status of Ronald Ziegler's press briefing. Nixon suggested that Dean and Richard Moore meet with him after the briefing concluded to discuss another unspecified matter. Dean confirmed he was not planning to go to lunch and would check with Moore.
President Nixon and John Dean briefly confer while awaiting the completion of a briefing by Ron. Nixon instructs Dean to wait until the briefing is finished before coming in, suggesting Dean might take more notes in the interim. Dean agrees to handle the situation.
President Nixon met with John Dean and Richard Moore to discuss strategy for responding to congressional investigations, particularly the Ervin Committee's inquiries into Watergate. They debated the extent of executive privilege, the administration's cooperation with subpoenas, and potential press strategies. Key action items included managing public statements, preparing for potential legal challenges, and considering counter-offensives regarding Democratic campaign activities.
President Nixon urgently inquired of John Dean whether the FBI had previously provided raw files to congressional committees. Nixon demanded immediate confirmation and threatened severe repercussions for the FBI if the information was not promptly supplied. Dean agreed to contact the FBI to ascertain this information.
President Nixon met with Ron Ziegler, John Dean, and Henry Kissinger to discuss the ongoing Watergate investigation and the administration's public relations strategy. Key topics included how to respond to press inquiries about executive privilege, the Segretti case, and the administration's cooperation with investigators. Nixon and Ziegler strategized on managing press conferences and limiting the disclosure of FBI raw files to avoid further complications.
President Nixon, John Dean, and Ron Ziegler discussed the administration's policy on providing FBI raw files to congressional committees. Nixon expressed frustration with agency responsiveness and emphasized the need to "shake them up." Dean clarified that while formal submissions of raw files were unprecedented, informal access had been granted in past cases, such as the Valachi and Harry Dexter White cases, without leaks. The discussion centered on whether congressional committees should be allowed to formally receive and record such sensitive information.
President Nixon, John Dean, and Ron Ziegler discussed the strategy for responding to a subpoena issued to Dean in a Common Cause civil suit. They debated the legal basis for Dean refusing to testify, particularly if the questions related to his role as President's counsel versus his personal capacity. The conversation also touched upon precedents involving congressional aides and White House staff depositions, with a focus on distinguishing between questions related to official functions and those that are not. A potential speech by Senator Ervin on executive privilege was also noted as being canceled.
President Nixon, John Dean, and Richard Moore discussed the President's recent press conference, focusing on the press's lack of interest in significant foreign policy matters and their intense focus on Watergate. They also debated the administration's strategy for handling Senate investigations, particularly regarding executive privilege and the release of FBI raw files, drawing parallels to Nixon's past role in the Alger Hiss case. The conversation highlighted concerns about potential subpoenas for White House staff and the legal and political implications of various disclosure scenarios.
President Nixon and John Dean discussed the administration's strategy for handling the Watergate investigation and the release of FBI files. They debated the extent of disclosure to the Senate Judiciary Committee, emphasizing the need to protect "innocent people" from "raw files." The conversation also touched upon managing public perception, particularly through press conferences and statements by Ronald Ziegler, and strategizing responses to Senator Ervin's committee. A key action item was for Dean and Richard Moore to develop a "master plan" at Camp David.
President Nixon and John Dean discussed the fallout from the Watergate investigation and the upcoming Senate hearings. They reviewed the agreement reached with Senators Ervin and Baker regarding FBI reports and the Justice Department's handling of information. Nixon instructed Dean to work with Richard Moore on preparing a general statement for the President, to be released after the sentencing of the Watergate burglars, which Dean confirmed would occur the following week. Dean also expressed concerns about the difficulty of preparing a comprehensive report without creating new problems and suggested focusing on Donald Segretti's activities as a potentially less problematic area for public disclosure.
President Nixon met with H.R. "Bob" Haldeman and John W. Dean III to discuss various political and public relations strategies. Key topics included managing public perception through speeches and events, the influence of media coverage, and the administration's approach to congressional relations. They also touched upon the upcoming book by Theodore White and the potential for public relations stunts to backfire, as well as the strategic handling of information for media consumption. A significant action item was the planning of a bipartisan meeting on trade with Wilbur Mills.
President Nixon met with John Dean and Richard Moore to strategize on managing the Watergate disclosures and related legal challenges. Key topics included the extent of potential disclosures, the use of executive privilege, and responses to press inquiries and the Common Cause lawsuit. A significant development was the discussion around Dean's deposition in the Common Cause case, with consideration given to asserting executive privilege versus cooperating with the legal process to avoid appearing evasive.
On March 20, 1973, President Richard M. Nixon and John W. Dean, III talked on the telephone from 10:46 am to 10:47 am. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 037-164 of the White House Tapes.
On March 20, 1973, President Richard M. Nixon and John W. Dean, III met in the Oval Office of the White House from 10:46 am to 10:47 am. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 884-006 of the White House Tapes.
President Nixon and John Dean discussed a draft letter that Dean and Richard Moore were preparing. Dean indicated the letter was nearly complete and suggested it should be released that afternoon. Nixon agreed to meet with Dean and Moore at 1:30 PM to review the draft before its release.
President Nixon and John Dean briefly conferred in the Oval Office regarding the timing of a meeting. Nixon indicated that Dean and Moore should come in to discuss matters when Dean felt ready, suggesting a 1:30 PM meeting for that afternoon. The conversation was a brief check-in to schedule a more substantive discussion.
President Nixon, H.R. Haldeman, John Dean, and Richard Moore discussed the President's schedule, including upcoming meetings with Congress and the Cabinet, and the declining quality of leadership in the US. A significant portion of the conversation focused on the Watergate investigation, with Dean providing an update on the administration's strategy for responding to Senate inquiries and potential media narratives. They debated the best approach to handling the ongoing investigations, including the possibility of a counterattack and the timing of releasing information.
President Nixon and John Dean discussed the ongoing Senate Watergate hearings, focusing on the difficulties faced by acting FBI Director Patrick Gray and the potential confirmation vote. They also reviewed new witnesses being subpoenaed, including individuals linked to the Finance Committee and Thomas Lombard, and strategized on how to respond to inquiries. Dean proposed a meeting with Nixon to present a comprehensive overview of the investigation's implications, and they discussed the possibility of a limited, general statement to reassure the public and Congress without revealing sensitive details.
President Nixon and John Dean discussed the ongoing confirmation hearing for L. Patrick Gray and the potential strategy for responding to congressional inquiries. They debated whether Gray should be made a "martyr" and considered various approaches for Nixon to provide information, including written statements or general assurances, to address concerns about executive privilege and cooperation with Congress. The conversation also touched upon the need for Nixon to have clear facts to counter allegations against individuals like Haldeman and Colson.
In this March 21, 1973, meeting, John Dean informed President Nixon and his top aides, including H.R. Haldeman and John Ehrlichman, about the escalating "cancer" of the Watergate cover-up. Dean detailed the blackmail demands from defendants and outlined the origins of the break-in, tracing it back to a directive from Haldeman for campaign intelligence. The discussion focused on the growing legal liabilities, the difficulty of raising funds for hush money, and the potential for key individuals to perjure themselves or reveal damaging information, leading to a "cancer on the presidency" that threatened to engulf Nixon.
President Nixon met with H.R. Haldeman, John Dean, and John Ehrlichman to discuss strategy and public relations concerning the Watergate scandal. They debated various approaches to managing the ongoing investigations and press inquiries, including the potential benefits of a new grand jury, releasing a presidential statement, and attacking the Senate committee. The conversation also touched upon historical precedents for handling such crises and the potential impact of different disclosure strategies on the administration's standing.
President Nixon met with John Dean, John Ehrlichman, H.R. Haldeman, and John Mitchell to discuss strategies for handling the Senate Watergate committee's investigation. The primary focus was on how to respond to subpoenas and questions, with Nixon explicitly instructing them to "stonewall it" and "plead the Fifth Amendment, cover up." Key discussions revolved around executive privilege, the potential for witnesses to testify, and managing public perception of the White House's cooperation.
On March 22, 1973, John W. Dean, III and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 2:26 pm and 3:28 pm. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 044-011 of the White House Tapes.
On March 22, 1973, John W. Dean, III and Ronald L. Ziegler talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 2:26 pm and 3:28 pm. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 044-012 of the White House Tapes.
H. R. Haldeman and John Dean discussed the White House's urgent need for intelligence regarding ongoing grand jury proceedings and the testimony of E. Howard Hunt. Due to Dean’s increased public profile, they coordinated for Richard Moore and Fred Fielding to act as intermediaries with Henry Petersen to secure updates. The conversation also addressed concerns regarding potential political sabotage, specifically noting that attorney Bernard Fensterwald had reportedly expressed interest in targeting President Nixon while representing James McCord.
President Nixon, H.R. Haldeman, John Dean, Julie Nixon Eisenhower, and Charles Colson discussed the ongoing Watergate investigation and potential strategies. Key topics included John Dean's potential grand jury testimony, the possibility of an independent commission, and how to manage public perception. A significant development was the proposal for Attorney General Kleindienst to meet with Judge Sirica to suggest options like a special prosecutor or a new grand jury, coupled with an assurance of full White House cooperation and a waiver of executive privilege.
President Nixon and H.R. Haldeman discussed the unfolding Watergate scandal, focusing on the testimony of Jeb Magruder and John Dean. They reviewed Magruder's evolving story regarding his involvement, the plan for intelligence operations, and cash disbursements to G. Gordon Liddy, as well as Dean's role in coordinating testimony and potential perjury. The conversation also touched upon Charles Colson's alleged involvement and the broader implications for White House staff facing Senate investigations and potential executive privilege claims.
President Nixon, John Ehrlichman, and H.R. Haldeman discussed the Watergate scandal, focusing on a draft statement regarding John Dean's potential grand jury testimony and the waiver of executive privilege. They debated the timing and wording of the statement, considering its release before Nixon's evening speech. The conversation also touched upon press strategy, potential testimony from other Watergate figures, and the broader implications for the White House.
John D. Ehrlichman and John W. Dean III discuss Dean’s precarious legal standing and potential grand jury testimony regarding the Watergate scandal. The conversation centers on navigating the fallout from James McCord’s recent statements and the implications of Dean’s past interactions with key figures, including John Mitchell and Jeb Stuart Magruder. They evaluate the risks of Dean providing voluntary testimony versus appearing before the Ervin Committee, while also addressing allegations surrounding Donald Segretti and the administration's overall liability.
President Nixon met with top aides John Ehrlichman, H.R. Haldeman, John Dean, and others to discuss the escalating Watergate scandal, including potential testimony from key figures like E. Howard Hunt and the legal strategies for dealing with the Senate Watergate Committee. They also touched upon foreign policy matters, specifically the situation in Vietnam and Cambodia, and debated the best approach to manage the unfolding crisis, weighing options like cooperation with investigators versus stonewalling. The conversation revealed deep concern over the potential legal and political fallout, with a focus on damage control and preserving the presidency.
John Dean contacted John Ehrlichman to report that he had arrived and was available to talk, indicating there were no significant new developments beyond their last conversation. Dean mentioned he had been "brooding" and had some thoughts he believed Ehrlichman would want to record. Ehrlichman agreed to meet with Dean later that morning. President Nixon could be heard conferring with Charles Colson in the background.
President Nixon met with John Dean and Stephen Bull to discuss the potential resignations of Dean, H.R. Haldeman, and John Ehrlichman in light of ongoing investigations. Nixon sought Dean's advice on the best way to handle these resignations, whether as a leave of absence or outright resignation, and stressed the need to have these documents in hand to manage the public relations aspect of the unfolding Watergate scandal. Dean agreed to draft resignation letters for himself and the others, and they also discussed the legal complexities and the importance of truthfulness in testimony.
On April 16, 1973, President Richard M. Nixon and John W. Dean, III talked on the telephone from 4:04 pm to 4:05 pm. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 038-069 of the White House Tapes.
President Nixon briefly spoke with John Dean, asking him to come over to the Oval Office due to a scheduling delay. The conversation was very short and appears to be a logistical arrangement for Dean to meet with Nixon shortly. Stephen Bull was also present in the office before Dean arrived.
President Nixon and John Dean met to discuss the drafting of a public statement intended to address the mounting Watergate-related legal pressures facing the White House. The conversation centered on the potential risks of appearing to prejudge staff members, the complexities of managing public perception regarding internal investigations, and the need to insulate the President from specific illicit schemes. They specifically addressed the optics of staff members testifying before the grand jury and considered various ways to present these actions to the public without creating a liability or a perception of scapegoating.
President Nixon and John Dean discussed the Watergate investigation, specifically the approach being taken by Leonard Garment and the potential impact of public statements. Nixon expressed concern about damaging the case, referencing a conversation with Henry Petersen and the reluctance to make statements that could be misconstrued. They also touched upon Jeb Stuart Magruder's upcoming statement and the judicial procedures involved, with Nixon asking Dean to research the constitutional implications of confessing in open court. Nixon encouraged Dean, acknowledging the difficult circumstances.
President Nixon and John Dean met briefly to discuss the legal strategy and potential fallout from the Watergate investigation, specifically concerning the upcoming court proceedings and statements from individuals like McCord. Nixon sought Dean's assessment of the best approach to manage the situation and its public perception, while Dean indicated that certain key developments, like McCord's statement, were still pending. They agreed to meet again later that day to further discuss the matter.
Press Secretary Ronald Ziegler and White House Counsel John Dean coordinate their messaging regarding the unfolding Watergate scandal. Ziegler informs Dean of his intent to adhere to a consistent public posture, emphasizing that the administration's goal is to uncover the truth and cooperate with the grand jury rather than seeking a scapegoat. The pair discusses the necessity of maintaining this unified narrative during upcoming press briefings.
President Nixon and Ron Ziegler discussed John Dean's recent public statement and a New York Times article suggesting Dean might implicate others in the Watergate scandal. They strategized on how Ziegler should respond to press inquiries, agreeing to emphasize the administration's commitment to finding the truth rather than scapegoats and to fully cooperate with the grand jury. Nixon authorized Ziegler to state that no one would be made a scapegoat, a message Ziegler relayed to Dean. The conversation also briefly touched on a meeting with Jewish leaders regarding Soviet emigration.